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Abstract 
 
 
The thesis aims to explore the effectiveness of international cooperation to combat transnational 
organized wildlife crime by analysing some lessons learned from two specific initiatives in Asia: the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Wildlife Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN) and the Border 
Liaison Office (BLO) Mechanism. However, both exploring and measuring effectiveness are part of a 
difficult puzzle.  
To fit all the pieces of the puzzle together, the research explores the international framework within 
which the illegal wildlife trade is combated as well as the role of the various actors involved. The 
illegal wildlife trade is then examined as a transnational organized crime. This is followed by an 
analysis of the emergence of new structures or initiatives developed to facilitate cooperation and 
coordination to combat the illegal wildlife trade in Asia, and Southeast Asia in particular. The 
research provides a process evaluation of the initiatives on the illegal wildlife trade and cross-border 
cooperation and is grounded on findings which are constructed around themes identified based on 
available literature and perceptions of participants involved in the initiatives. 
The thesis provides an in-depth analysis of two existing efforts in Asia and attempts to measure their 
effectiveness as organisations, though it is not possible to undertake an outcome evaluation. It also 
identifies ways to strengthen both the effectiveness of efforts and the way one could analyse or 
measure their effectiveness. This includes exploring the challenges of cooperation and the various 
actors involved; considerations on wildlife crime as a serious transnational crime and combating it 
through platforms for cooperation, and; exploring and measuring the effectiveness of the different 
initiatives in a process evaluation. Given the pervasive role of corruption, some reflections on this 
important matter are included. The thesis concludes with some thoughts for future research and 
engagement for the broader research community as well as practitioners or organizations involved 
in similar efforts to combat transnational organized wildlife crime.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Research 
Overview  
  
 
The thesis aims to explore the effectiveness of international cooperation to combat transnational 
organized wildlife crime by analysing some lessons learned from two specific initiatives in Asia. How 
did the idea come about? What is the focus of the investigation? How it was done? And crucially, 
why is it useful? This chapter aims to provide a broad overview to these questions and includes an 
initial exploration of the research boundaries and the focus of the research, as well as its usefulness 
today (see 1.1 to 1.5 below). The chapter also includes a brief overview of the ensuing chapters of 
the thesis (see 1.6 below).   
 
1.1 Research foundations 
The initial research concept emerged quintessentially due to the author’s personal interest in 
transnational organized crime and my exposure and involvement in a number of projects and 
initiatives on transnational organized crime while I was working for the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in their regional 
offices in Bangkok, Thailand and later at TRAFFIC Southeast Asia, from 2007 onwards.  
In particular, interest was stirred through involvement in two particularly interesting initiatives. The 
first was the Border Liaison Office (BLO) Mechanism, which is, in a nutshell, a concept to fuel 
informal law-enforcement cooperation across and along borders to combat transnational crime. The 
mechanism historically had a focus on drugs but there was an intention to expand it to other 
transnational crimes including human smuggling and trafficking as well as environmental crimes 
such as wildlife crime. This expansion started roughly around 2010 with the implementation of a 
new project to support it. The second was the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
Wildlife Enforcement Network (WEN) – or ASEAN-WEN in full. This initiative or network emerged in 
2005 as an innovative and novel approach to combat wildlife crime in the region (see chapters 4 and 
7 for details on both).   
Both initiatives were funded by different sources and supported by different organizations including 
UN specialized agencies and a number of NGOs. Both had targeted activities, end dates, detailed 
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(sometimes painfully detailed) reporting frameworks, and a number of expectations and targets to 
achieve. Neither, however, had at the time really looked at the overall picture (e.g. how effective is 
the initiative?) nor had it ever been researched in detail.  
Motivated by my supervisors at the time, I started to ask additional questions and found out that 
relatively little research with that type of focus existed on transnational organized crime and efforts 
to counter it, and in particular on the illegal wildlife trade (an area I was focusing on at the time) in 
Asia – and more concretely in Southeast Asia. Research in this field in other regions (notably Europe 
and the United States of America as well as in the Caribbean region) exists, but in Asia is limited to a 
handful of researchers (at least in the English, Spanish or French languages). Where research existed, 
the focus was mostly on specific species traded illegally rather than the overall regional picture and 
dynamics of the illegal wildlife trade and the criminal networks involved, which only some 
researchers had explored. What is more, virtually no research existed on the specific initiatives. The 
only available research - if it can be called that – was project reports (both internal and public) on 
the various initiatives written by the different implementing agencies to donors or as part of the 
reporting or evaluation process.  
A further question I had at the time was: is it business as usual without more research on the 
matter? The reality at the time was somewhat complicated. If we look at the Wildlife Enforcement 
Network concept, for example, this was a relatively new model in Asia. By all accounts, working 
together to combat transnational wildlife crime was supposed to be a good approach and was being 
welcomed by countries in the region, and provided an excellent opportunity to bring countries 
together to combat the illegal wildlife trade at the regional level. As a new initiative, research on it 
was not available. If we look at the cross-border level, the BLOs were considered a ‘flagship 
initiative’ in the region according to both UNODC and the countries involved and had been reported 
as extremely successful in combating the illegal cross-border trade in narcotics. The expansion of the 
mandate to wildlife crime (and other transnational crimes) was, theoretically, an excellent idea.  
My interest remained and I believed that further research would be needed to inform future 
decisions – and I subsequently embarked into the puzzle that is exploring the effectiveness of 
international cooperation to combat transnational organized wildlife crime.   
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1.2 Focus of the investigation  
The aim of the research is, broadly speaking, to examine efforts to counter the illegal wildlife trade 
and increase cross-border and international cooperation in Southeast Asia, and to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the two specific initiatives highlighted above. It should be noted however that, due 
to the limited availability of data, as will be elucidated in ensuing chapters, the original aim of 
evaluating the impact of the initiatives was revised into an exploration of how they could become 
more effective to contribute towards combating transnational wildlife crime.  
In order to do so, a number of questions have been developed to delimit the boundaries of the 
research, as well as its aims and objectives. The overall research question is:  
 Are border and regional law-enforcement initiatives, such as the BLO mechanism and 
ASEAN-WEN, effective in combating transnational organized crime? 
The broad nature of the research question requires that one examines its different dimensions (or 
sub questions) in order to achieve a full understanding of the specificities and issues involved. These 
include: 
 What are the patterns of the illegal wildlife trade? (and how organized is it really?) 
 Who is tasked with countering transnational wildlife crime? (and what are the roles of the 
respective actors involved?) 
 What are the policies/initiatives that have been developed as a response in Asia and how do 
they work?  
 What is the law-enforcement response? 
 Is cross-border/international cooperation effective? (and how can it be measured?)  
Chiefly, the research is about networks, international law-enforcement cooperation and combating 
transnational wildlife crime. Transnational wildlife crime is analysed by establishing how 
transnational, organized and criminal it might be, its links to other transnational crimes, and how it 
might be best to combat it. Networks are explored as multi-agency initiatives at the regional, sub-
regional or global level that have emerged to assist countries to combat transnational crime by 
encouraging them to work together at the national, international, regional and/or sub-regional 
levels. International law-enforcement cooperation includes an investigation into how different 
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enforcement agencies work together to tackle cross-border or international crimes as well as the 
various levels of cooperation that exist, from the political level where decisions are made to the field 
level where criminals are arrested. By enforcement, it refers to actions taken by law-enforcement 
officers in the field that may lead to a seizure, arrest, prosecution or conviction.   
It is also about the effectiveness of international cooperation to combat transnational organized 
wildlife crime. Defining effectiveness is however somewhat complicated and, as will be established, 
there are a multitude of interrelated issues that need to be considered when examining it. What is 
more, the thesis explores the effectiveness of initiatives in a field that is severely under-researched 
and where information is rather limited both on the initiatives themselves as well as on ways to 
measure their effectiveness. I have in fact, perhaps rather dangerously, not established one single 
definition of effectiveness and suggest that it has to be measured using a number of different and 
balanced measurements. The main reason is that, as highlighted in later chapters (see in particular 
chapters 4 and 8), there are a number of layers that should be taken into consideration, some of 
which can be very specific or sometimes difficult or impossible to measure. Different views and 
perceptions on effectiveness have therefore been explored throughout the different chapters, 
including the effectiveness of environmental regimes (see chapter 2); of international cooperation 
and law-enforcement efforts (chapter 4); some practical considerations on effectiveness (chapter 5); 
and perceptions of effectiveness and potential definitions and layers of effectiveness suggested by 
participants interviewed (chapter 7). I provide a final measurement of the effectiveness of the 
initiatives taking into account a broad number of potential indicators in the concluding chapter (see 
chapter 8).  
 
1.3 Research blueprint  
Once the overall focus of the research had been identified, a detailed and structured work plan for 
what I expected to need as well as who I should interview was prepared (see chapter 5 for details). 
One of the benefits of working for the organizations directly involved as well as in the initiatives 
themselves while I was developing the research idea was that, at the time, I could negotiate and gain 
access to materials, the initiatives and those involved from the outset. This proved to be an 
invaluable asset and allowed for excellent levels of access to the initiatives, though it was always 
important to distinguish the research from my employment.  
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Collection of data on the effectiveness of the initiatives on the illegal wildlife trade was made 
through: 
 Academic research (international law, international environmental law, transnational 
policing, transnational organized crime, international politics/policy, international 
agreements, international conventions); 
 Background research on the selected initiatives/projects; 
 Information taken from different activities and events and the implementation of the 
different activities by means of attending different workshops, meetings and training events. 
Interviews, focus groups or questionnaires were planned for the four different levels of personnel 
directly involved in the initiatives: 
 Law-enforcement officers (field level/border staff); 
 Senior law-enforcement officers (heads or provincial representatives); 
 Senior government representatives & network focal points; 
 Senior NGO, IGO, UN representatives and academics. 
The first phase of research included academic research (on international law, international 
environmental law, transnational policing, transnational organized crime, international 
politics/policy, international agreements, CITES, etc.) as well as background research on the selected 
initiatives and projects. This provided a sound understanding of the background problem and the 
different people, groups of people and organizations that are involved in the different initiatives. The 
second phase involved gathering information from a number of activities and events of the 
initiatives by means of attending different workshops, meetings and training events. This was done 
in conjunction with the third, which involved ‘elite’ interviews (see box 5.1, chapter 5), as well as 
focus groups or questionnaires for the four different levels of personnel directly involved in the 
initiatives (from field level to heads/regional representatives, in addition to representatives from 
relevant governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations and academics).  
The interviews aimed at a broad representation from the different levels to acquire a deep 
understanding of the overall state of affairs as understood by participants. It was agreed that it was 
necessary to conduct elite interviews to get a first-hand account from those directly involved in – or 
working with or for – the different initiatives. This was determined to be the most effective way to 
obtain information and perspectives from those involved.  
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The selection of participants for the interviews was done with the following criteria in mind: 
 Involvement in activity/initiative;. 
 Knowledge of activity/initiative; 
 Involvement in efforts to counter wildlife crime or transnational crime; 
 Knowledge of wildlife crime or transnational crime; 
 Position within the government/initiative/organization (seniority);  
 Access to participant and availability/interest of participants to participate in the research; 
 Availability of funds to the researcher. 
The research started in October 2010. The empirical research was conducted between March and 
October 2012 in Thailand, Viet Nam and Cambodia.  In numbers (total number of interviews 
conducted, hours, people interviewed), the research included: 
 Individual interviews: 34 people; 
 Focus groups/group interviews: 6 groups 
Hence, total interviews/focus groups: 40. 
 Total people interviewed (individual): 34 people; 
 Total people interviewed (in groups): 34 people; 
Hence grand total (participants): 68. 
 All interviews recorded: over 50h 50m.  
The research therefore provides a snapshot of how two particular initiatives operated at a specific 
time (2010-2013) and place (Southeast Asia) based chiefly on the perceptions of those involved. 
Since 2013, I have continued to follow developments in the field and in relation to the organisations 
involved and these data are included where relevant up to the timing of writing in early 2017. 
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1.4 Boundaries of the inquiry  
The research aims to explore the effectiveness of international cooperation to combat transnational 
organized wildlife crime by analysing some lessons learned from two specific initiatives in Asia. 
The limelight of the research is on combating transnational crime. The thesis however focuses 
chiefly on a specific form of transnational crime: the illegal wildlife trade. Within the illegal wildlife 
trade the focus is on certain species (as can be seen by the case studies in chapters 4 and 6). The 
species-specific nature of the case studies does not, however, limit the research to these species, 
but to all plant and animal species protected under the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) noting that the illicit trade is often different 
from species to species.  
The aforementioned emphasis denotes a further boundary of the research, which is the focus on 
international trade of protected species at the cross-border and international (or regional) level and 
more precisely between certain countries in Asia, and in particular Southeast Asia (focusing mainly 
on Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, Lao PDR and Viet Nam). Internal (e.g. national) illegal trade is 
therefore not necessarily an area of focus (see chapter 4 for additional details). 
The research explores the importance of initiatives and networks to combat illegal wildlife trade. In 
particular, the research provides an in-depth analysis of two existing efforts in Asia and, in doing so, 
attempts to measure their effectiveness and identify ways to strengthen both the effectiveness of 
efforts and the way one could analyse or measure their effectiveness. It does not however 
necessarily aim to provide the ultimate and final answer to combating transnational organized 
wildlife crime but merely further information on one of the ways to combat it through networks of 
organisations.  
 
1.5 Usefulness today  
As noted earlier and as will be highlighted in subsequent chapters, there is a relatively limited 
amount of data and research available on all transnational organized wildlife crime and in particular 
on the initiatives that are the focus of the research (see chapters 4, 6, 7 and 8). The thesis aims to 
contribute to knowledge by exploring some lessons from initiatives in Asia to combat transnational 
wildlife crime so that eventually a better understanding can be reached. 
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The research will contribute to the fields of transnational environmental crime, green criminology 
and in particular of transnational organized wildlife crime, and facilitate further research in the 
future on the illegal wildlife trade. Additional exploration of the degrees of organisation of the illegal 
wildlife trade and ways to evaluate the effectiveness of networks is something that is necessary, 
lacking and that requires significant attention (see chapters 4, 6, 7 and 8). This is not only needed in 
Asia, but across the world as a myriad of similar initiatives exist worldwide and research of this kind 
is limited or non-existent.  
There is also a limited amount of academic and independent research on networks, particularly 
those explored here. The choice of initiatives is particularly interesting to explore if they successfully 
encourage bilateral or multilateral cooperation, and if this, in turn, increases the capacity of law-
enforcement agencies to effectively counter transnational crimes. It also leads to a number of 
conclusions and recommendations that could be used to strengthen and enhance transnational 
cooperation and the initiatives themselves. Moreover, as it will be elucidated in later chapters (see 
chapters 7 and 8), each is particularly strong in certain aspects and weak in others and no attempt 
has previously been made to compare the two in order to strengthen the overall efforts to counter 
transnational crime.  
The thesis also aims to provide recommendations and advice on potential follow-up actions to 
governments and donors, as well as intergovernmental organizations and NGOs involved in the 
different efforts. It is hoped that the research could have a considerable impact and provide a solid 
basis for future initiatives in Asia or in other regions of the world. The research may also be able to 
indicate useful paths for action against other forms of transnational organized crime in Southeast 
Asia.  
It should be noted that, since the research started (2010) and even since the fieldwork was 
conducted (2012), a lot has changed. Projects that started have ended, been extended or have 
evolved. New ones have emerged. Moreover, similar cross-border efforts have been replicated and 
comparable regional initiatives have emerged in multiple corners of the world (see ICCWC 2013, 
2016). The question however remains: how effective are they? As will be noted in the conclusion, 
some steps have been suggested that could contribute to this. These have, however, not started to 
date.  
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1.6 Chapter overview 
The thesis has been divided into two parts. The first focuses on the illegal wildlife trade as a 
transnational organized crime and examines the international framework within which the illegal 
wildlife trade is combated, as well as the role of state and non-state actors in combating 
transnational organized wildlife crime. It also explores the research methodology. The second goes 
into further detail and analyses the two initiatives that are the focus of the research. It includes an 
analysis of the initiatives and of the perceptions of participants interviewed, and an exploration of 
the effectiveness of the initiatives to combat transnational organized wildlife crime. The thesis ends 
with some practical recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of regional and sub-regional 
initiatives designed to combat the illegal wildlife trade and some potential future areas of research  
or of interest1.  
Part I: Introduction, literature review and research methodology 
Chapter 2 highlights that international environmental problems such as the illegal wildlife trade have 
resulted in the emergence of tailor-made procedures in international environmental law and the 
development of dynamic and flexible regulatory regimes aimed at enhancing cooperation to deal 
with environmental problems. Regulatory regimes facilitate a speedier response to new problems 
and are essential to enable effective cooperation. Dealing with international environmental 
problems is essentially political in nature and thus heavily linked to securing international 
cooperation at a global level taking into account the different priorities of states in the international 
community. States remain the key decision makers and retain control over the commitment to non-
binding norms and rules. Nonetheless, they have responsibilities and have to cooperate with the 
international community to effectively deal with international environmental problems.  
Chapter 3 examines the role of state and non-state actors in combating transnational organized 
crime. It suggests the need to protect the environment has generated an intensified focus of 
transnational collaboration and emphasized the need for collective action. The state is no longer 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that this thesis uses and expands on parts of three separate publications by the author and 
for which permission to use the different chapters in the thesis has been granted. This is the case for the final 
section of chapter 3 on CITES, chapter 4 and some sections of the chapter 7 and 8. Van Asch (2013) is available 
in: Getting By or Getting Rich? The formal, informal and criminal economy in a globalized world (see chapter 8) 
edited by Pietro Saitta, Joanna Shapland and Antoinette Verhage published in 2013 by Eleven International 
Publishing; whilst van Asch (2015) is in Environmental Enforcement Networks: Concepts, Implementation and 
Effectiveness (see chapter 9) edited by Michael Faure, Peter De Smedt and An Stas published in 2015 by 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, and van Asch (2016) is in the Handbook of Transnational Environmental Crime 
(see chapter 25) edited by Lorraine Elliot and Bill Schaedla  published in 2016 by Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 
The original chapters cannot be used for any other purpose without further permission of the publishers. 
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able to effectively deal with global problems alone. It needs to involve additional players that are 
able to fill in the regulatory gaps that states are unable to fulfil. The participation of non-state actors 
in the process does not obscure the role of the state. Rather, it complements it, as their involvement 
is mutually beneficial. The participation of additional actors is important to assist states and to 
ensure compliance with treaties, regulatory regimes and international obligations and to shape state 
behaviour. The participation such players, albeit in different ways, is crucial if environmental 
problems are to be addressed with some measure of success.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the illegal wildlife trade as a transnational organized crime and includes work 
published by the author with a focus on the illegal wildlife trade. The chapter highlights that the 
illegal wildlife trade is best understood in categories, each with its own smuggling methods, 
trafficking routes and specific markets ranging from individual collectors and small traders to highly 
organized wildlife networks and organized crime groups with connections all over the world. It also 
underlines that, even though the illegal wildlife trade has been linked to other transnational crimes 
such as drugs, arms or people smuggling and criminal syndicates like the Mafia, most of the illegal 
wildlife trade is, however, done by competing networks dealing with particular species. Such 
networks display different levels of organization depending on the volume and value of the trade.  It 
suggest links with other commodities and criminal networks exist through similar smuggling 
techniques and transport routes or through individuals participating in the illegal wildlife trade that 
may also be linked with other sorts of crime as a complementary trade or because they have 
particular links to other criminal networks. It also highlights the emergence of new structures of 
cooperation through the development of a number of initiatives, with a focus on the BLO 
mechanism and ASEAN-WEN.   
Chapter 5 outlines the research methodology and explores the research questions, the methods 
used and the process that was followed to answer the questions. It provides an overview of how the 
methods were used in practice, the analysis and interpretation of data, and other issues of 
consideration such as ensuring the reliability, validity and credibility of the research and other 
important matters including research ethics and management of data. 
Part II: Research findings 
Chapter 6 and 7 provide an analysis of the two initiatives and collective efforts that are the focus of 
the research (the BLO Mechanism and ASEAN-WEN) and is based on an in depth analysis of the elite 
interviews conducted. It explores a number of categories or themes identified during the interviews 
and participants’ perceptions on the illegal wildlife trade and how criminal networks and organized 
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crime may be involved; and also on the need for international cooperation to counter transnational 
wildlife crime and the range of players involved. It also explores the different initiatives as a platform 
for cooperation to combat wildlife crime, how to measure effective cooperation and the initiatives’ 
perceived effectiveness. It ends with an interesting section on corruption and the illegal wildlife 
trade which highlights the devastating effect of corruption in the illegal wildlife trade.  
Chapter 8 returns to the key research question: are border and regional law-enforcement initiatives, 
such as the BLO mechanism and ASEAN-WEN, effective in combating transnational organized wildlife 
crime? In order to answer the question, the different dimensions (or sub questions) explored in 
earlier chapters will be considered. The chapter explores the challenges of cooperation and the 
various players involved in combating wildlife crime. This is followed by some reflections on wildlife 
crime as a serious transnational organized crime and combating it through platforms for 
cooperation. The chapter also explores and measures the effectiveness of the initiatives and 
concludes with an overall assessment of their effectiveness to combat transnational organized 
wildlife crime. The thesis ends with some thoughts for future research and engagement for the 
broader research community as well as for practitioners or organizations involved in similar efforts. 
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Chapter 2: International Law, 
International Environmental Law, and 
the Development of Regulatory Regimes 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As it will be further elaborated upon in Chapter 4, organized crime is transnational in nature, and 
there is a need for cross-border and international cooperation to counter transnational crime. 
Before we proceed further to discuss the research methods used and the specific initiatives that will 
be analyzed throughout the thesis in order to establish or measure the effectiveness of international 
cooperation in fighting transnational organized crime in Southeast Asia, we need to analyze the role 
of the different players involved in combating transnational organized crime. The main reason for 
this, as it will be stressed in the next chapter, is that participation of different actors in international 
environmental affairs is what ultimately makes the environmental regimes work and parties able to 
meet their treaty obligations while effective countering transnational environmental problems. 
Firstly, however, it is necessary to outline the basis of international law and of international 
environmental law, as well as the key arrangements that have developed in international 
environmental law that have contributed to ensure greater participation, and increased amounts of 
cooperation between countries to counter international environmental problems (Bernie, Boyle and 
Redgewell, 2009; Barret, 2003). 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to explore the root causes of environmental problems2, nor to 
examine the nuances of international law or of international environmental law. Rather, this chapter 
will aim to introduce the concept of the environment as an issue of common interest and concern 
(United Nations, 1945) and the need for international cooperation to counter environmental 
problems. Following a brief introduction to international environmental law, the following sections 
examine how international environmental law has emerged in response to international 
environmental problems, and how it has evolved with regards to the more ‘traditional’ international 
law. The chapter also explores the key aims and underlying principles of international environmental 
law and will serve as the basis for the following chapter that will highlight the different actors 
                                                 
2 For more information on the driving forces behind international environmental problems see Hunter, 
Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 43-122.  
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involved in international environmental law and their respective roles, with an emphasis on the 
changing role of the state and the importance of non-state actors in the development, 
implementation and enforcement of international environmental issues.  
 
2.2 The environment, an issue of common concern 
‘Protection of the global environment (…) is the most difficult problem facing the 
international community3’ (Tarlock, 1992, 61).  
The initial issue that should be discussed is why international law should be involved in protecting 
the environment.  Overall, international lawyers tend to agree on the fact that what happens to the 
environment is a common concern and that ‘[international environmental problems] threaten the 
globe. (…) Such a threat to the planet, (…) should perhaps lead us to shift our thinking, analysis and 
policy making onto a global level’ (Yearly, 2000, 374; Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009).  
Many environmental problems are international or global in nature and cross political borders. It will 
be argued throughout this chapter that countering such a diverse and growing range of challenges 
requires a coordinated effort amongst all parties – including states and non-state actors – to 
effectively deal with the problems (Victor, Raustiala and Stolnikoff, 1998; Sands, 2003; see also 
United Nations 1945, Preamble). Initially, however, the general characteristics of such problems will 
be examined, as well as how international environmental law has developed to counter 
environmental problems more effectively.  
International environmental law has developed largely in response to the growing amount of 
environmental issues4. It has been argued that environmental problems are ‘unusually’ international, 
and inherently global in character, as their effects are global5 (Yearly, 1994, 158-160).  The nature of 
                                                 
3 ‘International community’ has different connotations in international law and there are a number of 
discussions, for example on whether the term international community should be used, or whether it should 
instead be ‘international society’. I will not delve into the discussion, but use international society as it is 
believed to be more encompassing (for details on these discussions, see for example Buchan 2008; Widlak, 
2015). Bull (1977, 13) referred to international society as a ’group of states, conscious of certain common 
interests and … values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common 
set of rules … and share in the working of common institutions’.  
4 While international environmental law has developed largely in response to environmental problems, it 
development is also linked to other international threats and issues of concern such as for example 
international peace and security, human rights and poverty reduction. See United Nations, 1945, Chapters VI, 
VII. See also Elliott, 2005. 
5 Environmental issues are global for several reasons: firstly they are often transboundary in character; 
secondly they are usually related to aspects of ‘the commons’, and finally; global environmental problems tend 
to require collective action and the participation of additional actors in the process in order to counter them. 
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the problem is, in many cases, determined with the aid of science. It is necessary to highlight at this 
stage that International environmental law is scientifically driven and has strong scientific 
foundations (Tarlock, 1992). One of the key reasons for this is that scientific analysis is a crucial point 
in the diagnosis and management of environmental problems: ‘many of the objects of 
environmental concern are only knowable through science’ (Yearly, 1994, 162) and can only be 
understood with the aid of science it is only through precise and specialized scientific analysis that 
the adverse effects environmental problems can be known (see Bodansky, Brunee and Hey, 2007; 
Yearly, 1994, 2000; Sands, 2003). Science has therefore been crucial in the identification and 
measurement of global environmental problems, such as biodiversity loss and pollution. It is 
important to highlight that scientific findings are usually widely accepted by the international society 
because tend to be a ‘neutral’ player that ‘aspires to universal generalizations and universally valid 
truths, which apply to the world over’ (Yearly, 2000, 384). While there is considerable debate over 
the uncertainty of scientific information – all sides use the findings in environmental debates to back 
up their respective arguments (see generally Buck, 1998) –, as Yearly (1994, 163) states, ‘the 
supposedly universalistic characteristics of scientific argument (…) lend(s) credibility’ to the 
necessary collective action. 
Global environmental problems tend to relate to the international exploitation of ‘global commons’6 
(i.e. – resources ‘covering, influencing or relating to the whole world’ and shared by all members of 
the international society) that should be preserved in the ‘common interest’ (United Nations, 1945, 
Article 1; Vogler, 1995, 9; Buck, 1998). Environmental problems can also be transnational7 in nature 
and cross boundaries of different states (even if they are not entirely global, they are international in 
nature). It is important to highlight that, while many processes of overexploitation may be initially 
local or regional in scale, when they are also experienced in numerous areas around the world they 
are considered global (or regional) problems (Green, 2001). In some instances, their global character 
arises from ‘the nature of the problem itself’, such as the depletion of the ozone layer. In others, for 
example with habitat loss, ‘[environmental problems] are repeated the world over or because one 
region’s problems are distributed or displaced elsewhere’  (Yearly, 2000, 384). While environmental 
problems tend to be international in nature and may affect different states, regions or the whole 
world8, it is important to highlight that not necessarily all environmental problems are global9 
                                                                                                                                                        
For more information, see S. Yearly; Social movements and environmental change, in Redclift and Benton, 
1994, 158-160. 
6 See generally Buck, 1998, chapter 1;  Vogler, 1995, chapter 1.   
7 Transnational refers here to activities ‘extending or operating across national boundaries’. See Oxford 
Dictionary Online, 2017.   
8 Environmental problems can be local, international (affect a number of states), regional (affect a specific 
region) or global (affect the whole world) in nature 
22 
 
(Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009). Natural resources may lie either within or beyond the political 
and legal sovereignty of individual states. They can be local, national, international or global 
problems, and each can be tackled differently10 (Anreiter, 1997). In the case of the former, local or 
sub-national environmental problems are usually dealt with more effectively at national or sub 
national levels by individual states (Stein, 1972). The latter and more ‘global’ cases are issues of 
‘common interest’ where priority is given to concerns that are the most urgent for the globe as a 
whole (Yearly, 2000, 385) that require a ‘more coordinated and concerted effort’ (Anreiter, 1997, 9). 
As a general view, it has been argued that it is in the ‘common interest’ to work together to protect 
the world’s environment. This, however, is not without criticism (see Yearly, 2000), given that 
international environmental issues pose important challenges to the theory and practice of 
international relations and international environmental law (Green, 2001). The major discrepancies 
in international environmental law relate to the ‘global’ focus (both in terms of the ‘global’ problems, 
but in relation to potential ‘global’ solutions) on one hand and the conflict of international 
environmental law with the concept of state sovereignty (French, 2009, 263). The former difficulty 
challenges the idea that globally unified responses will flow from common goal problems, given the 
diverse perspectives of different countries. Specifically, in relation to their different geographical 
location and level of development: officials in developing and developed countries do not tend to 
agree on what the main environmental problems are, as states place a higher interest in different 
matters. In some cases, so-called ‘global’ environmental problems will be interpreted as an 
expression of special interest or as a priority of the different states (Yearly, 2000). As Middleton et al 
argue, amongst other authors, ‘in some instances ‘global policies’ have been perceived to give 
priority to an environmental agenda of developed countries interests in the name of ‘globalism’’ 
(Middleton, O’Keefe and Moyo, 1993, 5; See also Yearly, 2000, p382). A second difficulty is the 
possibility of disagreement about which issues are global environmental matters, and which are not. 
So-called ‘global’ issues might therefore not necessarily be considered as a global problem by other 
states. It is necessary to highlight that even if all environmental problems were accepted as ‘global’, 
in practice, different countries and regions would still have distinct priorities (Yearly, 2000). 
Moreover, ‘seeing a threat as a ‘global’ threat does not necessarily make it more likely that policy 
                                                                                                                                                        
9 Environmental issues should not only be described as national, or only as international or global. ‘They can be 
global, regional, transboundary, domestic or a combination of all of these’ (Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009, 
9). Some environmental problems may only local and can be tackled by individual states. Nonetheless, the 
focus throughout this thesis will remain on cross-border, international, regional and global issues given that 
the overall theme is on transnational environmental crimes (in particular the illegal wildlife trade) and the 
effectiveness of international cooperation to counter it. We will therefore ignore local issues, albeit accepting 
that there are many cases of local and national issues that can be dealt with on an individual basis.  
10 Resources can lie fully within a specific country; partially within a particular country, or; beyond national 
sovereignty. For more information, see Anreiter, 1997, 9.  
23 
 
makers will respond’ (Yearly, 2000, 383). The emphasis on the global nature of the different 
environmental problems ‘tends to imply that there is much more common interest in countering 
them than is, in fact, the case’ (Yearly, 2000, 382).   
A further problem is that international environmental problems involve significant scientific 
uncertainties. Although international environmental disputes are often attributable to differences in 
interests and values amongst states, they are complicated by uncertainties concerning actual 
scientific facts. This is because it is often unknown how serious a problem actually is, or if it is even 
possible to address, given that its effects can be widely dispersed and long term, with long latency 
periods. As scientists will not therefore always be able to provide conclusive answers, decisions are 
made in the face of uncertainty (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007). An added difficulty that cannot 
be overestimated is that all environmental measures overlap with many political and economic 
policy areas. Environmental law making is therefore essentially political and institutional in nature 
(Green, 2001). Any processes designed to combat environmental problems are thus ‘intrinsically 
linked to broader political and socioeconomic processes which in themselves are part of the global 
political economy’ and part of a ‘global system’ (Green, 2001, 388-389).  
The problems associated with international environmental issues are best understood as a reflection 
of the difficulties of securing international cooperation on global environmental management 
‘within a complex and diffuse structure of political authority’ and with the ‘deeply conflicting 
priorities’ of states (Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009, 40). States have, nonetheless, managed to 
agree upon certain areas of common interest – such as biodiversity and pollution – that have 
emerged from the shadows and have now occupy a more important place the international 
environmental agenda (Yearly, 2000).   
 
2.3 International Law & International Environmental Law 
International environmental law is still a ‘relatively new’ field. Relatively new because such issues are 
‘not entirely new, nor are the legal arrangements’ (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 2). 
International environmental law is part of, and conforms to, many of the rules and norms of 
international law, which places individuals, governments and nongovernmental organizations under 
‘new systems of legal regulation’ (Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009, 37), with recognized powers 
and duties, and rules and norms that have to be followed, even though they might not necessarily be 
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backed-up by an international institution with ‘real powers of enforcement’ (Held, 2000, 167) similar 
to those of the state within its territory11.  
International law offers many of the tools that are necessary for the development of standards and 
regulations to deal with international environmental issues (Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009). 
However, ‘environmental concerns present the international community with a unique challenge, 
which demand a legal system that is adaptable to this new state of affairs' (French, 2006, 52-8). 
Traditional international law is, thus, not adequate enough to deal with international environmental 
problems, because of the very nature of environmental problems and of international law itself. This 
is mainly because international environmental problems are very dynamic and ‘present a moving 
target’12 that traditional international law is not able to keep up with because international law 
develops slowly13 (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 7).  Moreover, ‘international law was 
conceived (…) as a law between states; states were its subjects and individuals its objects’ (Held, 
2000, 167). International law therefore primarily addresses questions of governmental conduct such 
as territorial claims, the use of force and human rights, to name a few. While some environmental 
problems may result from governmental conduct, most international environmental issues (such as 
the depletion of natural resources) result, generally, from private activities. For example, it is the 
consumers who wish to purchase ivory products – and the poachers who satisfy the demand for 
such products – that are the ones create the actual threat to African elephants, rather than activities 
of the state itself, albeit the state is also to blame for its lack of preventive action14 (Bodansky, 
Brunnee and Hey, 2007).  
The challenge for international environmental law is to reconcile the concepts of international law 
with environmental problems (Sands, 1999, 119) and to develop new and effective ways of 
regulating activities that are harmful to the environment by ‘requiring states to regulate or (…) 
influence the behavior of (…) non state actors within their borders’ or by ‘engaging the different 
                                                 
11 As Greenwood (2008) notes, there  is  no  ‘Code  of  International  Law’. There is no world Parliament or 
‘nothing  that  can  really  be  described  as  legislation’.   There  is  an  International  Court  of  Justice  and  a  
range  of  specialised  courts/ tribunals but ‘their jurisdiction  is  critically  dependent  upon  the  consent  of  
States  and  they  lack  … a compulsory jurisdiction of the kind possessed by national courts. The result is that 
international law is made largely on a decentralised basis by the actions of … [member] States’.  See also 
Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009; Held, 2000. 
12 In part, this results from changes in scientific knowledge and new data availability, as well as from the 
development of detailed understanding on the subject (Bodansky, Brunne and Hey, 2007, 7)  
13 The sources of international law (treaty, custom) are difficult to establish and are often subject to caveats 
and reservations. 
14 Of course these are both related, as one is able to poach or pollute in many cases because the state is not 
doing enough to control, regulate and counter such issues, or it may not be clearly dealing with the root cause 
of the problem. For more information on Traditional sources of international law, see Bodansky, Brunne and 
Hey, 2007, p290-360. 
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private actors directly’ (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 6-7) at the national level, and on a global 
scale, within the structure of international law. The evolution of a this new style of international law 
alongside the more ‘traditional’ international law developed and matured in many ways because of 
the rise in importance of global environmental problems.  
 
A historical perspective 
‘Natural resource management has been a subject for international lawmaking for over 200 years’ 
(Sand, 2007, 31; see also Bodansky, Brunee and Hey, 2007).  Human beings have had a major impact 
on the environment for a long time, with a tendency to exploit natural resources as if they were 
inexhaustible (Green, 2001).  Yet, it was not until the last part of the 19th century that environmental 
issues first emerged in the international agenda. It was in the late 1960s and 1970s – as a 
consequence of a growing concern about the environment and because of the increased awareness 
of the nature of many environmental issues – that environmental problems emerged as a major 
focus of international concern (Green, 2001). In the 20th century international environmental law 
efforts have been steadily increasing in order to solve global and regional environmental problems. 
During this period, ‘new principles (…) emerged concerning state responsibility for [the] protection 
of the environment, cooperation between states to deal with environmental problems and the need 
for an ‘ecosystem’ approach towards environmental protection’ (Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 
1998, 1), together with increased global consciousness about these problems15. 
In the evolution of international environmental law16, attention originally focused on clear, visible 
and immediate environmental problems such as transboundary resource use or pollution. In the 
1970s, the dominant approach was to promulgate legislation designed to prohibit or restrict 
‘environmentally harmful activities’ (Gunningham, 2009, 182). Legal responses to such problems 
were generally ad hoc and sporadic, involving the application of traditional principles of 
international law (equality of states, non-intervention, territorial integrity and state sovereignty, and 
related to state responsibility and territorial integrity (see generally Barret, 2003; Anreiter, 1997; 
Bodansky, Brunne and Hey, 2007; Kuokkanen, 2002). It is not until 1992 with the rapid development 
of international environmental soft law that, in Sand’s (2007, 33-5) words, the ‘modern era’ of 
                                                 
15 General principles include among other: sovereignty and responsibility for the environment; good 
neigbourness and international cooperation; precautionary principle; common but differentiated responsibility, 
and; sustainable development. See generally Soto, 1996; Soroos, 1999; Sands, 1999 and 2003, Den Boer, 
Romsay and Rothwell, 1998; Green 2001. For more details on the history of international environmental law 
see Brown Weiss, 1993, 675-710). 
16 For more elements on history of international environmental law, see Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007. 
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international environmental law started with the Stockholm conference. The rise in importance of 
international environmental problems highlighted the need to ‘develop a body of law more 
specifically aimed at the protection of the environment’ (Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009, 2). Since 
then, international environmental law has, to a significant degree, diverged from international 
environmental law and become a ‘distinct body of law’ (Den Boer, Romsay, Rothwell, 1998, 3) or a 
‘distinct field’ of international law: ‘distinct not simply in the sense of addressing a discrete set of 
problems through a discrete set of substantive rules, but also in the (…) sense of having its own 
distinctive characteristic structure and process, and its own set of conceptual tools and 
methodologies (…), legislative and administrative processes and concepts’ (Bodansky, Brunnee and 
Hey, 2007, 5-6). As a result, international environmental law remains rooted in international law, but 
‘has come a long way from its origins in the application of broad principles derived from state 
sovereignty to environmental issues’, especially over the past three decades (Bodansky, Brunnee 
and Hey, 2007, 4; see also French, 2009, 259). 
The 1972 UN Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment was the first in a series of 
‘landmark’ conferences (including the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development 
(referred to as UNCED, the Rio Conference [or Earth Summit] and the 2002 Johannesburg World 
Summit on Sustainable Development [known also as WSSD or the Johannesburg Summit]) to discuss 
the environment and to seek solutions to environmental problems (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 
2007, 162).  
These initiatives were historical benchmarks that significantly contributed and accelerated the 
development of international environmental law to what it is today (Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 
1998).  
At the Stockholm conference, states issued the Stockholm declaration, which included a set of 
principles aimed at guiding the future direction of environmental activities environment, including 
among other principles that recognized the right to a healthy environment and the need to 
safeguard it for future generations, and that emphasized on the need for states to tackle 
environmental problems in a more coordinated way (United Nations, 1972; See also Hunter, 
Salzman and Zaelke, 2007; Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 1998; Palmer, 1992; Soroos, 1999; Sands, 
1999). Agreement (under Principle 21 of the Declaration) was also reached on a universal notion of 
state responsibility for environmental harm to areas beyond national jurisdiction (Den Boer, Romsay 
and Rothwell, 1998). Stockholm resulted in the UN General Assembly establishing the United 
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Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) in Nairobi in the 1970s, as well as a number of principles17, 
institutions and programs which helped provide a framework to promote the development of 
international responses to tackle transnational environmental issues (Den Boer, Romsay and 
Rothwell, 1998; Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007).  Stockholm reinforced a new wave of 
consciousness that highlighted the severity and complexity of environmental issues and the need to 
collaborate to solve the problems (Anreiter, 1997). 
The Rio Declaration with the primary goal of the formation of ‘a new and equitable global 
partnership through the creation of new levels of cooperation amongst states, key sectors of society 
and people’ was endorsed two decades later (United Nations, 1993, 3). The Declaration affirmed the 
sovereign right of countries ‘to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and 
developmental policies’ (Barret, 2003, 405) and proclaimed 27 general principles to guide action on 
the environment and development, including principles relating to national responsibilities and 
cooperation on environmental protection, the need for development and eradication of poverty, 
and the roles and rights of citizens, women and indigenous people (Green, 2001). Core principles of 
the Declaration demanded states to ‘cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect 
and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem’ (Principle 7), and called for 
‘environmental measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems (…) based on 
an international consensus’ (Principle 12)18 (United Nations, 1993, 4-5).  Rio was a catalyst for the 
concept of sustainable development and the need to protect the environment and its natural 
resources for the sake of future generations19). The most widely used definition of sustainable 
development states: ‘sustainable development is the development that meets the need of the 
                                                 
17 The no harm principle, acquired special legitimacy when it was included in principle 21 of the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment. According to principle 21, ‘states have, in accordance with 
the charter of the UN and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction’ (Barret, 2003, 121). The no harm rule was developed to prohibit one state to cause 
‘significant environmental costs’ or ‘significant environmental harm’ to another. This notion represents a 
‘cornerstone of international environmental law’. Environmental law has, however, extended considerably and 
now encompasses wider concerns (see Bodansky, Brunne and Hey, 2007). It should be highlighted that in some 
cases, the no harm principle is disregarded. One of the main reasons for this because given that the causes and 
consequences of many environmental problems are uncertain, it is easy circumvented if it is not clearly known 
whether the harm is being caused by a particular activity or whether a the reduction or alteration of such 
activity would actually alleviate harm. The process of what constitutes harm is also controversial (see Barret, 
2003, 122-123). However, for the purpose of this chapter, it needs to be highlighted that agreement is usually 
reached through negotiation, and the regulatory regimes that will be discussed represent the best vehicle for 
effective negotiation. 
18 For more information see Bowman, Redgwell, 1996; Soroos, 1999, 33-35; Sands, 1999, 2003.  
19 For additional information see Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, 2010, Vig, 1999; Den Boer, Romsay and 
Rothwell, 1998; Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009;  Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007.  
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present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’20 
(Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 1987; in Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 14). As the definition 
clearly highlights, the concept involves the integration of environmental concerns at all levels of 
decision-making to promote economic and social development in ways that avoided environmental 
degradation, and the overexploitation of natural resources21 (Green, 2001). To use as simple – yet 
clear – example, when a species becomes extinct, the loss is permanent (Bodansky, Brunnee and 
Hey, 2007).  
In addition to the declaration, two binding conventions were signed (the Biodiversity Convention 
and the Climate Change Convention), and an 800 page ‘blueprint’ for sustainable development22 in 
the 21st century – called Agenda 2123 – was created, together with additional non-binding principles 
and other agreements such as the agreement to create a commission on sustainable development to 
monitor and implement the Rio agreements and Agenda 21 (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 173-
197; See also Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 1998; Sands, 2003). The Rio conference was the 
largest UN conference ever held at the time, with more than thirty thousand participants from 176 
countries, including 103 heads of state or government assembled for the concluding of the earth 
summit (United Nations, 1992; Sand, 1999). Rio has been compared, with regards to its importance 
and vast participation, to key historical multilateral peace conferences, such as the Congress of 
Vienna or the 1919 Versailles Conference (Sand, 1999).  After the Rio conference, there has been a 
remarkable growth in the amount and variety of international organizations, institutions and 
instruments seeking to address international environmental problems (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 
2007; Held, 2000).  
It was during the above mentioned period that international environmental politics and 
international environmental law developed and matured with the negotiation of multiple 
conventions to protect the marine environment, to regulate the trade in endangered species and the 
control the dumping of hazardous wastes, to name a few (see generally Bodanksy, Brunnee and Hey, 
2007). It was also during this period that ‘green movements, environmental (…) NGOs and 
international organizations established themselves as key actors in international environmental 
                                                 
20 For more information see Green, 2001, 387-414; Sands,  1999, 128-129; Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 
1998, 13. 
21 For information on the debate over the definition and principles of sustainable development, see Den Boer, 
Romsay and Rothwell, 1998. 
22 For additional information on the elements of sustainable development see Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 
2009. 
23 Agenda 21 is a comprehensive and detailed blueprint of the implementation of sustainable development 
that intended to launch a global partnership for sustainable development. For more information, see Hunter, 
Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 195; Sands, 2003, 57-59.  
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politics alongside states’ (Green, 2001, 389-393), but this latter point will be further discussed in the 
following chapter.  
The next section will highlight that treaties remain the basis of most international environmental 
regulation, and will show that they are the most frequently used instruments for creating generally 
applicable rules relating to the environment - the 1992 Conventions on Climate Change and 
Biological Diversity mentioned above are, for example, law making treaties24. Environmental treaties, 
however, have developed and evolved from the more ‘traditional’ concept of international law.  
 
2.4 The treaty-making process and the emergence of regulatory 
regimes  
Treaties and custom have historically been the main sources of binding international law25 (Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, 1945). While custom is also important in international 
environmental law, treaties are the most common form of agreements26 (Anreiter, 1997). Treaties, 
however, have adapted to the requirements that are necessary to effectively deal with 
environmental problems. 
                                                 
24 Treaties of this kind are the most important basis for international environmental law (varieties/alternatives 
include or can be called: treaty, convention, protocol and/or covenant). Others (such as Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOU) are done at the administrative level and are not necessarily binding, but may still be 
taken into account or create good faith expectations. See Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009  
25 Art. 38 identifies the main sources of international law, summarized by Geenwood as follows: (a)Treaties 
between States; (b) Customary international law derived from the practice of States; (c) General  principles  of  
law  recognized  by civilised  nations;  and as  subsidiary  means for the determination of rules of international 
law: (d) Judicial decisions and the writings of “the most highly qualified publicists”. See Article 38, Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 1945. Greenwood (2008) notes that the list is no longer believed to be 
complete but it provides a ‘useful starting point’. See also Greenwood, 2008; Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009.  
26 Treaties, as formal institutions, enter into force by means of formal procedures, the most important of 
which is ratification. Ratification, however, as we shall briefly explain, is preceded by other decisions. Treaties 
are first signed. By signing, a state signals its intent to comply with the agreement: ‘a signature only indicates a 
states’ intent to seek ratification. It does, however, not impose a legal obligation for a state to actually ratify it’ 
(Barret, 2003, 147). Nonetheless, a signature is ‘not a mere gesture’. By signing, a country is ‘obligated to 
refrain from undermining (…) [the treaty] objectives’ (Barret, 2003, 147) The signature of a treaty marks the 
day the treaty is adopted. After the time for signature has elapsed, countries that have not signed can accede 
to it (there is usually is a fixed period of time for countries to sign the treaty after the treaty has been adopted). 
Accession to a treaty carries the same weight as ratification. Treaties and agreements only become legally 
binding only after they are ratified. The process of ratification is different in each and every state, and normally 
requires the approval from the parliament (or a similar organism). Treaties come into force after they have 
been ratified by a minimum number of countries (For more information, see Barret, 2003, 147-158) The 
agreed minimum number of ratifications varies according to each treaty. Moreover, ratification does not 
necessarily come hand in hand with implementation, as there are sometimes long delays in the actual 
implementation of the treaties (For more information, see Sand, 1999, 274). 
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The dynamic character of international environmental issues has called for the development of a 
more dynamic and flexible ‘standard-setting process’ for treaties in international law (Bodansky, 
Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 21; Brown Weiss, 1993, 689). Thus, treaties no longer reflect a ‘static set of 
rules agreed to by states for an indefinite period of time’. Instead, they have a tendency to create 
regulatory regimes through which a ‘complex pattern of detailed rules and standards evolves’ 
(Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009, 17).  
In contrast with the more traditional treaties in international law, the regulatory regimes – also 
known as framework arrangements –, do not include clear, detailed or specific rules. Rather, they 
‘establish basic aims, principles, norms, institutions27 and procedures for coordinated international 
actions, including procedures for regularly reviewing commitment and for strengthening or revising 
them and developing other rules and institutions of the regime as deemed appropriate by the 
parties’ (Green, 2001, 406). The phenomenon, also referred to as ‘autonomous institutional 
arrangements’ by Chrurchill and Ulfstain (2000, 625), marks a unique and distinct approach to 
‘institutionalized collaboration between states’, being both more informal and more flexible, and 
‘often innovative in relation to norm creation and compliance’ (Chrurchil and Ulfstsein, 2000, 625).  
Before we proceed further, it has to be highlighted that International regulatory regimes provide a 
measure of international governance for addressing environmental problems. Placed between the 
traditional concept of sovereignty and a new world governance, the regimes are arrangements for 
cooperation and include all relevant actors – member states, International Governmental 
Organizations (IGOs), International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) and groups of experts – to provide ‘issue specific remedies’ to ‘specific 
transborder externalities’ (Barret, 2003, 133; Vogler, 1995, 23-5; Faure and Lefevre, 1999; Vig, 1999). 
Overall, arrangements of this kind address ‘almost every kind of transnational environmental issue’ 
(Barret, 2003, 133). It needs to be highlighted, however, that not every treaty is the same and not 
every environmental problem can be dealt with through the same mechanism. In fact, there are 
many different regimes that deal with different issues, each requiring specific arrangements (Vogler, 
2000). 
Under such framework, while states remain the ‘key decision makers’, they are also required to ‘take 
measures’ or ‘all practicable measures’ to protect the environment (French, 2009, 261; Bernie, Boyle 
                                                 
27 A key feature of the institutional development of international environmental law is the establishment of 
treaty bodies within the framework of international environmental treaties. Such institutions, however, are 
not independent from their member states (French, 2009, 260-261)  
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and Redgwell, 2009, 17). All states have common, yet differentiated responsibilities28, and have to 
‘cooperate in spirit of global partnership’ to solve environmental problems (Bernie, Boyle and 
Redgwell, 2009, 132). While the initial obligations on parties to such treaties are general very broad 
and weak, treaties of this kind establish flexible and interactive processes which allow international 
environmental law to develop promptly in response to the emergence of new problems, recent 
scientific findings, or new priorities within the specific treaty (Green, 2001; Bodansky, Brunnee and 
Hey, 2007). In Bowman’s (2010, 29) words, regulatory regimes provide a more ‘malleable and 
sophisticated mechanism’ which is particularly important when dealing with environmental 
problems that are commonly of a ‘technically complex nature’ and constantly evolving in character 
(Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, 2010). The set-up of the regime allows for potential adjustments to 
the treaty when changes in scientific understanding arise29. An example of such a regulatory regime 
– albeit it is also not a traditional regulatory regime – is the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species (CITES). CITES is different to other regulatory regimes as it establishes clear 
obligations and responsibilities on states from the outset. However, as it will be further elaborated 
in the following chapter, it allows for the fast amendment of its appendices through the regular 
meetings of the parties.  
Essentially, contemporary environmental treaties, and the institutions they create, establish 
international environmental regimes and ongoing regulatory processes where the treaty text itself 
only represents ‘the tip of the normative iceberg’ (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 21). Because 
of the above mentioned need for flexibility, ‘framework agreements establish the basic principles 
and their respective regimes, while the majority of the norms are elaborated by more precise 
regulatory protocols addressing particular activities’ (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 21; See also 
Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, 2010). Detailed measures and standards require the creation of, and 
agreement on, specific protocols or annexes to existing conventions or the adopting of non-binding 
guidelines or recommendations elaborated through decisions of treaty bodies. Such protocols are 
usually negotiated, signed and ratified through regular meetings of the parties ( Anreiter, 1997, 18). 
Technical details can therefore be added through a more flexible and dynamic process. This allows 
the parts of the treaty that need to be acted upon to be amended more easily by the decisions of the 
parties by means of ‘formally non-legally binding decisions’, provided parties agree (Bodansky, 
Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 21). Such informal methods to set environmental standards(commonly 
                                                 
28 Common suggests that certain risks affect all nations on earth (e.g. climate change or peace and security to 
name a few) and that nations should cooperate to tackle them. Differentiated suggests all countries should not 
contribute equally to tackle them as the burden should be placed more prominently on more affluent 
economies and developed countries. See generally Stone, 2004, 276-301.  
29 For more information, see Brown Weiss, 1993, 8. 
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referred to as soft laws30), adopted in the context of a binding agreement, allow for the speedier 
development and adjustment of the different environmental regimes and for the flexibility that is 
necessary when dealing with global environmental problems. Treaties have therefore become 
regulatory regimes with their own machinery for ensuring compliance and implementation (Bernie, 
Boyle and Redgwell, 2009; Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007).  
The main objectives of the different regulatory regimes are to encourage cooperation to counter 
environmental problems, to effectively alter state behavior, and to improve the response to global 
environmental problems. The different regimes can also act as ‘learning facilitators’ by sharing or 
encouraging states to inform and share experiences that may benefit from others (Young and Levy, 
1999).  
Generally, such treaties impose basic obligations that are intended to correct, through collective 
action, ‘the problem that brought countries to the negotiation table in the first place’ (Barret, 2003, 
161). It is important to highlight that by imposing equal restriction and duties on all parties, treaties 
manage to overcome a potential ‘political dreadlock’ and encourage further cooperation, as it is in 
the communal benefit of all parties to cooperate (Anreiter, 1997, 14). Most agreements, for example, 
tend to incorporate trade restrictions as a means of achieving their objectives31: the CITES 
convention prohibits trade wild animal and plant species – and their related products and derivatives 
– that are listed in its appendices, by restricting imports and exports (Barret, 2003). Most 
environmental treaties aimed at the protection of the environment and preserving global commons 
employ measures to control the movement resources in selected countries or areas (Isozaki, 2003). 
It is important to highlight that, ultimately, regimes are developed to alleviate problems that require 
international cooperation and collective action: ‘a regime that channels behaviors in such a way as 
to eliminate or substantially ameliorate the problem that leads to its creation is an effective regime’ 
(Young and Levy, 1999, 1).  
As Barret states, however, ‘successful international cooperation ultimately depends on more than 
just treaty design. It depends also on the support given to the treaty by state behavior’ (Barret, 2003, 
219). Thus, treaties that sustain ‘real’ cooperation must somehow enforce participation and 
compliance with its norms and rules. And yet, most environmental treaties do not actually 
                                                 
30 The term Soft Law is ‘simply a convenient description for a variety of non-binding instruments used in 
contemporary international relations’ (Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009, 35). On environmental matters, they 
usually take the form of codes of practice, codes of conduct, recommendations, guidelines, resolutions and/or 
declarations (e.g. a joint ministerial declaration) within the context of umbrella or framework treaties.  
31 Amongst other reasons, trade control measures are employed in treaties on nature protection in order to 
restrain unsustainable use of living resources (Isozaki, 2003, 45), See also Barret, 2003.  
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incorporate enforcement mechanisms. Rather, they aim to ‘coordinate state behavior’ and to induce 
compliance by encouraging states to alter their behavior (Mitchel, 1996; see also Barret, 2003, 254). 
A crucial factor in encouraging such alteration of their behavior is, as we will further elaborate upon 
in the following chapter, the participation of additional actors in the different efforts to counter 
environmental crimes: non state actors may transform state identities and their interests ‘and 
through doing so change (…) [state] behavior’ (Mitchel, 1996, 23).  
A particular characteristic of many of such arrangements is that they establish an institutional 
framework with a defined structure and roles in the form of Conference of the Parties (CoP), 
subsidiary bodies, and secretariats. In order for the regime to function effectively, arrangements are 
hierarchical, with the CoP as the visible, legislative and authoritative head and ‘supreme body’ that 
directs cooperation and triggers behavioral responses from the parties (Chrurchill and Ulfstein, 2000, 
631; Young and Levy, 1999, 24). The different bodies develop and control the environmental 
commitments of the parties with regards to the specific treaty (Chrurchill and Ulfstein, 2000).  The 
CoP is the organ on which all states parties are represented. It has a more informal function than a 
plenary organ of an intergovernmental organization. CoPs meet regularly (annually, biannually or 
every other year at different venues around the world in accordance with its decisions) to discuss, 
and monitor enforcement and implementation (Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 1998). The CoP 
usually conducts the ‘major business of monitoring, updating, revising and enforcing the conventions’ 
(Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 248). A bureau elected by the CoP may act on its behalf between 
regular meetings and serves as facilitating organ during the CoP decisions.  
Its key functions are: to deal with internal matters and to provide guidance to the subsidiary bodies; 
to contribute to the development of new substantive obligations by amending or adopting new 
protocols; to supervise the parties implementation and compliance (as well as to decide over the 
consequences of noncompliance, and; to adopt any necessary arrangements with international 
organizations and states, as necessary. The Subsidiary groups are either advisory groups (that 
provide scientific or technological advice), groups that provide financial assistance and transfer of 
technology (such as a multilateral fund), or responsible for implementation and compliance with the 
treaty provisions (subsidiary bodies may, occasionally, have additional roles). The membership of the 
bodies consists of qualified experts from all parties. The Secretariats are responsible for the ‘day-to-
day operations of the convention’ (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 250-51) They can be either on 
a permanent (such as the CITES secretariat) or on an interim basis. The secretariat is generally 
located in intergovernmental organizations such as the UN (the CITES Secretariat is hosted by UNEP) 
and its main functions are to provide services to the treaty bodies (CoP, subsidiary bodies, and state 
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parties) and to assist with the implementation and development of cooperation arrangements under 
the treaty. Its functions vary depending on different conventions, but usually involve monitoring and 
reporting on the implementation of states and gathering, analysing and distributing information. The 
secretariat usually engages in the different activities and liaises with other international 
organizations when necessary32. 
The first agreement of this kind was the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora in 1973: the ‘CITES CoP represents what one might call the full-fledged CoP 
model’ (Chrurchil and Ulfstein, 2000, 630). Since then, a considerable number of similar agreements 
have been concluded, establishing a common pattern of institutional arrangements. The purpose of 
such arrangements is to develop the normative content of the different regulatory regimes33. Such 
arrangements, because of their nature, are not intergovernmental organizations in the traditional 
sense. The regimes can be considered independent and autonomous entities with their own 
particular compliance mechanisms and law making powers (Chrurchil and Ulfstein,2000). However, 
such regimes are ‘in no sense independent from their member states’ (French, 2009, 260-61). Thus, 
they are similar to an intergovernmental organization, albeit with a less formal and more ad hoc 
nature than traditional intergovernmental organizations, and with an emphasis to ‘adjust to hard 
and soft rules alike’ (Sand, 1999, 67; Chrurchil and Ulfstein, 2000). 
It is necessary to keep in mind that any efforts to protect the environment in the ‘horizontal, 
anarchic international system’ that is international environmental law usually require a ‘strategic 
manipulation of incentives’ (Barret, 2003, 18). Treaties of this kind should therefore be seen as an 
instrument of a broader strategy where the key elements are to achieve a maximum number of 
participation and to ensure countries comply with the norms and regulations set forward for the 
greater good of the international society. This is particularly important when dealing with 
environmental problems. 
 
                                                 
32 For additional information on the structure of regulatory regimes, see Chrurchil and Ulfstein, 2000; Hunter, 
Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 148 and 626-627. ; Brown Weiss, 1993, 688-689. 
33 ‘Most of the agreements in question establish what international relations writers describe as regimes, i.e. 
to cite one widely quoted definition, ‘governing arrangements constructed by states to coordinate their 
expectations and organize aspects of international behavior in various issue areas. [Regimes] thus comprise a 
normative element, state practice, and organizational roles’ (Kratochwil and Ruggie in Chrurchil and Ulfstein, 
2000, 623)  
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Non-binding agreements in international environmental law 
A particular ‘routine practice’  of international environmental law is the growing use of non-binding 
instruments (soft laws) – such as codes of practice, recommendations, guidelines, standards, 
declarations or principles – to compliment the more general treaty obligations (Sand, 1999, 64; 
Anreiter, 1997; Brown Weiss, 1999). Since the 1970s, the use of soft laws and the ‘regulatory’ 
approach discussed above has become the ‘favorite technique of international environmental law-
making’ (Sand, 1999, 65). 
Soft laws are non-binding norms, a ‘half-way stage in the law making process’ that make a major 
contribution to the establishment of ‘a new legal order in a fast growing and unsettled field’ (Bernie, 
Boyle and Redgwell, 2009, 37).  They can be ‘real vehicles for focusing consensus on rules and 
principles and for mobilizing a consistent, general response on the part of states’ (Bernie, Boyle and 
Redgwell, 2009, 34). The reason for this is that, while soft laws also have to go through a tough 
negotiation process, the non-binding character of such arrangements has a tendency to facilitate 
agreement upon the necessary collective action (Redgwell, 2010). Soft laws are therefore real 
solutions to produce agreement and to change the political thinking on an issue. The use of soft laws 
has also facilitated the process so that issues can be countered more quickly than it would be 
otherwise possible through traditional legal instruments (Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 1998). A 
further advantage of soft law over ‘hard law’ is that ‘it can enable states to take on commitments 
that otherwise they would not, because they are binding, or to formulate them in a more restrictive 
form that could not at that point be agreed in treaty form’ (Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009, 35). 
Treaty bodies, most notably the CoP, will usually adopt non-legally binding measures ‘because states 
are unwilling to commit themselves to a hard obligation[s]’ (Chrurchil and Ulfstein, 2000,  642). In 
addition, the adoption of soft laws has a legitimizing effect on policy and practice because it 
‘contributes to the evolution of new international and national law and to the harmonization of 
environmental law and standards at the global level’ (policies adopted may later take legal form at 
the national, regional or international level) (Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009, 37). Moreover, 
regardless of the ‘soft’ and non-legally binding character of the agreements, standards or guidelines 
adopted, such agreements usually influence and shape state practice as their formally binding 
counterpart (Sand, 1999; Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, 2010, 36-38). In fact, it should be 
highlighted that that soft law arrangements developed as part of a treaty may also end up as an 
intermediary step on the road towards a binding agreement. Soft agreements can be a very 
important catalyst in securing an agreement with a harder edge later, and a useful step of a longer 
journey with the potential to develop into a more stringent law or a new treaty (Palmer, 1992; 
Anreiter, 1997). 
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It has to be noted that, while the success of soft law instruments is establishing the foundations of 
the evolution of contemporary international environmental law, it has also produced a backlash: 
‘governments have become wary of attempts at formulating reciprocal principles even when 
couched in non-mandatory terms, being aware that ‘soft’ declarations or recommendations have a 
tendency to harden over time, and return to haunt their authors’34 (Sand, 1999, 68). This is due to 
the fact that, in reality, ‘the distinction between hard and soft law is difficult to discern’, as soft laws 
can have – in practical terms – the same value as hard law, even when they are in non-binding form 
(Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, 2010, 37; Brown Weiss, 1999). It is anticipated that the formulation 
of nonbinding agreements in international environmental law is likely to increase more rapidly than 
the negotiation of formal international conventions. This is because ‘agreement is normally easier, 
(…) the costs are less, the opportunity for detailed strategies to be set forth are greater, and the 
ability to respond to rapid changes in (…) scientific understanding of environment and development 
issues are more vast’ (Brown Weiss, 1993, 708).  
 
The need for regulatory regimes  
Before we proceed to further discuss the role of states and the broader international society in 
countering international environmental problems, it is necessary to examine the need for the 
regulatory regimes. This will be done by returning to the concept of ‘global commons’ previously 
mentioned, and by examining the reaction of the different countries to environmental problems and 
to international cooperation. This will be done by briefly exploring the tragedy of the commons, the 
prisoner’s dilemma and the red/black card game of international cooperation. 
Global35 commons are areas and resources that do not fall within the sovereign jurisdiction of 
individual states (Vogler, 2000, 2005). The resources in such areas are finite (i.e. there are limited 
amounts) and subtractive (i.e. if one party consumes it, the other cannot) (Soroos, 2005).  The 
tragedy of the commons36  represents the ‘ruin is the destruction toward which all men rush, each 
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in 
a commons brings ruins to all’ (Hardin, 2005, 28). The tragedy develops as follows:  
‘Picture a pasture [that is] open to all. It is expected that all herdsmen will try to keep as 
many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably well for 
                                                 
34  For examples see Franck and Weisband, 1971. 
35 A conventional definition of the term global is: ‘covering, influencing or relating to the whole world’ (Vogler, 
2000, 9). 
36 For more information on the tragedy of the commons, see Vogler, 1995  
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centuries because of tribal war, poaching and diseases [that] keep the numbers of both man 
and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of 
reckoning, that is (…) when (…) social stability becomes a reality. At this point the inherent 
logic of the commons remorsely generates tragedy [because] every man is locked in a system 
that compels him to increase his herd without a limit – in a world that is limited’ (Hardin, 
2005, 28).  
The tragedy describes many causes of environmental degradation37 (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 
2007). With the absence of a global government it is difficult to regulate the commons and the 
outcome will be, as noted above, ‘ruin to all’, given that without any regulatory body or international 
agreement to control and preserve the commons, if one farmer has noble intent and leaves the 
common area so that the it flourishes, others (the ‘free riders’) will ‘take advantage of his generosity 
and graze even more’ (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 129). In other words, an external authority 
must intervene to enforce good behavior and the preservation of the global commons. The solution 
to the tragedy is therefore the need to create some sort of regulatory regime that adopt and enforce 
rules that impose limits on the global commons and that can regulate the commons on behalf of – 
and in the collective interest of – all parties (Soroos, 2005; Vogler, 2000). 
Above, it has been argued that it is in the ‘common interest’ to work and cooperate together, yet 
securing that cooperation on a global scale is not as easy as it might sound. This is exemplified by the 
prisoner’s dilemma, which highlights the difficulty of international cooperation. The dilemma is a 
hypothetical demonstration of why individuals fail to cooperate when it would be on their best 
interest to do so38. Specifically, it is a situation in which one prisoner has to choose whether to 
cooperate or not, when he does not know if the other prisoner will do so. In effect, it is in the best 
interest of both parties to cooperate, yet achieving such cooperation is not an easy task: ‘if this were 
an easy problem, countries wouldn’t have agonized over how to address it for the last decade’ 
(Barret, 2003, 83). 
The dilemma, explained also by Barret through a card game of red (cooperation) and back (self-
interest) cards, shows that mutual cooperation for a greater general benefit, rather than a more 
unequal distribution of benefits is the ideal target. The dilemma, however, is that when one tries it 
                                                 
37  It needs to be highlighted nonetheless, that not every environmental problem is consistent with the 
dynamics of the tragedy of the commons (see Soroos, 2005, 35).  
38 As Barret (2003, 56) note, the prisoner’s dilemma is best described by Luce and Raifa (1957): ‘Two suspects 
are taken into custody and separated. The district attorney is certain that they we guilty of a specific crime, but 
he does not have the adequate evidence to convict them at the trial. He points out to each prisoner that each 
has two alternatives: to confess to the crime (…), or not to confess. If they both do not confess, then (…) he will 
book both of them on minor charges (…) and they will both receive a minor punishment; if they both confess 
(…) he will recommend less than the severe sentence; but if one confesses, and the other does not, then the 
confessor will receive lenient treatment (…) whereas the other will get ‘the book’ slapped at him’. See Barret, 
2003, 56; See also Vogler, 1995, 10-11).  
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(especially in the case of the red and black card game), tests have shown that only a fraction of 
players of the game votes for cooperation when there is a greater general benefit. However, this is 
only a fraction of the total community of players that participate in the game. In other words, and in 
the case of international environmental problems, only a fraction of the international society will 
choose to cooperate, if the choice is up to individual states alone. Studies have shown, however, 
that if there is an organization that intervenes in the game, (such as a government or a regulatory 
body), then the players (i.e. the international society) would place a much larger proportion of votes 
towards cooperation for the general benefit of the whole community. It is necessary to highlight at 
this stage that, even though the obligation to cooperate in good faith is one of the most important 
aspects of international environmental law (together with the application and adherence to the core 
principles of international environmental law39), actual cooperation is one of the key problems in 
countering international environmental problems. Of course, if the problem deals only with 
resources that lie entirely within a nation’s territorial sovereignty, they can be managed effectively 
without international cooperation. However, as it has been explained above, shared resources are 
prone to overuse when countries pursue unilateral policies (Barret, 2003). 
The main reasons for the dilemma and behavior of the players are, as Abraham and Chayes claim, 
the lack of transparency and of discussion amongst the players: ‘conditions (…) specify that (…) 
parties cannot communicate with each other and that they have no information about each other’s 
moves (…). If only the parties could talk about their problems and observe how others have chosen, 
the dilemma could be avoided’ (Chayes and Chayes, 1995, 144, in Barret, 2003, 61). In opposition, 
Benet argues that transparency and communication would not help, as, while a larger number of 
parties would undoubtedly choose to cooperate, a fraction of them would always fend for 
themselves (Barret, 2003). It is important to remember that, above all, these processes are political 
and diplomatic processes in nature. International environmental law is closely linked with politics 
and international relations, and it is very difficult to separate these spheres from each other 
(Cameron, 1996). International environmental law is, thus, diplomatic in nature, and political in spirit: 
                                                 
39 Core principles of international environmental law include the concept of sovereignty over national 
resources (Sands, 1999, 127; see also Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, 2010, 48-52); the obligation of states not 
to cause environmental harm (for more information see (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 502-507); see also 
(Bowman, Davies and Redgweell, 2010, 52-55) the obligation of states to conserve the environment and its 
natural resources; the need for states to assess and monitor actual impact on the environment of activities, 
the concept of common but differentiated responsibility and the ‘polluter pays’ principle (Sands, 1999, 129-
130) and; the need for international cooperation to solve international environmental problems (see Den Boer, 
Romsay and Rothwell, 1998, 9-12; Sands, 1999, 127-128) In addition, the precautionary principle (see Bernie, 
Boyle and Redgwell, 2009; Sands, 1999, 129-130) envisages taking anticipatory actions in order to avoid 
environmental harm before it occurs, and in the face of uncertainty. See Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 
510 (Note only the principles that are most relevant to the thesis have been highlighted. For a general 
overview see on the principles of international environmental law, see Chapter 4 in Sands, 2003).  
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‘in the game of diplomacy, self-interest is the only sound basis on which to predict the reactions of 
the other nation’ (Barret, 2003, 49). 
However, it will be argued – somewhat in the middle of the above perspectives – that even though 
states will ultimately seek their own benefit, the regulatory approach discussed above is a key move 
toward effective – and up to date – cooperation, through the various discussions and negotiations at 
the different CoP meetings. The main reasons for this are that it encourages international, regional, 
multilateral and bilateral cooperation and, of equal importance, that it’s unique and generic 
character, coupled with the application and use of non-binding arrangements, facilitates agreement 
on key and pressing issues to be tackled. After all, as Barret (2003, 33) states ‘an effective treaty can 
improve on unilateralism and make every party better off’. Treaties of this kind represent a ‘real 
vehicle for lawmaking, with (…) wide appeal to the international community’ (Bernie, Boyle and 
Redgwell, 2009, 13; Green, 2001, 387-414), and are arguably the best way to get the prisoners to 
cooperate or to get countries to hand in their red cards to the regulating body of the treaty, which is 
actually comprised the states themselves (Barret, 2003).Through the different meetings, and with a 
certain amount of pressure applied by the different actors of the international society at different 
points along the way, common interests can be found alongside the individual self-interests. 
Negotiations should identify with a collective mission even if this sometimes this may go against the 
self-interest of certain states40. 
Ultimately, international environmental law-making is a complicated process that is heavily 
entrenched in political – it is a ‘political game’41 – and economic spheres, and there will always be a 
proportion of countries that will not wish to cooperate. The challenge of international 
environmental law is to accommodate the perspectives of the different countries (north and south), 
as well as their priorities, into a ‘global partnership’ to achieve sustainable development and to 
counter environmental problems (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 164). As noted above, this is 
not as easy as it seems. For the process to work, it is not only essential to find a formula acceptable 
                                                 
40 The best example of a well negotiated treaty is probably the Rio declaration, with a ‘delicate balance of 
policy goals’ reflected in two sets of key principles: ‘on the one hand, public participation, the ‘precautionary 
approach’ and the ‘polluter pays’ maxim (principles 10, 15 and 16) which are considered to be essential by 
developed countries. On the other hand (…) key principles include the ‘right to develop’, poverty alleviation 
and the recognition of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (principles 3, 5 and 7)’ which are essential 
to developing countries (Sand, 1999, 67). 
41 It is worth highlighting that, while most problems addressed by international law are predominantly political 
in nature, international law ultimately seeks to address failures of human behavior through the development 
of rules, institutions and other modalities of international governance. Of course this is political in scope. 
Nonetheless, there is an and additional dimension which is not traditionally shared by other international 
problems in international law: it involves impacts on extremely complicated physical processes that have an 
effect on the earth as a whole (Bodansky, Brunne and Hey, 2007).  
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to a large rough number of countries. Since treaties must be self-enforcing, they must do more than 
simply tell countries what to do: ‘treaties must make it the interest of the countries to behave as 
every country would like them to behave’ (Barret, 2003, 18). 
International environmental law is best seen as ‘effort to reconcile competing or differing concerns 
of nations. Before treaties come into force, they need to be negotiated and ratified by a minimum 
number of parties in a process that normally takes several years before states agree to the terms of 
the treaties42. Treaties of this kind, nonetheless, tend to be more rapidly agreed upon, and come 
more rapidly into force than traditional international law treaties. The challenge is to engage enough 
key states to participate and to ensure commitments are the adhered to (Bodansky, Brunnee and 
Hey, 2007, 11).  
 
2.5 Effectiveness of environmental regimes 
It needs to be stressed from the outset that determining effectiveness of an environmental regime is 
a very complicated task. As it is not the purpose of this chapter – or of the thesis – to examine the 
effectiveness of a particular environmental regime, this section will not attempt to do so. However, 
given that the thesis will focus on the effectiveness of international cooperation to counter 
transnational organized crime, it is worth briefly highlighting, for the benefit of latter discussions43, 
the multitude of interrelated issues that need to be considered when examining the effectiveness of 
a particular regime and effectiveness in a broader sense. Effectiveness (see generally Vogler, 2000, 
155-179; Young and Levy, 1999; Anreiter, 1997; McCormick, 1999, 52) can be seen as:  
 Effectiveness as international law (legal approach): the rules and regime constructed are 
consistent with the norms, principles and legal obligations of international law.  
 Effectiveness as transfer of authority (normative approach): the regimes, as a form of 
governance, encourage international cooperation, information exchange, cross-border and 
international coordination and monitoring. The regimes should also have sufficient decision 
making powers. 
                                                 
42 The ratification process involves the relevant national legislative power of each state (…) confirming that the 
state will be legally bound by the treaty’ (Green, 2001, 387-414)  
43 Chapter 4 as well as chapters 6, 7 and 8 will further expand on notions of effectiveness and ways to measure 
the effectiveness of initiatives based on available literature and perceptions from participants interviewed. 
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 Effectiveness as behavior modification (political approach or policy effectiveness): the 
regimes should be effective in changing the behavior of states towards the environmental 
problem and the rules of the treaties should be observed. Note: the change in behavior must 
be sustained.  
 Effectiveness as problem solving (implementation): efforts must be able to address the 
environmental problems effectively. 
 Economic effectiveness: activities and efforts must be cost effective and efficient.  
 Environmental effectiveness: the environmental objectives of the treaty are achieved. 
All the above dimensions of effectiveness are interrelated and there are a multitude of overlaps that 
exist between them. There are also additional dimensions that are not listed above, as this is only an 
exploratory list and does not attempt to be comprehensive. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight 
here that, ultimately, environmental effectiveness is the most important aspect that would 
determine the effectiveness of a particular regime (Anreiter,1997, 22; Young and Levy, 1999, 273). 
However, it will only be met if a combination of the other dimensions occurs. Particularly important 
is the point listed above as ‘behavior modification’.  
The development of environmental strategies and plans of action to effectively counter 
environmental issues has been continuously undermined – at both national and international levels 
– by lack of political will, continuous debates over scientific uncertainties and a general failure or 
unwillingness to conduct preventive action (McCormick, 1999). Indeed, ‘a major determinant (…) is 
the willingness and the ability of national governments to translate regime rules, procedures and (…) 
commitments into practices that succeed in directing (…) behavior (Young, 1999, 273).   
Against this backdrop, the different actors of the international society are essential to ensure that 
rules and norms are implemented and that theory is translated into action. As it will be further 
elaborated upon in the next chapter, non-state actors have thus stepped in to: generate the 
necessary political pressure; raise awareness and funds for implementation of activities; assist with 
the monitoring of the different treaties, and; promote public awareness about environmental 
problems and the need to counter them (McCormick, 1999).    
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2.6 Conclusion 
Throughout the chapter, it has been highlighted that the environment is an issue of common 
concern and that a shift in the way ‘traditional’ international law worked was necessary in order to 
effectively deal with global environmental problems (Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009). This is 
because of their ‘global’ nature and the fact that it is in the ‘common interest’ of the international 
society to protect their ‘global commons’ (Yearly, 2000). The nature and character of international 
environmental problems and the need to have the greatest possible degree of participation by the 
widest possible range of parties has thus resulted in the emergence of tailor-made procedures in 
international environmental treaty making with the development of a dynamic and flexible 
‘standard-setting process’ (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 21). Such processes have created 
complex regulatory regimes 44  aimed at enhancing cooperation amongst states to deal with 
international environmental problems in a new and innovative way. This has allowed for rules to be 
adjusted and developed more promptly in response to the emergence of new problems and new 
priorities by making use of non-binding guidelines, adopted and negotiated through the meetings of 
the parties (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 13-21; Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009). As 
stressed throughout the chapter, soft laws make a crucial contribution to the development and 
increased participation of states in international environmental law by focusing consensus, 
facilitating agreement and enabling states to commit when they would otherwise not (Bernie, Boyle 
and Redgwell, 2009).   
It has been stressed that the regulatory approach is crucial to enable effective cooperation and that 
this approach makes every party better off, has wide appeal to the international society, and is 
arguably the best way to find a way to work together for a common goal (Barret, 2003; Bernie, Boyle 
and Redgwell, 2009, 13; Green, 2001, 387-414). Against this backdrop, the legal status parts of the 
treaties ‘seems to be of secondary importance’ (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 23-24; See also 
Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009, 36). Specially as ‘it does not seem to make them any less effective 
than binding measures’ (Bodansky, Brunnnee and Hey, 2007, 23-24) and because regardless of the 
‘soft’ character of some agreements, the standards and guidelines adopted influence and shape 
state practice as effectively as their formally binding counterpart (Sand, 1999; Bernie, Boyle and 
Redgwell, 2009). 
                                                 
44 A key feature of the institutional development of international environmental law is the establishment of 
treaty bodies within the framework of international environmental treaties. Such institutions, however, are 
not independent from their member states (French, 2009, 260-261) 
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As argued throughout this chapter, environmental law making is essentially political in nature (Green, 
2001). Dealing with international environmental problems is thus heavily liked to securing 
international cooperation at a global level taking into account the different priorities of states, the 
‘key decision makers’ (French, 2009, 261) in international environmental law. Regardless of the 
binding nature of treaties, states retain control over the commitment to non binding norms and 
rules. And yet, they have responsibilities towards the international society and have to cooperate in 
a spirit of global partnership to counter international environmental problems (Bernie, Boyle and 
Redgwell, 2009). They also have, as will be discussed in the next chapter, to work closely with other 
actors of the international society – namely intergovernmental organizations, international 
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations – to effectively deal with the problems. It is 
necessary to highlight that, despite the remarkable growth of international environmental law over 
the past few decades, one of its most significant problems and weaknesses is enforcement. As a 
general proposition, it can be stated that ‘the policing of international law has proved extremely 
difficult’ (Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 1998, 17):   
‘Though nature pays no attention to lines drawn up on a map, the institutions that can be 
used to correct an externality are defined by political boundaries. Local or intranational 
externalities are the easy ones to put right; they can be corrected by the state – by a 
legislature that creates a law, a judiciary that settles disputes, and an executive that enforces 
the law. Transnational externalities can only be corrected by the intervention of two or more 
states. They are thus much harder to remedy’ (Barret, 2003, 107).  
After all, International law is not the law of a world government and the international system has 
little in common with unitary government systems. There is no world government that is authorized 
to both ‘police the streets’ to ensure compliance or to tax the world’s citizenry, and there is no world 
fund to pay for the provision of transnational public goods. In addition, there is no world legislature 
to create binding laws on global community - the UN General Assembly may be stylistically similar to 
a parliament, but its resolutions are not legally binding on member states – and parties cannot 
appeal to a world legislature. Nor can parties depend on a world court, as even though there is one, 
its primary role is dispute settlement, and it can only decide on cases that ‘all parties agree should 
be heard’ (Barret, 2003, 108).  Moreover, there is no world executive with the authority to enforce 
the decisions (Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, 2010; Barret, 2003). It is indeed a major successes that 
International environmental law-making has managed to develop a different method for keeping 
order in an ‘anarchic international system’ and it has been able to adapt to its own characteristics: 
even though ‘the international system lacks the hierarchical legal structure that characterizes (…) 
national institutions, it is nonetheless highly organized’ (Barret, 2003, 108).   
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Chapter 3:  the Role of State and Non 
State Actors in Combating Transnational 
Organized Crime 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 highlighted the emergence of new procedures in international environmental law that 
allow for a more dynamic and flexible process to safeguard the environment. This process has 
managed to achieve the greatest possible degree of participation and involvement from states and 
has created regulatory regimes that have increased cooperation and participation of countries in 
efforts to counter international environmental problems. Regulatory regimes are thus, the best way 
to get countries to cooperate and to work together for the greater good of the community (Barret, 
2003). One of the more important developments is that the regimes facilitate and promote 
cooperation between states and non-state actors and makes use, as will be further elaborated upon 
below, of the relative strengths of the different actors to effectively counter environmental 
problems. Overall the regimes are concerned with ‘regulating environmental problems, providing 
common standards and practices for prevention (…), or promoting conservation and sustainable use 
of natural resources and biodiversity’ (Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009, 9). In addition, 
environmental regimes seek to strengthen and harmonize national environmental laws and policies. 
The participation in environmental treaties and its regulatory regime does not, however, directly 
ensure the fulfillment of commitments. To achieve such results, it is important that the different 
institutions of the regulatory regimes work effectively, and that they cooperate closely with both 
state and non-state actors to ensure the implementation of commitments and the monitoring of the 
conventions. A further concept that was highlighted is the inherently political nature of international 
environmental law and that states – the ‘key decision makers’ (French, 2009, 261) – retain control 
over the degree of commitment to the different norms and rules developed (Bernie, Boyle and 
Redgwell, 2009).  
This will be further discussed throughout this chapter when a particular feature of international 
environmental law is highlighted: the increased participation of non-state actors (Redgwell, 2010). 
While throughout most of the 20th century the international system was one of ‘nation-states and 
their subunits’, today it includes both state and non-state actors as ‘essential components constantly 
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interacting’ (Brown Weiss, 1993, 709). As the chapter will demonstrate, there are increasing amount 
of responsibilities accorded to the different actors in the international society when dealing with 
environmental issues. This, it will be argued, is both necessary and essential. 
The different sections of this chapter examine the actual implementation of environmental law, and 
the different ways of ensuring compliance with the norms and regulations that the states have 
adhered to. The role of states and the various actors in the international society, with regards to the 
additional array of actors involved in international environmental problem-solving will also be 
discussed. It will be argued that that the state remains the key actor and decision-making ‘machine’ 
in international relations and in international law. However, since the last quarter of the 20th century, 
the importance of non-state actors has increased significantly to the point where non state actors 
hold unique roles and responsibilities that supplement those of the state, and that are key to 
ensuring compliance with treaty provisions, and effective enforcement. This is predominantly the 
case in relation to environmental problems, transnational environmental crime and the illegal trade 
in endangered species.  States therefore have to work closely with a different array of 
intergovernmental organizations, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to 
effectively deal with international environmental problems.  
 
3.2 The Changing Role of the State: Actors in International 
Environmental Law 
‘In a very real sense, modern international environmental law is no longer made by states 
alone’ (Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009, 9) 
As it was discussed throughout the previous chapter, the development of international 
environmental law has changed the way traditional international law works. Emphasis has been 
added on the need for collective action to protect global commons as contributions and solutions to 
transnational or global environmental concerns on the part of any state demand cross-border, 
bilateral, or multilateral cooperation. Thus, collective action that is agreed upon is required in order 
to act upon international environmental problems. In order to reach that goal, a ‘negotiated balance’ 
between the traditional rights of states (i.e. territorial integrity and territorial sovereignty) and the 
environmental needs of the international society is sought, since ‘neither can be absolute in the 
environmental context’ (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 9). Such collective action is agreed upon, 
coordinated, and achieved through the creation of environmental regulatory regimes. 
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Throughout the chapter it was stressed that that solutions to collective actions in international 
environmental law usually depend on dynamic arrangements between states and on the regulatory 
regimes, and the intergovernmental institutions that are created where a great variety of actors, in 
addition to the states themselves, have a voice. The inclination of international environmental law 
has therefore been to create global and multilateral treaty-based regimes that pursue the greater 
good in order to prevent a tragedy of the commons. The use of regulatory regimes seems, by far, the 
most flexible and beneficial way to reach agreement on – and act upon – the necessary norms, rules 
and standards that states must adhere to in order to protect the environment. As explained using 
the examples of the prisoner’s dilemma and the black and red card game, effective cooperation 
leaves every state better off. Undoubtedly, there are different debates on the how international 
regulatory regimes should be designed in order to accomplish this objective, how can states be 
motivated to join and commit to the standards that are set by the regimes, and how the burdens of 
such commitments should be shared (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007).  
As Cameron argues, effectively countering international environmental problems requires more than 
‘just intergovernmental cooperation’. It is argued in latter sections that states cannot act alone to 
effectively counter environmental problems because ‘states alone do not possess the sum of the 
real world power necessary or adequate to solve problems of such scale and complexity’ (Cameron, 
1996, 33). States, therefore, can benefit from the assistance of additional actors to counter 
environmental problems. Such actors do not generally go against the wishes of the state. Rather, 
they supplement and assist with state activities, and ensure compliance of international 
commitments. It needs to be recognized that under this so-called ‘new’ system, there is an 
increasing amount of pressure on states to conform to agreements and a growing amount of 
organizations that are vigilant on state actions. This is believed to be a very practical way to ensure 
environmental commitments are not ignored or put aside. It is important to emphasize that, while 
some of the traditional functions of the state have changed in the international environmental law-
making process, the state remains the absolute power in any decision making process. The ‘absolute’ 
power, however, has made close ‘friends’ that tend to influence the way in which it behaves. Before 
we further elaborate on any of these points, however, it is necessary to analyze the different actors 
in international environmental law and their functions and roles. 
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3.3 International Environmental Law & the Changing Role of the State 
In traditional international law, it was largely states that have rights and responsibilities (Hunter, 
Salzman and Zaelke, 2007). States are the primary and principal subject of international law: they 
negotiate, create, adopt, ratify and implement treaties and only states are responsible for 
implementing them (Sands, 1999). The ‘substance’ of international law is, ultimately, developed 
through a process of inter-state negotiation as sovereignty designates states as ‘the only players 
with unlimited rights to act in the international system’ (Barret, 2003, 54). Thus, nongovernmental 
actors are do not participate in, nor are they subjects of, international law, even if they play a 
significant role in the process (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007). With the development of 
international environmental law, states remain main actors, albeit they are not the exclusive ones: 
recent changes in international environmental law have afforded a ‘historically unparalleled 
opportunity’ for non-state actors to participate in the development, formulation, implementation, 
monitoring and enforcement of international environmental law (Redgwell, 2010, 692; Raustiala, 
1997b). As Yamin argues, non-state actors are no longer ‘mute observers’. Rather, they are ‘actors in 
their own right’; ‘reconciling this insight with state-centric accounts (…) is more of a theoretical 
challenge because, in practice, it is abundantly clear that formal legal rules assisting (…) [them with] 
a peripheral role in the international affairs represent and inaccurate and obsolete view of the 
international legal order’ (Yamin, 2001, 161). 
International environmental problems have therefore required the participation of a new set of 
actors that, in conjunction with the state, hold specialized roles and specific responsibilities in 
international environmental law. The different actors interact amongst themselves as a ‘web of 
institutions’ that is linked through a variety of arrangements with the task of providing ‘governance 
without government’ (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 11). In other words, they need to influence 
state conduct and state practice for a better collective outcome. The traditional key player in 
international law is therefore no longer the only actor in international affairs. Although states 
remain– and will probably continue to remain – the central body in international environmental law, 
the nature of the state system is in itself changing (Jordan et al., 2005; Wapner, 2005, 539). The state 
is no longer able to effectively deal with global problems alone. It needs to involve additional players 
that will assist him in resolving its problems (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007; Aas 2007, 
Michalowski and Bitten 2005; Noortmann, Reinisch and Ryngaert 2015). 
Before we proceed to further elaborate on the different types of actors, and their roles and 
functions in international environmental affairs, it is necessary to examine when – and how – this 
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process started and the key reasons why non state actors need to be involved in international 
environmental efforts.  
Until the latter part of the 20th century, non-state actors were usually denied participation in 
international affairs. A key milestone that contributed to changing this relationship was the 1992 Rio 
Earth Summit, where the principles for supporting wide participation in environmental problem-
solving and the need to involve, whenever relevant, the nongovernmental community ‘received a 
significant political boost and some legal and institutional backing’ (Cameron, 1996, 35). The Summit 
marked a watershed in the relationship between states and non state actors (Yamin, 2001). Agenda 
21 called governments to recognize that non state actors hold ‘well established and diverse 
experience, expertise and capacity in fields (…) of particular importance to the implementation and 
review of environmentally sound and socially responsible sustainable development’ and highlighted 
that their resources ‘should be tapped, enabled and strengthened’ (Yamin, 2001, 151; see United 
Nations, 1945, Ch27, Article 21). This followed earlier dialogues held with the establishment of the 
UN in 1945 when the involvement of nongovernmental organizations in intergovernmental policy 
and program discussions was formalized: Article 71 of the UN charter notes that ‘the economic and 
social council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with nongovernmental 
organizations which are conceived with matters within its competent’ (Cameron, 1996, 33; See 
United Nations, 1945, Article 71).   
Today, the development of international environmental law can no longer be understood without 
taking into account non-state actors in the process, particularly when dealing with environmental 
issues such as wildlife trade (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007). As Bisschop (2013, 169) highlights 
in the context of timber trade45 governments, civil society and international organizations ‘have the 
potential to shape the governance and regulation of the tropical timber trade’. 
Since Rio, the role of international organizations and the broader international society has become 
more important in the achievement of environmental objectives and their involvement in 
environmental policy has increased (Raustiala, 1997b). There has been a gradual recognition that 
environmental problems can only be effectively addressed if there is a system of ‘environmental 
governance’ (Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 1998, 23) to ensure cooperation between states, as 
well as between states and non state actors: environmental issues ‘need to be managed over time in 
ways that increase cooperation and coordination among a large number of stakeholders’ (Hunter, 
Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 220). This is the responsibility of the state, but also of international 
                                                 
45 This is also applicable to broader trade in fauna and other flora in general. 
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organizations such as – but not exclusively – the United Nations, as well as bodies created under the 
treaties regulatory regimes (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007).  
Global environmental issues therefore involve a complex array of players: ‘States, international 
institutions, individuals, NGOs, business, and technical experts – and these categories only begin to 
capture the rich variety of actors involved’ (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 16). It needs to be 
highlighted that such players are not a homogenous set of actors, will vary widely in membership, 
goals, approach, and resources and usually have different methods, objectives and priorities  (Yamin, 
2001; Raustiala, 1997a; McCormick, 1999; Michalowski and Bitten 2005; Duffy, 2010). It is also 
important to highlight that the effectiveness of their involvement will vary ‘according to their 
seriousness of purpose, funding, depth of research, skills in political advocacy, means of exercising 
pressure, and narrowness of focus’ (Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009, 101-102). Thus, not 
necessarily all actors will be involved in international environmental affairs. Some, however, have 
become effective at achieving a consultative status in international environmental regimes and have 
been instrumental in the development and negotiating process for a range of conventions and 
protocols. This particular group is able to perform a variety of functions that are crucial for the 
development and implementation of international environmental agreements (Sands, 2003). It is 
such actors that will be the focus of the next section.   
  
Actors in International Environmental Law:   
As noted by Raustiala (1997b, 567; see also Sands 2003): ‘[s]tates can no longer claim to be the sole 
holders of the right to participate in the international legal order and its processes, having been 
joined by a new range of actors’.  
Alongside the states there are, thus, numerous organizations charged with different roles to protect 
the environment (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke 2007). They all have different functions within the 
system, and perform different tasks. Overall, there are five basic types of global and regional 
organizations: there are global intergovernmental organizations (such as the United Nations and its 
specialized units); regional intergovernmental organizations (such as ASEAN); the different 
secretariats and CoP of the international conventions; global quasi-governmental organizations 
(such as IUCN), and; Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (such as WWF, TRAFFIC, or other 
similar organizations)46 (Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell 1998, 25). Arguably the most important and 
influential non state actors are intergovernmental, intra-governmental and international institutions. 
                                                 
46 For more information, see Chapter 2 in Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 1998.  
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For example, two of the most important contributors to international environmental law and 
international environmental regimes are IUCN, a ‘hybrid organization’ comprising of member states, 
government agencies, over 800 national and international NGOs and over 10.000 scientists, experts 
and lawyers from around the world’ (Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009, 102), and the United Nations 
Environmental Program (UNEP)). They have both played a very important role in initiating 
negotiations and supporting countries by providing sounds advice and expertise to ‘substantially 
increase countries capability to respond to environmental problems’ (Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 
2009, 102-103). The NGO community is also an important and permanent player in the international 
arena47. 
Before we proceed any further, it is necessary to briefly highlight the difference between the terms 
that will be used for the remainder of this chapter: ‘non state actor’ and ‘nongovernmental 
organization’. The broad ‘non state actor’ term covers every organization that is not a state (Yamin, 
2001, 149-150). This includes all types of organizations mentioned above. The term ‘non state actor’ 
will be used when we wish to refer to the broad range of actors involved in international 
environmental law. When we wish to refer to particular non-governmental organizations we will 
refer to them as NGOs. 
Non state actors are complex actors at global, regional, subregional and bilateral level. They perform 
different functions as determined by the parties (states) (Sands, 1999). The different actors can be 
usually grouped in several interlinked dimensions according to: the types and degree of influence 
they exercise in the policy cycle agenda; the basis on which they exercise influence, power and 
expertise, and; the way in which they exercise influence on states to support a set of policies or to 
implement international obligations. Actions of one actor are rarely understood in isolation 
(Gunningham, 2009,  181), as the different types of organizations ‘play a significant role in virtually 
every aspect of the international environmental process’ (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 20) and 
exercise different degrees of influence in the ‘life cycle’ of international agreements (Yamin, 2001, 
153). In general, it can be argued that no single organization controls the management of global 
environmental issues’ (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 219).  
It is crucial to highlight that the participation of additional actors in the environmental process ‘is not 
meant to obscure the central importance of interstate relations in world affairs’ (Wapner, 2005, 539). 
As noted above and throughout the previous chapter, states remain the main decision makers in 
                                                 
47 For more information on non state actors see Tarlock, 1992; Anreiter, 1997; Sands, 1999; Bernie, Boyle and 
Redgwell, 2009; Vogler, 1995; Raustiala, 1997b; Noortmann, Reinisch and Ryngaert, 2015; Michalowski and 
Bitten 2005; Otto 1996.  
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international environmental affairs, and will probably continue to be for the indefinite future 
(Wapner, 2005; See also Jordan et al, 2005, 212; Barret, 2003, 53; French, 2009, 261). States are ‘the 
primary players in games of international environmental relations (…), as represented by their 
governments’ (Barret, 2003, 53). States, however, depend largely on non state actors as they are 
crucial for the effective development and implementation of international environmental regimes 
and to ensure compliance with the different obligations. This is exemplified in the wildlife trade 
where non-state actors are ‘taking up responsibilities traditionally reserved for the nation state’ 
(Bisschop 2013, 169; see also Loader, 2002; Sheptycki 2002). 
States and non state actors can sometimes have a paradoxical relationship: while states are the 
dominant players in both the development and implementation of international environmental law, 
they often need to incorporate a range of non state actors into ‘states-only’ activities that have 
traditionally been reserved to states (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007; Raustiala, 1997a). ‘The 
paradoxical nature of the relationship (…) is felt all the more keenly as it is certainly arguable that 
the effectiveness of international environmental regimes depends on their success in influencing 
[states] actions’ (Cameron, 1996, 32).  The involvement of the broader international community – 
viewed in terms of broader than a community of states alone – in international environmental 
efforts is seen as mutually beneficial, as governments will benefit from the information, expertise, 
knowledge and resources of their ‘new’ partners, as well as from a certain amount of political ‘cover’ 
(Redgwell, 2010). In return, the ‘new’ partners will gain increased access to information and a more 
direct input into official positions, discussions, and standard-setting processes (Hunter, Salzman and 
Zaelke, 2007; Raustiala, 1997b). This also reflects a more inclusive approach to the concerns of the 
wider international society. Governments, with limited resources and a growing list of concerns, are 
gradually providing greater roles to environmental non-government organizations because they are 
able to effectively ‘fill the regulatory space that states previously occupied’ (Gunningham, 2009, 196-
8). Such organizations are, arguably, the main actors that ensure environmental problems get 
tackled, the ones that provide the impetus to the movement, and the ones that enable states to 
comply with their obligations. As Gunningham states:  ‘at regional, national or global level, probably 
the biggest gains have been achieved by environmental (…) organizations’ (Gunningham, 2009, 196). 
   
Roles and Functions of Non State Actors 
As noted above, the different actors of the international society hold different roles in virtually every 
aspect of international environmental law (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007). The last few decades 
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have particularly witnessed an extraordinary rise in the level of international activities undertaken by 
non state actors (Yamin, 2001).  
This section will highlight the different roles and functions that such actors may hold to support the 
activities of the state (see Sands, 2003, 71; Stein, 1972, 259; Anreiter, 1997, 13; Faure and Lefevre, 
1999, 142; McCormick, 1999, 55-56; Noortmann, Reinisch and Ryngaert, 2015). The roles and 
functions of the different actors will be grouped in the following categories: informational, 
normative and operational. In order to highlight the importance of non state actors in the 
monitoring, implementation and compliance of international environmental agreements, there will 
be a separate section for this issue. It is important to note that the below sections are interlinked 
and that involvement is not necessarily sequential. Moreover, as noted above, different types of 
organizations will be more involved than others. Some may be more involved in all aspects, others 
may be highly involved in some aspects and have limited influence over others, and another group 
may only hold specific functions.  
 
1. Informational:  
One of the key roles of non state actors is to provide information about new and emerging issues, 
disseminating such information, facilitating information exchange, and initiating discussions that 
may, ultimately, lead to states taking normative action against international environmental 
problems (Sands, 1999, 2003).  
Non state actors, particularly specialized groups, are often the first ones to identify the different 
environmental problems and alert governments to the need for action (Yamin, 2001). Most of the 
current serious environmental issues were not immediately apparent until such expert networks 
recognized the problem because of new scientific findings or new research about a particular issue 
(Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007). Non state actors are thus crucial actors in the ‘problem-
definition process’ and can advocate from a universal perspective, particularly when they provide 
neutral scientific information of specific problems (Yamin, 2001, 153; Stein, 1972; Tarlock, 1992, 72).  
As a result, they provide constant forums for discussion of current and pressing environmental issues 
at different seminars, conferences and scientific engagements before this is pushed through a series 
of international conferences and meetings at the national or international level (Yamin, 2001; 
Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 18; Buck, 1998, 8; Anreiter, 1997, 13). They also raise awareness 
about the existence of environmental problems and provide the necessary arena to exchange 
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information and deliberate upon matters that require collective action (Akande, 2010; see also Den 
Boer, Romsay, and Rothwell, 1998, 25; Bodansy, Brunne and Hey, 2007, 20). The United Nations and 
its specialized units, for example, are well known for providing the principal forums for cooperation 
and coordination of activities where ‘most of the interstate cooperation necessary for developing 
international environmental policy and regulatory regimes has been realized’ (Bernie, Boyle and 
Redgwell, 2009, 45; see also Sands, 1999, 120-121). UNEP in particular has achieved the most as 
facilitator of meetings and a coordination unit. Its involvement is seen as an impartial and unbiased 
force which facilitates negotiations and potential compromise between states (McCormick, 1999; 
Sands, 2003; Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009).  
A particular example of the role that non state actors play by providing and sharing information is 
the reporting of negotiations. NGOs have been, for some time, providing daily bulletins at the 
different meetings and CoPs. The bulletins provide a detailed account of the statements, proposals, 
discussions, points of contention, and decisions of the day and are given to the participating 
delegates (Burke, 1997; in Raustiala, 1977a). To use a famous quote from a delegate attending the 
1972 Stockholm Conference: ‘the crew that put out ECO should attend all international conferences 
so we'll know what the hell is going on’ (Raustiala, 1997a, 730). This particular example highlights the 
importance of non state actors, as the reporting of ongoing negotiations is something governments 
cannot do on their own. If they did, it would be considered ‘biased and unrepresentative’. Equally, if 
a UN agency or a formal secretariat published daily reports, they would have an ‘official document’ 
status, and participants would find it very difficult (or impossible) to agree on its content, style, tone, 
and the like within the given time-frame (Raustiala, 1997a, 730). NGOs may publish such a bulleting 
as this would be considered an informal and informative document only. 
  
2. Normative  
As noted above, non state actors have played an important role in highlighting new environmental 
problems, and bringing them to the attention of the international society. They have also played an 
essential coordinating role to encourage states to enter into dialogue, generating political consensus 
on the key issues that need to be addressed and facilitating and encouraging collective actions to 
solve environmental problems (Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009; Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007; 
Stein, 1972). These are one of their most important roles in international environmental law. 
As a matter of fact, non state actors have shaped policy making at both the national and 
international level. They are able to intervene in debates and meetings – even in some cases as 
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members of official delegations – and have the ability to shape the agenda of meetings and 
conferences (Yamin, 2001; Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007; Tarlock, 1992). In addition, they can 
exercise informal power to shape the way in which problems are addressed, the priority they receive, 
and in some cases, the way governments cooperate with each other to solve them (Yamin,2001). 
Non state actors have also influenced states to strengthen and develop national legislation and are 
also important players in the negotiation and development of environmental regimes as well as 
other actions taken to effectively counter global environmental issues (Den Boer, Romsay and 
Rothwell, 1998; Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007; Wapner, 2005). They are particularly active in 
the international standard-setting and implementation processes and have strongly contributed to 
the development of national and international legal obligations and the development of soft laws 
(Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 1998; Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007; Sands, 1999, 2003). In 
addition, non state actors are increasingly involved – and participate more directly – in international 
institutions and have substantial influence in the design and implementation of international 
environmental regimes (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007; Buck, 1998, 7).  
Given that many global and regional environmental issues are ‘relatively novel and highly complex’ – 
new problems keep on appearing (Raustiala, 1997a, 726-7) – and there is ‘little experience to guide 
the policy making process’ (Raustiala, 1997b, 558-9; See also Tarlock, 1992, 69), non state actors can 
provide a varied range of information about potential policy options (Raustiala, 1997a, 726). Such 
information is often provided to policy makers freely by multiple organizations. The ‘plurality of 
sources’ ensures data quality and the ‘biases of most major NGOs are fairly well known to the 
governments’ and can easily be avoided. The result is that states can maximize their information and 
benefit from ‘reasonably accurate, efficacious, and creative policy advice’. States are also able to 
minimize their expenditures by working with the different actors of the international society 
(Raustiala, 1997a, 727). It needs to be highlighted that some organizations have played a 
fundamental role in the creation of environmental regimes and in the pioneering of initiatives. The 
most notable examples are UNEP and IUCN, which are renowned for producing ‘extensive, well-
researched policy papers’ and have helped draft, negotiate and adopt multiple binding multilateral 
agreements. Such organizations have greatly contributed to the development of international 
environmental law and have provided secretariats for several international conventions such as 
CITES (Soroos, 1999; Petsonk, 1990; Raustiala, 1997a).  
A key aspect of the participation of non state actors is that it also ensures wide participation in 
international environmental issues. This is largely, particularly in the case of the UN, its ‘consensus 
and negotiating procedures’ have created a real potential for securing approval and participation in 
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international environmental efforts. If one takes into account the quantity of states and their 
different interests and priorities, this has proved essential when dealing with global environmental 
problems as it ensures a global participation and support (Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009). Other 
non-state actors, including several high profile NGOs, also have a major and positive role to play in 
this process (Tarlock, 1992). For example, it was pressure groups that led to the convening of the 
1972 Stockholm convention and contributed to the development of the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 
and the different treaties opened for signature at the conference (Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009, 
48; Yamin, 2001, 151). 
 
3. Operational 
In addition to the above, non state actions are unique partners as they hold vast amounts of 
expertise in international environmental issues, they are able to motivate governments, in different 
ways, to ensure they comply with international norms and regulations, and are able to help by 
providing resources and assistance with implementation of activities.  
International environmental issues are so technical and specialized that governments sometimes 
rely on external assistance and expertise to seek solutions to the problem (Vogler, 2000). By 
providing extensive information and assistance to governments, non state actors have ‘put 
themselves forward as actors with solutions’ (Yamin, 2001, 155). As a result, governments now look 
at diverse international organizations and NGOs as partners in the development and implementation 
of international environmental law, with the capability to provide specialized technical, scientific and 
policy advice and assist them directly or behind-the-scenes. Such groups increase the capacity of 
governments to undertake negotiations and comply with international obligations (Yamin, 2001). For 
example, one of the initial roles of many environmental organizations and NGOs was wildlife 
conservation. As such, these organizations have been heavily involved in wildlife conservation issues 
to ‘ensure and support the creation of environmental regimes’. Given that they possess substantial 
expertise in the area and that they are able to bring forward expert and independent – although not 
necessarily always objective – judgments, they have become important actors in wildlife 
negotiations, to the point that they have become part of national delegations at the different CoP 
(Raustiala, 1997b, 551-9; Raustiala, 1997a, 733; see also Michalowski and Bitten 2005). 
Globally, states have an increasing number of issues to deal with at both national and international 
levels. In addition, in reality, environmental issues tend to figure towards the bottom of the national 
agenda. What is more, states are becoming increasingly porous and unable to effectively deal with 
56 
 
environmental issues independently, due in many cases to the lack of funds (Bodansky, Brunnee and 
Hey, 2007). Given the abundance of expertise and funds available to the state outside of its 
sovereign authority, it is clear why states have acceded to collaborate with a growing variety of non 
state actors to resolve environmental problems. Independent networks and NGOs are able to assist 
governments with international environmental problems as they have the resources and the 
necessary expertise to assist with the problems 48 . Moreover, given the different levels of 
development in different countries, it is necessary that the costs and burdens are shared. It will be 
argued that non state actors play an important role in this particular aspect as they are able to 
channel funds into different activities. In some cases such activities are funded by more developed 
countries that, under international environmental law, are called upon to assist with the burdens 
and costs of measures taken in developing countries that may benefit the international society as a 
whole (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007). States therefore must accept the assistance of non state 
actors to effectively counter environmental problems. This last point – predominantly the case in 
relation to environmental problems, transnational environmental crime and the illegal trade in 
endangered species – is crucial to understanding how the traditional roles of the state have changed 
in international environmental law.  
In addition, it can be argued that a further role of the international society is to motivate and assist 
states when they do not find the necessary motivation by themselves, as well as to engage with 
them when needed, and to ensure that they comply with the rules and regulations they ratified. Non 
state actors put a considerable amount of pressure on states by openly demanding action, including 
international cooperation, and educating the public about the existence of problems and the need 
to do something about them. This is arguably the most important role of the NGO community in 
international affairs (Yamin, 2001). Non state actors can also motivate states to join and commit to 
standards set by treaties and their regulatory regimes, share part of the economic burden of 
complying with such norms and regulations in order to achieve the desired goals, and apply, when 
necessary – and if possible – an additional layer on pressure on states to comply with international 
commitments (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007). This, of course, places a further constraint to the 
concept of state sovereignty, as ‘adherence to the concept of state sovereignty poses difficulties for 
the establishment of a role for non state actors in helping develop and enforce primary rules’ 
(Cameron, 1996, 31). Nonetheless, it has to be highlighted that, while the participation is desired, it 
is ultimately the actual states that have the final word, and the role of the international society is to 
assist states.   
                                                 
48 Budgets of the largest nongovernmental organizations is usually equal to, if not double, the annual 
expenditure of government organizations that deal with environmental problems (Wapner, 2005, 527). 
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3.4 Monitoring, Implementation and Compliance with International 
Environmental Agreements 
As we have noted above, non state actors play significant roles and participate more intensively in 
international environmental agreements (Redgwell, 2010; Victor, Raustiala and Stolnikoff, 1998). As 
a result, there are different actors that may end up being responsible for parts of the monitoring and 
implementation of, and compliance with, treaty provisions. It is necessary to highlight that the 
participation of non state actors in international environmental efforts and in environmental 
regimes is largely dependent on the type of agreement reached amongst states, and whether or not 
they allow non state actors to be involved in the process (Mitchel, 1996).   
Compliance with treaty provisions is usually facilitated by non state actors, which are arguably one 
of the best ‘assistants’ states and the treaties regulatory machinery have when dealing with 
international environmental problems. Before we examine the involvement of non state actors to 
ensure implementation and compliance with environmental regimes, it is necessary to clarify the 
term ‘compliance’ and its implications. In traditional international law, compliance49 focuses on 
concepts such as breach, state responsibility, invocation of responsibility by another state, dispute 
settlement and restitution and compensation. This is ‘seldom applied in international law generally 
and even less so in international environmental law’ (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 23; See also 
Fisher, 1981; Young, 1979). States rarely enforce international environmental law by invoking state 
responsibility, and cases of noncompliance are rarely addressed through traditional dispute 
settlement (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007). Rather, as noted in previous sections of this chapter, 
the overall aim of international environmental regimes is to enhance cooperation and alter state’s 
behavior towards environmental problems.  
In international environmental law, the term compliance is commonly applied in comparing behavior 
to specific treaty provisions, a treaty’s broader spirit and principles, implicit international norms, 
informal agreements and even tacit agreement (Mitchel, 1996, 5). Even if parties do not reach actual 
compliance or do not go beyond minimum treaty requirements, they can include considerable 
beneficial behavioral change.  Compliance and behavioral change, however, are wanted if they lead 
to the achievement of the treaty goals. In Young’s terms, ‘we are interested in a treaty’s problem-
solving, as well as behavior changing impacts’ (in Mitchel, 1996, 24).  
                                                 
49 Compliance is understood here as ‘an actor’s behavior that conforms to a treaty’s explicit rules’ (Mitchel, 
1996, 5; see also Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 369) 
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The term compliance is often misused: ‘the term compliance is often not used in a consistent way, 
but focused with related terminology such as implementation, effectiveness, or even enforcement’ 
(Faure and Lefevre, 1999, 138-9). These terms refer to ‘different aspects of the process of achieving 
international political and legal cooperation’ (Faure and Lefevre, 1999, 139). It is therefore necessary 
to clarify the different meanings of such terms. 
Implementation refers to ‘specific actions’ (organizational, legislative and practical actions) that 
states take to make international agreements ‘operative in their national legal system’ (Faure and 
Lefevre, 1999, 139). Implementation, thus, links the national realm with the international treaty 
obligations. It is a complex process – ‘what turns grand principles and commitments into actual 
practice’ (Victor, Raustiala and Stolnikoff, 1998, 29) – and an essential part of international 
environmental affairs. Implementation of international environmental law ultimately depends on 
national actions50 . For example, once a treaty has entered into force, it must be implemented51. 
Though states are normally given ‘substantial leeway in choosing the means for implementation’ 
(Barret, 2003, 149), the process will often require the development of national legislation or the 
adoption of certain regulations at the domestic level to give domestic force to the treaty obligations. 
In addition, in most cases parties will be required to report on their implementation (often to the 
secretariat and at CoP meetings) (Barret, 2003). Implementation of treaty provisions is done with the 
aim of achieving compliance. Compliance is therefore ‘the extent to which the behaviors of the 
different states conform to the conditions of the treaty’ (Faure and Lefevre, 1999, 139).   
As noted above, the term ‘compliance’ is also misused to refer to the enforcement or to the 
effectiveness of a treaty. The former indicates the methods available to states to implement and 
comply with treaty obligations. The latter is concerned with the effect of the treaty objectives or 
particular parts of the treaty (Faure and Lefevre, 1999, 139). It needs to be highlighted that 
‘compliance with a treaty doesn’t necessarily mean that it is more effective’ (Mitchel, 1996, 6). 
Compliance can provide, in theory, a proxy for effectiveness, as greater compliance will, theoretically, 
produce more environmental improvements. Nonetheless, ‘greater compliance is neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for effectiveness’. The process of making conventions effective 
has proved a ‘long term task’ and the involvement of key actors is crucial in making this possible. 
Above all, states need to be willing to cooperate and work together to counter the problem at hand 
                                                 
50 National actions maybe include the enactment of international standards into domestic legislation, the 
establishment of domestic procedures, the monitoring and reporting of certain regulated activities, the 
punishment of any violations, and the judicial application of the law (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 17; 
See also Sands, 2003, 174-5) 
51 Implementation refers here to ‘the process of putting (…) commitments into practice’ (Hunter, Salzman and 
Zaelke, 2007, p363)  
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(Mitchel, 1996; Green, 2001). Franck (1998, 909-25), similarly, suggests that cooperation will be 
more likely and that international law will be more effective if the system is fair and legitimate (in 
both the creation and application of rules) and based on a sense of community with shared values 
and reciprocity on the need to take action but also subject to the scarcity of goods, which would 
actively require members to take action and counter the problem.  
Compliance is often evaluated against treaty provisions rather than the treaty as a whole (Mitchel, 
1996). In general, parties tend to comply with some provisions and not with others. While 
compliance may be because of parties’ particular interests, noncompliance tends to be because 
either because states choose not to comply with specific provisions, because they cannot comply 
with them (or they are incapable to comply with them) or because they do not reach the acquired 
target even if they do comply with the treaty provisions (Mitchel, 1996; Faure and Lefevre, 1999). 
One of the greatest challenges posed to those involved in the international environmental 
movement is ensuring implementation of, and compliance with, international agreements. It has 
long been recognized that most implementation gaps with environmental regimes are not the result 
of any premeditated violation of treaty obligations, but rather of parties’ lack of reporting, or 
institutional and financial constraints - this is particularly the case in developing countries (Sand, 
1999, 166).  
With particular attention to the reporting, the concept of state sovereignty creates a barrier to any 
intrusions into the domestic affairs of the states as states are very resistant to information gathering 
within their borders by other states or international organizations. As a result, most international 
environmental agreements rely on national self-reporting (Raustiala, 1997a; 1997b). It is the states 
themselves that report on their progress and compliance (or lack of compliance). In such situations, 
there are clear incentives for states that are not in full compliance to misrepresent, procrastinate, 
and otherwise fail to provide information in a timely and truthful fashion. Indeed, this is often the 
case. It needs to be highlighted that this is as much as a result of a lack of capacity as much as a lack 
of ‘good-faith efforts’. Many states will simply not have the necessary tools, personnel, or resources 
to adequately gather the information. Regardless of cause, however, ‘information tends to be sorely 
underprovided – even when states are fully in compliance – and this underprovision is a major 
source of delay and ineffectiveness’ (Raustiala, 1997a, 728). Non state actors thus have a clear role 
to fulfill in order to close the reporting. 
Non state actors, and particularly the NGO community, provide an alternate route to gain 
information about state behavior. Certain NGOs are well positioned and are able to provide 
independent assessments of state compliance as well as other useful information. Indeed, NGOs 
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place a significant amount of effort and financial resources on the monitoring of state actions 
(Raustiala, 1997a). Clearly not all states welcome this monitoring. One of the reasons for this is that 
NGOs remain ‘imperfect monitoring agents’, as NGO monitoring is sometimes concerned with 
particular issues or projects rather than specific actions. It is argued, nonetheless, that NGOs are well 
qualified to assist with the monitoring and implementation of international environmental regimes, 
particularly when they help address the environmental problem and make available their 
independent assessments. In addition, the regimes can become more effective if it includes 
particular ‘target groups’ and NGOs with expertise in the implementation and monitoring process 
(Raustiala, 1997a; Victor, Raustiala and Stolnikoff, 1998). A prominent example of this, further 
discussed in a latter section of this chapter, is CITES.  
One of the most characteristic and innovative features of the CITES was its emphasis on verification 
of compliance with the rules of the treaty. As such, the Secretariat was empowered by the parties to 
follow up on alleged infractions and to draw them to public attention, in close collaboration 
nongovernmental organization TRAFFIC (an IUCN/WWF specialist group set up in 1976 that was 
created to act as an independent watchdog for the wildlife trade52) (Sand, 1999). Within CITES, NGOs 
have therefore been instrumental watchdogs of the convention, monitoring the implementation and 
compliance with the treaty provisions, as well as the wildlife trade and the progress of the 
conservation regime. It is believed that without the monitoring of CITES, the work of the convention 
would not be as effectively undertaken: ‘the stronger and more active NGOs are [in the regime] (…) 
the larger the probability of compliance’ (Faure and Lefevre, 1999, 142; See also Yamin, 2001; 
Raustiala, 1997b; Sands,1999). 
Returning to the issue of enforcement mentioned above, it is important to highlight that, while non 
state actors play a significant role in the development, monitoring and implementation of 
international environmental law, their enforcement function is rather limited. States – ‘as principal 
subject[s] of international law, (…) have the primary role in enforcing rules’, and are usually unwilling 
to transfer much enforcement powers to secretariats and non state actors (Sands, 2003, 182, 191-
200). While a small number of NGOs undoubtedly plays an increasing role in the enforcement of 
international environmental standards – under the direction and in close cooperation with the 
relevant governments –, most non state actors have coordinating or monitoring roles (Tarlock, 1992; 
Buck, 1998; Sands 2003). 
 
                                                 
52 For more information, see Traffic, 2017.  
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3.5 State and Non State Actors: a Mutually Beneficial Coexistence?  
The pattern that emerges from the participation of non state actors in international environmental 
law is the greater access and participation at initial states of the negotiations – ‘as the structure of 
the negotiating space is defined and policy prescriptions are debated’ – and less access to latter 
parts of the negotiation, when ‘details of essentially fixed positions are hammered out’ (Raustiala, 
1997b, 571). When the focus shifts back to implementation and monitoring, non state actors often 
reemerge as major participants in international environmental regimes. 
The participation of additional actors in international environmental law, however, poses a threat to 
several concepts of traditional international law. International law was originally designed to 
‘regulate the interactions of states by defining their respective rights and obligations’ within the 
traditional ‘state centric’ approach (i.e. the state as the ultimate sovereign). In brief, international 
law’s key notions are state sovereignty, which recognizes the freedom of states act freely within 
their territory, and territorial integrity, which recognizes the right of states to be ‘free from 
interference from others’ (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 9).   
The development of international environmental law alongside the traditional state centric 
approach of international law has, as a result, given rise to potentially contradictory notions in 
international law, as it contextualizes international environmental law in terms of the ‘mutual rights 
and responsibilities of states’ (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 10) to protect the environment: 
certain environmental problems require particular actions on behalf of the international society as a 
whole when their impacts are global, or when activities that occur within one state inflict significant 
harm (following the no harm principle), or have adverse effects on the territory of another53 
(Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007; Barret, 2003). This brings about a great amount of debate 
amongst different authors in international relations and international law, specifically on the notion 
of sovereignty – ‘the cornerstone of international law’ (Cameron, 1996, 31) – as ‘common concerns’ 
of the international society may challenge state’s sovereignty (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007). 
In traditional international law, states hold the dominant and primary role (Sands, 1999). States are 
the permanent sovereigns of over the resources of their territory: sovereignty refers to the absolute 
‘independence and supremacy of the state’ (Elian, 1979, 12; Sands, 2003; Buck, 1998). Sovereignty 
therefore indicates the ‘absence of any higher authority’ (Craven, 2010, 215). States are independent 
                                                 
53 The no harm rule is meant to prohibit one state to cause significant environmental costs/harm to another. 
This notion represents a ‘cornerstone of international environmental law’. Environmental law has, however, 
extended considerably and now encompasses wider concerns (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007) 
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entities that do not want to give ‘an inch of authority to foreign powers’ (Barret, 2003, 109). They are 
their own supreme authority with their own and specific interests (Keohane, 2000). Given that most 
international environmental treaties, by their very nature, constrain a state’s sovereignty, they 
arguably represent a problem within international politics, international law and international 
relations theory, particularly relating to the role and significance of states in international 
environmental law-making and implementation, and to the notion of state sovereignty (Hunter, 
Salzman and Zaelke, 2007; Green, 2001). These challenges give rise to multiple discussions, given 
that a fundamental principle of international law is ‘the absolute sovereignty of every nation (…) 
within its own territory’54 (Barret, 2003, 119). 
The main discussions with regards to international environmental law and international politics are 
as follows: Realists view the pursuit of power and the use of power as the primary determinant of 
international behaviors in an anarchic system of international relations where each sovereign state 
has their specific national interests and self-interest (Waltz, 1979; Noortmann and Ryngaert, 2010; 
Vig, 1999). They believe that international law has little impact on the behaviors of states and that it 
should only be used for issues that are relatively unimportant and not related to security of 
sovereign nation-states. Realists would therefore tend to choose to cooperate unless there is a 
regulatory regime that does not constrain their sovereignty and power. They would accept other 
actors only if they retained full authority. Institutionalists admit that states are the key players in 
international relations, but, on the other hand, agree that non state actors play a crucial role as 
‘participants in an effort to elicit compliance’ (Mitchel, 1996, 4-7; Vig, 1999). They believe non state 
actors can be crucial to assist states to monitor (and sometimes implement) the treaties and norms 
they have agreed upon. Institutionalists would tend to use the red card as they tend to agree with 
Morgenthau that ‘the great majority of rules of international law are generally observed by all 
nations’ (Mitchel, 1996, 4). The participation of non state actors in international environmental law 
can also be seen as an effect of globalization, which ‘continues apace and has implications for 
sovereignty that affect[s all states]’ (Keohane, 2000, 110). 
The issue of transboundary resources makes it clear that ‘absolute sovereignty is an idea of the past’ 
(Buck, 1998, 28). In the present, states have to – and indeed have chosen to - cooperate on new 
international regimes. In the process, their sovereignty control has changed.  In most cases, 
international environmental law reflects the common interests of the international society as a 
whole and is guided general principles that are beneficial for the community as a whole, based on 
                                                 
54 For more information on the key issues and challenges in international environmental politics see also Green, 
2001, 387-414   
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the belief that the outcome is best for all parties (Barret, 2003). States therefore have rights and 
responsibilities that go above and beyond their sovereign rights. Such rights and responsibilities, to a 
certain degree, may take precedence over the traditional notions of state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. There has, therefore, been a shift in from the traditional principle of state sovereignty and 
a new set of principles and rules have been created which ‘can delimit and curtail the principle of 
state sovereignty itself’ but that does not actually challenge state sovereignty (Held, 2000, 168). 
Rather, they complement it.  
It is important to highlight that, in such instances, it is the different states that, ultimately, agree on 
the mutual restraints that are placed upon them – and that are necessary – in order to prevent a 
‘tragedy of the commons’ (Barret, 2003, 49-50; see also Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 11), such 
as the extinction of wild animal species. The participation of non state actors remains a privilege 
‘granted and mediated by states’ (Raustiala, 1997a, 724). The inclusion of non state actors in 
environmental institutions and in the environmental processes is therefore not unpredictable or 
random. Rather, it is based on the ‘confluence of governmental incentives’ and the comparative 
advantages, expertise and resources non state actors possess (Raustiala, 1997a, 720-734). Non state 
actors are thus seen as partners of the state and as ‘vehicles for taking action on international or 
transnational environmental problems’ (Akande, 2010, 253; See also Anreiter, 1997).  
The relationship between states and NGOs is sometimes depicted as inherently oppositional: an 
increase in power and importance by non state actors must necessarily come at the expense of state 
power (Akande, 2010). It is strongly believed that this is not the case. As Raustiala (1997a, 724) 
clearly notes, sovereign states are both empowered and enabled by the participation of non state 
actors in international environmental affairs. The participation of such actors does not undermine 
but rather compliments and strengthens the capability of states to deal with environmental issues 
with ‘greater efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy’ (Raustiala, 1997b, 539; See also Raustiala, 
1997a; Soroos, 1999). The role of states is thus reinforced by the supplementary role of international 
organizations and, to a lesser extent, other non-state actors (Sands, 2003).  
Non state actors fill the void in both domestic and international environmental competencies that 
states are unable to deal with because of scarce resources or lack of expertise (Tarlock, 1992; Aas 
2007, Duffy 2010). This is particularly the case in smaller and developing countries that often lack 
the resources and manpower to develop the necessary expertise. In such cases, governments may 
call on non state actors to assist in the process and rely heavily on non state actors to ensure 
implementation of, and compliance with international obligations (Palmer, 1992; Sands, 2003; 
Raustiala, 1997b). The participation of such groups is not a threat to the sovereignty of the state, but 
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rather leads to more realistic and more effective agreements and to more successful measures to 
counter environmental problems (Victor, Raustiala and Stolnikoff, 1998). In most cases, the degree 
of participation of the different organizations involved usually reflects the range of resources, 
expertise, and influence the have over the state and the amount of trust states may place on them 
(Raustiala, 1997a).    
Upon examination of the particular roles of environmental NGOs, it can be clearly observed that 
they are increasingly involved in all aspects of international environmental law (Hunter, Salzman and 
Zaelke, 2007). Even though the formal rights accorded to NGOs have, theoretically, not changed over 
time, common practice has modified them somewhat (Cameron, 1996). In addition to their formal 
rights, NGOs have played a more informal – and very effective – role, often in the background 
providing support to government officials and policy makers. More and more frequently, however, 
NGOs are taking active roles in the development or strengthening of laws and the implementation of 
activities, as well as a more direct role in international environmental regimes, including its 
development, compliance mechanisms, and implementation process (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 
2007; Cameron, 1996; Bernie, Boyle and Redgwell, 2009).  
As the next section will highlight, NGOs have ‘quasi official’ roles in monitoring and reporting 
processes under CITES (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 21). They have a ‘symbiotic relationship’, 
in which the NGO may, as requested, conduct research or other services that the secretariat lacks 
the resources, manpower, expertise or the authority to provide for itself. In return, the NGO receives 
a greater amount of input into the decisions of the treaty secretariat and the CoP. Such 
arrangements have become ‘instrumental to the effective implementation of CITES’ (Hunter, 
Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 264) as well as for the supervision of treaty commitments (Den Boer, 
Romsay and Rothwell, 1998). Returning to the global roles and functions of NGOs in international 
environmental law, NGOs also have an increasing amount of influence on states and are capable of 
influencing state policy, rule-making, and lobby or pressure governments to ensure they develop, 
enact and enforce stronger national legislation and comply with treaty regulations, even if states 
‘lack the incentive to do so’ (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007, 20; See also Wapner, 2005; 
Gunningham, 2009) . Moreover, the NGO community plays an important role in engaging civic 
society, shaping public opinion, and influencing consumers and markets about the need to counter 
environmental problems (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007; Wapner, 2005; Gunningham, 2009). 
Once empowered, the communities can respond to these processes more successfully. They also 
engage and create partnerships with different types of organizations to effectively deal with 
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environmental issues. This is extremely important given that the most important NGOs tend to have 
larger annual budgets than the total amount states spend annually on environmental issues55. 
 
3.6 The Illegal Wildlife Trade and CITES56  
The use and protection of wildlife has historically been considered a matter of domestic law. 
Controlling the growing amount of international wildlife trade has, nonetheless, been the subject of 
international cooperation for over a quarter of a century (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007).  
The growing concern over the amount of ‘international economic activities’ such as the trade in wild 
animals and plants has called for increased international cooperation to respond to activities such as 
the illegal wildlife trade and the preservation of biodiversity: ‘wildlife species are (…) renewable 
natural resources but, like many ‘flow resources’, they have a critical level below which a decrease in 
reproduction capacity becomes virtually irreversible’ (Sand, 1999, 144).  
‘The need to prevent extinctions can be justified scientifically because of the need for the 
preservation of biodiversity. Briefly, the term biodiversity encompasses ‘an umbrella term for the 
degree of nature’s variety’ (Bowman, 1996, 5). The core concept is the preservation of ecosystems: 
‘all living organisms exist and function not in isolation, but as part of a wider environment, and it is 
through the preservation of the entire ecosystem that diversity can be secured’ (Bowman, 1996, 5). 
This is considered at interdependent three levels: the protection of species diversity (variety of 
different species in existence); the genetic diversity (genetic variation between populations of a 
particular species) of species, and; the ecosystem diversity (species habitat) (Den Boer, Romsay and 
Rothwell, 1998). It can also be justified as economically for the lost revenue of the illegal trade. 
Ultimately, however, concerns are really affected by deep ‘ethical value judgments’ and moral 
philosophy that justify the conservation of wildlife (Sand, 1999, 144; Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, 
2010, 61).  
While ‘extinction is a natural consequence (…) and a regular occurrence in the natural world’ (Hunter, 
Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 7) over long periods of time, the current rate of mass extinctions is not: it 
is ‘at least a thousand time greater than the natural rate and is created by human beings, ‘one 
species among the 14 million or more species sharing the planet’ (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 
                                                 
55 For example, in 1992 the budget of WWF was roughly US$200Mill for the total annual budget of US$75 of 
UNEP (Wapner, 2005, 527-537; See also Gunningham, 2009, 197; Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 219). 
56 See footnote 1 in the Introduction for details on previously published worked used in this thesis.  
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7). ‘Humanity is destroying the very ecosystem it depends on for its survival and prosperity’ by 
overexploiting species for food, ornaments, pets or luxury items (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007, 
9; TRAFFIC, 2008). Exploitation of species for commercial purposes is not, nevertheless, the only 
cause of wildlife depletion. The destruction of natural habitats, followed by introduction of alien and 
invasive species, unsustainable harvesting, and the decrease in population diversity of species (range 
of species) are also key factors in the process (du Plessis, 2000; Sand, 1999; Den Boer, Romsay and 
Rothwell, 1998). 
The different approaches to protect biodiversity would therefore be a focus on conservation, 
combating illegal trade, or on habitat protection, with the most effective response incorporating 
elements of all (Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 1998). For the purpose of this chapter, the focus 
will remain on international efforts directed to the protection of the diversity of species, and more 
specifically the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(hereinafter referred to as CITES) , the main convention dealing with the international wildlife trade 
(Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, 2010; see generally CITES, 2017). Other efforts should, nonetheless, 
not be underestimated, as they remain highly important for the preservation of biodiversity. 
As noted above, there are multiple threats to biodiversity. Before CITES is discussed in further detail, 
it is necessary to highlight that the convention is not a general wildlife treaty, as it only attempts to 
deal with one component: the overexploitation of species because of the international trade, which 
is one of the multiple threats to wildlife (Sand, 1999). There have been multiple discussions on CITES 
(Hutton and Dickson, 2000). For example, it has been argued that the primary rules of CITES address 
the activities of the actors engaged in the trade ‘rather than focusing on processes which, if 
regulated, could also have a positive impact on wildlife conservation, such as sustainable 
management, habitat destruction, or the establishment of protected areas’57(Cameron, 1996, 188). 
The views of other commentators vary. Overall, it is believed that, despite its weaknesses, CITES has 
had a very significant impact on the trade in endangered species (Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 
1998). Some are very favorable to CITES and consider the convention as ‘perhaps the most 
successful of all international treaties concerned with wildlife’ (Sand, 1999, 168; See also Lyster, 
1985). Others see different ‘weaknesses, limitations and criticisms’ (Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 
1998, 95-119) and rate its success as ‘symbolic rather than substantial’, though conceding its 
usefulness as an international forum for wildlife issues (Sand, 1999; Trexter, 1990). The objective 
here, however, is not to discuss what CITES should or should not address, as it is not relevant thesis, 
and would also require an independent piece of research by itself. Rather, the aim of this section is 
                                                 
57 The merits and shortcomings of this approach are discussed by Swanson (1992, 57). 
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to introduce the convention and its background in order to further elaborate on the international 
trade in endangered species and more specifically, the illegal wildlife trade (see chapter 4). 
The convention was conceived in an effort to regulate the international trade (trade that crosses 
borders between countries) in wild animals and plants. As it will be further elaborated below, 
safeguarding species from overexploitation requires not only effective communication and 
cooperation at the governmental level, but also amongst other players of the international society 
(Isozaki, 2003).   
CITES is an international agreement between governments that was concluded after two previous 
unsuccessful international attempts to regulate wildlife (Sand, 1999, 145-149). The concept of the 
convention goes back to a 1963 resolution of the IUCN assembly, followed by draft texts provided at 
the IUCN environmental law center, and culminating in a conference in Washington DC in February 
1973. By March of the same year CITES was negotiated and signed by 21 states. On 1 July 1975 it 
entered in force58. 
From its inception CITES was seen as a flagship treaty (Lanchberry, 1998). Hailed by conservationists 
as ‘Magna Carta for Wildlife’ (Sand, 1999, 148-149; Layne, 1973; Kij, 1974) and ‘the world’s leading, 
most successful international conservation convention’ (Huxley, 2000, 11), CITES was both ‘a 
conservation and a trade instrument (…) to protect wild fauna and flora both for humankind (…) and 
as a national heritage’ (Sand, 1999, 148-149).  Today, it is regarded by many as one of the most 
widely accepted treaties in existence (Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 1998) and remains ‘one of 
the most important international conventions for the conservation of wildlife’ (Cameron, 1996, 204).  
The convention was established as an instrument for cooperation59 and to prevent international 
trade to cause extinctions by promoting trade controls: ‘CITES seeks to protect biodiversity through 
the regulation of international trade in endangered animals and plants and their 
products’60(Cameron, 1996, 188). Its aim is to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild 
animals and plants does not threaten their survival.  Its objective is thus to regulate or restrict trade 
                                                 
58 See generally CITES, 2017; See also Chrurchil and Ulfstein, 2000, 630; Sand, 1999, 147-148, 237; Cameron, 
1996; Lanchberry, 1998, 69; Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 1998, 105; Romsay and Rothwell, 1998, 105.  
59 The preamble to convention states: ‘international cooperation is essential for the protection of certain 
species of wild fauna and flora against over-exploitation through international trade’ For more information, 
see Chapter 1 in Huxley (2000)  
60 See also CITES Article II  of CITES (2017b). 
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species in decline because of commercial trade (i.e. international trade in wildlife) (Sands, 2003; 
Redgwell 2010). This is managed by subjecting international trade in certain species to controls61.  
CITES, therefore, controls the international wildlife trade directly but only protects endangered 
species individually (Barret, 2003). It is important to highlight that many wildlife species in trade are 
not endangered, but the existence of an agreement to ensure the sustainability of the trade is 
important in order to safeguard these resources for the future62.  
CITES is an international agreement to which parties adhere voluntarily. Contrary to many of the 
regulatory international environmental regimes in existence, CITES was one of the first 
environmental treaties to provide for sophisticated provisions on information gathering, reporting 
and international monitoring on its member countries from the outset (Cameron, 1996; Den Boer, 
Romsay and Rothwell 1998). Given that there is no universal model suitable for all countries, the 
convention produced a set of ‘guidelines for legislation’ containing a set of minimum domestic 
measures that all parties have to adhere to, such as the creation of at least one CITES Management 
Authority and a Scientific Authority and the prohibition of trade in certain species (Sand, 1999, 162; 
See also Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 1998). Parties are also required to penalize trade in and 
possession of illegal wildlife and to confiscate specimens found in the illegal trade. All parties have a 
duty to enact and enforce the terms of the treaty by implementing certain national laws and 
providing periodic reports on enforcement measures and the wildlife trade in their respective 
countries (Sand, 1999). Albeit the convention is legally binding on its members, it does not take 
precedence over national laws. Rather, CITES set up an ‘elaborate committee structure’ with specific 
functions and commitments  to be respected by each member country, which has to adopt its own 
domestic legislation to implement CITES at the national level and to take ‘appropriate measures’ to 
enforce its provisions63.  
As noted above, CITES only deals with certain species. The species that are covered by CITES are 
listed in three Appendices, with different levels of regulation according to the degree of protection 
they need (Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, 2010; Lanchberry, 1998; Isozaki, 2003). A principal 
feature of the convention is the creation of a permit system - that controls import and export of 
listed species. Once a species is listed under one of the CITES appendices, trade in that particular 
species becomes subject to the permits system, which is under the control of the national CITES 
Management and Scientific Authorities (Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 1998 Isozaki, 2003; 
                                                 
61 All import, export, re-export and introduction from the sea of species covered by the Convention has to be 
authorized through a licensing system. 
62 See generally CITES, 2017b.  
63 See generally CITES, 2017b. See also Sands, 2003; Cameron, 1996; Lanchberry,1998. 
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Cameron, 1996; See also CITES, 2017b, Article VI-X). The permit for a listed specimen will only be 
issued if the relevant authorities are satisfied that the export will not be detrimental to the survival 
of the species, and if authorities are satisfied that the specimen was not obtained illegally. For 
certain species, an import certificate may also be required (Petsonk, 1990). The Management 
Authority is in charge of administering the licensing system and the Scientific Authority advises on 
the effects of the trade and on the status of species that is traded in each country (CITES, 2017b). 
CITES ‘leaves it up to the designated MAs (…) to operate the system [at a national level] on behalf of 
the international community’ and the secretariat plays a coordinating role between parties (Sand, 
1999, 162; Den Boer, Romsay and Rothwell, 1998). 
Adjustments of the appendices are done during the Conference of the Parties (CoP) meetings. The 
CoP is the highest decision making body concerned with the implementation of CITES: It was 
established as an ‘autonomous body for decision-making and periodic treaty adjustment’ (CITES, 
2017b, Articles XI, XV; Cameron, 1996). It was during the first CoP (1976) that the institutional 
structure of CITES emerged – and was agreed upon – after the treaty’s entry into force (Lanchberry, 
1998; Sand, 1999). Meetings have, since then, been held every three years in order to monitor and 
review the implementation of the convention and to make recommendations for improving its 
effectiveness, including any changes or alterations to the appendices. Regular CoP are essential to 
the continued development and advancement of the regime as they monitor parties compliance, 
serve as a constant reminder to parties of their obligations and enable them to take ‘appropriate 
action’ (Cameron, 1996, 189). It is also during the CoP that any recommendations for enforcement 
and implementation of treaty provisions are made, together with a range of resolutions or policies 
that are decided by the parties (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007; Hutton and Dickson, 2000).   
It is worth highlighting that, even though recommendations are not strictu sensu considered legally 
binding, they have effectively shaped the regime and governments behavior ‘in a manner hardly 
foreseeable at the time of its creation’ (Sand, 1999,150). 
With regards to the monitoring of the convention, parties are required to submit reports to the 
CITES secretariat which, in turn does reports on parties implementation and compliance with the 
convention. The convention also has a formal mandate for assistance by ‘qualified NGOs’ to monitor 
the illegal wildlife trade (Sand, 1999, 149). 
Without a doubt, CITES stands out as the first major multilateral treaty to incorporate NGOs in an 
active way, and is clearly a landmark in this regard as NGOs play significant roles under CITES in 
monitoring (Raustiala, 1997b; Redgwell, 2010). NGOs have indeed been ‘very active participants’ in 
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the different meetings, and strong partners of the secretariat, who has regularly sought, for example, 
opinions of the IUCN environmental law center or the assistance of TRAFFIC to monitor the illegal 
wildlife trade (Raustiala, 1997a, 1997b; Lanchberry, 1998). With particular attention to the 
monitoring of parties implementation and compliance, the regime has greatly benefited from the 
participation of NGOs in the different meetings. Such organizations have been instrumental in 
tracking the wildlife trade, evaluating the progress of the regime and improving compliance with the 
provisions of the convention (Raustiala, 1997a; Redgwell, 2010). For example, by allowing NGOs to 
attend the CoP and informally present about CITES implementation, CITES has been successful in 
eliciting higher degrees of compliance than might otherwise have been the case (Cameron, 1996).  
Arguably, cooperation with non state actors has provided the convention ‘not only [with] a high 
degree of transparency, but also what is probably one of the best operational information sources 
available to any environmental treaty’ (Sand, 1999, 165). This is due to the fact that there have been 
multiple and in depth surveys in major wildlife consumer countries and the trends and scope of the 
illegal wildlife trade, as well as targeted investigations of the trade in particular threatened species 
(Sand, 1999). It is important to highlight, however, that NGOs do not have access to all the sessions 
of the CoP and are not involved in the decision-making process. Member states continue to yield all 
the decision power, and have even developed what are called ‘informal informals’ where only states 
representative meet and discuss particular issues (Raustiala, 1997a, 773).   
With regards to NGO participation, CITES is ‘unusual for its time’, as it provided an unprecedented 
new approach to cooperation between governments and NGOs through its NGO participation clause 
(Raustiala, 1997b, 547). This clause actually became a standard formula for subsequent international 
environmental treaties (Sand, 1999). It needs to be highlighted that during the CoP held in 2000, 
parties called for international organizations and NGOs to provide further technical support and 
assistance and to continue to assist with trainings: ‘The Secretariat may seek assistance from 
‘suitable (…) nongovernmental international or national agencies and bodies technically qualified in 
protection, conservation, and management of wild fauna and flora’’ (Raustiala, 1997a, 722-723; 
Sands, 2003, Redgwell, 2010). This is arguably a direct response from states calling for further 
assistance to effectively deal with international environmental problems. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
As it has been discussed throughout this chapter, the subject, scope and source of international law 
has changed. International environmental law has emerged as a distinct field and a different – more 
flexible and dynamic – process, that makes broad use of soft law and framework arrangements and 
involves actors other than the state. This distinctiveness is already reflected in the actual 
terminology of international environmental law, which refers to ‘commitments’, ‘non-compliance’ 
and ‘consequences’ rather than ‘obligations’, ‘breach’ and ‘remedies’ or ‘sanctions’ (Koskenniemi, 
1992, 123; Bodansky, Brunne and Hey, 2007, 24). The need to protect the environment has also 
generated a ‘new and intensified focus of transnational collaboration’ (Rosenau, 2000, 186) and has 
emphasized the need for collective action between states, regulatory regimes, and the different 
array of actors in order to effectively counter environmental problems. 
Throughout this chapter we examined the essential roles of non state actors in international 
environmental affairs. It has been stressed that their participation is a key aspect to ensure 
compliance with the treaties, regulatory regimes and international obligations and to shape state 
behavior.  
It has also been highlighted that the involvement of additional actors in international environmental 
law does not obscure the role of the state. States remain – and will continue to remain – the central 
body in international environmental law (Jordan et al, 2005; Wapner, 2005; McCormick, 1999). 
However, the state is no longer able to effectively deal with global environmental problems alone, 
and needs to involve additional players that will assist in resolving the problems (Bodansky, Brunnee 
and Hey, 2007). Such actors, as noted throughout this chapter, are able to fill in the regulatory gaps 
that states are unable to fulfill by offering expert advice and undertaking different roles and 
functions (Gunningham, 2009; McCormick, 1999; Michalowski and Bitten, 2005, Aas, 2007).  
Non state actors have played a central role and remain highly influential in international 
environmental law (Sands, 2003). Their presence and participation at meetings and CoP, official 
negotiations and at different stages of the implementation process has become routine (Brown 
Weiss, 1993, 1999). It has been argued that this involvement is mutually beneficial, as non state 
actors are essential in raising awareness of issues at stake, ensuring environmental problems get 
tackled and providing the necessary impetus for the creation and realization of international 
environmental regimes (Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke, 2007). Non state actors also enable states to 
comply with their commitments and obligations under the treaties, and perform varied functions in 
implementation and review to ensure states comply with the treaty (Lanchberry, 1998).  While in a 
72 
 
formal sense law making remains firmly in the hands of states, non state actors participate and 
provide input into the lawmaking process and help shape its outcome (see generally Bodansky, 
Brunnee and Hey, 2007), as highlighted by the CITES example. 
One of the larger successes of international environmental law is perhaps its ability to find a way to 
accommodate the distinct interests of a wide variety of states and non state actors, who’s 
participation in international environmental, albeit in different ways, is crucial if environmental 
problems are to be addressed with some measure of success (Bodansky, Brunnee and Hey, 2007).  
As noted throughout this chapter, non state actors exercise a vast amount of influence on states to 
ensure they continue to adhere to international commitments and treaty obligations. International 
institutions, organizations and NGOs, however, are not simply transnational pressure groups. Rather, 
they are actors in their own right. The predominant way to think about them is as transnational 
interest groups that are able to successfully ‘affect state policies and interstate behavior’ (Wapner, 
2005, 539). 
To conclude, it has to be stressed that the process of interaction among the different non state 
actors is indeed a very complicated one (Brown Weiss, 1993). Only states – the primary subjects of 
international law – are entitled to enter into binding agreements, although most of these 
agreements have been reached at the initiative (formal or informal) of different non state actors 
(Sands, 2003; Anreiter, 1997). In reality states are the main actors in international environmental law. 
In practice, non state actors play a central role in virtually every aspect of it and hold multiple roles 
that they fulfill in close cooperation with governments (Sands, 2003).  
In addition, non state actors seek to influence states by increasing public awareness and public 
pressure. Governments, at the same time, use non state actors to convey positions to the public. 
States, during the different venues and forums for discussion that are provided for them to express 
their views and to call for action, may use non state actors strengthen their expertise and to remain 
well informed about important issues. Non state actors will also use such venues to influence and 
work closely with governments to shape and influence their behavior.  
At the same time, states provide, through the creation of regulatory regimes and intergovernmental 
organizations, the possibility to have a direct link with national governments. Such organizations are 
heavily relied upon to provide information and insights to non state actors that will be useful in 
influencing state behavior (Brown Weiss, 1993; Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, 2010). 
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Chapter 4: Combating transnational 
organized wildlife crime: the illegal 
wildlife trade, transnational policing and 
new structures of cooperation  
  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Earlier chapters highlighted that international environmental problems such as the illegal wildlife 
trade have resulted in the emergence of tailor-made procedures in international environmental law 
and the development of dynamic and flexible regulatory regimes aimed at enhancing cooperation to 
deal with environmental problems. They also explored the role of state and non-state actors and 
suggested the need to protect the environment has generated an intensified focus on transnational 
collaboration and emphasized the need for collective action. 
This chapter will focus in more depth upon the specific elements of the illegal wildlife trade, 
transnational policing and the development of new structures of cooperation to combat it.  
In an earlier publication (van Asch, 2007) I used a quote from Fijnaut and Paoli to describe the 
difficulties of international cooperation. The word puzzle has often been used for it by many, but is 
particularly relevant here:  
‘Anyone wishing to put together a proper picture… is like someone who has to complete a 
jigsaw puzzle in which a large proportion of the pieces are missing or… (do) not… fit together’ 
(Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004, 258;  in van Asch, 2007, 29) 
In order to try to put together the different pieces of the puzzle that is international cooperation, the 
chapter has been divided into three sections64: 
 Section I will explore the illegal wildlife trade and in particular to what extent it is a serious 
transnational organized crime. It will also make some comparisons with other types of crime 
and explore key similarities and differences with other transnational crimes, with a focus on 
drugs and art crime. 
                                                 
64 See footnote 1 in the Introduction for details on previously published worked used in this thesis.  
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 Section II will focus on regulating the illegal wildlife trade, the globalization of crime and 
what it has meant for international police and law-enforcement cooperation. It will 
elaborate on the emergence of new structures of cooperation to enhance cooperation and 
coordination to combat the illegal wildlife trade.  
 Section III will explore existing research on (illegal) networks and various available methods 
that can be used to evaluate them and measure their effectiveness.  
The literature reviewed in this chapter provides a basis for the evaluation to be used in the following 
chapters of the thesis (see chapter 6, 7 and 8) to assess the effectiveness of two initiatives analysed 
throughout the fieldwork and will attempt to put the pieces of the puzzle together.  
 
4.2 (Section I) The illegal wildlife trade - to what extent is it a serious 
transnational organized crime? 
This section will explore the illegal wildlife trade and in particular to what extent it is a serious 
transnational organized crime. Firstly, it will explore the availability and reliability of data on wildlife 
crime and continue by considering what is meant by transnational organized crime and in particular 
how organized transnational crime is. It will then explore wildlife crime in further detail in Southeast 
Asia, including the drivers and modus operandi, smuggling routes and trafficking techniques to 
establish to what extent the illegal wildlife trade is a serious transnational organized crime. The 
section will conclude by comparing wildlife crime with other transnational crimes to explore the links 
between them.  
 
4.2.1 The illegal wildlife trade  
Worldwide there is a high – and growing – demand for wild plants and animals. While most of the 
trade is legal, there are considerable amounts of illegal trade taking place driven by a vast demand 
for protected species.  The illegal wildlife trade is a product of the free market and is encouraged by 
the lucrative profits it generates (Hayman and Brack, 2002; TRAFFIC, 2008; Duffy 2010, 2016). 
Wildlife is often exceptionally valuable, with the price dependent on a number of variables including 
demand, rarity and the luxury of the item, as well as its fashion status and its real or perceived 
medical value. This precipitates a lucrative black market for opportunistic criminals and 
unscrupulous traders to exploit, irrespective of the damage that this causes to countries, their 
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ecosystems and the livelihoods of communities around the globe (Liddick, 2011, 43). One of the 
consequences of the illegal trade is that some species are pushed to the brink of extinction. This 
includes not only high-profile and highly threatened species such as tigers, elephants and rhinoceros, 
but also other smaller and less known animals and plants such as bears, pangolins, tortoises and 
turtles, orchids and rare wood species, to name a few. Such species have been subject to a drastic 
decline in their population (TRAFFIC, 2008, Broad et al., 2003).   
The implications of the illegal trade, nonetheless, go far beyond the extinction of species and have 
far-reaching effects and implications at local and national levels as well as regionally or globally 
(TRAFFIC, 2008). The illegal trade also undermines national and international efforts to achieve 
sustainable development and poverty alleviation, and may include potentially severe environmental, 
economic and human impacts such as the collapse of ecosystems, the loss of revenue and the 
spread of diseases such as SARS or avian influenza (Karesh et al., 2005, 2007). Ultimately, the illicit 
market may create a culture of lawlessness that is closely linked with corruption and that leads to 
the erosion of state authority due to the constant undermining of national laws, international 
regulations and enforcement efforts (Liddick, 2011; Bowman, 1996; Hayman and Brack, 2002; 
TRAFFIC, 2008; World Bank, 2005; Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2014).   
Yet, to date, the illegal wildlife trade has not received the attention that is given by governments and 
academics to other transnational crimes such as drugs (South and Wyatt, 2011, 546). This chapter 
aims to highlight the illegal wildlife trade as a major transnational crime and will examine what is 
known about how the criminal networks behind the trade operate.  
 
Availability and reliability of data 
It is important to highlight that when one looks at data sources on the illegal wildlife trade, it is 
necessary, in some cases, to approach them with caution and a certain degree of scepticism. I have 
reached the below conclusions conducting interviews for the thesis and in previous and current 
work experience where I observed how easily statements can be made and/or taken out of context.  
Firstly, the illegal wildlife trade as a transnational organized crime and within green criminology is a 
relatively recent topic (South and Wyatt, 2011, 546), particularly when compared to other 
transnational crimes such as drugs. As Elliot highlights, while other transnational organized crimes 
have been ‘securitized’ (i.e. highlighted as crucial crimes to tackle), transnational environmental 
crimes such as illicit trafficking in wildlife have generally been ‘un(der)securitized’ (Elliot, 2007, 2016) 
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and they are often ‘not taken seriously within the broader policy and enforcement community’ 
(Elliot, 2012, 87).  
In addition, research on  illicit wildlife trafficking is insufficient in terms of both quantity and quality 
(Schneider 2008, 275) and there is limited information available on illegal trade (Rosen and Smith 
2010, 28). Where available, most research tends to focus on particular species rather than the 
criminological aspects of the trade. There is, for example a vast amount of research that has been 
conducted on the illegal trade in certain species or commodities from Country A to Country B. There 
is also significant information and official analysis available on, for example elephants, as there are 
specific projects and reporting mechanisms and requirements under CITES. Similar information 
however does not exist to date on the transnational criminal aspects of the illegal wildlife trade, 
which is a relatively recent issue of research.  
One of the main problems is that primary data are often lacking and unavailable from the source (e.g. 
the countries and their respective government agencies). This has resulted in the majority of 
information available being generated to date by a broad range of international, intergovernmental 
and nongovernmental organizations. While generally such organizations are well respected65, they 
are still influenced by particular interests or priorities and are consequently not always objective 
observers. Reporting may therefore present inconsistencies such as contrasting claims by different 
organizations. One of such claims is, for example, the way in which the illegal wildlife trade is 
portrayed as a transnational organized crime, where it is has sometimes been claimed that the illegal 
wildlife trade is a mafia-style crime and heavily linked with other transnational crimes such as drugs 
and arms, with little evidence to support the facts. Another source of data is the media, which has 
been known to trivialize the news to make larger profits and where information is often portrayed 
incomplete or in an inconsistent manner (e.g. the same case is reported differently by various 
sources). Such data are often used for reports (without verification) which are in turn used in further 
reports or publications.  
Furthermore, wildlife crimes often occur in remote areas and are rarely discovered, and therefore 
not known or reported. Data on the actual volume of the illegal trade are therefore largely unknown 
and any analysis will show clear inconsistencies. As Hill (2005, 55) among others notes, figures are 
                                                 
65 Good examples, amongst others, are IUCN, WWF or TRAFFIC, that have produced vast amounts of research 
on both the legal and the illegal wildlife trade. These organizations are globally respected for their research on 
the wildlife trade. A relatively ‘new’ important player in future research on the illegal wildlife trade is the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and their research on wildlife crime for the Transnational Organized 
Crime Threat Assessments (UNODC, 2010, 2013) and more recently, the World Wildlife Crime Report (UNODC, 
2016). 
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based on what one is able to see, ‘however, the ratio between failures and successes is unknown. 
Therefore, estimates can vary greatly’. When seizures are made, data are often not reported by 
countries, making any analysis of official statistics incomplete. In many cases there are clear 
differences between official statistics and other reports from the media or the NGO community. 
In some extreme cases data inconsistencies may also result from statements made when data are 
insufficient or unavailable or when it is assumed that a particular claim is true when there is no 
substantive evidence.  Once such a claim is made, the information often becomes commonly used by 
others without being able to trace the original source and to verify it.  One example is the value of 
the illegal wildlife trade as a ten billion dollar business per year. This was supposedly given by 
Interpol sometime between 2008 and 2010. Interpol had, however, not actually made such a 
statement, and it was unclear where the original information had originated from. The result was 
that the value – correct or not – was used for years by a broad range of organizations and academics, 
until it became clear that the source of the information was uncertain and that further research 
needed to be conducted on the matter.   
There is, however, some good (or better) news. The increasing profile of wildlife and environmental 
crimes over the last decade has generated a growth of related disciplines (green, conservation or 
environmental criminology) and interest from research institutions, as well as a growth in interest of 
the organizations that are ‘tasked’ with combating it (Wellsmith, 2011, 126). The limited knowledge 
of wildlife networks is also ‘slowly growing’ (Ayling, 2013, 59; see generally Elliott and Schaedla, 
2016; Faure, De Smedt and Stas, 2016; Pink, 2010, 2013a,b, 2015; Pink and Lehane, 2011, 2015; Pink 
and Bartel, 2015 and others).  
Crucial, perhaps more than one might think, is the development and publication of the first ever 
World Wildlife Crime Report (UNODC, 2016). The report, produced by UNODC with support from 
ICCWC ‘takes stock of the present wildlife crime situation with a focus on illicit trafficking of specific 
protected species of wild fauna and flora, and provides a broad assessment of the nature and extent 
of the problem at the global level. It includes a quantitative market assessment and a series of in-
depth illicit trade case studies’ (UNODC, 2016, 9). The key reason why this report is particularly 
important to future research on wildlife crime is that it is based on official data provided by 
countries to CITES and the WCO66, using a similar approach to the Annual World Drug Reports 
(UNODC). Another reason is that finally wildlife crime is getting sufficient attentions for countries to 
actively request it to be monitored much more closely.  
                                                 
66 While the report (or future iterations) will not, for the reasons stated above, provide a full picture of the 
illegal wildlife trade, it will most certainly improve on the current one.  
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In addition, CITES Parties are now requested to submit (starting in 2017 and with the first reports 
due at the end of October 2017), official data on the illegal trade and have requested that these data 
continue to be analysed (CITES Notification 2016/007; see CITES, 2017b). This will generate future 
iterations and improve and expand the current knowledge base and information available.  
 
4.2.2 Transnational Organized Crime 
Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) has been labelled as a ‘new monster’ that can be defeated only 
through improved collaboration at the international level: a threat by the ‘armies of evil’ that 
demands increased and more effective international cooperation to enable authorities to ‘display 
the same ingenuity and innovation, organisational flexibility and cooperation that characterises the 
criminal organisations themselves’ (Woodiwiss, 2003, 21; Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004, 39; van Asch, 
2007). Indeed, as Richards (1999, 3) highlights: ‘Where criminals and criminal organizations are 
limited only by their imagination, local and national law-enforcement agencies have always been 
limited to combating crime by the confines of the law and their particular geographic distribution’. 
The purpose of the thesis is not however to delve into discussions over the concept or definitions of 
transnational crime or transnational organized crime as there is a broad and ongoing discussion on 
this issue.  
Wildlife crime in intrinsically transnational. However, whether it is committed by organizations (or 
not) and the levels of organization involved need to be discussed in further detail.  Before exploring 
this monster further in relation to wildlife crime, a few points should nonetheless be clarified and a 
brief overview is needed to explore the overall concepts and understanding of TOC, as this will be 
relevant to later discussions.  
The main agreement around a definition of organized and transnational organized crime is that 
agreeing on a definition is ‘problematic’ (Ponsaers, Shapland and Williams, 2008, 647) and that there 
is no consensus over a definition of either transnational organized crime or of organized crime 
(Ponsaers, Shapland and Williams, 2008; Madsen, 2009; Michael, 2008; Cockayne, 2007).  
TOC is sometimes used as a synonym of international mafia-type organisations (Woodiwiss, 2003, 
13). Fijnaut and Paoli (2004, 27) suggest TOC groups are ‘groups primarily focused on illegal profits 
systematically commit crime that adversely affect society and are capable of effectively shielding 
their activities, in particular by being willing to use … violence or eliminate individuals by way of 
corruption’.  
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Cockayne (2007) suggests it is possible to outline some overlapping concepts of TOC as:  
 A ‘set of activities which may be undertaken by any actor or entity, whether economic or 
political, private or public’ (2007, 1). These activities generate an informal economic system 
that meets demand by supplying illicit goods and services regardless of the actors 
conducting the illicit activities (Cockayne, 2007, 1-2; see also Nadelmann, 1990; Naylor, 1995; 
Serrano, 2002). 
 ‘A set of hierarchically-organized entities, conducting diverse commercial activities unified 
by their underlying business model—the protection racket … [which] focuses on specific 
membership-based business “groups”—which may even be characterized as illicit “firms”—
conceptually distinct from government and politics, and essentially concerned with 
conducting criminal activities. In this conception, TOC is any entity engaged in 
transnationally-organized criminal activity’ (Cockayne, 2007, 2).  
The main types of global or transnational criminal organizations include the traditional transnational 
criminal organizations (Sicilian and American mafia families, Russian mafia, Japanese Jakuza, Chinese 
triads and Colombian and Mexican drug cartels) and smaller but highly sophisticated groups or 
networks with certain criminal specialties that work like a business (Richards, 1999, 4-5). It should 
however be noted that not all transnational crime is committed by organizations, and not all 
organized crime is ‘organized’ (it can be, for example, disorganized crime, loosely organized, or a 
one-off illicit activity). 
Richards (1999) suggests a number of characteristics that are shared by organized crime groups or 
criminal organizations, including among other: the ability to corrupt officials, discipline and 
confidentiality among its members, capacity to infiltrate organizations, motivation for power and 
wealth, sophistication of methods and techniques to obtain or smuggle goods, continuity in 
operations, a diversity in illicit activities, the ‘bonding’ of its members and mobility across borders. 
Overall, Dobovsek (2008, 681) notes that organized crime is a criminal enterprise which strives 
towards the ‘acquisition’ of larger profits, both in terms of power and financial profits.   
Later sections will explore wildlife crime and the links to TOC, but for example, Pires and Moreto 
(2011) refer to transnational crime as anything from three or more loosely organized individuals to 
large and highly organized criminal networks and/or criminal organizations that are involved in some 
instances of the trade or control the illegal wildlife trade chain. The ‘strive’ for financial profits is also 
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one of the key features of transnational organized wildlife crime (Hayman and Brack, 2002; TRAFFIC, 
2008; Duffy, 2010, 2016; UNODC, 2013).  
For the purposes of this thesis, transnational organized crime will be defined as referred to by Article 
2 of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), which refers to organized 
criminal groups as ‘a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and 
acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offenses established …, 
in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit’ (UNODC, 2010, 1; see 
also UNTOC, 2000; McClean, 2007; Pink, 2013b).  
It should also be noted that throughout the thesis, in addition to referring to TOC and transnational 
organized wildlife crime (see also other chapters of the thesis), I will be using interchangeably the 
terms ‘policing’ and ‘law-enforcement’ or ‘enforcement’. Unless indicated otherwise, when I use 
these terms I refer to government agencies (normally police and customs) that have the authority to 
investigate crime within their jurisdiction and have relevant associated powers (such as powers to 
seize and/or arrest, noting that these are often different in the different countries). 
 
A local, international, transnational, global – or glocal – issue? 
Organized crime has traditionally been viewed as a local or national issue and it is sometimes 
suggested that ‘responses must be predicated on the reality that even if they sometimes cross 
borders, they operate within particular local, social, political and economic contexts’ (Edwards and 
Gill, 2003, 4; Richards, 1999; Hill, 2005; van Asch, 2007).  
Indeed, the debate is between those that emphasize (subscribing to a global pluralist theory) the 
need to combat TOC in an increasingly transnational dimension on the one hand, and on the other, 
that TOC is a local problem. Fijnaut and Paoli (2004, 248) argue that the most influential criminal 
groups are well integrated in a particular country and will remain ‘domestic’ and that ‘in focusing on 
the cross-border transnational aspects … we remove the … activity from the originating political, 
economic and social context within which it might be better understood or … dealt with by law-
enforcement’ (Beare, 2003, XXIII). Under this premise, TOC is not global or transnational, as these 
are ‘abstract fields devoid of relations’ (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004, 39; Hobbs, 1998, 419). The 
transnational aspect refers to the transportation of goods or commodities but where the ‘crucial 
phases’ take place locally (van Asch, 2007).  
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However, over the past few decades, there has been a growing recognition that crime and criminal 
organizations have crossed jurisdictional boundaries (Richards, 1999, 3) and have moved and 
evolved into a global phenomenon (Chatterjee, 2005) that may include the transnational, regional or 
international. Hill (2005, 47) suggests that whatever their geographic scope, it is clearly no longer 
simply a local or domestic matter. Michael (2008) uses Hobbs’ (1998) terminology (a glocal crime) 
and suggests that at any particular point in time a transnational criminal activity has a local 
dimension (e.g. provincial level within a nation) as well as a more international, transnational or 
global dimension (e.g. the source and end points for the goods or services): it is ‘not simply 
“geographic”, as there are many more logical domains from which transnational crime must be 
considered including the social, political and the economic’ (Michael, 2008, 9).  
The challenge for law-enforcement agencies is how to think of both the local and global i.e. the 
glocal (Michael, 2008, 20), as typically policing methods used to deal with local crime cannot cope 
adequately with international crime (Anderson, 1989, 189). Equally, international crime cannot 
usually be deal adequately with the same toolbox as local crimes. As I suggested in an earlier 
publication, the different types of crime (local, national, cross-border and international) should be 
fought first at their own level, and then bilaterally, transnationally or internationally as may be 
appropriate (van Asch, 2007). As Bowling (2009, 149) highlights, the world is becoming more 
economically, politically, technologically and socially interconnected and therefore all aspects of 
policing are gradually transforming in the local, national, regional, international and global spheres. 
It is therefore imperative that we explore the effectiveness of cooperation and collaboration across 
the different levels to combat transnational crime more effectively.    
 
How organized is transnational crime? 
There are a number of ‘typologies’ of TOC groups. Some forms of organized crime are organized 
while others are more disorganized in nature (Michael, 2008). Organized crime could include mafia-
style organizations or a network of individuals. Nonetheless, all transnational crimes are not 
necessarily orchestrated by organized criminal groups (Hill, 2005, 48) and there are varying degrees 
and types of organization (see Section II for additional details in relation to wildlife crime).  
Usually, organizations such as the Italian mafia do not generally expand outwards to avoid 
competition and tend to recede to their territories (Paoli, 2004, 263-302). The expansion of a 
criminal network such as the mafia would therefore not necessarily be a strategic choice, but might 
more likely be due to the migration of its members who then reunite and establish new international 
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links (Paoli, 2004). Conversely, ‘business’ style networks based on supply and demand will readily 
expand to new and emerging countries. These types of criminal networks are ‘characterized by a 
large degree of fluidity and structural complexity’ (Chatterjee, 2005, 9). 
Perhaps a key difference was suggested by Galeotti (2005), which defined ‘mafia associations as 
criminal enterprises wishing power. Their true goal is power … they see money as a route to power’ 
(in Dobovsek, 2008, 683). Gaspar (2008, 18) notes that internationally, ‘organized crime is typically 
seen as being behind the running of illicit commodity trading routes and markets’. Criminal networks 
share a number of characteristics, but are more akin to business networks or models: 
‘these groups are now able to link up with criminal groups in other countries and establish 
international networks for the production, management, financing and distribution of their 
products and services… these networks have the ability not only to escape prosecution … but 
also to infiltrate the law-enforcement, judicial and political systems’ (Aas, 2007, 135). 
What appears to be happening is that the ‘traditional’ view of a large and hierarchical Mafia (e.g. a 
criminal group made up of a single family) is changing to a view that organized crime is comprised of 
‘loosely federated networks’ (Michael, 2008, 20). A large proportion of transnational crimes are 
being perpetrated by ‘globally interspersed ever mutating interlocking networks of locally-based 
serious criminality’ (Hobbs, 1998, 70; see also van Asch, 2007).  
 
4.2.3 A serious transnational organized crime? 
Drivers and modus operandi for the illegal wildlife trade 
In Asia, the wildlife trade is an issue and concern of great importance, because the region contains 
one of the largest amounts of biodiversity and wild fauna and flora globally. It is also a region where 
the wildlife trade poses a disproportionately large threat to wild species because of overexploitation 
and illegal trade (Nijman, 2010, 1102).  
The market for wildlife meat and products is driven by a high and rising demand (TRAFFIC, 2008, 61; 
Broad et al, 2003) and is motivated by functional reasons, mainly associated with the perceived 
health benefits of traditional medicine as well as other motivations such as displaying social status or 
honouring and respecting guests67 (TRAFFIC, 2010a, 9). Wildlife is also consumed because of its 
                                                 
67 Demand for protected species is motivated by a number of reasons, usually related to wealth, power, 
influence and status, particularly when the wildlife goods are considered non-essential or luxury items (van 
Asch 2013, 147–162). 
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perceived properties extending beyond nutrition, such as increased virility, luck or the ability to 
restore health or cure cancer (TRAFFIC, 2008, 62; Liddick, 2011, 46; Oswell, 2011; Hayman and Brack, 
2002; Milliken and Shaw, 2012; van Asch, 2013, 147–162; UNODC, 2013; Broad et al, 2003). Much of 
the illegal trade is driven by age-old beliefs, cultural values and traditions concerning the medical 
properties of rare plants and animals. Believed to be expanding at a rate of 10% per annum (Liddick, 
2011, 46), the traditional medicine market has attracted a considerable amount of illegal trade 
(Hayman and Brack, 2002; World Bank, 2005), as the species often used in the medicines are largely 
protected by CITES. While it has been scientifically proven that many of the traditional remedies do 
not possess the curative properties they are perceived to have, demand for wildlife for traditional 
medicine continues to thrive. Wildlife is also traded as pets, display materials and/or household 
decorative objects (TRAFFIC, 2008; UNODC, 2010, 2013). Demand has increased in recent years as a 
result of the ongoing process of globalization and the economic growth in developing countries 
across Asia. Population growth and increasing economic affluence and disposable income in 
previously economically-deprived communities have led to a rise in demand for exotic wildlife in 
consumer countries. This has enlarged the scale and extent of the international wildlife trade in 
developed, emerging and developing nations alike (Nijman, 2010, 1102; TRAFFIC, 2008, 6). Indeed, 
as the World Wildlife Crime report highlights, the illegal wildlife trade is a global phenomenon 
(UNODC, 2016). 
The links between wealth, poverty and engagement in the wildlife trade are complex: people 
involved in the trade are not necessarily poor, and the poor who are involved usually do not drive 
the trade. In fact, studies suggest that wealth appears to be a stronger driver of illegal and 
unsustainable wildlife trade than poverty: as income increases, so does the demand for wildlife 
(World Bank, 2005, 4; TRAFFIC, 2008; Broad et al, 2003). This is particularly the case where wildlife 
products are considered non-essential or luxury goods (TRAFFIC, 2008, 62). Unsurprisingly, 
harvesters and suppliers are highly responsive to the market opportunities presented by the wildlife 
trade, displaying mobility between products, locations and markets in order to meet demand 
(TRAFFIC, 2008, XII). Harvesters are usually contacted by middlemen or paid to poach specific 
animals (Oswell, 2011). Studies suggest higher prices for wildlife products do not have a major 
influence on wildlife consumption (TRAFFIC, 2008, 61), albeit there is some evidence to suggest that 
it has contributed to a change in the profile of consumers. On the contrary, higher prices tend to 
stimulate the black market in wildlife, as traders respond to the lucrative opportunities that are 
generated by the demand for wildlife and the expanding consumer base (TRAFFIC, 2008, 61).  
84 
 
Improved communications and connectivity, road development, and accessibility to protected areas 
and wildlife markets have also had a major influence in the illegal trade (TRAFFIC, 2008, 63). Porous 
borders and weak enforcement along and across borders in the region, together with improved 
transport and communication links and advances in technology have led to a situation where wildlife 
traffickers move almost unimpeded across borders (World Bank, 2005). Furthermore, the creation of 
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015, has, unintentionally, facilitated the illegal movement 
of goods across borders (AEC, 2012; AEC Blueprint, 2012). This makes it even less complicated to 
move illegal wildlife between source and consumer countries (TRAFFIC, 2008, 6; UNODC, 2013). The 
problem has been made more challenging in places by unscrupulous elites and corrupt public 
officials who exploit all available natural resources with little regard for the sustainability of wild 
species, or the detrimental effects of the illegal wildlife trade to their country’s economy, 
ecosystems and the livelihoods of rural communities (Liddick, 2011; see also van Asch, 2013; Shaw 
and Reitano, 2013).  
 
The Illegal Wildlife Trade in Southeast Asia  
Asia, and Southeast Asia in particular, is a hub for the consumption of wildlife and a key supplier of 
wildlife products to the region and the world. Countries in the region play one or more of three roles 
in the international wildlife trade: as a source of wildlife, conduit for the trade (transit or re-export) 
or consumer (World Bank, 2005, 3; UNODC, 2010, 2013). Trade is initiated in the source countries 
and is met by both legal and illegal means (TRAFFIC, 2008, IX), as exemplified by the number of 
illegal wildlife available at any given time in markets across the region.  Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand 
and Vietnam were historically the main sources of wildlife in the region. As wildlife became scarce, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Myanmar became the ‘new’ sources for wildlife (World Bank, 2005, 4). 
Thailand, together with Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam, play major roles as regional and global 
conduits for the illegal wildlife trade in the region. China and Vietnam, are considered the main 
drivers of the illegal wildlife trade and are the largest consumers, particularly for products and 
ingredients for traditional medicine and as symbols of power and wealth (Liddick, 2011, 46; World 
Bank, 2005, 3; UNODC, 2013).  
It is virtually impossible to put an exact figure on the extent of the trade, as seizures and official 
estimates depend upon official action, which varies between countries. As noted above, data are 
also insufficient or unavailable. It is clear, however, that the nature and structure of the trade can be 
extremely complex, as the relationships between all parties involved continues to change and evolve 
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in response to the availability of wildlife. Traders will rapidly adapt to changing circumstances to 
maintain their substantial income (World Bank, 2005, 3; UNODC, 2013). The trends and patterns of 
the trade are thus not static and tend to shift and evolve over time. Given that wildlife - unlike drugs 
– is a finite resource, as forests are emptied and wild populations decimated, traders move to other 
source areas or countries to meet demand (Hoare, 2007)68.  
 
Smuggling Routes and Trafficking Techniques 
The illegal wildlife trade is best understood in categories, each with its own specific markets, 
smuggling methods and trafficking routes (TRAFFIC, 2008; Rosen and Smith, 2010; UNODC, 2010, 
2013). These range from individual collectors dealing in small quantities of specific species to 
organized networks that will deal in larger shipments and quantities. In all cases, smuggling methods 
and routes will shift and adapt in order to avoid detection or make it more difficult. In most cases, 
traders will exploit weak wildlife law-enforcement and a general lack of knowledge as well as the low 
degree of importance given to the illegal wildlife trade in the region. When caught in possession of 
illegal wildlife, traders will attempt – often successfully – to bribe officials or convince them that 
their illegal shipment is legal. Even when traders or smugglers are caught, there are often no follow-
up investigations, and even fewer prosecutions69. To make matters worse, fines and other penalties 
are generally weak and do not deter smugglers as the benefits far outweigh the penalties and risks 
of being involved in the illegal trade (World Bank, 2005, 3; UNODC, 2013; van Asch, 2013; Shaw and 
Reitano, 2013, 15; Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 2014; Wyatt, 2016).  
Illegal wildlife shipments are transported with relative ease by land, air or sea throughout the region. 
Routes and transport mechanisms range from the most simple and open smuggling cases where 
illegal wildlife is not even intentionally hidden, to complex smuggling mechanisms similar to those 
used for drugs and other illegal commodities. The more organized traders often use legal imports 
and exports as a cover for their illicit activities and will falsify certificates, mix protected species with 
legal shipments or look-alike species, and take advantage of porous borders, the lack of capacity of 
law-enforcement agencies and regulatory loopholes to smuggle wildlife with relative ease (Liddick, 
2011, 43; Schneider, 2008; Wilson-Wilde, 2010b). The methods of concealment vary depending on 
                                                 
68 Wildlife is considered a finite resource if harvested unsustainably. The unsustainable harvesting of wildlife 
will lead to the depletion of wildlife in a particular area unless populations are given sufficient time to recover. 
69 There are many reasons why there are very few investigations and even less prosecutions and convictions. 
Corruption is amongst them, but there is also a general lack of awareness of the illegal wildlife trade amongst 
enforcement officers as well as very weak national wildlife laws in most countries in Asia. In addition, there is a 
general lack of knowledge and concern from prosecutors for these crimes compared to other crimes..  
86 
 
the type, size and quantity of the species that need to be smuggled and the resourcefulness of the 
smugglers – smugglers have been caught squeezing birds into tubes and packing tiger cubs or 
smaller reptiles in luggage and suitcases, hidden in specifically designed items of clothing or in 
special concealed compartments in cars, vans and trucks. Species have even been reportedly 
transported using fake army or government plates, or ambulances (Liddick, 2011, 44-45). A curious 
example is bear bile smuggling in Vietnam, where illegal traders adapted to the boom in demand for 
bear bile and bear parts in the early 2000s by smuggling the animals in fake army vehicles, organizing 
fake funerals and using fake ambulances carrying bears dressed as patients (World Bank, 2005, 3). 
Laundering of wildlife also occurs when traffickers import commodities through intermediate 
destinations.  
 
Wildlife crime, a serious transnational organized crime 
As noted above, wildlife crime, however, affects all countries and impacts developed and developing 
countries alike (CITES, 2013a, 3; UNODC, 2016). In Southeast Asia, it is best understood in different 
categories. Most of the poaching from the wild is done by locals rather than professionals or 
organized criminal networks, albeit in some cases local poachers work ‘on demand’ and organized 
crime groups and professional poachers are involved (Pires and Moreto, 2011, 106; see also TRAFFIC, 
2008; Duffy, 2010; Ayling, 2013; UNODC, 2013, 2016). After the initial act, one begins to see a 
greater degree of organization in all subsequent stages of the trade chain at the local, regional and 
international level. As is also the case with other illicit trade in a number of commodities ‘[f]or each 
illicit good, the actors involved in sourcing, transporting, protecting and vending … will be different’ 
(Shaw and Reitano, 2013, 22).  
The illegal wildlife trade can have global repercussions (UNODC, 2016) and trade chains are usually 
well established, with fixed market locations and managed by the same groups of people. The value 
of the commodity in the trade chain will increase dramatically at its final destination (Bean, 2008) 
and those at the source (e.g. poachers) will only receive a very small percentage of the profits. A 
further issue to highlight is that it is generally a specialized trade. As Schneider (2008) suggests: 
‘The commodities that serve as the foundation for the illicit wildlife markets are markedly 
different … By their nature, endangered species are indigenous plants and/or animals that 
are removed from their country of origin … Obtaining the animals requires knowledge of 
habitat, tracking, hunting, and preserving the specimens…  Harvesting [also requires] this 
specialized knowledge’ (2008, 288) 
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Research on the organization of the illegal wildlife trade and those involved (both individuals and 
organizations) is sparse and fragmented, particularly given the lack of detection and prosecution of 
wildlife crime. Some of the illegal trade is opportunistic. Most of it, however, involves networks of 
people (including friends, associates and family members) with links to markets or distribution 
centres either locally, nationally or internationally. These networks tend to display different levels of 
organization depending on the particular value and volume of the trade (Liddick, 2011; Duffy, 2010; 
Wright, 2011; Elliott, 2012; Wyatt, 2016). The term 'organized' as used here involves anything from 
three loosely organized individuals to large networks and/or criminal organizations that control 
some or all instances of the illegal wildlife trade (Pires and Moreto, 2011, 107; Wilson-Wilde, 2010a, 
149). Unsurprisingly, large scale illegal trade in particularly valuable commodities appears often to 
be the most highly organized, and may be linked to large organized crime groups that make use of 
the latest technologies and have vast resources at their disposal (Hayman and Brack, 2002, 7; Ayling, 
2013, 64; Wyatt, 2016). The trade in traditional medicine and the broader trafficking in wildlife 
exhibit moderate levels of organization (Liddick, 2011, 45).  The least organized tends to be the trade 
driven by individual collectors and specialists seeking particular wildlife species. It needs to be noted 
that in some cases even the more loosely organized trade may involve relatively well organized 
networks (Hayman and Brack, 2002, 7). Overall, existing trade networks dealing with the legal 
wildlife trade are often used as a cover for illicit activities. Such networks are often managed or 
closely linked with specialized legal wildlife traders that have the necessary knowledge and expertise 
to exploit the regulatory weaknesses and trade routes in the region (Liddick, 2011, 48).   
In general, the wildlife literature underlines the fact that growing wildlife demand in the region has 
resulted in fierce trade networks that are competing against one another for a slice of the illicit 
market as the availability of certain wildlife products evaporates (World Bank, 2005; TRAFFIC, 2008). 
Sellar (2007) highlights the common characteristics and arrangements of such organized networks70. 
In many cases, the level of organization and influence that such networks display is enormous and 
may be as large as other criminal networks dealing in drugs or other illicit commodities. The noted 
increase in involvement of organized criminal groups was also echoed by participants of a ministerial 
meeting in March 2013 that ‘acknowledged the serious nature of transnational organized wildlife 
and forest crime, and … made reference to the disturbing escalation in the levels of poaching and 
illegal trade, and the increasing involvement of organized crime groups’ (CITES, 2013a, 3).  
                                                 
70 They include significant financial support, the capacity for detailed planning and the organization and 
management of shipments (often international in nature). In addition, organized groups have the capacity to 
create fake permits and certificates and are lured to the illicit trade by the lucrative profits that can be made. 
The organizations may also use, or threat to use, violence and may be heavily armed.  For more information, 
see Sellar (2007).  
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It should be noted that the networks and actors involved in the illicit wildlife trade chain and the 
level and organizations of the networks are likely to be different from region to region (Wright, 2011; 
Ayling, 2013; Pires and Moreto, 2011). In general, however traffickers are generally rather flexible 
and effective, especially when set against ‘some rather ineffective and outdated forms of 
interdiction’ (Bean, 2008, 142). 
 
Transnational Organized Crime and the Illegal Wildlife Trade: a Wildlife Mafia? 
The illegal wildlife trade, however, is not believed to be led by the kind of organized criminal 
syndicates that one would associate with the ‘mafia’ (Sellar, 2013; Hayman and Brack, 2002; van 
Asch, 2013, 156). Such groups (e.g. the Chinese ‘Triads’ or the ‘Yakuza’) might be involved on 
occasion in the illegal wildlife trade but it is unclear at present how frequent their involvement is – 
and whether they are involved – as there is no substantive evidence that confirms the degree of 
their participation. In most cases, the illegal wildlife trade is ‘organized in the sense that informal 
unity and reciprocity may be found rather than in the journalistic “mafia” sense’ (Hayman and Brack, 
2002, 7). Large transnational wildlife networks have established transit hubs and networks of 
couriers in different countries, have developed procedures for laundering profits and have managed 
to corrupt government and public officials to ensure they continue to operate with impunity (Liddick, 
2011, 48; Sellar, 2007; Zimmerman, 2003).  
Such criminal groups are lured into the illegal wildlife trade by the lucrative profits that can be made 
and, like their counterparts in other criminal activities, may be heavily armed and violent (Sellar, 
2007). Sellar (2013) highlights further that:  
Organized crime groups use sophisticated techniques and routes to smuggle their illegal 
goods … Specially designed routes exploit ports by employing limited screening facilities and 
using several transit and transhipment points to conceal the true country of origin.  
… Further, much of the wildlife contraband smuggled around the world is consigned to 
companies and addresses that either do not exist or serve purely for the period of transport. 
Front companies with elaborate false credentials conceal the illicit origin of animals, plants, 
and products. Senior and midlevel organized crime figures also minimize risk by recruiting 
couriers to transport illegally harvested contraband within countries or across international 
borders. Many different types of couriers prove effective. (Sellar, 2013, 33) 
In reality, the lack of a single ‘Mr. Big’ is thought to make it more difficult for law enforcement to 
dismantle the illegal operations. In turn it will also be more damaging for the environment, as 
competing illegal networks will be more reckless in their operations to ensure maximum benefits, 
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independently of the harm caused: ‘a single mafia-type organization might exercise more restraint 
on exploiting endangered animals than small competing enterprises’ (Hayman and Brack, 2002, 7).  
Two of the best known, highly organized criminal operations are the illegal rhino horn and ivory 
trades between Africa and Asia. Research shows that organized groups are in fact involved and that 
they use very imaginative and elaborate schemes to smuggle wildlife. Such groups have become 
increasingly sophisticated and make use of helicopters, night vision equipment and high calibre 
weapons with silencers to poach and are led by experienced mercenaries (CITES, 2012; UNTV/CITES, 
2012)71. Other examples include exploiting the legal trophy hunting trade by sending ‘working girls’ 
from Thailand or Vietnam to South Africa to ‘pose as hunters’. They then return to Vietnam with 
‘trophies’ that rapidly disappear into the black market (Interpol, 2012; Ayling, 2013; Rademeyer, 
2016). The media has also often reported the use of helicopters and high calibre machine guns in the 
poaching of elephant ivory and rhino horn, with Asia as a likely destination (Hogg and Stoddard, 
2012; Tomlinson, 2012; Sinha, 2012; Smith, 2011). This highlights the involvement of highly 
organized and resourceful criminal groups with strong links to source and demand countries. It does 
not, however, demonstrate strong links with criminal syndicates like the mafia.  
Known examples of highly organized illegal wildlife networks dealing in reptiles and other wildlife 
species in the region include the notorious trader from Malaysia known internationally as ‘Anson 
Wong’ and his alleged highly organized transnational smuggling operations (Christy, 2008, 2010, 
2010b, 2012; TRAFFIC 2010b, 2010c; BBC, 2010; Wyatt, 2016; see also Rademeyer, 2016, for 
examples in Africa). At the other end of the spectrum, one finds local farmers and poachers who 
may not be necessarily involved in broader illegal wildlife trade networks and their operations. Local 
middlemen may also be going to the provinces to buy protected wildlife for traders. 
 
4.2.4 Comparisons with other transnational organized crimes 
A number of links between transnational crimes such as the illicit drugs trade and wildlife crime have 
been claimed, but not substantiated (Schneider, 2008, 288). Earlier sections of the chapter explored 
                                                 
71 The demand is thought to be ‘fuelled by rumours of rhino horn being a cure for cancer, and being 
increasingly used in a manner akin to a recreational drug, such as ‘rhino wine,’ to improve male sexual 
performance, and to treat hangovers and other ill-effects of the over-consumption of food, drugs or alcohol’ 
(see CITES, 2012). United Nations TV (UNTV) and the CITES Secretariat launched in June 2012 a documentary 
film ‘Rhinos Under Threat’. The film shows the involvement of highly organized criminal organizations in the 
illegal trade in rhino horns from parks in South Africa and Swaziland, to Hanoi in Vietnam. It highlights the 
increase in trade in recent years and the brutality and impact of the killings on the local communities. The 
documentary investigates black markets in Hanoi, the demand for rhino horn in Asia and the measures taken 
by authorities to combat such crimes (see UNTV and CITES 2012). See also Rademeyer, 2016. 
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in detail how organized crime organizations are structured or operate (i.e. vertically , horizontally, as 
a business model, or unorganized). The next sections will briefly explore other crimes and some 
potential links with wildlife crime. It should be noted, however that this is by no means an 
exhaustive analysis of the different crimes. It intends only to provide a (sometimes very brief) 
overview so that it can be compared with wildlife crime. The questions explored are: 
Are criminal organized groups dealing in arms, drugs or human trafficking involved in the illegal 
wildlife trade? Are organized wildlife networks involved in the trade of other illicit commodities? 
Worldwide there is anecdotal evidence of links between the illegal wildlife trade and other areas of 
crime and the involvement of organized criminal networks72. Nonetheless, the real extent of this 
‘link’ is uncertain, as there is no solid evidence in the previous literature that allows for a 
comprehensive answer to these questions.  
 
Drug trafficking  
Tarrius (2003), analysing the nexus between legal and illegal markets in the informal economy, 
suggests that within the legal trade in the area there is an embedded illegal trade, which is often 
managed by ‘mediators’ (2003, 41). It is then conceivable that there are mediators of illegal trade 
along and across borders, for both, for example, drugs and illegal wildlife. It is helpful to consider 
first what is known about the organised drug trade and whether it is likely that there may be 
similarities which would mean that such organizations may also deal in illegal wildlife.  
If we look specifically at how, for example, drug cartels are organized, Bean (2008) suggests that:  
‘[they] are best characterized as a federation of multiple independent groups that, when 
necessary, form multiple alliances. They are not centrally organized, although some cartel 
members are more powerful than others and offer leadership when required. The[y] … 
function much like legitimate business, with [a number of] sections … They tend to 
compartmentalize … into production, transportation, distribution and money laundering… 
they rely on bribery, extortion and violence to achieve effective and efficient production and 
distribution.’ (2008, 144-145)   
Zaitch (2002) explores the Colombian cocaine ‘firms’ in the Netherlands. He suggests they are 
relatively small, informal and decentralized and will mutate based on specific needs. They do not 
follow the typical Mafiosi (vertical) structure and can form flexible, temporary ‘partnerships’. Kinship 
                                                 
72 Such links are often based on examples from enforcement reports and cases made by a number of NGOs, 
the popular press and existing literature. See generally Hoare 2007; Liddick 2011; Duffy 2010; Christy 2008, 
Zimmerman 2003. 
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ties are still important and relatives are likely to be frequently involved, but they do not operate as a 
‘family business’. 
Generally speaking, Bean (2008, 145) suggests that it is possible to distinguish between dealers, 
traffickers and cartel members73, ‘although sometimes they are one and the same’. The merchandise 
(cocaine) is normally smuggled in containers, by air, sea or using couriers and various sophisticated 
concealment methods are used (Bean, 2008, 145-148). In most cases, violence – or the threat of 
violence – will be part of the business (Zaitch, 2002). 
Dealers and traffickers or others involved will easily switch commodities to maximize profits, and will 
move into for example smuggling of cigarettes or other illicit activities that are equally profitable, 
specially where ‘the likely sentence if caught [is] much less severe’ (Bean, 2008, 148). 
Overall, a few instances of overlapping between the illegal wildlife trade and other forms of 
transnational organized crime have been observed. Drug trafficking organizations in Latin America, 
Asia, Russia and Europe have been found to be involved in the illegal wildlife trade. For example, 
Russian organized crime groups are believed to control much of the illicit caviar trade. Mexican drug 
lords have also been found in possession of endangered wildlife. Chinese Triads have also reportedly 
been linked to the illegal wildlife trade and/or wildlife trafficking. By contrast, in 1999, a report 
found that the involvement of major transnational organized crime groups in the Australian wildlife 
trade was minimal (Liddick, 2011, 42-49). Hayman and Brack (2002, 8) highlight that when the 
connection between organizations occurs, it often includes a combination of some or all of 
commodities in the illicit trade74, parallel trafficking with other illicit commodities (e.g. drugs and 
small arms)75, the use of both legal and illicit wildlife shipments to smuggle other illegal goods76, and 
the laundering and use of funds from other illegal commodities to provide capital for the illegal 
wildlife trade77.  
                                                 
73 Cartel members will own the drugs, while traffickers will transport them and likely act as middlemen with 
local dealers that will sell the drugs of the cartel. Trafficking and traffickers may vary depending on the drugs 
smuggled, where they are produced and the local distribution mechanism (Bean, 2008, 141). 
74 Although it is rare to use endangered wildlife as mules for heroin or cocaine, a number of cases exist where 
wildlife and drug trafficking are combined and drugs are stuffed into animals to hide them from detection. See 
also Zimmerman (2003). 
75 In most cases wildlife is a secondary or opportunistic trade that makes use of shared smuggling routes and 
smuggling methods. ‘Back loading’ may also occur, where smugglers carry drugs to one destination and bring 
back wildlife to maximize the trip and to avoid returning empty handed. 
76 Drug smugglers have used dangerous wildlife (tigers, snakes, bears, crocodiles) to protect shipments or have 
been found hiding drugs in wildlife containers. 
77 In some cases wildlife products have been used as currency to ‘barter’ for drugs, or there is an exchange of 
drugs for wildlife as part of the laundering of the revenue from the illegal drug trade. As noted by Liddick 
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Arts and antiquities crime 
The international illicit trade in antiquities is, perhaps, the most closely comparable crime to wildlife 
crime as it is a similar form of transnational crime (Brodie, Doole and Renfrew,  2001; Mackenzie, 
2007) that is ‘intimately linked with legal markets and the legal international art trade’ (Ponsaers, 
Shapland and Williams, 2008, 647). As Ponsaers, Shapland and Williams (2008, 647) suggest, ‘the 
informal and formal economies are not only intertwined, but … may also, in terms of their structures, 
modes of operation and activities blur into each other in particular circumstances’.   
Brodie (2003) notes that there are four characteristics of the antiquities trade which serve to 
distinguish it from other illicit trades (which appear to be relatable to wildlife): the importance of 
portals for laundering illicit material, demand is geographically and socially demarcated: ‘antiquities 
collecting has traditionally been a rich person’s pastime’78 (Brodie, 2003, 187), the resource is limited 
and not renewable, and there will always be a demand for the unique piece. 
The trade chain is also similar and is generally divided between source and market states. It will 
involve local finders, international dealers and destination markets (Mackenzie 2005, Brodie, Doole 
and Renfrew, 2001). Bowman (2008), Mackenzie (2005) and Tijhuis (2006) highlight that illicit 
antiquities are illegal for the reason that they have been illegally removed (i.e. looted, smuggled, or 
laundered). In many ways, in terms of the functioning of the illegal operation, those involved and 
corruptive influences, the smuggling of antiquities is similar to other forms of commodity illicit 
trafficking such as wildlife crime (Alder and Polk, 2005; Massy, 2008). Similarities include the fact 
that trading in antiquities is legal, that artefacts are sold at very high prices and that buyers are 
wealthy (Alder and Polk, 2002). Chiefly, ‘it must be profitable’ (Bowman, 2008, 227; see also Massy, 
2008; Sultan, 1999). 
As Sultan (1999, 809) argues, ‘cooperation … is imperative in order to track and recover stolen 
artwork’. In a similar way to what is faced by authorities trying to combat wildlife crime, antiquities 
crime is a specialized field where ‘direct informal contact between specialists is paramount’ (Block, 
2011, 19), and where officers face similar obstacles. To combat it there is a  need for a network 
forming through various meetings and training that ‘form the foundation for a close-knit network of 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2011, 49): ‘the USFWS says that loads of smuggled birds from Australia are exchanged for heroin in Bangkok, 
with the drugs flown back to Australia for resale’. 
78 As Bowman (2008) highlights, those conducting the initial crime (e.g. digging) ‘like many who become 
entangled in transnational criminal activity, conduct illegal digging out of poverty, desperation, and lack of 
economically viable alternatives of livelihood (2008, 236).  
93 
 
specialists whose personal relations and mutual trust drive the cooperation’ (Block, 2011, 20). This is 
also the case in wildlife for example where participants meet through various meetings of networks, 
the INTERPOL Wildlife Crime Working Group, or similar initiatives.  
Identification challenges are also a significant challenge for the enforcement community in relation 
to antiquities and art and contacts with local experts (informal networks of artists, dealers, experts, 
museums or national institutions) are essential for any necessary follow up activity (Block, 2011). 
This is also the case with wildlife crime which needs to resort to CITES management and scientific 
authorities, local experts, zoo keepers and/or NGOs as appropriate.  
Information sharing is also a problem: ‘There also seems to be a lack of information flow on art 
crimes from the local to a national centralized level, which presents a major stumbling block in the 
fight against art thefts’ (Block, 2011, 20). 
There is a general lack of political will and public attention (Block, 2011; Charney, 2009), and 
priorities fluctuate: 
‘Activities related to policing art crime … diverge significantly: in some, art crime receives 
very little attention; in others, highly specialized units are fully dedicated to its prevention 
and investigation. … can thus be roughly categorized as those that give policing art crime a 
low priority, … medium priority, and … high priority.’  (Block, 2011, 14)  
Similarly to wildlife crime, even though there might be some capacity limitations as a legitimate 
reason not to follow up on every international case or enquiry, requests for a ‘low priority crime [are] 
particularly unlikely to be allocated resources’ (Block, 2011, 21). Lack of judicial awareness and 
involvement (or lack of involvement) of the judiciary, as well as the low priority afforded to the 
crime are also problems as the following example suggests:  
‘In one … case, the magistrate did not see fencing stolen art as a serious matter and, despite 
ample evidence provided in an International Letter of Request (ILOR), allowed neither the 
arrest of the fencer nor a search of the fencer’s premises, even though the exact same ILOR 
had convinced two other district magistrates to allow coercive measures against others 
involved in the same case.’ (Block, 2011, 21) 
Interestingly, Mackenzie (2005) highlights in his research interviews a number of cases where those 
who could be used to combat the illicit trade in arts (e.g. government officials) would not be 
interested in intervening as they are likely to be involved. Mackenzie’s interviewees also highlight 
corruption with reference to the ‘interest’ of the police to be involved: ‘Oh, they were very 
interested. They were arresting …, confiscating the goods and then re-selling them. They get a low 
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salary’ (2005, 259). There appear to be very similar issues with wildlife crime (see chapter 6 and 7), 
especially as the authorities involved in the interviews were also from Southeast Asia.  
Potential differences from the wildlife trade are, as Mackenzie (2005, 251) notes, that individuals 
involved in the illicit markets may believe they are saving and preserving objects for future 
generations. One of the possible ‘benefits’ (if that is the right word) of the art trade, is that the 
valuable items need to be kept intact in order to keep their value. A statue (or a Picasso if speaking 
of art theft), for example, will be worthless if it is damaged. In addition, the detrimental effects of art 
looting are a direct loss of cultural heritage and cultural assets in the country of origin (Mackenzie, 
2005). This can potentially be reversed through the return of the smuggled goods (albeit Mackenzie 
highlights this rarely happens). This is perhaps the opposite with wildlife crime79, particularly for 
dead animals (e.g. ivory tusks, rhino horn, tiger parts, pangolins to name a few) where the crime is 
pushing the species closer and closer to extinction. In fact, as noted earlier, recent reports suggest a 
degree of financial speculation (i.e. the more endangered or extinct, the higher the profits) is driving 
some of the illicit wildlife trade (UNODC, 2016).  In wildlife crime, poaching and illegal trade often 
results in the killing of the animal, albeit in some cases in seizures of live animals which can be 
returned (recent examples for example include iguanas to the Bahamas or eels to Spain). 
 
Human trafficking  
Art and antiquities crime and drug trafficking are the most obvious potential exemplars of other 
crimes which may be similar to wildlife crime. Feingold (2005) however, provides a detailed and 
comprehensive overview of human trafficking in Southeast Asia that merits a brief mention. He 
opens an article on human trafficking with a very relevant headline, where one could easily replace 
the words ‘human trafficking’ and ‘people’ with ‘wildlife trafficking’ and ‘wildlife’:  
‘Judging by news headlines, human trafficking is a recent phenomenon. In fact, the coerced 
movement of people across borders is as old as the laws of supply and demand. What is new 
is the volume of the traffic-and the realization that we have done little to stem the tide. We 
must look beyond our raw emotions if we are ever to stop those who trade in human lives’ 
(2005, 26). 
                                                 
79 A potential exception would be the illegal trade in live animals as pets or for zoos, but given that there is a 
legal and theoretically a (relatively) well regulated international trade (which is not the case for arts and 
antiquities) this would appear to be a bit farfetched.  
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He suggests that human trafficking is a big business, but that it involves ‘mostly disorganized crime’ 
between ad hoc groups in the region. While he suggests that networks used to exist (which have 
faded in importance, owing to changes in the structure of the sex industry (2005, 28)), organized 
crime groups being directly involved are rare: ‘Japanese mafia, or yakuza, do control many of the 
venues in Japan where trafficked girls end up, but they are more likely to purchase people than 
transport them’ (2005, 28).  
 
Exploring the links in more detail 
As seen above, there are some commonalities, differences and links between the various illicit 
trades. These are summarized below. Commonalities between the trades include: 
1. The illegal market is intimately linked with legal markets and the legal international trade 
(particularly for arts/wildlife, but not necessarily for drugs)  
2. The commodities are poached/stolen/produced illegally  
3. The smuggling routes and techniques are similar 
4. Goods are smuggled along a trade chain: from source (or producer) to a consumer market in 
rich or emerging economies, with varied distribution mechanisms that adapt to the market 
demands 
5. They range from highly organized and criminal organizations to the loosely organized or 
disorganized 
6. Criminals operate across ‘disturbingly porous’ borders (Schmidt, 2004, 98)  
7. They are ‘enterprise crimes’. In other words, they are ‘conducted as a business would be 
conducted, meeting a demand with an illegal supply’ (Wright, 2011, 337) 
8. They undermine the authority and legitimacy of government and enforcement efforts 
9. Commodities can be laundered into the legal trade (where such legal trade exists)  
10. Combating them requires technical and specialized expertise that is ‘often beyond the 
capacities of ordinary law-enforcement personnel who have not been specifically trained in 
this area’ (Wright, 2011, 337) 
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11. They rely on bribery, corrupt practices and violence to conduct their business 
One additional point, harder to agree with in terms of overall trends and patters, due mainly to the 
limited and anecdotal evidence available (some examples were noted above) include: 
12. Live animals can be used conceal drug shipments or as drug mules. For example, drug 
consignments can be secreted among live, venomous snakes or stuffed with cocaine or 
snails with heroin  
There are two additional points that need further elaboration: 
13. The organizations will deal in any commodity to maximize profit 
14. Organized criminals involved seek control, power and wealth 
However, there are differences between the trades. As highlighted above, it is believed by the 
enforcement and international agencies involved that (at least in Southeast Asia) organized groups 
dealing in wildlife will not generally be involved in other crimes such as drugs as this will radically 
increase their chances of being arrested, prosecuted and convicted, as well as the risk and fines 
involved. Conversely, organizations dealing in drugs, or border operators, will complement their 
illicit trades with any other profitable commodity, including wildlife. In addition, it appears that 
those involved in highly organized forms of organized wildlife crime are not necessarily seeking 
power (such as for example the concepts of power of the mafia noted earlier in this chapter). Rather 
the key dynamic of wildlife crime appears to be the generation of profit. While in some cases 
revolutionary or insurgent groups or political movements may finance parts of their activities with 
wildlife, there is little evidence that this is the case in Asia. It is potentially the case in Africa (as 
noted above) but as the recent World Wildlife Crime report (UNODC, 2016) indicates, this is a small 
proportion of their funding. 
 
4.3 (Section II) Regulating the illegal wildlife trade 
Transnational organized crime encompasses a multitude of forms and activities and combating it, 
particularly where there a well-established groups that operate transnationally, will therefore 
require frequent cooperation or collaboration at the international level (Dupont, 1999). Edwards 
(2003, 10) suggests that transnational strategies are necessary to respond to the threats of TOC, as 
they ‘cannot be addressed by nation-states alone’. Bigo’s ‘bureaucracy beyond the state’ and 
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Waever’s ‘securisation of Europe’ also identify the need for policing within a ‘wider field of political 
and cultural possibility’ (Waever, 1996). Cooperation between states is therefore ‘encouraged on 
pragmatic grounds to match the forms of cooperation between deviant groups across borders’ (van 
Asch 2007, 22-23; Walker, 2003, 114). 
Block (2008, 74) highlights that cooperation is needed with partners across borders and 
internationally to share intelligence, coordinate operations, secure evidence, and track down 
suspects to successfully tackle organized crime. Tackling organized crime is rarely short-term: ‘It is 
much complicated, multifarious, on-going, and impossible to handle independently’ (van Asch 2007, 
12). As discussed in earlier chapters, there is a role for a broad range of organizations in the process. 
Cockayne (2007, 15) also suggests that effective responses require the strengthening of structures at 
multiple levels (e.g. society, state and international) against corruption and infiltration by 
transnational crime. Indeed, corruption is a particular issue that should be addressed. Madsen (2009, 
21) uses an interesting analogy from human anatomy that is worth replicating here: ‘if monetary 
funds of licit or illicit origin are like the bloodstream, then corruption would be the lymphatic system. 
Corruption is the lubricant, which allows the various mechanisms to operate smoothly.’  
Taking the above into consideration, Section II will focus on regulating the illegal wildlife trade and 
on the increased commitment to tackle it at the global level. In particular it will explore the 
globalization of crime and what it has meant for international police and law-enforcement 
cooperation. In addition, it will elucidate upon the various levels of international police cooperation 
and how coordinated (or not) these may be, as well as what are the main requirements for effective 
cooperation based on existing literature on the operation of platforms for cooperation. The 
emergence of new structures of cooperation (in form of BLOs and ASEAN-WEN in the region) to 
enhance cooperation and coordination to combat the illegal wildlife trade as well as the role of such 
initiatives will also be explored. 
 
4.3.1 The regulatory framework 
As noted in earlier chapters (see chapter 3), the harvesting of natural resources is basic to every day 
human life (UNODC, 2013). Concern over the growing trade has led to some increased cooperation 
between states (Sand, 1999) and to a number of national and international laws and agreements to 
regulate the legal trade as well as to combat its illicit equivalent. The main international effort 
directed to the protection and control of the international wildlife trade, albeit not the only one, is 
the CITES Convention which provides varying degrees of protection to close to 35,000 species (see 
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chapter 3 for general details on CITES). As Duffy (2010, 76) suggests, CITES ‘provide[s] us with the 
definitions of what is legal, what is appropriate and what is sustainable … [but] also tell[s] us what is 
illegal, what is criminal and what is illegitimate’. 
Today, CITES continues to be perceived as one of the most widely accepted treaties in existence 
(Boer, Ramsay and Rothwell, 1998, 105; Zimmerman 2003), but it is worth noting that it can only be 
as good as the willingness of its parties to enforce it. It was designed as an instrument for 
cooperation and as a way to prevent international trade from causing the extinction of species by 
promoting trade controls by categorizing wildlife into three categories (set out in appendices) 
through a system of permits and certificates. Trade for commercial purposes in Appendix I species - 
those most endangered and close to extinction – is only permitted in exceptional circumstances.  
Trade in species listed in Appendix II should be controlled in order to avoid threatening their survival 
in the wild.  Species in Appendix III are protected by legislation in at least one country (see chapter 3 
for additional details on CITES, see also Lanchberry, 1998; Isozaki, 2003; Bowman, Davies and 
Redgwell, 2010; Wilson-Wilde, 2010a; Ayling, 2013; Duffy 2016; Stahl and De Meulenaer, 2017 and 
others).  
The focus of this thesis will remain with CITES, and more specifically on the unlawful or illegal trade 
of CITES-listed wildlife, which is just one of the multiple threats to wildlife (Sand, 1999, 168; Boer, 
Ramsay and Rothwell, 1998, 105; van Asch, 2013, 151). While CITES is the main convention dealing 
with the international wildlife trade (Bowman, Davies and Redgwell, 2010, 651), other efforts such 
as the Convention on Biological Diversity (see CBD, 2017), the Convention on Migratory Species of 
Wild Animals (see CMS, 2017) and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (2017) should not be 
underestimated, as they remain highly important for the preservation of biodiversity. It must be 
highlighted that while the conventions may have different approaches to protect biodiversity 
(conservation, combating illegal trade, or habitat protection), the most effective response would 
incorporate elements of them all (Boer, Ramsay and Rothwell, 1998, 100-102).  
At the 16th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES (CoP16) held in Bangkok, Thailand in 
March 2013, the seriousness of wildlife crime was discussed and decisions adopted by CITES Parties 
highlighted the need to counter wildlife crime at the national, sub-regional, regional and global 
levels. This was not the first time the seriousness of the problem was stressed, but it provided a 
background for countries around the globe to rally behind what the CITES Secretary-General 
referred to as a ‘watershed moment’ for combating wildlife crime (Scanlon, 2013).  
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This ‘watershed moment’ was the culmination of a number of commitments and declarations made 
by members of the international community, through a series of pledges, resolutions and decisions 
or agreed documents on the need to take urgent action to combat the illegal wildlife trade.  
It may be useful to first establish some basic definitions of what is considered as ‘wildlife’ and what 
constitutes wildlife ‘crime’, particularly an ‘international crime’, which is what is referred to when 
speaking of transnational organized wildlife crime.   
Wildlife crime is ‘no different from many other forms of illegal activities’ (see ICCWC, 2017). It shares 
many of the characteristics of other transnational crimes. However, to a significant degree, wildlife 
crime has yet to be viewed, and accordingly responded to, as ‘mainstream’ crime (see ICCWC, 2017; 
see also Sellar, 2013). By wildlife we refer to all fauna (e.g. animals, including birds and fish) and flora 
(e.g. plants, but also timber and forest products). The term wildlife will be used throughout the 
chapter mainly to refer to protected species for which their international trade is regulated by CITES 
and protected by national legislation. ‘Crime’, will be referred to as ‘acts committed contrary to 
national laws and regulations’. This would include:  
‘[I]llicit exploitation of natural resources, such as the poaching of an elephant, uprooting of a 
rare orchid, unauthorized logging of trees, or unlicensed netting of sturgeons[;] … subsequent 
acts, such as the processing of fauna and flora into products, their transportation, offer for 
sale, sale, possession, etc[; and] … the concealment and laundering of the financial benefits 
made out of these crimes’ (Sellar, 2013).  
Wildlife crimes will occur in the country of origin, in transiting countries, and/or in the country of 
destination. Any international movement of CITES-listed species without the appropriate 
documentations and permits also involves a violation of the CITES Convention. 
  
Commitment to tackle the illegal wildlife trade 
There have been a number of declarations and resolutions focused on the need to take urgent 
action to combat the illegal wildlife trade. Some examples over the past few years are given below. 
In 2010, the INTERPOL General Assembly unanimously adopted a Resolution noting the seriousness 
of environmental crime and calling upon its Member Countries to assist INTERPOL in providing 
appropriate responses to address the problem of the illegal wildlife trade,80 among other issues. 
                                                 
80  See ICPO - INTERPOL, 2010. 
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The UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ, known also as the UN Crime 
Commission; see CITES Secretariat, 2013f) adopted a Resolution on ‘Crime prevention and criminal 
justice responses against illicit trafficking in endangered species of wild fauna and flora’ during its 
meeting in April 2011 in Vienna. The Resolution expresses concern about the involvement of 
organized criminal groups in the trafficking of endangered species and recognizes the work being 
conducted at international level by the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime 
(ICCWC).  
The UN Conference on Sustainable Development, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 2012, through 
paragraph 203 of its outcome document, ‘The Future We Want’, recognized and emphasized the 
importance of effective international cooperation among international organizations in combating 
illicit trafficking in wildlife.81 
In September 2012, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Declaration 2012 noted 
the concern of APEC leaders over the increasing trafficking in protected species and made a 
commitment to take action to combat the illegal wildlife trade and to take ‘meaningful steps’ to 
counter the illegal wildlife trade.82 
At an event on wildlife trafficking and conservation in November 2012, Hillary Clinton, the US 
Secretary of State at the time, encouraged countries to continue to combat the illegal wildlife trade. 
The ‘Call for Action’ included increased diplomatic efforts, global outreach, strengthened and 
increased enforcement, and a concerted global response, as the magnitude of the threat requires a 
commensurate response at all levels – national, regional and global.83 
In November 2012, the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on 
‘Strengthening the United Nations’ crime prevention and criminal justice programme, in particular 
its technical cooperation capacity’. The resolution expresses concern at the negative effects of 
transnational organized crime and the serious challenges and threats posed by illicit trade, including 
                                                 
81 See United Nations, 2012 
82  ‘[We] are concerned by the escalating illicit trafficking in endangered and protected wildlife, including 
marine resources, and associated products, which has economic, social, security, and environmental 
consequences in our economies. We commit to strengthen our efforts to combat illegal trade in wildlife, 
timber, and associated products, to implement measures to ensure sustainable marine and forest ecosystems 
management, and to facilitate sustainable, open, and fair trade of non-timber forest products. We will take 
meaningful steps to promote sustainable management and conservation of wildlife populations while 
addressing both the illegal supply and demand for endangered and protected wildlife, through capacity 
building, cooperation, increased enforcement, and other mechanisms.’ See APEC, 2012  
83 Former Secretary Clinton highlighted that ‘over the past few years wildlife trafficking has become more 
organized, more lucrative, more widespread, and more dangerous than ever before ... it is also a national 
security issue, a public health issue, and an economic security issue’. For more information see US Department 
of State, 2012. 
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the trafficking in endangered and protected species of wild fauna and flora. It emphasizes the need 
to combat transnational crimes by strengthening international cooperation, capacity-building, 
criminal justice responses and law-enforcement efforts. It also highlights the need to develop 
comprehensive policies to combat transnational organized crime and corruption.84 
At a G8 Summit in the United Kingdom in June 2013, G8 Leaders recognized the need to combat the 
illegal wildlife trade as part of broader efforts to counter criminal trafficking and strengthen border 
security. In the final communiqué of the meeting, the Leaders agreed to ‘take action to tackle the 
illegal trafficking of protected or endangered species’85 and highlighted the importance of combating 
the illegal wildlife trade and to treat it as seriously as other transnational organized crimes such as 
drug and human trafficking and corruption. 
During the 16th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP16) to CITES in March 2013, a large 
number of resolutions and decisions were adopted and revised recognizing the illegal wildlife trade 
as a serious transnational crime. CoP16 also saw ‘unprecedented levels of international cooperation 
in addressing the threats posed to wildlife, to people and to livelihoods through poaching and 
smuggling’. CITES’ Secretary-General highlighted the success of the conference in addressing a 
number of issues, including: ‘ensuring high-level political engagement; enhancing international 
cooperation; coordinating enforcement support at global, regional and national levels; deploying a 
wider-range of operational techniques and enhancing enforcement effectiveness; enacting CITES-
implementing legislation; attracting further financing, and reducing demand for illicit goods’ 
(Scanlon, 2013).  
At CoP16, CITES Parties adopted a strengthened Resolution Conf. 11.3 (Rev. CoP16) on compliance 
and enforcement, which reflected the request from CITES Member States (178 at that time)86 to 
support a more coordinated approach to combating wildlife crime. The Resolution encourages closer 
communication, collaboration and cooperation between the Convention’s institutions, national 
enforcement agencies, and existing intergovernmental bodies that have a mandate from their 
Member States to engage in or support wildlife law-enforcement.87 
During a ministerial roundtable hosted by ICCWC alongside CITES CoP16, ministers and high-level 
government representatives reaffirmed their ‘strong commitment … to combat transnational 
                                                 
84  For more information, see United Nations General Assembly, 2012  
85  See paragraph 70 of the Lough Erne G8 (2013) Leaders’ Communique (2013), 7; see also CITES Secretariat, 
2013b. 
86  CITES has 183 Member Countries (182 plus the European Union) as of February 2017. For more information, 
see CITES, 2017b.  
87  See CITES Secretariat, 2013c. 
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organized wildlife and forest crime’ and acknowledged the ‘escalating levels of poaching and illegal 
trade, and the increasing involvement of organized crime groups’.88  
In July 2013, an Executive Order on Combating Wildlife Trafficking was issued by President of the 
United States Barack Obama. The Executive Order addresses the domestic and international 
response to wildlife trafficking of the United States of America and highlights the need to treat 
wildlife crime as a seriously as other transnational crimes such as drugs and arms. It also highlights 
that illegal wildlife trade operations have expanded ‘beyond small-scale, opportunistic actions to 
coordinated slaughter commissioned by armed and organized criminal syndicates’.89  
In addition, the UN Crime Commission recommended a resolution on ‘Crime prevention and criminal 
justice responses to illicit trafficking in protected species of wild fauna and flora’, which recognizes 
wildlife crime as a serious transnational organized crime and ‘strongly encourages member States to 
take appropriate measures to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in wild fauna and flora, including 
the adoption of the necessary legislation for the prevention, investigation and prosecution of such 
trafficking’.90 The resolution was adopted in July 2013 by the ECOSOC, which serves as the central 
United Nations forum for discussing international economic and social issues.  
The above really increased the momentum, particularly at the international and global level, of 
efforts to combat wildlife crime. Since then, a number of milestones have also taken place. These 
include CCPCJ Resolution 23/1 on Strengthening a targeted crime prevention and criminal justice 
response to combat illicit trafficking in forest products, including timber (May 2014), Customs Co-
operation Council, a Declaration from the Customs Co-operation Council on the illegal wildlife trade 
(June 2014), a United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) Resolution on Illegal trade in wildlife 
(June 2014) as well as regional statements and declarations (such as the London Conference 
Declaration in 2014, the Kasane Conference Statement in 2015, and the Hanoi Statement in 2016 
among others) and regional strategies and action plans (such the development of regional action 
plans and strategies in Africa and Europe to combat the illegal wildlife trade). 
Chief among them is the UN General Assembly resolution 69/314 on Tackling illicit trafficking in 
wildlife, adopted 30 July 2015, which urges Member States to take decisive steps to prevent, combat 
                                                 
88 The report of the roundtable also highlights the broad-reaching impacts of the illegal wildlife trade on 
species, regional security, national economies, people and their livelihoods. During the meeting, many 
countries reaffirmed their strong commitment to fight ‘the organized crime groups that are behind 
transnational organized wildlife and forest crime’. See CITES Secretariat, 2013a, 3; see also CITES Secretariat, 
2013d. 
89 For further details, see the White House, 2013; see also CITES Secretariat, 2013e. 
90 See United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2013.  
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and eradicate illegal trade in wildlife. This is the first resolution focusing specifically on wildlife crime 
adopted by the UN. Another important milestone was the adoption by the UN GA of  a resolution 
proclaiming 3 March as World Wildlife Day across the world (resolution 68/205, adopted in 
December 2013) which aims to raise awareness about wildlife and wildlife crime.  
Finally, CoP17 (Johannesburg, September-October 2016) marked a further ‘major shift towards 
stronger protection for wild animals and plants from overexploitation and illegal trade’91 where 
governments adopted a suite of decisions and resolutions, including to strengthen efforts to combat 
wildlife crime (including illegal trade over the internet) and strategies to reduce demand for illegally 
traded species among other. In particular these included the further strengthening of Resolution 
11.3 (now CITES Resolution Conf. 11.3 (Rev 17)), and the adoption of the first ever CITES resolution 
on countering the associated corruption linked to the illegal wildlife trade (see Resolution Conf. 17.6), 
which, as noted in other sections and will be further explored in chapter 7 and 8, is essential if one 
wants to counter the crime effectively (see also Global Initiative against Transnational Organized 
Crime, 2014). This is a particularly important step forward as ‘environmental policies are often 
rendered ineffective by corruption. Thus, an understanding of policies which promote corruption 
and ways to control it is of some importance’ (Damania, 2002, 421-422). 
As stated by Scanlon ‘wildlife crime has become a serious threat to the security, political stability, 
economy, natural resources and cultural heritage of many countries, and … the extent of the 
response required is beyond the sole remit of environment or wildlife law-enforcement agencies, or 
of one country or region alone’ (Scanlon, 2013). These above demonstrate that the international 
community increasingly recognizes wildlife crime as a serious transnational organized crime that 
requires a ‘determined and coordinated response’ (CITES, 2013, 3).  
It needs to be noted that the above does not include a number of other statements and declarations 
and expressions of intent by countries, donors and international, intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations to combat the illegal wildlife trade at the regional level, such as the 
2009 Manifesto on Combating Wildlife Crime in Asia,92 the 2009 Kathmandu Recommendations,93 
the 2010 Hua Hin Declaration on Tiger Conservation,94 or the Ministerial Statement on ASEAN and 
the International Year of Forests in 201195 in Asia among others.  
                                                 
91 See CITES Secretariat, 2016  
92 See Manifesto on Combating Wildlife Crime in Asia (ASEAN-WEN, 2009). 
93 See Kathmandu Recommendations (ASEAN-WEN, 2010) 
94 See Hua Hin Declaration on Tiger Conservation (ASEAN-WEN, 2010b) 
95 See Ministerial Statement (ASEAN-WEN, 2011)  
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It is clear, therefore, that international bodies and national governments have agreed on the need to 
treat wildlife crimes as serious crimes, that enforcement efforts should be coordinated at national, 
regional and global levels and that countries need to work together across the trade chain (e.g. 
among source, transit and destination countries). The above also highlights the need to use available 
techniques and methods that are used to combat other transnational organized crimes such as drugs 
trafficking in the fight against the illegal wildlife trade. 
 
4.3.2 The Globalization of Crime and International Police Cooperation 
Anderson (1989, 1995) and Nadelmann (1993) pioneered research in transnational policing and their 
work was followed by Benyon (1994), Bigo (1994, 1996, 2000), Sheptycki (1995, 1997, 2002), Deflem 
(2000, 2002), Bowling (2002, 2005, 2009, 2010), Newburn (2003), Fijnaut and Paoli (2004), Loader 
(2004), Maguer (2004), Block (2008, 2010), Brown (2008) and Guille (2008, 2010), among others, on 
various aspects of transnational, regional or cross-border policing. This thesis aims to expand the 
analysis of transnational policing to a specific commodity (wildlife) and to specific initiatives in Asia. 
Before proceeding further, it is however important to explore some concepts of international 
policing and the various levels and challenges of international policing cooperation96. 
Transnational policing is most frequently cited as ‘a’ or ‘the’ solution to organized crime (Bowling, 
2009; Block, 2008). The growing realization of the threat posed by TOC has prompted governments 
to give higher priority to the ‘development of effective international mechanisms to meet the threat’ 
(McClean, 2002, 3). This has resulted in the growth of bilateral, regional, multilateral and 
international agreements and arrangements to ‘pressurise states into passing legislation … and to 
set up … legal … mechanisms to facilitate international exchanges of intelligence and to progress 
cases’ (Levi, 2007, 526). It also contributed to the creation of regional law-enforcement entities 
(such as Europol, Aseanopol) or initiatives (see later sections of this chapter) which range from 
‘associations with an annual conference to those with much greater operational ambitions’ (Bowling, 
2009, 154).  
                                                 
96 A distinction should be made between policing cooperation and operational forms of policing. Policing 
cooperation includes how different enforcement agencies work together to tackle cross-border or 
international crimes as well as the various levels of cooperation that exist and how more effective cooperation 
can be attained, from the political level where decisions are made to the field level where criminals are 
arrested. Operational forms of policing are the actions taken by law enforcement officers in the field that may 
lead to a seizure, arrest, prosecution or conviction. Both are particularly important, but ultimately, law 
enforcement takes place in the field and should result in action on the ground (e.g. investigation, arrest and 
prosecution of those involved). 
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Globalisation and the blurring of the limits between the domestic and the global have increased the 
prominence of and need for international policing and may be accelerating the linkages between 
previously separate illicit markets and the increased mobility of criminals. This is generating a 
‘common internal security continuum encompassing all the member states and creating a great new 
challenge for law-enforcement agencies’ (Elvins, 2003, 30; see also Hebenton and Thomas, 1995, 
160-161; Den Boer, 1994, 174; Edwards, 2003, 264; in van Asch, 2007, 8) and posing a threat to 
national and regional security.  
Indeed, international policing institutions have been created to enhance cooperation as TOC ‘cannot 
be satisfactorily dealt with either by traditional means or solely within a national framework’ 
(Bowling, 2002, 1006; see also van Asch, 2007, 6). 
 
International and transnational policing 
Bowling (2009, 149) notes that the ‘idea that contemporary policing requires collaboration across 
international boundaries has become accepted as a fact’. This is echoed by Hill (2005, 54, emphasis 
added) amongst others, who suggests that ‘the globalization of crime demands a coordinated or 
transnational response’. Indeed, one of the key aims and objectives of international policing is to 
‘resolve the lack of co-ordination between national law-enforcement agencies, and reconcile 
divergent national interests and laws’ (Anderson, 2002, 38; see also van Asch, 2007, 7-8). 
International policing bodies, structures and forms of cooperation have largely arisen as a response 
to changes and developments throughout the world and ‘proliferate in the international arena’ 
(Newburn, 2003, 107). The development and progress of policies and cooperative practices has 
however been slow and intermittent because the field of police cooperation embraces a large 
number of extremely complex and varied issues that coexist in a complex and interconnected 
network (Benyon, 1994, 497-498): there are secret agreements, bilateral agreements (i.e. cross-
border), formal structures, mechanisms, initiatives and networks, and informal networks all working 
to promote cross-national policing with neighbouring states or internationally. This includes for 
example, cooperation between French and Spanish police (Guille, 2010, 2010a) or German and 
French police (Maguer, 2004), regional police cooperative initiatives, networks and border 
mechanisms.97 Some of these bodies or structures may have official recognition while others may 
                                                 
97 Such as for example the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Wildlife Enforcement Network 
(WEN) – or ASEAN-WEN – and the Border Liaison Office (BLO) Mechanism (see later sections of this chapter for 
additional details on both initiatives). 
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not, some will be recognised unofficially and others officially but may not be institutionalised (Bigo, 
1994; van Asch, 2007).  
I noted in the past that ‘a high level of effective cooperation is often difficult to achieve between 
forces operating in the same country, when there are more than one police forces, or even within 
the same force (van Asch 2007, 7; see also Benyon et al, 1994, 49). Measuring the effectiveness of 
international cooperation to combat transnational wildlife crime is therefore inherently challenging 
and, as Greener (2011, 239) suggests, local and political cultures and developments will impact on 
how international policing is conducted in practice. Transnational policing is thus a complex matter, 
involving a large number of different players with different structures and roles.  
It should also be highlighted that there are a number of legitimate reasons why governments may 
choose not to follow up on each and every international inquiry or request they receive. The 
capacity of law-enforcement agencies (police and customs) to investigate and combat serious and 
organized crime is not infinite and requests from abroad compete with a number of national and 
local priorities that need to be allocated. And as, among others, Deflem (2002) and Block (2008) 
argue, ‘national interests remain paramount’ (Block, 2008, 81).  
 
An international police force? 
The politics of international policing are ‘complex’ (Greener 2011, 239) and particularly puzzling 
because the role and functions of the police are intimately connected to the sovereign identity of 
states (Deflem, 2000). However the ‘internationalisation’ of crime drives enforcement efforts 
beyond their national jurisdiction (van Asch 2007) and conventional methods of governance are no 
longer sufficient (Bruggeman, 2002; den Boer, 2002; Loader, 2002; Walker, 2002; Sheptycki, 2002a; 
Arnull and Wincott, 2002; Harlow, 2002). It is however essential to distinguish between global 
policing and the idea of a global or international police force (Bowling and Murphy, 2010). The idea 
of a globally police force, with officers with universal powers of arrest has often featured in movies 
and been explored by some (see for example Brown, 2008) as a solution to TOC and international 
and global problems. As Bowling (2009, 156-157; emphasis added) notes, ‘the solution [to 
transnational crimes] is to create a body unfettered by the constraints of national borders to 
respond to these problems. The main obstacle is national sovereignty’. 
To date, there is no global police force or ‘supranational investigative body with executive powers’ 
and global policing authority (Greener, 2012, 183; Bowling, 2009; Brown, 2008a; Occhipinti, 2003). 
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Given the loss of political control over a potential international or global police force, as Bown 
(2008a, 5) highlights, ‘it is hardly surprising that … [it] has not found favour’.  ‘New’ international 
policing is not therefore an international police force with executive policing powers that enforces 
state behaviour. Largely, the focus of transnational cooperative efforts is on exchanging information 
and building capacity (Occhipinti, 2003) through ‘much more fluid and varied responses to specific 
issues’ (Greener, 2012, 183). In fact, these may have a greater impact beyond the operational level 
of policing98. They will explore ‘reinforcing trends towards a rules-based international order through, 
amongst other things, an increased standardisation of … behaviour’ (Greener, 2012, 184) and are 
likely to create what Bowling (2010) refers to as new structures of cooperation that have important 
roles at various levels, not only strictu sensu on policing. This has happened at regional levels with 
the emergence of regional police forces (such as for example Europol, ASEANAPOL or AFRIPOL), as 
well as through the development of regional initiatives and bodies such as those examined in the 
thesis.  
With the emergence of these regional structures and enforcement bodies, ‘there now exists … a 
powerful institutional motor driving the formation of stronger ties between … police forces and a 
transnational police elite oriented to forging common solutions to common security problems’ 
(Loader, 2004, 57; in van Asch 2007, 11). A core function of these should be, as Cockayne (2007, 18) 
highlights, geared towards ‘developing operational capacity complementary to that which is found 
at lower levels of governance. Global control regimes are only as strong as their weakest link’. 
 
4.3.3 Exploring the levels of international police cooperation 
In general there is limited research on police cooperation and how different police agencies work 
together to investigate cross-border or international crimes and ‘systematic evaluations of police 
cooperation are scarce’ (Block, 2008, 74; see also Chatterton, 2001; Guille, 2010). Block (2010, 195) 
highlights that academic literature on police cooperation includes limited original research 
contributions regarding the practices of liaison officers (i.e. Nadelmann, 1993; Bigo, 1996, 2000; 
Block, 2007; Bailey, 2008; Fowler, 2008). Additional contributions on liaison officers usually build on 
Bigo’s original work, that provides an extensive account of European police liaison officers (without 
going into details on their practices) or the work of Nadelmann (1993) that explores the practices of 
                                                 
98 It should however be stressed that, unless such cooperation leads to action at the ground level by relevant 
enforcement agencies (e.g. actual investigations, arrests, prosecutions and/or convictions of the masterminds 
behind the illegal wildlife trade) these will, ultimately, have limited effect.   
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liaison officers (from a US perspective). If such research is limited for Europe, similar research in Asia 
is extremely rare (at least in English, French or Spanish). 
Deflem (2002) sees professional autonomy as one of the conditions for successful police cooperation. 
Block (2008, 74) examines ‘on the-ground empirical examples of police cooperation in Europe with 
the aim to further the understanding of its practicalities’  and highlights, as Benyon et al. (1993) 
observed also, that direct and bilateral contacts between law-enforcement officers are the backbone 
of actual operational police cooperation. These findings are in line with other research on police 
cooperation to combat TOC (Den Boer and Spapens, 2002; Harfield, 2005).  
In addition, Guille’s broader research (2008, 2010) explores the ‘European puzzle’ of cooperation at 
bilateral (France-Spain and UK-France border areas) and multilateral (France, Luxembourg, Spain and 
the United Kingdom) level and how the available tools (in Europe bodies such as Europol or Eurojust) 
affect the work of law-enforcement in practice. Maguer (2004) explores cooperation along the 
Swiss-German border where German and Swiss agents are able to go from one country to the other 
and act around border areas as needed. This surpasses by far all previous examples of international 
police cooperation (see Maguer, 2004, 363-366; van Asch, 2007, 19). 
In general, cooperation can take a variety of forms99: cooperation and exchange of information 
and/or intelligence, joint or coordinated law-enforcement, or provision of training and building 
capacity. These activities take place at the bilateral and multilateral as well as at the local, regional 
and global levels (Anderson, 1989). There are however a varying amount of aspects that will affect 
cooperation such as the legal systems in place, as well as different cultures and languages, and 
differences between the way law-enforcement is organized and works in the various countries. 
Hence, police cooperation can be characterized as a ‘dynamic and complex endeavor’ (Block, 2008, 
76). Success often depends on personal contacts among individuals that are part of informal 
cooperative networks, bilateral, multilateral or other agreements and arrangements (van Asch, 2007,  
17-18 and 2015). 
Block (2008, 2010) explores the practices of enforcement liaison officers (in Europe) and suggests 
liaison officers are a practical way to encourage cooperation as they provide support, can facilitate 
requests for information, evidence, interrogations, arrests and extraditions and have a role in 
                                                 
99 Ultimately, however, the idea behind international law enforcement cooperation is to bring criminals to 
justice. In other words, offenders must be prosecuted at the national level (given that no international 
prosecution mechanism exists for TOC on wildlife, and that law enforcement agencies cannot do this 
themselves. This highlights the importance of the involvement of prosecutors in combating wildlife crime and 
transnational crime more generally. 
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operational police cooperation100. His research highlights that liaison officers, despite the availability 
of multiple alternative options, represent the practical cooperation at the international level and is 
‘a significant strategy for transnational cooperation’ (2010, 201; 2008, 79; see also Bigo, 2000, 70; 
Nadelmann 1993, 109). Bigo (2000, 79) argues that liaison officers are crucial for the development of 
police cooperation and Bowling suggests ‘the liaison officer … is the first point of contact for visiting 
police officers and those requesting information or assistance’ (2009, 155). Indeed, authors generally 
agree that the efficiency of liaison officers will vary depending on their ability to build a strong 
network of contacts, and their professional autonomy and discretion, as well as their knowledge of 
the legal, organisational and cultural aspects of the jurisdictions where they are posted (Deflem, 
2002; Bigo, 2000; Block, 2010; Bowling, 2009). 
 
Levels of law-enforcement cooperation 
The literature highlights that there are generally three levels of cooperation: the macro, meso, and 
micro levels. These levels are an indication of ‘points along a continuum of the degree of political 
agreement required for the establishment of strategies for police cooperation’ (Benyon et al, 1994, 
50) and are interrelated and not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
As I highlighted in the past:  
The macro-level is that which entails constitutional and international legal agreements and 
the harmonization of national laws and regulations. It involves fundamental questions and 
major decisions to be taken by government ministers on ‘high’ policy issues. For example, the 
legal issues about police operational powers across borders, especially in relation to 
investigation, surveillance, arrest, detention or interrogation. Agreements on harmonization 
and collaboration in these areas must be made at the highest level as they involve issues of 
national sovereignty (van Asch, 2007, 9; see also Benyon, 1994, 503).  
The meso-level is concerned with operational structures, practices and procedures of the 
police and other law-enforcement agencies within which operational policing occurs. 
Developments include the establishment of new organizations to enable police experts in 
particular fields to collaborate, or face-to-face contact between officers from different 
countries who share common professional interests in specific criminal investigations 
including linked information systems, common databases, and coordination of and access to 
information such as criminal intelligence. Unlike developments at the macro level, they do 
not require intergovernmental agreements (van Asch, 2007, 9-10). 
                                                 
100 It is important to note however that liaison officers do not normally have powers to investigate in the 
jurisdiction where they are posted. Depending on their assigned tasks they will have a role that may also 
expand to coordinate joint operations or facilitate follow-up or at the tactical level advise on avenues for 
cooperation (Block 2010, 196). 
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At the micro-level, cooperation happens through bilateral informal contacts, which means 
that they tend to be “concerned with the investigation of specific offences and the prevention 
and control of particular forms of crime” (Benyon 1994, 502-503). This level provides a quick 
and cost-effective method of cooperation that bypasses the often timely official procedures 
(van Asch, 2007, 10).   
Guille (2010) summarizes Benyon’s (1996) framework of cooperation as follows: ‘The micro-level 
mainly involves practitioners in the field at the ‘lower’ end, whilst the macro-level, located at the 
‘top’ end, refers to the political level … [and] the meso-level, which includes … operational 
procedures and structures such as Europol, Schengen and networks of liaison officers’ (2010, 258-9). 
In addition, she notes that the various levels are ‘interrelated’ and may ‘overlap’ and that the meso-
level is a ‘key stage in enabling interaction between the political aspects and the practitioners in the 
field’ (Guille, 2010, 259, 2010b).  
Her research highlights that ‘the gap between policies/decisions agreed at the macro-level and the 
work undertaken in practice is very wide’ (Guille, 2010, 258) and that ‘the legal architecture and 
political considerations act in a sphere that does not usually meet the requirements necessary for 
smooth cooperation at the practical level’ (2010, 260). Guille (2010, 260) emphasizes, as also 
highlighted by Anderson et al. (1995), Ashworth (1998), Reiner (1997) and Sheptycki (2002b), that 
‘there is a gap between central and political levels (macro-level) and the work of the officers in the 
field (micro-level)’ and stresses that ‘there has been an inaccurate assumption that the macro-level 
and the practitioners in the field have the same aims’ (2010, 260).  
This view is shared by Block and others. Block (2010) in particular notes that practices (of liaison 
officers) are mostly governed by national and organisational ‘particulars’ but that they depend on 
the discretion of officers. He also states that ‘policy instruments are largely driven by a political 
rationality and little intended effect of these instruments can be detected’ (2010, 19) and 
emphasizes that the different levels do not necessarily interact: ‘policy-instruments regarding liaison 
officers have had little, if any, effect’ (2010, 207). A key point to take into consideration is that in 
spite of the myriad of multilateral arrangements available for international/transnational law-
enforcement cooperation, informal bilateral cooperation remains the preferred method in criminal 
investigations (Guille, 2010, 27; Block, 2011, 19). 
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Uncoordinated layers?  
Guille (2010) provides a number of examples of challenges that may have a negative influence on 
cooperation because they were envisaged at a different level. Three excerpts are copied below as 
they are particularly relevant:  
‘Agreements are signed at ministerial level and then progress to other ministries for 
implementation without involving any practitioners in the process, which explains the gap 
between the macro- and micro-levels, as the macro-level does not know how the process works 
in practice’ (p.260).  
‘The coordination body is composed of representatives from the macro-level, which means that 
the culture is not police-based, but ‘politically’ driven, with a culture and impetus of the civil 
service and the government rather than operational policing.’ (p.261).   
‘hierarchy here is being perceived as more important than relations with the operational world … 
the negotiation level is unfortunately increasingly removed from practical needs’ (p.261, see also 
Anderson et al, 1995).   
A large number of agreements appear to have been developed at the macro-level and imposed from 
the top down, without allowing field officers to ‘trust … and therefore use them efficiently, as no 
communication link existed between the macro- and micro-levels. As a consequence, this enforced 
top-down situation often involves practitioners taking parallel paths of action’ (Guille, 2010, 265; see 
also Sheptycki, 2002b; Guille, 2009, 2010b).   
Guille suggests there is a gap between decisions made by ‘rule-makers’ and what needs to be done 
by officers in practice. Rule-makers do not necessarily understand the realities of police work in the 
field, but expect results when rules are imposed: 
‘There are clearly discrepancies between real needs at borders … and national level 
interests. … This situation may be due to the fact that, at the border, needs are more obvious 
and … tangible. There are more specialised practitioners working at the border, … [they] 
know each other, with better understanding of the needs required … whereas central levels 
are seen as bureaucrats who do not understand real work in practice’ (2010, 268-9). 
Ashworth (1998, 79) suggests that law-enforcement cannot be expected to operate with ‘their hands 
tied behind their backs’ and it is broadly accepted that, despite the existence of problems at the 
macro-level, police officers will adapt in order to solve the problem (Anderson et al., 1995, Guille, 
2010) as they cannot be expected to stay still (Sheptycki, 1997; Reiner, 1997; Holdaway, 1983). Work 
methods are therefore adapted into new structures of cooperation (Bowling, 2010) that are 
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developed with the aim of facilitating law-enforcement cooperation101. In some cases this prompts 
the development of bottom-up approaches that will bring the micro-level closer to the macro-level 
in order to align the requirements to the field (Gallagher, 1998; Maguer, 2004; Sheptycki, 2002b; 
Guille, 2010). 
Macro and meso levels therefore need to take the micro-level into account. However, for that to 
happen, Guille (2010, 268) suggests that the macro-level needs to admit that it is far too political and 
to find a healthier ‘balance’ with the needs of the field. Indeed, at the European level, the 
identification of a gap between the political and operational spheres is not new (see den Anderson 
et al., 1995; Monar, 2001; den Boer, 2002; Bruggeman, 2002; Sheptycki, 2002a; Walker, 2002; Guille, 
2010). Guille (2010, 263) for example, suggests that ‘Europol is far too political’ and that it should 
explore if it wants to be political or operational: ‘an instrument of cooperation for police forces or 
whether it should represent the Member States along with their own political priorities’.  
In addition, cooperation is also a question of priority. Countries have different priorities and will pay 
more or less attention depending on their interest (Harlow, 2002; Guille, 2010). What is more, within 
the national level, the different levels will have different priorities. Generally speaking, insufficient 
resources are given to officers in the field, especially at the border. In Europe, for example in the 
border between Spain and France, computers are sometimes outdated, networks frequently break 
down, and basic equipment is sometimes ‘totally non-existent’ (Guille, 2010, 265). This situation is, 
not surprisingly, much worse in developing countries.  
Guille suggests that priority is often given in relation to the political image governments need to 
portray. For example: ‘on the French-German border investment is needed to project a good image, 
[while] on the French-Spanish border minimum standards seemed sufficient as the image is 
conveyed through the high volume of work’ (2010, 265). These new structures of cooperation, 
explored in following sections of this chapter and in later chapters of the thesis, can therefore play 
an important role to direct the attention and image of governments. 
 
 
 
                                                 
101 It should be none the less highlighted that a number of authors stress that instead of creating further 
mechanisms to promote cooperation, countries should learn to use those that already exist more effectively in 
their daily work (Mogini, 2001; Elsen, 2007; Guille, 2010b). Indeed, the development of a number of networks 
across the world seems to have taken place without taking into consideration existing platforms.  
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Requirements for effective cooperation  
One can logically argue that effective international cooperation is based on good cooperation 
amongst the different law-enforcement officers within each country and with their counterparts in 
their neighbouring country. Enforcement agencies, however, are known for being reluctant to share 
information (Guille, 2008), and do not have a very long history of cooperation with one another. As 
Sellar often stressed at various events: everyone likes to cooperate, but no one likes to be 
coordinated. This is exemplified by the illegal wildlife trade where there are (or there should be) a 
number of agencies involved that are not necessarily used to working together. In fact, research on 
police cooperation in general indicates that enforcement agencies are as or more reluctant to share 
information within their national boundaries than internationally (Guille, 2008, 333). This is one 
important factor to keep in mind when talking broadly about international law-enforcement 
cooperation. 
Keeping in mind that no cooperation process is perfect, the questions that remain are: ‘What are the 
underlying characteristics that facilitate cooperation?’ and ‘What are the gaps that hinder 
cooperation?’ In order to understand and answer such questions, first we have to examine the 
different types of cooperation. There are, in general terms, two main forms or types of cooperation: 
formal and informal cooperation. Both are facilitated through a number of bilateral, multilateral and 
informal arrangements, the former being the oldest form of cooperation (Anderson et al, 1995; 
Deflem, 2002; Bigo, 1994).  
Guille (2008) suggests that transnational crime requires that governments implement methods that 
enable international and cross-border cooperation and that establish a legal basis for such 
cooperation. Efforts to sustain effective cooperation are, however, more generally based on levels of 
trust and interpersonal communication and relationships: ‘personal and informal contacts and the 
goodwill of the people involved in the process are key elements in terms of trust and speed’ (Guille, 
2008, 333).  
She argues that effective cooperation is only possible when trust is built amongst the law-
enforcement officers who are supposed to work together and that cultural factors such as language 
barriers or different cultural and social practices and habits also create what we will call an ‘invisible 
curtain’ that should be taken into account (Guille, 2008). Political differences and different political 
regimes may also hinder effective cooperation if they generate mistrust amongst law-enforcement 
officers. A further point highlighted by Guille (2008) is the need for political will and support from 
the higher levels of government. Most law-enforcement officers work in a very structured and 
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hierarchical environment in which they will not (and cannot) proceed with a given task without 
approval from a senior officer. It needs to be noted that political will and support are not reducible 
only to commitment to take action, but also refer to the allocation of pertinent resources, 
equipment and staff. 
 
The existing literature on the operation of platforms for cooperation and development of trust 
Analysing police cooperation in Europe, Block (2008, 81) states that ‘it can be argued that police 
cooperation to combat TOC is a dynamic and complex field of activities in which many different 
factors could cause success or failure’. He suggests crucial elements for success appear to be similar 
to existing practices of police cooperation: a common interest, knowledge of differences in legal 
systems and cultural understanding, professional autonomy and trusted personal contacts (see also 
Goldsmith and Harris,  2012; Guille, 2010). 
It should be noted that inadequate communication and lack of information, different understanding 
over certain approaches as well as potential rivalry and jealousy between and within agencies, are 
important aspects which can hamper cooperation at the national level, let alone the international 
level. These differences are greater between law-enforcement agencies operating in diverse cultures 
and countries which may have particular traditions, different legal systems and organizational 
structures and different languages and communications methods (Benyon, 1994, 516-517; van Asch 
2007, 17). 
Zaelke, Kaniaru and Kružíková (2005b, 383) suggest that ‘lack of meaningful enforcement and 
compliance has often been seen as one of the greatest weaknesses of international law, and 
international environmental law in particular, but new models of cooperation present great promise 
for effective international action’. Indeed, a number of initiatives and mechanisms (for example, 
what Bowling (2010) has called ‘new structures of cooperation’) provide a platform to enable the 
development of the above noted elements of international police cooperation and mitigate the 
potential challenges. Hills (2009, 313, emphasis added), for example, highlights that ‘personal 
relations and networks are important precisely because of the strength of cultural differences’. 
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4.3.4 The emergence of new forms of cooperation 
The road ahead 
A wide range of actions to combat the illegal wildlife trade are underway. Efforts include the 
strengthening of legislative frameworks, increased enforcement and surveillance, increased 
coordination across multiple agencies on issues related to wildlife crime, awareness-raising to 
reduce demand, and a number of training and capacity building events for wildlife law enforcement 
officials, police, customs and prosecutors (CITES, 2013a, 3). 
This has undoubtedly had a positive impact. Over the past few years, there have been a number of 
successful seizures and arrests of wildlife traffickers. This can be clearly seen by the recent efforts of, 
for example, countries identified at the 63rd meeting of the CITES Standing Committee and CoP16 as 
countries of primary concern for the illegal trade in ivory that were urged to develop national ivory 
action plans to counter trends in illegal trade. After the development and submission of the plans, 
there has been a clear increase in successful arrests and prosecutions in those countries.102  
However, while one would normally expect that the individual that is arrested for trade in or 
possession of illegal wildlife would be thoroughly investigated to examine if he/she is involved in 
broader illegal operations, in wildlife law-enforcement this is – or was – not historically the case. 
Individuals caught in possession of wildlife generally only receive a fine – in some cases they are also 
arrested – and the illegal goods they carried are seized. However, there is a lack of interest (but also 
capacity in many cases) to conduct in-depth investigations and to make use of special investigative 
techniques that are commonly used for other transnational crimes such as narcotics. This highlights 
a key deficiency: it is necessary to investigate the entire crime chain associated with the criminal 
networks behind the crimes and use all available techniques in the process to ensure criminals are 
brought to justice.  
It is important to highlight that special investigative techniques and other useful tools such as anti-
money laundering legislation, are often not mobilized for wildlife crime (see generally ICCWC 
website and CITES, 2013a, 4). CoP16 highlighted the need to use special techniques and other 
available resources such as intelligence driven operations, risk profiling, controlled deliveries, covert 
operations, forensics and the sharing of forensic evidence and the use of anti-money laundering and 
asset forfeiture legislation. This last point is particularly important, as tackling the financial flows of 
organized wildlife crime is essential given that controlling financial flows and seizing related assets is 
vital to successfully tackling organized crime in general and organized wildlife crime in particular 
                                                 
102 See for example BBC, 2013. 
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(Shaw and Reitano, 2013, 22). It needs to be noted that the use of special investigative techniques 
may not be essential to combat opportunistic illegal traders and un-organized and small-scale 
wildlife crime. These techniques are, however, crucial to finding the masterminds behind large-scale 
illegal wildlife trade and the organized criminal groups that may be involved.  
With special attention to the judicial process, there seems to be a general lack of understanding and 
interest from the judiciary and prosecutors to tackle the illegal wildlife trade. There are many 
reasons why there are very few investigations and even less prosecutions and convictions. A key one 
is that national wildlife laws are weak in a number of countries. A further one is that, in many cases, 
there is no legislation that criminalizes wildlife crime. A recent resolution adopted by ECOSOC 
encourages countries to treat wildlife crime as a serious transnational organized crime. A serious 
crime, as defined by Article 2 of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime is 
‘conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least 4 years 
or a more serious penalty’. As Sellar (2013) notes, this causes ‘considerable problems’, as national 
legislation dealing with wildlife crime in some countries ‘does not even constitute a crime, but only 
an administrative matter where a monetary penalty will be imposed’. Research in Africa actually 
indicates that a large number of countries in the region ‘have an inadequate legal framework under 
which to investigate, prosecute and prevent organised criminal activities, money laundering and 
corruption’ and that ‘[s]ome countries have no such legislation in place at all’ (Shaw and Reitano, 
2013, 19). Wildlife crime is therefore not generally treated as a serious crime.103  
This is exacerbated by the lack of knowledge and awareness of the scale of the problem and the 
perception of the seriousness and organization of wildlife crime amongst the judiciary and a large 
proportion of the enforcement community: they do not see wildlife crime as a serious transnational 
organized crime and there is a general lack of concern for these crimes compared to other crimes 
(World Bank, 2005). As Sellar (2013) highlights, ‘people generally have not heard news sources 
focusing on a major Mafia figure incarcerated because of the controlling and smuggling of [wildlife]’. 
This is exemplified by the lack of known prosecutions of wildlife crime or wildlife criminals.  
 
New forms of cooperation 
As stated by Kofi Annan in the foreword of the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNTOC), it is felt strongly by international actors that global responses must meet global challenges: 
                                                 
103  This, however, is changing thanks to the increasing focus on the illegal wildlife trade by countries in recent 
years, as highlighted above. 
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‘[i]f crime crosses borders, so must law enforcement. If the rule of law is undermined not only in one 
country, but in many, then those who defend it cannot limit themselves to purely national means’ 
(UNTOC, 2000, III). Indeed, as many have commented, the international character of transnational 
organized crime makes it difficult to understand and effectively deal with such crimes at the national 
level only: since crime is global, purely national responses are inadequate (see Madsen, 2009; 
UNODC, 2010; Pink 2013b; van Asch, 2015). Thus, preventing transnational crime requires increased 
international law-enforcement efforts (Sheptycki, 2002, 113), as only this type of cooperation can 
have a ‘real impact on the ability of international criminals to operate successfully’ (UNTOC, 2000, 
III).  
Recently, the strengthening of global enforcement networks has been attempted through improved 
communication systems and training and through the increased emphasis on collaboration to 
counter transnational wildlife crime. Major steps in fostering international cooperation to combat 
illicit wildlife trafficking are a result of the expansion of Interpol (it is becoming more and more 
interested in the illegal wildlife trade), and the development and ratification of international 
agreements such as the UNTOC and related resolutions104. The UNTOC contains ‘detailed provisions 
to support international cooperation in criminal matters (...) and provide for specific and innovative 
forms of cooperation that could be applied in the field of wildlife and forest crime’ and that require 
parties to ‘adopt appropriate measures aimed at promoting law enforcement cooperation’ (UNODC, 
2017). Similarly, efforts to protect endangered species and to tackle the international illicit trade 
could not have been possible without the creation and ratification of CITES or without the 
commitment expressed by countries to counter the illegal wildlife trade. 
Such agreements and bodies can be seen to represent a major step forward and in the recognition of 
the seriousness of transnational crime and the need for international cooperation to effectively 
counter it.  Bowling (2010) goes further by highlighting ‘the emergence of new forms of policing that 
transcend the boundaries of the nation state’ in the form of new structures of international policing 
and the growth of transnational assistance mechanisms and programs where a broad range of 
governmental, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations coexist and play active roles. 
These new forms of cooperation have taken the form of initiatives at the regional, sub-regional or 
global level and have emerged to assist countries to combat transnational crime by encouraging 
them to work together at the international, regional or sub-regional levels (Bowling 2010). This is 
particularly the case when the commodity that is illegally traded is protected species. 
                                                 
104 See UNTOC Resolution 55/25 (2000), Resolution 2001/12, Resolution 2003/27, Resolution 16/1 (2007), 
Resolution 2008/25, and Resolution 2011/36 and UNODC, 2017.  
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As noted previously, high demand for protected species has created a lucrative black market that is 
exploited by unscrupulous traders and fiercely competitive organized networks. One of the main 
reasons for this is that the illegal wildlife trade generates very large profits with little risk of 
prosecution. As we have seen, there is evidence to suggest that, while organized groups are not 
necessarily always involved in the illegal wildlife trade, organized criminal groups displaying different 
levels of organization are becoming increasingly involved. This is particularly the case when highly 
lucrative goods such as rhino horns or elephant ivory are involved. It could be concluded therefore 
that it cannot be dealt with individually and requires a holistic and coordinated response. 
Alongside a number of intergovernmental organizations there are a myriad of initiatives which are 
aiming to strengthen cooperation between countries in the fight against transnational wildlife crime. 
This section will examine the emergence of such new structures of cooperation, how the different 
initiatives may be of assistance to countries in the fight against transnational organized wildlife 
crime, how far they go, and how useful they might be.  
 
New structures of cooperation in the region 
CITES was conceived in an effort to regulate the international wildlife trade and to safeguard certain 
species from over-exploitation, and it has created the basis for cooperation amongst countries to 
regulate close to 35,000 species.105 The growing need to protect endangered species has led to a 
‘new and intensified focus on transnational collaboration’ (Rosenau, 2000, 186) and emphasized the 
need for increased collective actions at the national, sub-regional and regional level. However, a 
further problem, in addition to the challenges identified previously, is that countries are not 
historically used to working together to combat the illegal wildlife trade and there was therefore a 
general lack of cooperation and collaboration amongst countries. 
This gap may have been filled by what Bowling (2010) refers to as ‘new structures of cooperation’, 
where a myriad of initiatives and mechanisms have emerged to facilitate and foster cooperation 
between countries and to assist them to fulfil their commitments under CITES. These new models 
have been hailed as having ‘great promise for effective international action’ (Pink, 2013, 19) and 
have materialised due to the lack of coordination amongst agencies and the inability of certain 
countries to fully enforce the legislation: ‘[a]n inability or less than optimal ability in one county is of 
                                                 
105 For further details, see CITES, 2017.  
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great concern when considering an issue such as law-enforcement responses to transnational 
environmental crime[s]’ (Pink, 2013a, 19) such as wildlife. 
In Asia, the new initiatives have taken the form of the Border Liaison Office (BLO) Mechanism and 
the ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN), where a number of international, 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations play a central and active role (UNODC, 
2010b; ASEAN-WEN). These are two examples of mechanisms with the potential to effectively 
counter transnational crime and the illegal wildlife trade in Southeast Asia, though the purpose of 
this thesis is to see how effective they have been. These, however, are but two of a number of 
initiatives that have appeared in Asia and across the world with the same objective in mind.106 A 
further initiative that should be highlighted at the global level is the recently developed International 
Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC), which is briefly introduced below and explored in 
detail separately (see van Asch, 2016) as the current research does not aim to focus on ICCWC. It is 
hoped that the current research may make a number of points that ICCWC might take into 
consideration as it provides support to strengthen criminal justice systems and provide coordinated 
support at national, regional and international level to combat wildlife and forest crime. 
 
The Border Liaison Office (BLO) Mechanism  
A BLO is essentially a coordinating office for national law-enforcement agencies that encourages and 
facilitates enhanced cross-border cooperation. Located close to key border crossings or ‘hot spots’, 
offices are located on both sides of the border and act as a centralized clearing house for informal 
information exchange amongst law-enforcement officers in border areas, thus facilitating formal 
exchange of information amongst countries. The aims of the mechanism when it was established are: 
to foster cooperation along and across national borders between different national law-enforcement 
agency units working at the borders; to enable direct and real-time communication and information 
sharing as well as improved multilateral law-enforcement; to strengthen enforcement efforts at 
borders and prevent illicit trafficking; to conduct joint operations against transnational organized 
crime in the region, building trust and mutual understanding; and to promote the dissemination of 
changing trends and new developments in cross-border trafficking (see generally UNODC, 2010b, 
2015). 
                                                 
106 For more information see report of 1st Global meeting of the wildlife enforcement networks (ICCWC, 2013) 
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Counterparts meet on a regular basis both formally and informally to exchange intelligence and 
share information on latest trends and smuggling routes, and workshops are periodically held to 
disseminate the latest modus operandi of traffickers and the trafficking routes. The mechanism was 
developed in 1993 between Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam, and 
aimed to enable cross-border cooperation efforts against the illegal narcotics trade. During the 
period 1999–2010, it was seen to contribute to strengthening cross-border cooperation on drug 
control, and to have increased the capacity of government law-enforcement, prosecution bodies, 
relevant institutions and civil society to prevent, investigate and prosecute cases of cross-border 
crimes. Prior to the establishment of the mechanism, little to no cross-border cooperation existed 
between neighbouring countries (see generally UNODC, 2010b, 2015).  
The BLO programme is considered by participating countries and UNODC as a hallmark example107 of 
multilateral law-enforcement cooperation, and has led to calls from participating states to expand 
the mandate of the BLO mechanism to other transnational organized crimes (TOC), which was 
realized in 2010 with the expansion of the mandate to include environmental crimes and the illegal 
wildlife trade, amongst other crimes, through the development of the UNODC PATROL (Partnership 
Against Transnational-crime through Regional Organized Law-enforcement) programme (see 
generally UNODC, 2010b, 2015). 
 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Wildlife Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN) 
ASEAN-WEN was born as a result of Objective Two of the ASEAN Regional Action Plan on Trade in 
Wild Fauna and Flora (2005–2010) (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005, Objective 2; see also ASEAN-WEN, 
2017a,b). The development of the network was in response to a call from ASEAN Member States to 
cooperate on improved CITES implementation, including law-enforcement. This was followed by the 
ASEAN Regional Action Plan on Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora.108 
ASEAN-WEN was created with the objective to be a wildlife law-enforcement network that involved 
relevant enforcement agencies working to combat the illegal wildlife trade (police, customs and 
                                                 
107 It is considered a hallmark example by UNODC, participating countries and practitioners involved, albeit no 
independent research has however been conducted as to its effectiveness.  
108 ASEAN-WEN falls under declaration no. 24 of the ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sustainability, 
signed by the Heads of States and Governments of ASEAN in 2007 and is recognized under the ASEAN 
Charter’s ASEAN Socio Cultural Community (ASCC) Blueprint 2009–2015. In 2011 ASEAN Member States 
extended the ASEAN Regional Action Plan on Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora (2005–2010). The new Regional 
Action Plan (2011–2015) aims to sustain earlier efforts and successes of ASEAN-WEN. See generally ASEAN-
WEN, 2017b. See also ASEAN, 2007; ASEAN AEC, 2012.  
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environmental agencies) of all ASEAN countries.109 It was established with the aim to enhance 
cooperation amongst enforcement agencies and increase the capacity of governments to counter 
the illegal wildlife trade. Through annual meetings and a comprehensive array of workshops and 
trainings, ASEAN-WEN is considered as increasing the capacity of and enhancing cooperation 
amongst law-enforcement agencies regionally and globally (ASEAN-WEN, 2017).  
It provides a mechanism by which countries can share information and learn from each other’s best 
practices, promotes the implementation of existing national wildlife laws and international 
agreements (such as CITES), and is said to have contributed to strengthening national laws110. The 
network operates at both the national level111 and at the regional level112 to counter the illegal trade 
in wildlife and to enhance cooperation. Efforts of the network are coordinated by the Program 
Coordination Unit (PCU), in close cooperation with all its Member States (ASEAN-WEN, 2017).  
As part of the agreement to establish the network, ASEAN member countries agreed to allocate 
necessary financial and human resources, and to collaborate in cross-border cooperation and 
coordination to ensure the effective enforcement of legislation governing conservation, trade and 
sustainable use of wild fauna and flora. The development and nurturing of the network was made 
possible thanks to the support of the USAID funded ASEAN-WEN Support Program (2005–2010) and 
the ARREST Program (2010-2016). (see ARREST, 2016; see also Schaedla and Sinha, 2016). 
At the time of writing the network is in the process of being merged with the ASEAN Experts Group 
on CITES (AEG CITES) and into an AEG CITES Wildlife Enforcement (ongoing, see ICCWC, 2016; see 
also Freeland Foundation, 2016). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
109 ASEAN countries are: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Vietnam and Thailand. 
110 Through, for example, a number of activities and projects under the Support Programme and ARREST and 
the development of ASEAN Handbook on Legal Cooperation to Combat Wildlife Crime (See ASEAN-WEN, 2016) 
111 At the national level, each country operates an inter-agency task force or a national WEN. All ASEAN 
countries except Singapore and Brunei have established a national WEN. It needs to be highlighted that while 
such countries may not have an official WEN, they all have national mechanisms for international and inter-
agency cooperation.  
112 At the regional level, countries cooperate bilaterally and multilaterally by sharing information and 
conducting joint operations to counter the illegal wildlife trade. 
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The International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC)  
As noted above, the focus of the thesis will remain on ASEAN-WEN and the BLOs. It is however 
useful to provide a brief introduction to ICCWC as it is in a unique position to provide coordinated 
support at the global level to ongoing efforts to combat wildlife crime.  
Recognizing that a well-coordinated law-enforcement response is required to effectively combat 
transnational organized wildlife and forest crime, the CITES Secretariat, INTERPOL, the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the World Bank and the World Customs Organization 
(WCO) joined forces and agreed to work together to support national wildlife law-enforcement 
agencies and the sub-regional and regional networks mandated to combat the illegal wildlife trade. 
This resulted in the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC, 2010; see 
generally ICCWC, 2017). 
The mission of ICCWC is to ‘strengthen criminal justice systems and provide coordinated support at 
national, regional and international level to combat wildlife and forest crime’ to ensure that 
perpetrators of serious wildlife crimes are brought to justice through a ‘formidable and coordinated 
response’ (ICCWC, 2017) by working for, and with, frontline wildlife law-enforcement officers that 
are mandated to take action against the illegal wildlife trade.  
United under ICCWC since the launch of the alliance in November 2010 (ICCWC, 2010), the five 
organizations have a ‘unique pool of thematically relevant technical and programming expertise, 
presenting the opportunity for a novel approach to the multi-facetted challenges posed by wildlife 
crime’ (ICCWC, 2017). Each organization intends to offer specialized expertise to support national 
enforcement agencies and sub-regional and regional networks, drawing upon its extensive 
experience in developing and delivering comprehensive training and capacity-building programmes 
for law-enforcement officers at the global level.  
 
The influence and role of the initiatives  
The new focus on combating transnational wildlife crime, as highlighted at CITES CoP16 and shown 
by the growing commitment of countries in recent years, has emphasized the need for increased 
transnational collaboration. One of the results of such increased efforts is the emergence of new 
structures of cooperation that are intended to facilitate and foster cooperation at the sub-regional, 
regional and global levels, as highlighted in the previous section. The aim of the thesis is to examine 
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the influence of the initiatives on the illegal trade and if they result in increased actions at all levels 
of the enforcement chain, from initial seizure to detailed investigations and, ultimately, prosecutions 
and convictions.  
What is the potential for such effects?  
As explained above, the BLO mechanism is a sub-regional programme developed to assist countries 
to cooperate and share intelligence along and across borders on cases of illicit trade.113 ASEAN-WEN 
is a regional initiative created to encourage countries to cooperate at the national, sub-regional and 
regional levels to counter the illegal wildlife trade in the region.114 The focus of the former is on 
cross-border cooperation (along and across borders), while the focus of the latter is to improve 
coordination at the national and regional levels.  
Stopping illegal trade across borders is essential: in order to counter transnational wildlife crime, it is 
important to have effective border management. The problem is that, as highlighted throughout the 
paper, smugglers and illegal wildlife traders are often well equipped and largely resourceful, and 
enforcement officers face a number of challenges.  
The BLO mechanism and related projects are intended to have the crucial role of strengthening the 
capacity of border officers to stop, detect and investigate cases of illegal trade. Since 2010, a number 
of training events have been held to improve, strengthen and expand the capacity of law-
enforcement to prevent and investigate cases of cross-border crimes. In addition, the mechanism 
has aimed to build trust and promote informal cooperation amongst border officials, in order to lead 
to increased cross-border cooperation. This is probably the most crucial aspect of the initiative itself 
as it aims to increase cooperation and should, ideally, result in increased enforcement and further 
cooperation, and, in turn, lead to (ideally) more secure borders.  
While secure borders can contribute to increased seizures or to a change in the trends or routes 
used by smugglers, they are only one part of the enforcement chain. A concerted effort at the 
national level and the involvement of all relevant institutions are required. There still appears to be a 
gap with the judiciary and prosecutors in the different countries, and the mechanism would benefit 
from stronger connections to other initiatives and efforts, particularly with the judiciary. This is not 
                                                 
113 The UNODC-led initiative brings together relevant national law enforcement agencies working along and 
across borders to encourage enhanced cross-border cooperation. It enables officers working close to key ‘hot 
spots’ on both sides of the national borders to exchange information (see generally UNODC, 2010b).  
114 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Wildlife Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN) is a wildlife law 
enforcement network involving relevant law enforcement agencies working on the illegal wildlife trade (police, 
customs and environmental agencies) of all ASEAN countries.  
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necessarily because of the initiative itself, but rather because the involvement of justice and 
prosecutors in wildlife crime, particularly in Asia, remains a challenge.  
At the other end of the spectrum, ASEAN-WEN encourages more effective enforcement and 
increased engagement of countries at the national and regional level. The initiative is intended to 
contribute to the increased commitment in the region to combat the illegal wildlife trade. Elements 
of the capacity-building programme also include awareness raising for judges and prosecutors, 
which seems to be one of the crucial next steps to draw their attention to the magnitude of the 
problem. 
If one analyses both initiatives, one of the main differences between them is the focus. One focuses 
on the ‘macro level’ (i.e. the national and regional level) and the other focuses on the field or ‘micro 
level’ (Guille, 2010; Benyon, 1996). As explored in further detail in earlier sections in relation to 
other organised crimes, while both levels are essential, there seems to be a gap between the 
national and field levels, which Sheptycki (2002), Reiner (1997), Anderson et al. (1995) and Guille 
(2008, 2010) among others argue is one of the main challenges to effective cooperation. Guille also 
notes that, in many cases, broad cooperative agreements are signed without prior consultation at 
the field level. This poses a potential problem for effective cooperation, as political representatives 
at the macro level do not necessarily understand the operational requirements and needs at the 
field level. This does not allow field officers to trust the mechanism nor to use it efficiently (Guille, 
2008) and it forces field officers to improvise which leads them to use their own informal 
mechanisms (Sheptycki, 2002).  
Chapters 6 and 7 will explore the perceptions of participants involved in the initiatives explored 
above (ASEAN-WEN and the BLOs). Before proceeding further, it is however needed to explore how 
this initiatives can– or could potentially – be evaluated. As the following sections will highlight, this is 
not an easy task.  
 
4.4 (Section III) Evaluating networks: mission impossible? 
This section will explore existing research on (illegal) networks and various available methods that 
can be used to evaluate and measure their effectiveness. Firstly, the various forms and types of 
networks  as well as the benefits and common challenges associated with networks will be 
elucidated upon. In particular it will explore what are the crucial elements of networks and how to 
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measure their effectiveness. The final section will explore ways to assess the development status of 
networks. These will be used in chapter 8 to evaluate the effectiveness of the initiatives to combat 
transnational organized wildlife crime115.  
 
4.4.1 Various forms and types of networks  
As discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, networks or ‘new forms or platforms for cooperation’ 
are developed because it is believed that a number of problems cannot be countered alone and 
require collective action or because the challenge is beyond the area of expertise of particular 
organizations and requires collaboration (see Parts I and II). Given the nature of emergent and 
rapidly developing challenges such as the illegal wildlife trade, law enforcement agencies have not 
surprisingly ‘encountered difficulty in identifying and establishing appropriate contacts and 
information sources’ (Farmer, 2007). White (2008) also suggests that: 
‘environmental crime poses a number of challenges for effective policing. Such crimes may 
have local, regional and global dimensions. … [and] may demand intensive cross-
jurisdictional negotiation’ (2008, 197; see also Pink 2010, 42). 
It is broadly recognized that ‘[e]nforcement networks typically spring up due to the inability of 
government officials in one country to enforce that country‘s laws‘ (Slaughter, 2004b, 395; Pink, 
2010; Farmer, 2007) and in response to the need to ‘negotiate’ between jurisdictions. As a result, 
practitioners and policy makers look for assistance and this leads to the disparate establishment of 
various networks and initiatives. These incorporate different levels of members (local, sub-national, 
national, regional, and global) and are different in terms of formality (informal, semi-formal and 
formal) (Pink 2010, 2; Farmer, 2007). They vary in setup and operation (Farmer 2007, Fleming and 
Wood 2006, Pink 2010) and in the areas where they possess specific strengths for their members 
(Pink 2010). Indeed, Farmer (2007), Kaniaru (2002) and Pink (2010) among others suggest that the 
number of networks has grown considerably since the 1990s, but  that the evaluation framework for 
these structures ‘needs greater attention‘ (Williams, 2006, 260; Pink, 2010, 5) 
Pink (2010) conducted an in depth historical, academic and theoretical review of available literature 
and suggests that research should focus on the justification for the development of networks and on 
                                                 
115 It should be noted that research by Pink (2010) as well as his related research with others (e.g. Lehane or 
Bartel, see below sections for details), is of particular significance here as it highlights the importance of 
interagency cooperation and of networks as regulatory frameworks. It is also intrinsically linked with networks 
to combat wildlife crime that are based on inter-agency (and not inter-individual cooperation) and which are 
the focus of this thesis. As it will be explored further below, his research with others (e.g. Lehane) has also 
provided the foundations to assessing networks of this type. 
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the benefits of networks. Initially, available information on networks has tended to include aspects 
associated with access to information, skills and knowledge (Rhodes 2006, Williams 2006, Scholz and 
Wang, 2006; Pink 2010), exploring for example aspects related to coordination and ownership 
(Rhodes, 2006), networks and cross-cutting frameworks (Williams 2006), and network effectiveness 
(Scholz and Wang, 2006; Pink, 2010). Networks have been found to have varied aims and objectives 
that are shaped by their membership, specific area of focus, and historical/cultural considerations, 
but taken together they ‘perform certain common functions‘ (Slaughter, 2004b,  389). These 
common functions include ‘expanding regulatory reach, building trust and establishing 
relationships …, exchanging information, developing databases and best practices, and offering 
technical assistance and professional socialisation to members’ (Pink, 2010, 7).  
Commentators have highlighted a broad range of types of transnational networks. Zaelke, Kaniaru 
and Kružíková (2005b, 383) consider networks as global webs of transgovernmental networks. 
Networks can also be considered generally as ‘as a form of cooperation involving governments or 
government officials operating without a formal treaty or international institution’ (Pink, 2010, 6). 
Slaughter identifies three purposes for networks, or three types: in relation to information, 
enforcement and harmonisation (2004, 52-61; see also Pink and Bartel, 2015, 310). Isett et al (2011) 
suggest a typology of: policy networks, collaborative networks and governance networks (see also 
Pink and Bartel, 2015, 310). Milward and Provan (2006) suggest that networks form around 
implementation of services, dissemination of information, problem-solving and capacity-building 
(see also Pink and Bartel, 2015, 310). Popp et al (2013) refer to networks that are mandated as well 
as formal and/or informal and emergent networks (see also Pink and Bartel, 2015, 310). 
Pink and Bartel (2015, 310) take this forward and ‘consider three main forms of networks: 
geographically-based networks, discipline-based networks and commodity-based networks’, as well 
as hybrids that have features of all three. They describe the different types of networks as follows:  
• Commodity-based Networks: ‘Examples of commodity-based networks are the Wildlife 
Enforcement Networks. Although having wildlife in common, enforcement in this area is 
multifaceted. It is concerned with the treatment, trade and movement of wildlife and 
wildlife products within jurisdictions, across regions and internationally’ (Pink and Bartel, 
2015, 310).  
• Geographically-based Networks: these operate at specific areas (borders, airports, seaports, 
etc) and are more enforcement focused and operational in nature  
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• Discipline-based networks: targeted networks for specific practitioners by their specific 
areas and disciplines e.g. a prosecutors’ network or similar.  
• Hybrid Networks: established when the above types of networks are combined  
This typology appears to be the most suitable and encompassing analysis to date on types of 
networks and is particularly relevant for the initiatives that are the focus of research. It also takes 
into account a number of challenges identified previously on various aspects needed and layers to 
be taken into account when combating wildlife crime, albeit further research should be conducted 
to explore links between these types of networks and the cooperative gaps that exist between law-
enforcement at the different levels.  
 
Benefits and common challenges associated with networks and their crucial elements  
Zaelke, Kaniaru and Kružíková (2005a, 28) consider networks are more flexible and efficient than 
other structures for cooperation: ‘networks can quickly disseminate and distil information, enhance 
enforcement cooperation, harmonize laws and regulations, and address common problems’. 
Raustiala (2002) suggests networks improve treaties, fill gaps where treaties are not present, and 
facilitate negotiations for future treaties.  
In his thorough research on networks, Pink116 (2010) identified key benefits of networks:  
                                                 
116 Pink’s (2010) initial research is a qualitative analysis of Environmental Enforcement Networks and 
established that networks can be informal, semi-formal, or formal and have a clear benefits and associated 
challenges. The empirical research explored broad areas to capitalize on the benefits of networks, including: 
involvement in the network (e.g. why agencies/people engage with networks); the value of such involvement 
(and how this can be identified and measured); the effectiveness of networks (Pink considers how networks 
operate and how they could operate more effectively, recognizes that ‘little has been written in relation to 
measuring the effectiveness of networks’ (2010,10) and considers the characteristics of effective partnerships); 
and, support available to members (i.e. what is required to support members).  
His related research with Lehane (see Pink and Lehane, 2011, 2015) took this a step further to develop a 
network evaluation matrix that determines the development phase of networks and enables one to map their 
progression (see section below on assessing the development status of networks and Pink and Lehane 2011 
and 2015 more broadly for additional details).  
The development of the matrix focused chiefly on the Australasian Environmental Law Enforcement and 
Regulators network (AELERT). AELERT was founded in 2003 and is a professional network for environmental 
regulators in Australia and New Zealand. Current membership includes over 190 member agencies and more 
than 1000 member officers. AELERT aims to play an important role in securing a sustainable Australasia 
through the advancement of best practice environmental regulation. Its members work across local, state and 
federal government agencies to administer and implement environmental legislation. The network offers 
members a forum to: share and solve common issues; identify best practice and consistent approaches to 
environmental regulation; access a range of industry networking opportunities; and collaborate to exchange 
resources, information, knowledge and experience (information taken from AELERT website, see also AELERT 
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‘three benefits described by the key informants … were contacts, aspects relating to 
operational matters and better practices. Other benefits, listed alphabetically, included 
access to data/information, credibility and reputation, more level playing field, sharing 
experiences and information, partnering, and training.’ (2010, 24). 
He also identified the most significant challenges of networks:  
‘The three most significant challenges described … were participation, resource imbalances 
and funding, and management of the network secretariat. Other challenges, listed 
alphabetically, included cliques, continuity of personnel, costs outweighs benefits, disconnect 
(between management and frontline staff), inconsistency, and opportunity costs’ (Pink, 2010, 
24). 
Fleming and Wood (2006, 3) suggest networks can create conflicts at various levels and can be 
difficult to coordinate (see also Pink 2010, 11). It is also highlighted in the available literature that 
the effectiveness of networks can be constrained by a number of reasons, in particular:  
‘balanc[ing] cooperation and competition because organizational self-interest is still heavily 
engrained in the system despite the mantra of partnership working, and also to recognize 
that over collaboration can result in ”groupthink” which stifles innovation, adaptability and 
learning’ (Pink 2010, 12; see also Williams, 2006). 
In addition, Fleming and Wood highlight that networks require resources and can often appear to be 
unaccountable for their actions. They can also generate conflicts ‘between individual and 
organisational commitment; between local and national public expectations; between flexibility and 
rules; and between work goals and national regulators. They can be difficult to steer and they can 
mix with other governing structures like oil and water’ (Fleming and Wood, 2006, 20; in Pink, 2010, 
11). 
Notwithstanding a number of challenges that arise, the benefits of networks appear to outweigh 
their challenges (Pink, 2010, 53). Key elements of networks include learning and capacity building 
and strengthening relationships between members to enable effective cooperation.  
Pink and Bartel (2015) suggest agencies have specific short, medium, long term and ongoing needs. 
Short (and immediate) term capacity is required to carry out basic functions. Ongoing (and long term) 
needs are focused on improving practices. Learning may happen at a variety of levels and in different 
ways. Formal learning can be done through various training events or conferences, exchanges of 
information, mentorships and twinning programmes, or various activities at the national, regional or 
global level. Informal learning may happen by sharing experiences and understanding of various 
cultures and organizational standards between officers or network members (Pink and Bartel, 2015). 
                                                                                                                                                        
Annual Report: AELERT, 2015). The matrix has been recently tested in six other networks (see generally Pink 
and Lehane, 2016; and sections below for details). 
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The approach taken will also have a bearing on the effectiveness of the network:  
‘Bottom-up (or grass-roots) generation and maintenance of a network is necessary for 
member commitment, motivation and social capital. Top-down support is necessary for 
fostering cooperation, communication and transparency among network members; 
coordinating activities; analysing network strengths and weaknesses; and motivating 
prospective network members to be engaged in setting the agenda for the network’ 
(Thorgren, Wincent and Ortqvist, 2009, 35; in Pink and Bartel, 2015, 321) 
Trust is also one of the crucial elements and objectives of networks (and networking): 
‘By working together, organizations … learn to understand and trust one another, as well as 
learn whom not to trust. This learning can be extremely important’ (Milward and Provan, 
2011, 417; in Pink and Bartel, 2015, 318). 
As noted previously, a number of authors (see earlier sections) suggest that trust and personal 
relationships are key aspects for cooperation and that once they have been built, cooperation 
happens in a more coordinated matter. Pink (2010, 39) further stresses that ‘it was the human 
aspects and more specifically the criticality of interrelationships between individuals which [are] 
fundamental to enhanced network benefits’.  
Slaughter (2004a, 57) emphasizes that a network is dependent on the strengths and/or 
shortcomings of its individual members: ‘a network ... is only as strong as its weakest link‘ (see also 
Pink, 2010, 6). Pink agrees with Rhodes’ ‘sour laws of networks’ that suggests ‘networks struggle to 
deal with problems associated with co-ordination, mixing government structures, and ownership’ 
(Pink, 2010, 9; Rhodes, 2006). Pink (2010) suggests that suggests that networks: 
 require a strong ongoing secretariat; 
 require ongoing commitment and leadership (which frequently falls to an energised few); 
 are reliant upon ad hoc resources from disparate sources (which tend to involve a 
disproportionate resource burden on some members); [emphasis in original] 
 lack enforceable governance arrangements; and 
 involve a transitory (and at times non-representative) membership drawn from a variety of 
government and non-government organisations (often with vastly competing interests).’ 
These common functions and ‘laws’ can be used to indicate the possible impact and effectiveness of 
the networks to be studied in the current research.  
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4.4.2 Measuring effectiveness 
Similarly to research and data on the illegal wildlife trade, there is limited discussion on how to 
measure and evaluate networks. The word puzzle comes back to mind. 
As a starting point, there seems to be agreement that assessing or evaluating networks is 
complicated (Pope and Lewis 2008, in Pink 2010). In particular for environmental or more specifically 
for wildlife enforcement networks, there are virtually no commonly used evaluation practices within 
the relevant organisations other than internal reports and project management reporting. (Pink and 
Bartel, 2015, 326). It is therefore rather difficult to measure the effectiveness of networks: 
‘Despite sharing relatively common purposes … networks are each unique. Part of this is 
because the circumstances vary under which they were established. A range of factors 
influence their development and ultimately determine their relative capability and potential 
maturity as a network’ (Pink and Lehane, 2011, 1).  
It is broadly understood that there is no one formula or set of instructions for developing or a 
network. Similarly there is no one way of developing or creating a successful network. In fact, there 
are a number of ways to develop a network, and every network is dependent on its unique 
circumstances at the political, geographical and cultural level as well as in terms of the specific 
challenges it faces or has been developed to address (INECE, 2012; Pink 2010, 2015; Pink and Lehane 
2011; Pink and Bartel, 2015; ICCWC, 2013, 2016). There are, however, ways to measure different 
aspects.   
Provan and Milward’s (2001) evaluation criteria (focused on health systems) include reduced 
incidence of the problem, and increased perceptions by the broader public that the problem has 
been solved (i.e. customer satisfaction, which could be, for example, increased compliance with 
international commitments and obligations under CITES).  As Pink and Bartel (2015) note, this may 
however be problematic as different groups have different perceptions. At the network level Provan 
and Milward recommend the following evaluation criteria: growth in membership; network 
governance arrangements and maintenance costs; range of services provided; integration and 
coordination of services and avoiding duplication of efforts; and commitment of members to the 
goals of the network (2001, 422; see also Pink and Bartel, 2015). Out of these, and as Pink and Bartel 
(2015, 327) stress, commitment from the agencies to which members of the network are affiliated 
to is ‘essential for the network to survive’. 
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Network effectiveness has also been defined as ‘the achievement of positive network level 
outcomes that cannot be attained by individual organisational participants acting alone’ (Popp et al 
2013, 10; in Pink and Bartel 2015, 324). As Provan and others have observed:  
Effectiveness is …related to the concept of network learning ... the organisation learns from 
those organisations around them, and as they evolve, the network is more likely to evolve in 
ways that lead to network effectiveness. Without learning and evolution, the network may 
fail. (Provan, Fish and Sydow 2007; in Pink and Bartel 2015, 324) 
Provan and Lemaire (2012, 643) consider there to be five characteristics of effective networks. These 
include involvement at multiple levels, the design and structure of the network, and appropriate 
governance for the network that ensures members can trust it, as well as the legitimacy and stability 
of the network. Popp and others also suggest a number of potential evaluation questions117 (2013, 
68 in Pink and Bartel 2015, 325-326).  
 
Assessing the development status of networks 
Farmer (2007, 261) highlights successful networks require commitment by members, active 
secretariats, funding and deliverables based on the needs of its members. Pink and Lehane argue 
that there are five phases of development through which networks may transition and that mapping 
the transition or the phase in which the networks are ‘may assist and guide networks to reach their 
next level of maturity more effectively and efficiently’ (2011, 1). They see each phase as involving 
the network’s position on several themes and ‘postulate that the five major themes contain core 
criteria that should be used to assess Environmental Enforcement Networks’ (Pink and Lehane, 2011, 
5). They suggest ‘the five major themes aim to recognise and attribute some value to the intangible 
benefits of Environmental Enforcement Networks’ (Pink and Lehane, 2011, 6). These themes are 
membership, finances, governance, support and deliverables.   
                                                 
117 These include: 1) Does the network have a clear vision and goals that are understood and supported by all 
members? 2) Is the governance structure a good fit for this network? 3) Is the network appropriately 
resourced to do its work? 4) Does the leadership style fit with what we know about effective network 
leadership? 5) Are important management tasks being attended to, and is the management focus evolving 
appropriately over time? 6) Is attention being paid to both the management of the network, and management 
in the network? 7) Does the network have both the internal and the external legitimacy it requires? 8) Is the 
network/relationship structure evolving as expected and contributing positively to the work of the network? 9) 
Is there an optimal mix of strong and weak ties among network members? 10) Are the linkages targeted and 
appropriate? 11) Is there trust among network members? 12) Are power differentials being recognised and 
addressed as appropriate? 13) Are there multiple levels of involvement? 14) Is there a balance of stability and 
flexibility? See Popp et al (2013, 68) and Pink and Bartel (2015, 325-326) for additional details.  
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• Members:  involves issues such as the number and type of membership, their geographic 
distribution, levels of contribution to the network (in-kind, financial, advocacy, or leadership); 
and the value of the membership  
• Finances: relates to funds to support the functions of the secretariat (usually staff) and for 
funds to undertake project activities (workshops, training events, conferences)  
• Governance is an issue that requires to be revisited constantly and refers to ‘the balance 
between being over-prescriptive (so as to not fetter involvement or participation) and so 
relaxed that it leads to concerns about a lack of accountability’ 
• Support: support provided and/or received by members from the network and vice versa as 
well as from members to other network members bilaterally  
• Deliverables: (outputs or tangible benefits to demonstrate the value of the networks) 
include manuals, training events, workshops or similar. Pink and Lehane (2011, 6) note 
however that ‘intangible benefits such as reputation, association and peer support, are 
generally unreported and unrecognized. Notwithstanding, they need to be recognized and 
factored into any assessment of maturity’ 
Pink (2015) also established that an agency’s engagement with and benefits from networks to 
national organizations can be measured across 5 different phases. The first includes ‘exposed but 
sub-conscious’ where those involved in the network are aware of the network, have started to 
attend related events, but have a limited understanding of the network. The second is ‘increasingly 
aware but not involved’, where representatives attend events but do not actively participate and 
engage. Their understanding remains basic and their involvement does not necessarily benefit their 
national agency. The third is where network participants are ‘aware and involved’, have a good 
understanding of the network and start to actively engage and create links between the network 
and their respective agencies, leading to greater coordination and increased (informal) exchange of 
information. The fourth phase is where representatives’ understanding is comprehensive and they 
are ‘acutely aware and deeply involved’ in the network by becoming involved and taking a key role in 
related activities. In such cases national agencies recognize the work and benefits of the networks as 
a core activity and promote coordination through the network. The fifth and final level is where 
network representatives are ‘researching networks’ (Pink 2015, 13-16).  As we will see in latter 
chapters (see chapter 8), these could also be used as indicators to measure how effective the use of 
the network is for national agencies.  
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Networks however also need time, effort and resources toward their development, establishment, 
maintenance, ongoing development and evolution. Pink and Lehane (2011, 5) explore how to 
consider the levels of network maturity and measure effectiveness as levels of maturity through a 
network evaluation matrix . They suggest measurement should be by ‘identifying and documenting a 
number of capabilities that span the five distinct levels of maturity’. All phases can be characterised 
as absent, emerging, fragile, maturing or well established (Pink and Lehane, 2011, 2-5; see Tables 4.1, 
4.2 and 4.3 below). 
The overall objective is then to reach ‘maturity’ i.e. to be well established:  
‘The Well Established level is the most advanced level in terms of network development. 
Within this level of maturity, the network reaches the saturation point for its membership, 
has a comprehensive support base, includes active contributions from across the network, 
and has a secure source of funding for network services. Deliverables … are regular, tangible 
and of high standard. The deliverables in turn provide a catalyst for promoting the network, 
attracting new members, and marketing the network. This level tends to involve more 
aspects of review and continuous improvement’. (Pink and Lehane, 2011, 10) 
To assess levels of maturity (which can also be associated with relative levels of effectiveness (e.g. 
more mature is more effective or has higher chances of being more effective), Pink and Lehane give 
numerical values to each sector to value the levels of maturity of the different aspects of the 
network. Accordingly, they allocate numerical values (or points) for various maturity levels scored 
towards the major themes or attributes of each level (0 - Absent, 1 - Emerging, 2 - Fragile, 3 - 
Maturing, and 4 - Well Established; see Pink and Lehane 2011, 12 and Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 below 
for details). Once these are calculated, a general score is allocated to determine the overall level of 
maturity of networks (0 = Absent, 1 – 7 = Emerging, 8 – 13 = Fragile, 14 – 17 = Maturing, and 18 – 20 
= Well Established; see Pink and Lehane, 2011, 12): these ‘can be added together to determine an 
indicative overall level of network maturity’ (Pink and Lehane, 2011, 12; emphasis added). 
The Matrix has been developed as a practical and comprehensive assessment tool to explore the 
development of networks and can be a useful and dynamic tool to evaluate the evolution of 
networks and how they may have an effect on efforts to address the issues they were designed to 
address, which can as noted above be associated with relative levels off effectiveness (but not on 
the outcome or impact of such efforts).118 As Pink and Lehane (2011, 12) note, the ‘Matrix offers 
criteria and a process for both internal and external quality review’ and ‘enables an isolation and 
                                                 
118 As noted below and as will be further elucidated upon in Chapter 8, the Matrix is particularly useful as it 
enables researchers and organisations to assess the evolution of networks in terms of maturity, which in turn 
can be related to effectiveness, and theoretically to the effect they may have towards making an impact on the 
actual illegal wildlife trade. Measuring the actual outcome and impact of such efforts, as noted earlier, would 
however require additional data than were available in the current research.  
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categorisation of improvements as well as areas of shortfall … [and] provides … data for future 
review, management and evolution … [as well as] an overall picture of the network’s status’: 
‘by determining the current phase of development … able to map progression through future 
phases of development …  to reach their highest level of maturity more effectively and 
efficiently. Moreover, it provides a platform for … self-assessment to direct network effort 
and strategic planning, and also allows for peer assessment by other networks or 
independent third parties.’ (Pink and Lehane, 2011, 12)   
Certainly, this tool ‘provides a set of criteria and benchmark standards for independent evaluation’ 
(Pink and Lehane 2011, 12) and could also be used by networks as a self-assessment tool so they can 
independently measure their respective levels of maturity and identify areas that require attention. 
What is more, it appears to be the most comprehensive tool available to measure the effectiveness 
of networks. A number of potential gaps should, nonetheless, be taken into consideration.  
Firstly, the framework assumes that maturity is a synonym of effectiveness when it may not 
necessarily be the case. Maturity might not necessarily relate to activity or effective cooperation119. 
One could, however, assume that a more mature network would be more inclined to cooperate.  
In addition, the applicability to and use of the matrix for other networks has been recommended but 
is unknown at this stage. It should be noted that Pink and Lehane’s comprehensive Network 
Evaluation Matrix emerged from a specific experience of assessing an Australasian Environmental 
Enforcement network (AELERT, see footnote 116 for details and AELERT, 2015) and its applicability 
has been tested only in a small number of cases with other networks (this is also acknowledged by 
Pink and Lehane). Pink and Lehane (2015) conducted some subsequent research and tested the 
matrix with a random selection of six networks that were requested to conduct a self-assessment 
using the matrix to explore if the matrix was ‘fit for purpose’ (Pink and Lehane, 2015, 111). This 
research provided overall positive results and some suggestions to further improve the matrix. 
Based on the results, however, Pink and Lehane (2015, 117, emphasis in original) consider that ‘at 
this point in time, it is considered that the (matrix) need not be changed. … it is not a ‘one size fits all 
perfectly model, rather … a one size that fits all adequately model … (that) has (a) more a general 
application. This should also be taken into consideration when exploring potential results. Indeed, it 
would be interesting to explore potential synergies and areas of collaboration and potentially tailor 
the matrix to regional and cross-border networks (see examples of multiple networks in existence in 
Faure, De Smedt and Stas, 2016).  
                                                 
119 For example, Interpol was established in 1923, but its use remains sometimes limited in certain spheres and 
other methods of cooperation are often sought among law enforcement officers that are considered more 
flexible and direct. 
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Perhaps more importantly, the matrix does not take into consideration the gaps that are highlighted 
in the literature on international policing and transnational cooperation about the potential gaps 
between the macro, meso and micro levels of cooperation. Finally, there are a number of key 
aspects such as trust or corruption that are essential for effective cooperation, and yet are difficult if 
not impossible to measure using this framework. There is no developed solution to this problem, but 
some potential ideas will be explored in chapter 8 based on perceptions from participants 
interviewed in the current research.  
These issues should be taken into consideration in future revisions as the matrix evolves and adapts 
to other networks and mechanisms for cooperation. Indeed, much of this is acknowledged by Pink 
and Lehanne, who suggest a ‘dialogue’ (2011, 13-14) to further enhance efforts and advance the 
matrix (see also Pink and Lehane, 2015).  
Taking into account the different aspects identified above in relation to measuring effectiveness and 
assessing networks, I believe the matrix is a very useful tool to measure networks and intend to use 
it to analyse the initiatives being studied in the current research (see chapter 8). The Tables below 
(Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3) are taken from Pink and Lehane as a guide to facilitate assessment using the 
matrix. Assessment in the current research will however also include a number of additional key 
aspects identified n earlier sections of this chapter. As Brown suggests that a balance is needed: ‘The 
existence of the right political will, the appropriate legal framework and culture … supported by a 
sufficient capacity, are each required … [for] successful cooperation, but these enablers also have to 
achieve a balance’ (Brown, 2008b, 39). 
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Table 4.1: Network Evaluation Matrix – Fragile Criteria (taken from Pink and Lehane, 
2011) 
 
Members Finances Governance Support Deliverables 
Membership 
 Generally 
Increasing across 
significant actors 
within network 
sphere of 
influence 
Budget 
 Contributions 
are spasmodic 
and are made by 
small number of 
sources  
 Not 
sustainable 
Access 
 Central 
repository of 
information and 
communiqués to 
members  
 Limited open 
source access to 
network’s guiding 
documents 
Liaison 
 Emergent and 
Exploratory 
liaison with other 
networks 
undertaken  
 Information 
sought from 
other networks  
Events 
 Irregular 
events with 
Increasing 
frequency  
 Preliminary 
attempts to 
undertake 
cooperative 
exercises 
Leadership 
 Wider range 
of key individuals 
/ member 
agencies taking 
on leadership 
roles across 
network 
Contributions 
 Few core 
Member agencies 
/ individuals 
providing in-kind 
support 
Review 
 Regular 
changing of 
operating rules,  
 Constitutional 
documents, etc. 
to fit 
circumstances 
Support base 
 Growing level 
of support base  
 Increasing 
numbers of 
interested 
individuals 
Outcomes 
 Low level 
coordination to 
Deliver 
outcomes  
 Members 
seeking benefits 
Value 
 Tangible 
Benefits available 
for active 
members  
 Most 
members inactive 
/ passive and 
question value of 
network  
 Low level 
Communications 
disseminated to 
members from 
core members 
Project funding 
 Very limited, 
if available  
 Sourced from 
lead member in 
project team 
Structures 
 Guiding 
Documentation 
developed 
reactively to 
situations.  
 Clear Aims 
and Objects set 
out for network 
Supporting 
functions 
 Central 
Support function 
to support 
membership and 
administrative 
tasks only  
Products 
 Infrequent 
Publications 
being developed 
and 
disseminated  
 Range of 
Network 
members 
contributing to 
publications 
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Table 4.2: Network Evaluation Matrix – Maturing Criteria (taken from Pink and Lehane, 
2011) 
 
Members Finances Governance Support Deliverables 
Membership 
 Expanded to 
reach critical / 
core number of 
potential 
members within 
relevant network 
area of operation 
Budget 
 Sufficient 
funding for 
network to 
continue for 
short to medium 
term (2-3 years) 
Access 
 Increasing 
access of 
members to 
network steering 
/ guiding 
documents  
 Open source 
access to limited 
network 
produced 
documents 
Liaison 
 Interest by 
and liaison with 
other networks  
 Capacity and 
Capability 
discussions to 
identify areas of 
commonality 
Events 
 Held on semi 
regular basis  
 Delivered 
across network  
 Range of 
events relevant 
to all members  
 Restricted 
range of 
members 
working 
conjointly 
Leadership 
 Critical mass 
of individuals / 
member 
agencies take on 
leadership roles  
 Wide range of 
Membership not 
represented in 
leadership roles 
Contributions 
 In-kind 
support 
provided by 
central member 
agencies / 
individuals 
Review 
 Third Party 
review of 
constitutional 
documents and 
guidance 
considered 
Support base 
 Widening 
support base 
across network 
sphere of 
influence 
Outcomes 
 Member 
Agencies 
receiving 
identifiable 
benefits  
 Individuals 
Professionally 
realise benefits 
Value 
 Leading 
Members 
displaying 
demonstrable 
benefits through 
active 
participation  
 Level of 
inactive / passive 
members 
reducing  
 Increasing 
Engagement and 
communication 
between 
members 
Project funding 
 Project 
funding - 
increasing but 
ad hoc  
 Project 
leaders are able 
to source limited 
funding to 
support project 
 
Structures 
 Proactive 
Development of 
guiding 
documentation 
with consultation 
across 
membership  
 Development 
of Operation and 
Strategic Plans to 
set direction of 
network 
Supporting 
functions 
 Administrative 
tasks major part 
of function  
 Low level of 
Coordination and 
project capacity 
Products 
 Are of useable 
standard and 
considered as a 
step toward 
better practice 
across industry  
 Contributions 
from those 
outside of 
network being 
included 
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Table 4.3: Network Evaluation Matrix – Well Established Criteria (taken from Pink and 
Lehane, 2011) 
 
Members Finances Governance Support Deliverables 
Membership 
 Maximum or 
near maximum 
of possible 
members within 
relevant 
operation of 
network 
coverage 
Budget 
 Secured on 
permanent basis  
 Sustainable 
arrangements 
Access 
 Open and 
transparent 
access to 
network steering 
papers across 
membership and 
support base  
 Foundational 
and guiding 
documents 
available as open 
source 
Liaison 
 Level of 
support from 
other networks 
seen through 
Interaction and 
joint Activities  
 Good working 
Relationships 
between 
networks 
Events 
 Held regularly 
and well 
attended  
 Coordinated 
centrally for 
delivery across 
membership  
 Members 
readily work 
collaboratively 
Leadership 
 Large 
proportion of 
members taking 
leadership roles 
across network 
Contributions 
 High 
proportion of 
members 
contributing in-
kind support to 
projects, events 
and initiatives 
Review 
 Governance 
Structures 
reviewed and 
consistent with 
better practice 
  Subject to 
External scrutiny 
and review 
Support base 
 Strong 
support and 
contribution base 
from practitioner 
and senior 
management 
alike 
Outcomes 
 Delivering 
Tangible benefits 
to members  
 Serve as 
attractor, 
drawing new 
members into 
network  
 Members 
overtly 
promoting the 
benefits of 
involvement 
Value 
 Majority of 
Members realise 
benefits of 
membership 
attained through 
active 
participation  
 Open 
communication 
across members 
Project funding 
 Projects 
driven by / 
within network 
are readily 
funded  
 Projects 
undertaken by 
network bring in 
associated 
funding 
Structures 
 Robust 
written 
Governance 
structures in 
place  
 Membership 
Well represented 
on guiding body 
Supporting 
functions 
 Central 
function for 
coordinating 
network 
activities, project 
and events  
 Administrative 
tasks are a minor 
part of the 
function 
Products 
 High standard 
and considered 
better practice 
across industry  
 Subject to 
review and 
improvement 
process  
 Wide range of 
contributors to 
network 
publications 
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4.5 Conclusion 
As highlighted throughout this chapter, endangered and protected species are in great demand. This 
has created a lucrative black market for traders and fiercely competitive and highly organized trade 
networks to exploit.   While most of the illegal trade in wildlife is believed to be done by competing 
networks displaying different levels of organization depending on the volume and value of their 
trade, evidence suggests that sophisticated and highly organized criminal groups are increasingly 
involved in particular types of highly profitable commodities, such as rhino horn and elephant ivory. 
As highlighted at the ministerial roundtable held alongside CoP16, ‘[a]n imposing challenge lies 
ahead to combat the sophisticated criminal groups that are behind wildlife and forest crime, and to 
put an end to the alarming impacts that their activities are having on species, people and economies’ 
(CITES Secretariat, 2013a).  
The illegal wildlife trade in Southeast Asia is best understood as a market trade where criminal 
activities are structured around supply and demand (Hayman and Brack, 2002). Thus, it involves a 
collection of specialized groups that exhibit varying degrees of organization depending on the type 
of wildlife traded and the volume and value of their trade (Liddick, 2011). The chapter has 
highlighted that there exists anecdotal evidence linking the illegal wildlife trade to other areas of 
crime and organized criminal networks. It is therefore important to examine if the groups dealing in 
other illicit commodities are involved in the illegal wildlife trade, and if wildlife networks are 
involved in the trade of other illicit commodities.    
Are criminal organized groups dealing in arms, drugs or human trafficking involved in the illegal 
wildlife trade? Taking into consideration the aforementioned overlapping characteristics of the 
different kinds of illicit trade, it can be argued that larger networks of organized crime are indeed 
involved in some way or another in the illegal wildlife trade. In such instances, their involvement is 
often as either a complementary trade or as part of their wider portfolio of illicit criminal activities 
where the illegal wildlife trade is merely a secondary or opportunistic trade (Duffy, 2010). In most 
cases the involvement is not of the larger organization itself, but rather of individuals within the 
criminal groups that have particular links to – or are participating in – different stages of the illegal 
wildlife trade chain (Pires and Moreto, 2011). Such individuals make use of their existing networks 
and supply chains to deal in wildlife (World Bank, 2005) and would be involved, if at all, in the high 
volume and value commodities such as ivory or rhino (Elliott 2012; van Asch 2013, 2015).  
Are organized wildlife networks involved in the trade of other illicit commodities? It can be 
confirmed that wildlife is often moved along the same international trading routes as other illicit 
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commodities (Duffy, 2010) and that some individuals are linked with the illegal wildlife trade. There 
are not, however, clear signs that suggest that organized networks themselves are involved in trade 
in other commodities such as drugs (van Asch, 2013; Elliott, 2012). While some cases exist where 
organized networks dealing in illegal wildlife may be connected with other criminal syndicates and 
organizations (Christy, 2008), it is generally believed that specialized wildlife networks are rarely 
involved in other crimes. There are two reasons for this: firstly, the trade in wildlife is very 
specialized and requires specific knowledge and skills (such as species identification) without which 
the trade would not be possible. Secondly, and most importantly, most organized wildlife networks 
and traders tend to deal in illegal wildlife because there is a low risk involved and there are very high 
profit margins. Dealing in other commodities such as drugs would thus radically increase the risk of 
capture and prosecution (Duffy, 2010, 36). What is clear is that criminal organized networks dealing 
in wildlife often display similar levels of organization as their counterparts, that they have received 
very limited attention to date, and that they should be treated – and prosecuted – with the same 
vigour and determination as other transnational organized criminals.  
The decisions and resolutions adopted at CoP16 demonstrated a clear recognition by countries to 
coordinate enforcement efforts; make better use of special investigative techniques used to combat 
other transnational crimes in the fight against the illegal wildlife trade; conduct in-depth 
investigations and ensure follow-up prosecutions; and target the masterminds behind those highly 
organized criminal groups that are involved in the illegal wildlife trade (Scanlon, 2013). A well-
coordinated multi-disciplinary enforcement response is therefore necessary and countries need to 
continue to cooperate to effectively deal with transnational organized wildlife crime. As the CITES 
Secretariat (2013a) indicated, on-going efforts must be aligned, and countries need to continue to 
work together and cooperate to combat the illegal wildlife trade. CoP17 has further increased the 
momentum, with key amendments to a number of resolutions highlighting the need to combat 
transnational wildlife crime, and with the critical adoption of a resolution to combat corruption 
associated to wildlife crime. During the Conference of the Parties, CITES member states also 
emphasized the need to continue to strengthen efforts to combat wildlife crime (CITES Secretariat, 
2016).  There has also been broad support through a number of declarations, statements and 
decisions, most notably those of the UN General Assembly on combating illicit trafficking in wildlife 
crime.  
Indeed, the need to protect endangered species has emphasized the need for collective action and 
continues to generate an ‘intensified focus of transnational collaboration’ (Rosenau, 2000, 186). As a 
result, a number of initiatives and enforcement mechanisms designed to foster cooperation 
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between countries and to counter the illegal wildlife trade – at both the national and international 
levels – have emerged.  Such initiatives, as Raustiala (2002) suggests, involve network enhancing 
activities, filling gaps and facilitating negotiations amongst countries (see also Pink 2008, 2010, 2013). 
In particular, they aim to assist countries by encouraging them to work together to combat the 
lucrative black market that has emerged and the highly organized networks behind it. Bowling’s 
(2010) new structures of cooperation have materialised in the region in the form of the BLO 
Mechanism and ASEAN-WEN, where a number of international, intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organizations play a central and necessary role.   
This raises the following questions: Are the networks being effective? Is the proliferation of 
initiatives actually strengthening international and cross-border law-enforcement cooperation? Are 
these initiatives generating the necessary commitment at governmental level to deal with the illegal 
wildlife trade? How are the initiatives working at the national level and are they encouraging 
increased – and more effective – wildlife enforcement? What is the role of the different actors 
involved? Are these networks complementary or are they competing against one another to the 
detriment of the initiatives’ combined effectiveness?  These are key questions for the research in 
this thesis and were explored during the interviews with practitioners involved in the research, with 
the results being considered  in chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
This list of questions can be summarised to form the overall question being explored in this thesis: 
how effective are these cooperative efforts in the fight against transnational organized wildlife crime? 
This chapter has explored some potential ways to measure the effectiveness of the initiatives based 
on the existing literature and tools available. These are key aspects to be taken into consideration 
when measuring the effectiveness of networks. Chapter 8 attempts to put the right pieces of the 
puzzle together.  
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Chapter 5: Research Methodology 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Bryman (2008) suggests there are six steps in qualitative research. For the purpose of this chapter, I 
have merged them into three broader sections or points:  
A. The question: (1) development of general research question and sub-questions  
B. The research: (2) selection of relevant sites/subjects to help answer the questions; 
(3) the collection and (4) interpretation of data; (5) the development of the conceptual and 
theoretical framework  
C. The answer: (6) writing up findings and conclusions 
This chapter will focus on explaining how points A and B identified above were developed and the 
approach or strategy that was followed in order to do so. It will also examine any issues that should 
be taken into consideration when conducting research. This includes a brief overview of the main 
research methods available that were explored for possible use, the research questions, and what 
was done in order to answer them (i.e. what research methods were actually used and why). 
Aspects to be taken into consideration in order to be able to write the findings and conclusions as 
per point C above will also be addressed to determine how data should be analysed and interpreted 
as well as to ensure the reliability, validity and credibility of findings.  
As Murray Thomas (2003, 225) notes, ‘research methods commonly encompasses a diversity of 
procedures, including general approaches to data collection (historical, biographical, case study, and 
more), information-gathering techniques (content analysis, interviews, tests, and more), and ways of 
interpreting data (cause, comparison, prediction, and more)’. This chapter will explain what was 
done, why, and how.   
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5.2 Research questions 
As noted previously, the aim of the research is to examine the influence of two initiatives on the 
illegal wildlife trade and cross-border cooperation, and to evaluate their effectiveness as platforms 
to combat transnational organized wildlife crime. The overall research question is:  
 Are border and regional law-enforcement initiatives, such as the BLO mechanism and 
ASEAN-WEN, effective in combating transnational organized crime? 
The broad dimension of the research question requires that one examines its different dimensions 
(or sub questions) in order to achieve a full understanding of the specificities and issues that will be 
analysed and discussed, and that will enable answering the question.  The five sub-questions that 
emerge as a result of the different issues and aspects that have to be taken into consideration in 
order to answer the main question are: 
 What are the patterns of the illegal wildlife trade? (and how organized is it really?) 
 Who is tasked with countering transnational wildlife crime? (and what are the roles of the 
respective actors involved?) 
 What are the policies/initiatives that have been developed as a response in Asia and how do 
they work?  
 What is the law-enforcement response? 
 Is cross-border/international cooperation effective? (and how can it be measured?)  
In order to answer such questions, first it is important to explore the overall research design. The 
research design was done taking into consideration a central research question (above) and based 
on an inductive approach which aims to build theory and understanding based on facts by seeking to 
perceive how and why things happen. This is done taking into consideration that such results are 
complex to understand. The logical framework is based on analysing the available data to reach 
certain conclusions. In order to reach such conclusions it’s important to seek to understand the 
different realities and to take into consideration that realities will be different for different groups or 
under different configurations (see generally Pierce, 2008; see also Clark and Dawson, 1999).  
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Figure 5.1: Phases of inductive research (developed based on Pierce, 2008) 
 
Crucially, it is also important to establish the research boundaries. The research has not focused on 
examining what is actually happening at the cross-border level (or the field level). While it does aim 
to achieve an understanding of the actual situation in the field, what the research actually provides 
is an analysis of the perceptions of patterns, trends and issues, as opposed to the actual patterns of 
what is happening. Theoretically, the perceptions should be quite close to what is really happening, 
but it is not possible to confirm this with absolute certainty, as the subject matter is the illegal trade, 
and therefore not everything is known – or can be known – about it.   
In addition, the focus of the research is on transnational crime. The thesis however focuses mainly 
on a specific form of transnational crime: the illegal wildlife trade. Within the illegal wildlife trade 
the focus is on certain species (as can be seen by the case studies in chapter 4 and 6). The species-
specific nature of the case studies does not, however, limit the research to these species, but to all 
plant and animal species protected under CITES. This denotes a further boundary of the research: 
the focus on international trade of protected species at the cross-border and international (or 
regional) level and more precisely on the illegal trade in protected species between certain countries 
in Asia, and in particular Southeast Asia (focusing mainly on Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, Lao PDR 
and Viet Nam). 
It also needs to be noted that albeit in recent years research, understanding, and general knowledge 
of the illegal wildlife trade have grown exponentially, the available knowledge and understanding of 
the illegal wildlife trade versus other forms of transnational crime such as drugs are very limited (see 
chapter 4 for details). It is only mainly in the last five years or so that wildlife crime and independent 
research on this issue have become a ´hot topic` for mainstream academia. Overall knowledge is 
therefore limited in understanding and constrains any type of analysis on this issue. This will only be 
changed when much more research is done on the subject matter and will probably take some years 
until we are able to have a much more complete understanding of the situation. It is worth noting 
however that progress has been made in particular with the recent (2016) World Wildlife Crime 
report (see chapter 4 for details). A further issue to note is that this research is based on the 
perceptions of participants (e.g. perceptions and not necessarily actualities) and the potentially 
limited, biased or organizational understanding that individuals interviewed had of the situation 
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during the research phase. Every effort has been made to understand the different biases or 
perspectives of the participants interviewed. 
Moreover, he research aims to measure the effectiveness of international cooperative efforts to 
combat transnational crime. A key part of the thesis is therefore focused on effectiveness. But then 
again, what does effectiveness mean? How is it defined? How can it be evaluated? The answer is, 
naturally, debatable.  As highlighted in the introductory chapter of the thesis, defining effectiveness 
is somewhat complicated and there are a multitude of interrelated issues that should be considered 
when examining it (see chapter 1). In addition, the thesis explores effectiveness of initiatives in a 
field that is severely under-researched and where information is rather limited both on the 
initiatives as well as on ways to measure their effectiveness. I have therefore not established one 
single definition of effectiveness and suggest that it has to be measured using a number of different 
and balanced measurements as there are a number of layers that should be taken into consideration. 
Different views and perceptions on effectiveness have therefore been explored throughout the 
different chapters (see chapter 2, 4, 7 and 8). In particular, known definitions of effectiveness and 
what ‘effective cooperation’ and ‘effectiveness’ means. The empirical research also relates to the 
perceptions of what effectiveness means to those involved: what do they think effectiveness means? 
How do they believe it be assessed in relation to the initiatives? How effective do they think the 
initiatives are? The third is based on levels of development or progress (or relative progress) of the 
initiatives over time, and in relation to the cultural attitudes in the region, as well as what they could 
or should be, and factors that might make it more or less effective. All three parts have been used to 
reach a definition of effectiveness that has been the one used to measure the effectiveness of the 
initiatives and to, ultimately, evaluate them in the final chapter of the thesis. 
A further consideration is that the formulation of these questions was influenced by my previous 
experience working for these initiatives in Asia for a number of years. This is in relation to my 
knowledge of the initiatives and wildlife trade and also of those involved in the initiatives (at both 
government and IGO/NGO level). The background knowledge proved to be very useful in terms of 
understanding the illegal wildlife trade as well as the initiatives as little to no research existed on the 
matter when the research was initially developed (2010). While the analysis of wildlife crime is 
increasingly emerging, little research to date has been conducted on ASEAN-WEN and the BLO 
Mechanism (and their related projects) outside from those directly involved (e.g. United Nations, 
NGOs; see generally chapter 4). To my knowledge, no similar studies of the initiatives exist. It does 
not seem that there are studies on the initiative independently neither. Knowing many of the 
individuals involved in countering wildlife crime was also extremely beneficial as it provided a vast 
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amount of potential individuals or groups of people I could interview from the outset. This was 
possible because prior to starting the research I had worked with many of them while I was 
employed by the United Nations (UNODC and UNEP) and an NGO (TRAFFIC) that supported the 
program. While beneficial, this also created a potential conflict as people involved would also know 
me and could potentially feel obligated to participate. As it is noted in more detail in the ethics 
section, this was taken into consideration and it was made clear that the research was independent 
from my previous capacities and that participating in the research was voluntary.  
 
5.3 Research methods  
The aim of the research was, broadly speaking, to examine the impact of efforts to counter the 
illegal wildlife trade and increase cross-border and international cooperation, and to evaluate the 
effectiveness of two specific initiatives. As noted previously, the aim of evaluating the impact of the 
initiatives was revised into an exploration of how they could become more effective as platforms to 
combat transnational organized wildlife crime. In order to do so, a set of questions has been 
developed that delimit the boundaries of the research, as well as its aims and objectives. This 
includes definitions of effectiveness and discussions on how effectiveness can be evaluated. 
Before examining in further detail the questions and how they have been addressed, it is necessary 
to provide some background on the main research methods that were explored for the research. As 
it will become clear throughout the chapter, the research requires the use of a variety of data 
collection techniques and a research design that is formed and developed based on access to 
information and that maximizes access to participants who could be involved in the research. This 
included exploring potential qualitative and quantitative methods (a mixed methods approach) that 
could be used in the research to maximize the amount of research data.  
The following sections will briefly explore the underlying characteristics, differences and criticisms of 
the different research methods (qualitative, quantitative methods and mixed methods). It will then 
examine what specific methods were used for each question and why.  
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Quantitative and Qualitative Research 
Bryman (1996, 2006, 2008) provides a comprehensive discussion on the nature of qualitative 
research  and qualitative and quantitative methods. As Bergman (2008, 4) notes, ‘the focus on 
fundamental differences between qualitative and quantitative research methods (…) reached its 
zenith in the late 1980s and 1990s with the publication of an entire battery of influential texts’120. 
Pierce (2008)121 highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the two main research methods. As 
Murray Thomas (2003, 1, emphasis in original) suggests, in general terms, the simplest way to 
distinguish between them ‘may be to say that qualitative methods involve a researcher describing 
kinds of characteristics of people and events without comparing events in terms of measurements or 
amounts. Quantitative methods, on the other hand, focus attention on measurements and amounts 
(more and less, larger and smaller, often and seldom, similar and different) of the characteristics 
displayed by the people and events that the researcher studies’. 
Murray Thomas (2003, 1-2) has completed a comprehensive review of the definitions of qualitative 
and quantitative methods from a number of authors where ‘it is apparent that researchers are not 
all of the same mind’ in terms of the definition, and where ‘definitions become even more confusing 
when authors differ markedly in what they intend by the term method’. The following is a section on 
the definitions of qualitative and quantitative research taken directly from his book: 
Qualitative research is multimethod in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach 
to its subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural 
settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings 
people bring to them. Qualitative research involves the studied use and collection of a variety 
of empirical materials—case study, personal experience, introspective, life story, interview, 
observational, historical, interactional, and visual texts—that describe routine and 
problematic moments and meanings in people's lives.122 (Denzin and Lincoln cited in Murray 
Thomas, 2003, 2)  
Qualitative researchers seek to make sense of personal stories and the ways in which they 
interact. … Qualitative inquiry is an umbrella term for various philosophical orientations to 
interpretive research. For example, qualitative researchers might call their work ethnography, 
case study, phenomenology, educational criticism, … human ethnology, ecological 
psychology, holistic ethnography, cognitive anthropology, ethnography of communication, 
symbolic interactionism, … microethnography, ethnomethodology, postmodern 
                                                 
120 Bergman (2008) highlights in particular Brewer and Hunter, 1989; Danziger, 1990; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; 
1998; Flick, 1998; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Maykut and Morehouse, 1994; Reichhardt and Rallis, 1994; 
Silverman, 1993, 1997; 1999. 
121 See Chapter 4 in Pierce (2008)  
122 For more information see Denzin and Lincoln (1994). 
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ethnography… [or] participatory research.123 (Glesne and Peshkin cited in Murray Thomas, 
2003, 1) 
Quantitative research uses numbers and statistical methods. It tends to be based on 
numerical measurements of specific aspects of phenomena; it abstracts from particular 
instances to seek general description or to test causal hypotheses; it seeks measurements 
and analyses that are easily replicable by other researchers.124 (King, Keohane, and Verba, 
cited in Murray Thomas,  2003, 3-4)) 
Quantitative researchers seek explanations and predictions that will generalize to other 
persons and places. Careful sampling strategies and experimental designs are aspects of 
quantitative methods aimed at produce generalizable results. In quantitative research, the 
researcher's role is to observe and measure, and care is taken to keep the researchers from 
“contaminating” the data through personal involvement with the research subjects. 
Researchers “objectivity” is of utmost concern.125 (Glesne and Peshkin cited in Murray 
Thomas, 2003, 6)  
For Bryman (2006, 111), qualitative research is ‘a research strategy whose emphasis on a relatively 
open-ended approach to the research process frequently produces surprises, changes of direction 
and new insights’. He argues, however, that ‘quantitative research is by no means a mechanical 
application of neutral tools that result in no new insights. In quantitative data analysis, the 
imaginative application of techniques can result in new understandings’. 
Both methods have historically been portrayed as ‘mutually exclusive’ approaches (Pierce, 2008, 41). 
Generally speaking, quantitative methodologies tend to be framed by advocates of the qualitative 
approach as ‘a contest between innovative, socially responsible methods versus obstinately 
conservative and narrow-minded methods’, or by advocates of a quantitative approach as ‘precise, 
sophisticated techniques versus mere “common sense”’ (Stewart and Shields cited in Pierce 2008, 
23). As Pierce (2008, 23) notes: ‘Arguably, the essential operational distinction between quantitative 
and qualitative research is whether the researcher is a neutral, objective observer studying a person 
as an object, or as an independent variable engaging subjectively the person as a subject or client’.  
Both methods were explored to try to answer the research question using a primarily inductive 
approach. Mixed methods was initially of particular interest as the intention was to predominantly 
rely on qualitative data from interviews but use other possible and available sources of data to 
enhance the research and to contrast, compare and validate findings. It has therefore been 
suggested that a mixed methods strategy fits closely with the ‘practical enquiry’ that informs 
practice as it is also of particular interest to policy and policymakers (see generally Bryman, 2006; 
Wheeldon, 2010; Greene & Caracelli, 1997; Bergman 2008). Nonetheless, various options were 
                                                 
123 For more information see Glesne and Peshkin (1992). 
124 For more information see King, Keohane and Verba (1994). 
125 For more information see Glesne and Peshkin (1992). 
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explored for the research, and due to a number of practicalities and to the limited availability of 
quantitative data, it was decided that the research should primarily focus on qualitative research 
with an emphasis on elite interviews with key actors involved at various levels. This will be further 
explored in later sections of this chapter.  
 
Other considerations – Practical and Action Oriented Research  
A further consideration is that the research is inherently linked with a practical and action oriented 
approach, given that one of the key aims of the research is to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
initiatives and to contribute to their enhancement. The research design has therefore been 
influenced by what is known as evaluation research. The reason why this type of research is 
important is because it is often used when policy-makers need to assess the effectiveness of 
initiatives or make ‘informed decisions’ about the future of particular initiatives (including potential 
extension or development of new ones) (Clarke and Dawson, 1999, 94). Evaluation research is 
applied research which aims to ‘produce information about the implementation, operation and 
ultimate effectiveness of policies and programmes designed to bring about change’ (Clarke and 
Dawson, 1999, 35).  
The term ‘evaluation’ is used in a myriad of contexts, settings and circumstances and there is a broad 
range of definitions126. Evaluation is primarily concerned with determining the merit, worth or value 
of an established policy or planned intervention (Clarke and Dawson, 1999). Overall, it is ‘a form of 
applied social research, the primary purpose of which is not to discover new knowledge, … but to 
study the effectiveness with which existing knowledge is used to inform and guide practical action’. 
                                                 
126 See generally Clarke and Dawson, 1999. These include: 
Program evaluation as the systematic collection of information about the activities, characteristics, and 
outcomes of programs for use by specific people to reduce uncertainties, improve effectiveness, and make 
decisions with regard to what those programs are doing and affecting (Patton as cited in Clarke and Dawson, 
1999, 1-2). 
Evaluation as a type of policy research, designed to help people make wise choices about future programming. 
Evaluation does not aim to replace decision makers’ experience and judgement, but rather offers systematic 
evidence that informs experience and judgement. Evaluation strives for impartiality and fairness. At its best, it 
strives to represent the range of perspectives of those who have a stake in the program (Weiss, as quoted in 
Alkin, as cited in Clarke and Dawson, 1999, 1-2). 
Evaluation is usually defined as the determination of the worth or value of something - in this case, of 
educational and social programs, policies, and personnel - judged according to appropriate criteria, with those 
criteria explicated and justified (House, Scriven as cited in Clarke and Dawson, 1999, 1-2). 
Evaluation research is the systematic application of social research procedures for assessing the 
conceptualization, design, implementation, and utility of social intervention programs (Rossi and Freeman as 
cited in Clarke and Dawson, 1999, 1-2). 
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As Stufflebeam and Shinkfield (in Clarke and Dawson, 1999, 151) highlight, ‘the most important 
purpose of evaluation is not to prove but to improve’. For Weiss (in Clarke and Dawson, 1999, 516), 
‘evaluation … does not aim for “truth” or certainty [but] to help improve programming and policy 
making’. As Clarke and Dawson (1999, 1) highlight, ‘it is this practical orientation that constitutes one 
of the major distinguishing features of evaluation’. Broadly speaking, Weiss (in Clarke and Dawson, 
1999) describes it as ‘an elastic word that stretches to cover judgements of many kinds’ and 
‘involves judging the value, merit or worth of something’. It is an ‘action oriented’ form of inquiry 
(Clarke and Dawson, 1999, 2). The main difference with academic research is that one (research) is 
aimed at truth, while the other (evaluation), at action (Clarke and Dawson, 1999, 35). 
In fact, the main distinction between evaluation research and other forms of social research is not 
the methods employed but ‘the purpose to which the methods are put’ (Babbie cited in Clarke and 
Dawson, 1999, 2).  The choice of methods in evaluation research is influenced by the context: ‘There 
are no rigid rules that can be provided for making data collection and methods decisions in 
evaluation. The art of evaluation involves creating a design and gathering information that is 
appropriate for a specific situation and particular policymaking context’ (Patton cited in Clarke and 
Dawson, 1999, 64). The circumstances and purpose of the evaluation will therefore determine the 
choices in methods.  
As Clarke and Dawson (1999) note, evaluation techniques have been applied throughout the 
criminal justice system 127 . In most cases, evaluators have encountered practical, technical, 
conceptual and methodological problems128. This can be avoided and minimized by having a sound 
methodological approach.  
 
5.4 Answering the questions 
As noted previously, once questions take shape, it is important to examine what it means to be 
asking those questions and how it is best to answer each specific question. This entails examining 
the broad dimension of the question, to then go further into the specificities or the little details of 
                                                 
127 For example, there have been numerous studies covering the efficacy of community policing programmes 
(Bennett, 1992); the effectiveness of probation practice; the impact of community penalties (Mair, 1997); the 
performance of the Crown Prosecution Service (National Audit Office, 1989); the effect of crime prevention 
programmes (Pease, 1994); the impact of police-initiated attempts to reduce the levels of fear of crime 
(Bennett, 1991), and the implementation and effectiveness of policing strategies designed to combat specific 
types of crime, such as, domestic burglary (Stockdale and Gresham, 1995). See Maguire, Morgan and Reiner, 
1994 for details.  
128 These are discussed in detail by Clarke and Dawson (1999)   
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each question. We will therefore provide further details on what it means to be asking such 
questions, how to answer the different questions (i.e. what methods and tools have been used) and 
why such methods have been used. Other considerations such as potential problems, questions and 
issues that emerge from the different questions will also be addressed as necessary.  We will then 
examine the different stages that were followed to collect the information.  
 
Sub-question 1.1: What are the patterns of the illegal wildlife trade? 
In order to answer such question in depth desk research was conducted on the illegal wildlife trade. 
It is also essential to explore what experts and officers on the ground understand by the illegal 
wildlife trade and what their perceptions are of the illegal trade in relation to their office, 
organization or country. In addition it is important to discover how countries see the problem and 
what they intend to do about it (a major problem for us vs. there is no illegal trade in our country). 
This includes receiving the views of a broad range of people that are involved in the implementation 
and developing of policy designed to counter transnational crime. In order to do so, available 
academic literature as well as reports from a broad range of organizations and individuals on the 
illegal wildlife trade was consulted and experts were interviewed, as it is believed this is the most 
effective way to seek information from people on the ground. Those not available for interviews 
were sent a (qualitative) questionnaire with targeted questions that they would have been asked 
during the interview.  
 
Sub-question 1.2: Who is tasked with countering transnational wildlife crime? 
Answering this question was done following the same approach as question 1.1 above (i.e. desk 
research, interviews and data from questionnaires with interview questions for participants that 
were not available for an interview). Initially an analysis of international treaties applicable as well as 
a review of literature (e.g. international law, international environmental law and international 
environmental regimes) on the role of different bodies involved was conducted. The main aim of this 
question is to determine the main actors involved in countering transnational wildlife crime in 
countries in Southeast Asia. Which are the main organizations? This question is essential in order to 
determine what organizations are – or should be – involved in countering transnational wildlife 
crime and their role. It also enables further discussion on the need to work together to counter 
transnational crime and why it is beneficial to work together to counter it. This is particularly 
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important because the officers working at the border under the Border Liaison Office Mechanism 
are a combination of officers from different department, with different priorities and tasks. It is also 
important to know where they work from, and how. In order to answer the question, available 
academic literature as well as reports from a broad range of organizations and individuals was 
consulted and a broad range of experts from relevant organizations were interviewed. Data were 
also gathered through participation in a broad range of activities. 
 
Sub-question 1.3:  What are the policies/initiatives that have been developed as a response in Asia 
and how do they work?  
Once the above questions have been addressed, it is necessary to examine the initiatives that have 
been developed and that are the focus of the research, as well as the perceptions of the initiatives 
from relevant experts. It is important to note that the initiatives have different approaches, but are 
potentially complementary (see chapters 4 and 7 for further details on the initiatives). The aim of 
the question is to examine what people think about the different initiatives and to provide a basis 
that will enable recommendations on how to enhance them based on the perceptions of those 
involved. The question also aims to clarify the roles of the different people involved in the initiatives 
and how the different officers work. In order to do so, the limited literature on the initiatives was 
consulted (mainly project proposals, websites and reports) and a broad range of experts from 
relevant organizations were interviewed.  
 
Sub-question 1.4:  What is the law-enforcement response? 
Having examined the initiatives and the role of the different actors, it is necessary to examine the 
law-enforcement response as a result of the initiatives. Do the initiatives encourage effective 
cooperation at the national level? (I.e. within the different organizations working on the issue at the 
national level). Do the initiatives encourage effective cross-border or international/transnational 
cooperation? (I.e. across borders). For this purpose, the research relied on data from interviews with 
relevant experts as well as internal reports on the projects and initiatives. The possibility to conduct 
observations in the field was examined as a means to gather additional and unique information on 
what the law-enforcement response was in the field. It was, however, decided not to conduct 
observations on the border as it would have had considerable financial implications for the project 
and it would have been difficult to implement due to obvious barriers that would be very difficult to 
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address (such as language and multitude of locations) and others that could have been negotiated 
relatively more easily (such as access to border areas).  
 
Sub-question 1.5: Is cross-border/international cooperation effective?  
All of the above questions are intended to provide details and background on what the illegal trade 
is, how is it best to counter it, the initiatives that exist, and the resulting response. The next rational 
step is examining the effectiveness of the initiatives, if they encourage cross-border or international 
cooperation, and if as a result of the increased interactions efforts to counter transnational wildlife 
crime are more effective. In order to answer the question, participants involved in the different 
initiatives and relevant experts were asked to define effectiveness, and to assess the relative 
effectiveness of the initiatives. These are of course measures of people’s perceptions, not of actual 
effectiveness outcomes (since their success in creating outcomes, such as the perceptions held by 
potential offenders, amounts trafficked or preserving species cannot be known with any accuracy). It 
will also enable an analysis of the efforts: is there thought to be increased cross-border cooperation? 
Is it thought to be more effective? This was indeed one of the issues discussed throughout the 
interviews. Effectiveness will be measured, as mentioned above, using a number of different and 
balanced measurements as there are a number of layers, views and perceptions on effectiveness 
that should be taken into consideration. (see also chapter 1, 2, 4, 7 and 8).  
 
5.5 Methods in practice 
Having examined what information was requested, we will now highlight in more detail the methods 
used: how that information was gathered.  
The first phase included academic research (on international law, international environmental law, 
transnational policing, TOC, international politics/policy, international agreements, CITES) as well as 
background research on the selected initiatives/projects. This provided a sound understanding of the 
background problem and the different people or groups of people or organizations that are involved 
in the different initiatives. It has to be noted that outside of available literature and reports from the 
organizations involved in the different initiatives, other official data were not readily available as 
there has been little research to date on the initiatives. I did, however, manage to secure a number 
of reports and information that were only available internally due to my previous work experience 
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and connections. As noted above, when analysing data it is essential to explore the bias of the 
reports/documents. It is also important to note that these reports have their own methodology, 
which makes the analysis more complicated. 
The second phase involved gathering information from a number of activities and events of the 
initiatives by means of attending different workshops, meetings and training events. In this phase I 
was merely benefitting from activities that were organized by a number of organizations and that I 
could attend as a researcher to either observe or actively participate in the meeting. In some cases 
this involved returning the favour with specific assistance such as moderating a discussion during a 
meeting or a similar task. In most cases I was given the opportunity to present my research or to 
have a discussion on particular issues. While I was involved in the process, I did not directly choose 
the participants or the location. I simply made use of an opportunity to gather additional 
information for the research when I was invited to participate in an event or informed that an 
activity was taking place. In all cases it was made clear that I was participating as an independent 
researcher.  Specific events I participated in include: the 23rd Interpol Wildlife Crime Working Group, 
the 12th Asia Regional Partners Forum on Combating Environmental Crime (ARPEC) meeting, a UNEP 
Regional Enforcement Training, a UNODC PATROL Evaluation workshop and several PATROL Training 
events in Cambodia and Thailand between 2012 and 2013. Since then I have followed developments 
in the field and in relation to the initiatives involved and these data are included where relevant up 
to early 2017. 
This phase also included exploring options to use quantitative data (questionnaires to border 
officers). In particular it included assisting UNODC to develop a structured questionnaire that was 
completed by border officers participating in various training events. It needs to be noted however 
that while I was involved in the initial development and implementation of the questionnaires, I did 
not have any ‘decision power’ over the final version and also did not participate in all the events 
where it was used. UNODC kindly provided these data to me after the events to explore if these 
could be used in the thesis. After receiving the data, however, it became clear that the 
questionnaires had been revised and adapted to various specific activities and therefore could not 
be used in the research as they did not provide sufficient baseline data on my specific topics of 
interest to enable an in depth analysis. It should be noted that it would be worth exploring the use 
of quantitative data in future research on cross-border cooperation efforts in Southeast Asia, as such 
research appears not to exist to date.  
The second phase was done in conjunction with the third, which involved ‘elite’ interviews (see box 
below), as well as focus groups or questionnaires for the four different levels of personnel directly 
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involved in the initiatives (from field level to heads/regional representatives, in addition to 
representatives from relevant governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental 
organizations and academics). The interviews aimed at a broad representation from the different 
levels to get a solid understanding of the overall state of affairs as understood through the eyes of 
the participants. By having four different levels, from top to bottom and vice versa, one can achieve 
a greater understanding of the situation, and manage biases and perspectives of participants more 
effectively. It was decided that it was necessary to conduct elite interviews to get a first-hand 
account from those directly involved in – or working with or for – the different initiatives. This was 
determined to be the most effective way to obtain information and perspectives from those 
involved.  
Box 5.1: Interviewing and elite interviews 
A qualitative interview is defined by Corbetta (2003, 264) as a ‘guided conversation’ which is: (1) 
‘elicited by the interviewer’; where (2) a considerable number of participants are interviewed, (3) 
‘selected on the basis of a data-gathering plan’. The interview has a (4) ‘cognitive objective’; is (5) 
‘guided by the interviewer’, and is (6) ‘based on a flexible, non-standardized pattern of 
questioning’ where the interviewee will ‘structure his answer … as [he/she] thinks fit’. 
As Patton (in Corbetta, 2003, 265, emphasis in original) notes: ‘The purpose of qualitative 
interviewing is to understand how the subjects studied see the world, to learn their terminology 
and judgements, and to capture the complexities of their individual perceptions and 
experiences. … The fundamental principle of qualitative interviewing is to provide a framework 
within which respondents can express their own understandings in their own terms’. 
There are three types of interviews: structured, semi-structured and unstructured. These are all 
explained by Corbetta (2003) and others in detail, so the focus of this section will remain on 
semi-structured interviews as these are the ones that have been used. Semi-structured 
interviews generally speaking have a broad ‘outline’ of the issues or topics to be discussed. The 
order and wording is left to the interviewer's discretion, which ‘gives both the interviewer and 
the respondent ample freedom, while at the same time ensuring that all the relevant themes are 
dealt with and all the necessary information collected’ (Corbetta, 2003, 271). This is particularly 
important for the research conducted here in particular due to the limited availability of data and 
the need to explore as much information as possible from participants involved in the different 
initiatives. It also adjusts to the specific areas of expertise of the various interviewees and 
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The selection of participants for the interviews was done with the following criteria in mind: 
a) Involvement in activity/initiative 
b) Knowledge of activity/initiative 
c) Involvement in efforts to counter wildlife crime or transnational crime 
d) Knowledge of wildlife crime or transnational crime 
e) Position within the government/initiative/organization (seniority)  
f) Access to participant and availability/interest of participants to participate in the 
research 
g) Availability of funds to the researcher 
The interviews were usually conducted on a one on one basis in the office of the person being 
interviewed. Some were facilitated by my participation in the different training events and meetings 
and a number of interviews involved traveling to selected countries. In some cases, participants 
maximizes the value of information received.  
An issue to bear in mind is that ‘Interviews with … elites provide a major source of information … 
but you must never assume that what you are told or hear is reliable and accurate’ (Pierce, 2008, 
85-86). As Pierce (2008, 86) highlights, ‘You must always question (implicitly) the answers to your 
questions’ as they will reflect interests, perspectives and positions, most probably of their 
organizations or the official position of their countries.  In addition, the freedom or ‘lack of 
standardization’ is seen as ‘both a strength and a weakness’:  
‘Working under few constraints, the interviewer is able to pursue unforeseen leads and to work 
out and explore new hypotheses concerning the phenomenon under investigation, thereby going 
beyond the original formulation of the problem. Enjoying complete freedom of expression, the 
respondent is in a position to put forward his point of view using his own mental categories and 
his own language. The qualitative interview is therefore particularly suited to discovery and – as 
has already been said – understanding. At the same time, however, this lack of standardization 
makes both comparison and quantitative assessment of the phenomena studied problematic’ 
(Corbetta, 2003, 283, emphasis in original). 
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preferred to do a focus group, and invited additional staff to participate. I also conducted focus 
groups in several other events I participated and was invited to moderate discussions relevant to the 
research.  The aim of such interviews was to explore the following issues with relevant experts: 
I. Efforts of different countries to counter illegal wildlife trade: is it enough? What are 
the loopholes/gaps? What more is needed?  
II. The need for international cooperation and the initiatives – is it necessary? Better to 
do it alone or through international cooperation? Are the initiatives what you would have 
hoped for? 
III. The effectiveness of initiatives and their limitations, needs and problems 
IV. Their experiences, lessons learnt and suggestions for improvement  
V. Exploring the actual links between different transnational crimes and the nature of 
wildlife crime 
VI. Exploring the views of ‘effectiveness’ the different participants interviewed have.  
Participants whom I was not able to interview were sent an open question questionnaire which 
included targeted questions based on the above and their experience/role/position. This was done 
by email.  
As it has been noted already at various stages throughout the chapter, the research is based on 
perceptions: the perceptions of the different individuals, groups of people and/or organizations that 
are involved in the projects or that have a sound understanding of either the initiatives or the 
subject matter.  
Obviously, when a participant was an expert on wildlife issues but did not know about the initiatives, 
he/she was not asked in detail about the other issue, albeit general questions were indeed asked to 
see if he/she had heard of the initiatives, and if so their perceived opinion. In most cases, however, 
they would choose not to answer the question on the grounds that they did not have sufficient 
information and would prefer not to comment. The key issue to note is that it is the perceptions of 
the different sets of participants that are analysed, and that these are generally based on their 
particular priorities or interests, therefore they are not neutral.  This is also the case with reports 
and most of the available materials that have been used: they relate to others’ perspectives and 
opinions and reflect particular interests, motivations and perspectives. Given this background, 
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participants from – or materials from – the United Nations are theoretically the more ‘neutral’ 
observers. They continue to have, nonetheless, a bias. 
It should be highlighted that a possible approach to achieve a higher degree of certainty of what is 
actually happening versus the perceptions of what is happening would have required long 
observations at several border points and other potential ways to observe the reality of the field. 
This might have provided a clearer picture of what is actually happening. It was, however, not 
possible to do as part of the research. In addition, it should be noted that it would have been 
technically possible to gain additional perspectives on the dynamics and operation of the illegal 
wildlife trade and the modus operandi of transnational wildlife criminals by targeting a broader 
audience for the interviews. This could have included perpetrators of wildlife crimes, such as 
individuals arrested for poaching, smuggling, buying or selling wildlife, prosecuted criminals involved 
in the illegal wildlife trade, and/or legal or alleged illegal wildlife traders. Similar to the observations 
noted above, this would have provided additional information on the facilitating conditions of 
wildlife crime and sources of information to understand the actual modus operandi of the illegal 
trade in wildlife, versus the perceptions of officers and those involved in the initiatives. Due to the 
limited number of offenders arrested for wildlife crime in the region at the time, as well as the 
difficulty of gaining access to such individuals (and language barriers), this option was not explored 
further. It is also believed that such research would benefit from a more targeted and separate 
analysis focusing on for example, prosecuted offenders.  
Similarly, open sources of data, such as court records of trials or prosecutions were extremely 
limited and it was therefore not a viable option to use open data sources to provide a baseline of 
wildlife crime before or after the initiatives. It should be noted that during the interviews conducted 
as part of the research, respondents were asked about likely perpetrators of wildlife crimes and on 
the availability of non-open source data. Most participants however did not seem to have much 
more additional material at the time, except for details on specific cases in which they had been 
directly involved. The countries and organisations were not able to provide quantifiable 
'management information' on the extent of wildlife crime in specific areas, nor did it seem as though 
this was being collected at the time of the interviews. 
Taking the above into consideration, it was decided the focus of the empirical data should remain 
primarily on the perceptions of those involved in the different initiatives. Every effort was made to 
capture the different layers of the individuals involved in the initiatives, as this would provide a more 
targeted analysis for the purposes of this research. This means that the analysis of the influence of 
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the networks being studied is necessarily a process evaluation, rather than being able to encompass 
effects on outcomes, or the impact of the initiatives. 
 
5.6 The process 
A work plan was prepared for the project, with a detailed and structured plan for the interviews and 
(qualitative) questionnaires. This included the details of the people and organizations I would target 
for interviews, how the interview would be conducted (usually in person although in some cases 
Skype was used), the status of the progress (e.g. planned for X date, completed on Y date, awaiting 
response, completed, etc.), and a time frame for contacting expected interviewees, expected time of 
interview and so forth. In all cases a ‘plan B’ was calculated in case the interview was postponed or 
cancelled, which in hindsight was an excellent idea given the number of times this actually happened. 
All organizations (including government, intergovernmental and governmental organizations) 
involved in the different initiatives, as well as some members of academia were targeted and key 
individuals contacted129. Given my previous work experience and personal contacts with many of 
them this was relatively easy and provided an excellent range of participants.   
These formed the core baseline of participants of the research and were in many cases the ‘gate 
keepers’ that enabled initial access to information (Miller and Bell, 2012, 62).  As gate keepers, they 
had the potential to influence or provide more or less access to training events, to additional people 
to interview, and to information that would be essential such as internal reports or project reports. 
In most cases they fully opened their doors and granted me an impressive level of access to 
information, suggested colleagues that could be interviewed, and indeed provided access to training 
events, meetings and conferences. A potential problem of gate keepers is that they can exercise 
their authority over others to accept to be interviewed and provide information and so potentially 
both create a slightly coercive situation and/or affect the results (Miller and Bell, 2012, 64). It is 
believed that this was not a problem at all. Rather, everyone seemed very interested to participate 
in the research. In any event, every effort was made to ensure participants interviewed were 
voluntarily participating in the research.  In order to avoid any potential problems, most participants 
                                                 
129 Participants involved included from government organizations, representatives from Intergovernmental 
Organizations (IGOs) and academic institutions as well as from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) who 
were involved in the initiatives. Their involvement was explored based on the four different levels of personnel 
that were directly involved in the initiatives, including: law enforcement officers (field level/border staff); 
senior law enforcement officers (heads or provincial representatives); senior government representatives and 
network focal points; senior NGO, IGO, UN representatives and academics. 
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interviewed were contacted simultaneously to informally discuss the research and the potential to 
do an interview before any ‘gate keeper’ was formally contacted. This was facilitated by the personal 
contacts I had previously established with them. A further potential problem of gate keepers is that 
in some cases, they can make access to information difficult (Miller and Bell, 2012, 62). This only 
happened in one instance throughout the research, but it was mitigated as I was using multiple 
approaches and personal contacts at the same time. In fact, this particular gate keeper eventually 
agreed to participate in the research, was extremely welcoming, and provided very useful 
information. It is therefore not clear if the ‘closed door’ was intentional or – more likely – as a result 
of a very busy timetable.   
Recommendations from participants interviewed and colleagues produced what is known as the 
snowballing effect. Snowballing (as applied to this research) is, in short, where a participant or 
organization recommends potential additional participants to participate in the research or actively 
encourage them to participate. This in turn, creates a snowballing effect with additional layers of 
recommendation and encouragement to others to participate and so on. The main advantages is 
that it provides potential access to additional participants and may facilitate the discovery of issues 
or aspects of the research that may have been overseen or that had not been envisaged initially. Its 
main disadvantage is that it may unbalance the responses from one particular group over another 
(see generally Atkinson and John Flint, 2001).  Snowballing enabled me to interview additional 
people and to send questionnaires more broadly. I believe, however, that it did not drastically 
increase the amount of people actually interviewed or that responded to the (qualitative) 
questionnaire, as only 2 of the ‘snowball’ participants actually responded. Participating in official 
training events, meetings and workshops considerably increased the amount of information that 
could be gathered. It also provided me with the opportunity to interview experts who were only 
participating in the training, which had not been originally planned or envisaged. 
All participants interviewed face-to-face signed a consent form and agreed to participate in the 
research. All participants were informed about the research and told they could refuse to participate 
(see section 9 below for further details). For Skype/email interviews and group discussions over 
three (3) people, it was assumed that participants voluntarily agreed to take part in the interview 
and that a signed consent form was therefore not necessary, though verbal consent was given. The 
return of the (qualitative) questionnaire was seen as voluntarily agreeing to participate in the project 
for the 3 people that actually responded to the questionnaire. 
The original aim was to have a good representation from all organizations involved in the different 
initiatives. The chart below highlights the affiliation of the total of 68 participants interviewed. 
161 
 
Figure 5.1: Participants that participated in the research (focus group and & interviews) 
 
Note: Mixed audience is generally as a result of a focus group or a group discussion during 
conferences/meetings where the participants were of at least two different affiliations.  
The empirical research was conducted between March and October 2012 in Thailand, Viet Nam and 
Cambodia.  In numbers (total number of interviews conducted, hours, people interviewed), the 
research included: 
 Individual interviews: 34 people; 
 Focus groups/group interviews: 6 groups; 
Hence, total interviews/focus groups: 40. 
 Total people interviewed (individual): 34 people; 
 Total people interviewed (in groups): 34 people; 
Hence grand total (participants): 68. 
 All interviews recorded: over 50h 50m.  
Overall, it seems that the percentages of participants is representative of their involvement in the 
different initiatives. The donor perspective is also important as it provides an interesting perspective. 
While it would have been ideal to have an equal percentage of government and 
UN/Intergovernmental representation, the results from the mixed audience are also important 
because they reflect discussions and several perspectives that are unique to group discussions and 
that would have not emerged in individual interviews. While the percentage of people from 
UN/Intergovernmental organizations seems low, the people interviewed were the key people 
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22%
UN/Intergover
nmental
13%
Mixed 
audience
37%
Donor
6%
Non-
governmental
22%
162 
 
involved in the projects, and the data should therefore accurately reflect the perceptions of those 
interviewed and their respective organizations. 
A potential gap is the low number of (qualitative) questionnaires that were received: a total of three 
(3). However, given that these were mostly as a result of snowballing and that they were not 
considered essential to the research (sending the questionnaires for completion via email was in fact 
part of ‘plan C’), this should not negatively affect the research findings. A further gap is that I was 
not able to participate in all training needs assessments, training events and meetings that took 
place during the research period for purely practical reasons. In addition, not all countries involved 
in the initiatives were interviewed and/or part of the research. This was part of a strategic decision 
to focus on countries that played different roles in the regional trade (source, transit or destination) 
and where it would be possible to make arrangements to interview participants and participate in 
events. Thailand, Cambodia and Viet Nam were therefore chosen as the three countries which have 
played important but different roles in the illegal wildlife trade at the regional level. The first was 
believed to be at the time a transit country but also a hub for illegal trade. The second was thought 
to be mainly a transit country. The third was believed to be a transit country but also a major 
consumer country. A decision was also made to travel to these countries to ensure I could interview 
specific officials who were considered essential for the research.    
As noted previously, it is important to keep in mind that the interview data contain certain biases. 
When analysing the data every effort was made to detect the bias of those who participated in the 
research, and indeed also to eliminate any possible bias that I might have because of my background 
and experiences with the initiatives. As Pierce (2008, 17) notes: ‘you are unlikely to begin (…) with an 
open mind. Your choice of research topic, question and starting hypothesis will reflect deep-seated 
values and prejudices’ One must ‘realise that he is biased, and somehow or other he must manage 
to discover this bias’ (Webb and Webb in Pierce, 2008, 18). 
 
5.7 Analysis and interpretation of data 
As Weiss (1998, 271). notes: 
The aim of analysis is to convert a mass of raw data into a coherent account. Whether the 
data are quantitative or qualitative, the task is to sort, arrange, and process them and make 
sense of their configuration. The intent is to produce a reading that accurately represents the 
raw data and blends them into a meaningful account of events. 
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While there are different theories on how data can be analysed, these are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Overall, Bryman (2008, 369-370) argues that ‘theory is supposed to be an outcome of an 
investigation rather than something that precedes it’. He stresses that it is ‘something that emerges 
out of the collection and analysis of data’ and ‘the importance of allowing theoretical ideas to 
emerge out of one’s data’ (2008, 373).  
A combination of the methods was explored to analyse the ‘attractive nuisance’ that the large 
amount of data collected throughout the research has become (Bryman, 2008, 538). This has been 
done with mainly an inductive approach to qualitative data (interviews and qualitative 
questionnaires). Inductive research has been defined as ‘the inference from the particular to the 
general’ (Honderich, 1995, 405-6). It aims to generate and enable the researcher to develop 
generalizable inferences from observations. In other words, observations produce theory (Pierce, 
2008). This is congruent with the epistemological position of the research that stresses its 
interpretivist nature in gathering perceptions of the actors involved, rather than the researcher 
defining all the theoretical constructs before fieldwork. 
In general terms, Bryman (2008) suggests qualitative data analysis involves broadly speaking the 
following steps: (1) reading material, (2) coding, (3) re-reading the material to generate 
remarks/observations, (4) reviewing the codes and (5) considering more general theoretical ideas in 
relation to the codes and data (i.e. categories). An issue to note before proceeding further is the 
alternate use of the terms code and theme in the literature: ‘for some … a theme is more or less the 
same as a code, whereas for others it transcends any one code and is built up out of groups of codes’ 
(Bryman, 2008, 554). To ensure clarity, I will refer to both below but will only refer to ‘themes’ in 
other sections or chapters of the thesis. 
The development of themes, subthemes and categories (e.g. thematic analysis) is indeed one of the 
most common approaches to qualitative data analysis. As Bryman (2008, 554).  notes, ‘Themes and 
subthemes are essentially recurring motifs in the text that are then applied to the data. The themes 
and subthemes are the product of a thorough reading and re-reading of the transcripts or field notes 
that make up the data’.  
In addition the research has also been influenced by pragmatism, as it allows for initial explanations 
and hypotheses to emerge based on experience, expertise, and intuition (Wheeldon, 2010; Schurz, 
2002). This is very much the case as I had prior knowledge, understanding and experience on cross-
border cooperation and efforts to combat transnational crime, which have helped generate ideas 
and structure the analysis of data once the initial themes were developed. As Tomiyamal et al. (in 
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Wheeldon, 2010, 88) state: ‘through an innovative combination of existing knowledge, one can both 
generate possible research solutions and at the same time attempt to integrate various theories and 
approaches’.130  
The thematic analysis of data was done by gathering together all information and data form all 
sources available (e.g. interviews, questionnaires and relevant reports or notes taken). This included 
transcripts and detailed notes and pads that had been used throughout the fieldwork. The various 
documents and interview recordings were read and analysed multiple times using initially NVivo, 
access to which was facilitated by the University. This provided an initial structure and thematic 
overview that was further refined through multiple reiterations of: reading, re-reading and analysing, 
while adding additional information and material gathered. At the same time it was important to 
take into account potential individual and organizational biases, which identified the need to group 
the interviewees by organization. The themes that emerged based on perceptions of those involved 
guided the resulting analysis (see chapter 6, 7 and 8 as well as the introduction to Part II of the 
thesis). 
 
5.8 Reliability, validity and credibility  
A further issue to take into account is the reliability, validity and credibility of the research. Two 
issues should be differentiated here. As Tashakkori and Teddlie (cited in Bergman, 2008) highlight, 
one needs to look at the ‘quality of data’ (e.g. data validity, reliability, stability, credibility) and 
quality of inference (e.g. internal validity, credibility of the conclusions, etc.).  
With regards to the former, Pierce (2008) proposes evaluating available information by checking for 
validity (the extent to which a measure, indicator or method of data collection possesses the quality 
of being sound or true as far as can be judged) and reliability (the extent to which one can rely on 
the source of the data and, therefore, the data themselves (Jary and Jary in Pierce, 2008). Reliable 
data are dependable, trustworthy, unfailing, sure, authentic, genuine, and reputable. Consistency is 
the main measure of reliability. So, in literary accounts, the reputation of the source is critical’ 
(Pierce, 2008, 83). Accuracy (accuracy is sensitivity to change - especially of detail, e.g. dates, 
numbers, persons present) and triangulation (a ‘means … to secure effective corroboration’ by 
‘seeking accounts from three or more perspectives’) are also important (Pierce, 2008, 86-90; See 
also generally Pierce, 2008). With regards to the validity/reliability and credibility of the findings, 
                                                 
130 For more information see Tomiyamal et al., 2003; and Flick, 2007.  
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Bryman (2008) notes the overall reliability and validity criteria include external reliability (possible 
replication of the study), internal reliability (more than one observer/researcher produces more 
reliable results), internal validity (good match between observations and theoretical ideas developed) 
and external validity (can the findings be generalized?).  
By following the above standards and corroborating between interview data, reports and 
questionnaires we can attempt to, insofar as possible, ensure the validity of the data itself and 
confidently examine the findings that emerge from the data. 
Lincoln and Guba (in Bryman, 2008) propose alternative criteria for evaluating qualitative research 
based on the ‘trustworthiness’ of the research by examining its credibility (e.g. ‘ensuring that 
research is carried out according to the canons of good practice and submitting research findings to 
the members of the social world who were studied for confirmation’), transferability (good 
description of research), dependability (good record keeping of all phases of the research process) 
and confirmability (‘it should be apparent that he or she has not overtly allowed personal values or 
theoretical inclinations manifestly to sway the conduct of the research and findings’) (Bryman, 2008, 
377-378). In addition, they suggest criteria for authenticity related to ‘fairness’ (does it fairly 
represent views of participants), ontological authenticity (help arrive participants to a better 
understanding), educative authenticity (does it help appreciate better the perspectives of others), 
catalytic authenticity (has the research created impetus to engage or change circumstances) and 
tactical authenticity (has it encouraged action) (Bryman, 2008). 
In order to provide recommendations to enhance cooperation between countries in the region to 
combat transnational crime, following the above trustworthiness criteria seems crucial. This is 
particularly important as in order for the conclusions to be taken seriously one has to ensure that 
good research practice is followed, the research process is well planned and described and the 
researcher is dependable and neutral in his analysis. This was done by keeping close track of all 
phases of the research and those involved and ensuring an objective analysis is conducted and 
taking into account potential personal biases as well as the biases of those interviewed. Wherever 
possible, the initial research findings were informally discussed with colleagues as well as individuals 
involved in the various initiatives or in efforts to combat wildlife crime more broadly. Feedback 
received in most cases was positive and highlighting a fair and objective analysis as well as a good 
explanation of the findings. Initial findings and sections of the thesis were also published in peer 
reviewed books (van Asch 2013, 2015). Ensuring the above, however does only enable the results to 
be credible. It is hoped that such results will show a fair picture of the situation and that it will 
encourage action and a change for the better, which will be encouraged by submitting the research 
166 
 
findings to a number of participants and shared with relevant organizations for confirmation and 
further discussion when the research findings are published. 
 
5.9 Ethics and management of data 
The research received ethical approval from the University of Sheffield, School of Law Ethics Review 
Board and all ethical rules and regulations have been strictly followed. 
Key ethical considerations taken into account for the ethical approval included: 
I. Gathering of data and identification of participants: all participants of training events 
to be approached by the organizations that will prepare the different training events or 
workshops. Most of the research will be conducted as part of and as an addition to the 
different training events and workshops. All contact for individual interviews should be done 
directly by the researcher.  
II. Potential harms: the personal safety of researcher and participants are crucial and 
every effort was made to ensure no emotional harm could come to them as a result of the 
questions discussed or asked throughout the research. This also included ensuring physical 
safety during interviews by completing them in ‘safe’ environments (such as government 
offices, hotels, official meeting rooms or similar).   
III. Consent, confidentiality and recording of interview data: participants to be provided 
with an information sheet that outlines the general details of the research and informs them 
that their participation is voluntary and that they may decline to answer questions or 
withdraw at any time. Participants to be asked their permission to record the interview and 
to sign a consent form.  
IV. Data handling: The researcher is the custodian of all research data. All data will be 
treated as confidential, kept in a secure location and anonymized. Individual names will be 
omitted but reference might be made, if the interviewee has agreed to it, to the 
organization.  
Throughout the research it was clearly noted that participation was voluntary and that participants 
were not forced to answer questions if they did not wish to. All interviews were organized directly by 
the researcher and consent forms were received from all interviewees prior to the interview, except 
167 
 
for those being interviewed in focus groups or over Skype. Participants were asked if the interview 
could be recorded and, in most cases, agreed. Where they did not agree, the interview was not 
recorded. As noted previously for those participating in focus groups or doing the interview via 
Skype it was assumed that they voluntarily agreed to take part in the interview and that a signed 
consent form was therefore not necessary. They all received an information sheet and were 
informed of the different sections of the information sheet, particularly voluntary participation, and 
that they could refuse to answer any question and could leave at any time.  
A key issue to note here is that the interview questions and discussion points were carefully phrased 
in a diplomatic and non-confrontational manner to take into account the varying cultural sensitivities 
in the region, particularly in relation to ‘losing face’. While it might seem simplistic, it was crucial that 
participants were able to speak freely without having to ‘point a finger’ or be put in a situation 
where either they – or their organization or country – would lose face or make someone else lose 
face because of what they said, suggested or did. This is crucial when conducting research in Asia 
and an issue that is often not taken into consideration. 
All the information collected throughout the course of the research has been kept strictly 
confidential and handled with the utmost care and kept in a secure location throughout the research 
period. Data collected have been anonymized to ensure confidentiality and no one will be identified 
in any reports or publications. Participants were consulted to explore if the names of their respective 
organizations could be used and if their organizations could be acknowledged. When consent to do 
so was given, it was agreed the organization could be named, but that sensitive information would 
be anonymized regardless of any permissions given. This is particularly important taking into account 
cultural sensitivities in Asia and the possibility of people and/or organizations ‘losing face’. 
A further ethical consideration was the need to clarify the role of the researcher. Due to the fact that 
I had worked with many participants, I was seen in some members as a member of a particular 
organization (part of ‘the team’, of ‘the family’). Every effort was made to distance myself from the 
previous role and to clarify that I was conducting independent research for the University of 
Sheffield. This was often repeated throughout the training events to ensure neutrality and that 
participants would speak more freely.  A business card was made to give out to participants clearly 
highlighting my role and affiliation. 
Participants were informed that the results of the research will be published as a PhD thesis when 
completed and that data collected may be used in future research undertaken by the researcher or 
by partner institutions in the development of new initiatives. In most cases participants were 
168 
 
interested to receive further details once the results of the research have been published and hoped 
that it would help improved their efforts. 
 
  
169 
 
Part II: Introduction to research findings  
 
 
As indicated in previous chapters, and highlighted throughout the methodology chapter (see chapter 
5), the aim of the research is to examine the influence of initiatives on the illegal wildlife trade and 
cross-border cooperation, and to evaluate their effectiveness as platforms to combat transnational 
organized wildlife crime. The overall research question is:  
1. Are border and regional law-enforcement initiatives, such as the BLO mechanism and 
ASEAN-WEN, effective in combating transnational organized crime? 
This broad research question is divided into a number of sub-questions that emerge as a result of 
the different issues and aspects that have to be taken into consideration in order to answer it. As 
explained in the methodology chapter, there are a variety of methods used to collect information on 
these questions. The key ones used in this case are detailed elite interviews and targeted 
questionnaires for participants who were not available to conduct interviews (see chapter 5 for 
more information). As noted earlier (see chapter 5), the following issues were explored: 
I. Efforts of different countries to counter illegal wildlife trade: are they enough? What 
are the loopholes/gaps? What more is needed?  
II. The need for international cooperation and the initiatives – are they necessary? 
Better to do them alone or through international cooperation? Are the initiatives what you 
would have hoped for? 
III. The effectiveness of initiatives and their limitations, needs and problems 
IV. Their experiences, lessons learnt and suggestions for improvement  
V. Exploring the actual links between other transnational crimes and the nature of 
wildlife crime 
VI. Exploring the views of ‘effectiveness’ the different participants interviewed will have.  
Based on an in depth analysis of the elite interviews conducted a number of categories or themes 
were identified. A full analysis and discussion will follow in the final chapter (chapter 8) which will 
answer the main research questions above. Chapter 6 and 7 will focus on the research findings and 
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will analyse the main themes that appeared throughout the interviews and describe participants’ 
perceptions and responses to the different questions discussed131. Due to the nature of the research, 
some of the themes are cross-cutting. The themes identified have been grouped under six core 
discussion topics as identified in the table below: 
Table II.1: Core discussion topics and key themes identified   
 
Core discussion points Key themes identified 
Chapter 6: the illegal wildlife trade, transnational crime and international cooperation 
1. Illegal wildlife trade, 
networks and organized 
crime: how they operate 
 Lack of research 
 Organization of illicit 
networks 
 Impact of illegal wildlife 
trade 
 Risk versus reward  
 Links between legal/illegal 
trade 
 Links with other crimes 
 
2. Countering 
transnational wildlife 
crime and the need for 
international cooperation 
 Need for cooperation 
 Challenges 
 Benefits of a network 
approach 
 Political will  
 Need for support 
 Types of cooperation 
 Need for a platform 
3. International 
cooperation to combat 
wildlife crime: how and 
with whom 
 Elements of cooperation 
 Levels of cooperation 
 Formality versus 
informality 
 Trust and relationships as 
pillars of cooperation 
Chapter 7: the initiatives, their effectiveness and corruption 
4. The initiatives: a 
platform for cooperation 
to combat wildlife crime 
By network: 
 How and why it was 
developed 
 Benefits and achievements 
 Successes and influence 
 Challenges, gaps and 
limitations 
 Ownership, sustainability 
and commitment 
 Role of different partners 
5. Effectiveness and 
measuring effective 
cooperation 
 Defining effectiveness 
 Difficulties in assessment 
 A balanced measurement 
 Layers of effectiveness 
o Political will 
o Awareness, 
sustainability and 
ownership 
o Communication and 
cooperation 
o Strength of initiative 
o Trust and relationships 
… (continued) 
o Enforcement 
cooperation and 
intelligence exchange 
o Seizures, arrests and/or 
prosecutions 
o Increase in wildlife 
population 
o Number of operational 
units/offices 
o A ‘points’ system 
 Assessment of the 
initiatives 
6. Corruption and the 
illegal wildlife trade 
 A major challenge 
 Involvement at all levels? 
 Addressing corruption  
 Lack of evidence 
 Examples 
                                                 
131 Due to the large amount of interviews conducted, the research findings have been divided into two 
chapters based on the themes identified. 
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The first three discussion points (Illegal wildlife trade, networks and organized crime: how they 
operate; Countering transnational wildlife crime and the need for international cooperation, and; 
International cooperation to combat wildlife crime: how and with whom) will be analysed in chapter 
6 that focuses on the illegal wildlife trade, transnational crime and international cooperation. The 
last three (The initiatives: a platform for cooperation to combat wildlife crime; Effectiveness and 
measuring effective cooperation; and Corruption and the illegal wildlife trade) will be analysed in 
chapter 7 that focuses on the initiatives, their effectiveness and corruption.  
For ease of discussion and analysis, the responses to each theme have been differentiated based on 
the respondents’ ‘group’ or ‘type’. The first group of respondents includes participants from 
government organizations who were involved in the research process (including group discussions 
and working groups with multiple government delegates, shown separately in the table below). The 
second includes representatives from Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) such as the United 
Nations and representatives from academic institutions. The third includes participants from Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) who were involved in the research. The distinction does not 
presuppose that responses are more or less important if they are from one group or another. Rather 
this division is aimed at showing the differences in understanding, approach and perspective of the 
different groups, and will be discussed further in the following table. 
Table II.2: Total number of participants interviewed and percentage by group 
 
 
 
It should be noted that during the interviews, not all participants were asked to answer the same 
questions and the focus of the discussions varied. Moreover, in general, intergovernmental 
organizations interviewed had more interaction and involvement with the BLO mechanism and 
therefore usually responded to questions related to it and often declined to comment on the other 
34%
4%29%
33%
Government & Donors
Government working
groups
IGOs & Academia
Interview/Questionnaire TOTAL 
Government & Donors 
16 
2 Working 
groups 
IGO & Academia  14 
NGOs 16 
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network. Similarly, most nongovernmental organizations interviewed had much more interaction 
and involvement with ASEAN-WEN and therefore responded more generally to questions related to 
the regional initiative. This also applied to government representatives, who tended to respond to 
activities of one or the other depending on which initiative they were more involved with. Having a 
varying number of responses to one question or another from one group or another should 
therefore not (necessarily) be seen as a lack of knowledge or awareness from one of the groups to a 
particular question.   
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Table II.3: Interviews and participants pseudonyms  
 
Interview/ 
Questionnaire+ 
GOV/donor 
(Numbers CN) 
IGO (+Academia) 
(Numbers TH) 
NGO 
(alphabet letter) 
1* Working group of approx. 
15 gov officials 
  
2  Neung  
3  Song  
4  Sam  
5  See  
6   A 
7   B 
8   C 
9   D 
10  Ha  
11 and 12** Yi and Yao   
13   E 
14  Hok  
15  Jet  
16   F 
17   G 
18   H 
19   I 
20   J 
21 and 22* Working groups of approx. 
10 gov officials 
  
23 Er   
24  Peet  
25  Gao  
26  Sip  
27  Sipsee  
28  Yipsee  
29 San   
30   K 
31 to 33** Si, Wu and Liu   
34   L 
35 Qi   
36 Ba   
37   M 
38   N 
39   O 
40  Samsee  
41 to 44** Jiu, Shi, Ershi and Sanshi   
45 Sishi   
46 Wushi   
Q1  Hasee  
Q2   P 
Q3 Liushi   
TOTAL 16 + 2 working groups 14 16 
+   In random order.  
*  Working group during a conference or meeting. 
** Interviews conducted jointly.  
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Chapter 6: the illegal wildlife trade, 
transnational crime and international 
cooperation 
 
 
6.1 Illegal wildlife trade, networks and organized crime: how they 
operate 
Participants interviewed were asked about the illegal wildlife trade, their perceptions of the degree 
of organization of such illegal trade and how they thought organized criminal wildlife networks 
operate. The following themes were identified: 
 
6.1.1 Lack of research 
A common theme identified throughout the interviews was the lack of data and understanding of 
the dynamics of the illegal wildlife trade and the illicit trade chain. Interviewees also highlighted the 
need to know more about it and the potential criminal networks involved to combat it more 
effectively: ‘If we know about middleman, the trader or collector, we can cut the connection’132. 
Most respondents noted that additional research on the illegal wildlife trade would be beneficial.  
 
6.1.2 Organization of illicit networks 
The government perspective: 
Overall, participants from government noted that the illegal wildlife trade has varying degrees of 
organization:  
Illegal wildlife networks work in a variety of ways. You have those grouped by virtue of a 
shared interest normally linked by a clandestine or sometimes overt organisation for example 
the illegal sharing of bird eggs or reptiles (Questionnaire received from Liushi) 
                                                 
132 Interview with Si, Wu and Liu 
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From evidence and some reports …, I believe they have a network in more than one 
country … because most of the [animal] kids we can see obviously that some tiger kids go 
from one country to the other, must have good network, good communication and be very 
effective (Interview with San) 
In country, must be well organized, criminals well linked, have knowledge about each other’s 
markets etc…. [we] never get big fish, only small fish, but need to understand linkages, … 
control deliveries to discover routes (Interview with Qi) 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
Participants from intergovernmental organizations agreed that the illegal wildlife trade has varying 
degrees of organization, but also highlighted that in their view ‘a lot of wildlife crime is controlled by 
few individuals’133:  
I think that pretty much everybody is connected, but random links and hard to generalize 
(Questionnaire received from Ha) 
The seizures show the transnational nature of the crime and these usually requires some 
level of organization to arrange the supply chain [and] even though the traffickers are caught, 
the trade continues: this reveals that there are heads which continue recruiting people… My 
understanding is that there is a structure including poachers, middle men and the kingpins. 
Often only poachers are caught, not the kingpins … [they are] not directly involved, they are 
behind the scenes, only through money transfers (Interview with Sipsee) 
They vary in type and scale and by commodity. Evidence relating to Australia suggests that 
they are small scale and opportunistic, probably relating to the home aquarium-style market. 
The evidence for highly organised/sophisticated activity in Australia is slim at best, although 
I’m aware that the Australian Crime Commission does investigate wildlife trafficking. The 
types of wildlife often traded (at least in terms of what gets media coverage here) are eggs 
(especially from rare bird and reptile species), live birds, reptiles and amphibians 
(Questionnaire received from Hasee) 
Participants also highlighted the use of sophisticated techniques, ‘fake or front companies’ and in 
some cases violence to ensure the illegal trade could continue unabated134 and businesses:   
Illegal trade in wildlife requires money … it’s expensive … [requires] wildlife parts, transport, 
weapons, there must be some background financial support which covers the expenses 
(Interview with Sipsee) 
The issue of corruption – further expanded upon in a later section – and the potential involvement 
of government representatives in illegal activities (e.g. illicit permitting and protection of zoos) 135, as 
well as government non-involvement (e.g. looking the other way, accepting or actively seeking 
bribes, particularly at specific border points in a number of countries) were also noted.  
                                                 
133 Questionnaire received from Ha 
134 Interview with Sipsee 
135 Interview with Sipsee 
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The non-governmental perspective: 
Respondents from NGOs agreed with the above and added that the networks have varying degrees 
of organization (from basic to very sophisticated networks, as much as drugs or other smuggling 
efforts)136: 
There is disorganized crime and organized, and then highly organized crime … Many are 
opportunists … the disorganized criminal … a chance to make a quick buck. Most [illegal] 
trade is done by highly organized competing networks (Interview with F) 
The organizations usually pay someone to take the risks, the people who do the smuggling, 
that will move the contraband and get paid without knowing much about it. In many cases 
these people are more dangerous than the police, because they are close to the flame 
(Interview with H)   
[It is a] continuing criminal enterprise … people work together and work in concert to ensure 
their safety, their profits and squash resistance to what they are doing. Most criminals will 
just want to avoid being recognized and making their money with the least amount of 
resistance (Interview with F) 
Most participants highlighted that it is not well known how illegal wildlife trade networks are 
organised, but the fact that they are highly organised is evidenced by a number of factors, including:  
 They are aware of loopholes in the law and take advantage of them: ‘For example, 
they know that often penalties are low or enforcement is weak in some countries such 
as Lao PDR and thus will move goods through such countries’137 
 They are often armed: rangers and officers are often shot and killed for trying to stop 
poachers 
 They use sophisticated forgery of travel permits and documents to get the contraband 
across borders 
 They know and take advantage of corrupt officials at border points 
 They use sophisticated techniques to smuggle goods 
 They have strong communication networks to coordinate shipments and are ‘able to 
change trafficking routes if enforcement is beefed-up in a particular area’138 
                                                 
136 Interview with H 
137 Questionnaire received from P 
138 Questionnaire received from P 
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An interviewee gave a specific example of a ‘typical network’139 and of how the illegal wildlife trade 
operates in a particular market:  
At Chatuchak market, for example, it's a fascinating place, it’s one living and breathing 
organized crime … they all rely on one another, they protect themselves, they pay everyone, 
they are organized for self-protection … the market itself is a criminal enterprise … in front of 
your very eyes. From first-hand experience I can tell you that that's where people meet. You 
go and meet there and do some shopping … and the people there have a lot of access. The 
sales themselves are not always on site, but they have the connections.  There is no reason 
that it should be allowed to exist, but it’s there and it’s flourishing. The government should 
do something about it … but they are not going to. We have tried to get some work done 
there, but nothing really happens. Someone has to take a hit every now and then … but it’s 
probably because they haven’t paid their fees or something … otherwise it’s just business as 
usual.  This is the same in a few other markets in the region. They could close them, but they 
are not. There is a lot of money and influence and there is not leadership to take it down 
(Interview with F) 
A participant went into further detail and provided two examples of organized criminal networks 
dealing in wildlife crime (see box below). It was agreed the case studies could be used as examples 
highlighting some of the details of two networks specialized in trafficking wildlife internationally and 
in particular the highly organized nature of the illicit activities, which shows that wildlife crime can 
often be as sophisticated and organized as other transnational organized crimes and that in most 
cases traders deal only in illegal wildlife – and in some cases their networks are species specific.  
 
                                                 
139 Interview with H 
140 Interview with H 
Box 6.1: Case study I – The Bangladesh connection (not its real name): organized wildlife 
crime from Bangladesh to Bangkok (and onwards to Southeast Asia, China and Europe) 140 
‘There is a specialized [guy] in high value tortoises from India and South Asia. He is the perfect 
smuggler. He is very careful. Stays behind the scenes completely. Has [a] right hand … person that is 
also very careful and protected. They pay public officials in source countries … in India, Bangladesh, 
Madagascar, [they] bribe everyone to make sure the shipment gets on the plane. Their biggest fear is 
not getting arrested, but losing the commodities which are quite expensive … They bribe everyone 
that can deal with the shipment. From the baggage handlers to security people. The method of 
transport, because the tortoises are high value and small is in checked baggage. They put 150 or so in 
a checked bag … two or three shipments per week that gets (relatively) well paid. This will typically 
be based around 40 to 50,000USD per week, depending on what they are smuggling. Their runners 
never hear or see who the boss is. There will be a person in between, so now you are 3 people 
removed from the front guy.  
The bags don't get checked. In destination, they will have people to pick up the bag from the belt or 
the plane directly, they pick up bag and do the delivery off-site. It’s not the runner that takes the bag. 
He has nothing further to do with the bag, walks out of the plane and goes straight out. He will get 
instructions on where to go once they arrive but they are not involved at the other end. Then they will 
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An interesting note was made with regards to the competition between different groups or 
networks for the illegal market: ‘Sometimes there is conflicts between competing traders … At the 
airport there are 4 or 5 different people that want to get the shipment … and sometimes competitors 
will steal shipments from each other. One case a competitor had the shipment stolen by other traders. 
This trader was caught and beaten up so this would not happen again’.141 
 
 
                                                 
141 Interview with H 
142 Interview with H 
get a phone call to tell them where to go to get paid. Someone will do it all for them, the tickets, the 
hotel, they don't know. The runner wouldn't know much. Even if they are caught they wouldn't have 
much information  …  If the runners get caught, they get taken care of.  
The person that takes the bags … You don't know if it's the flight attendant, [the] customs guy, the 
baggage operators … [it] can be anyone that has access to the bag. It often goes to a market in 
Bangkok where they will get sold. It is often pre-sold. People know there is a shipment coming. Then 
the traders deal with it and sell it or take it to other countries with methods that they find useful 
depending on where the contraband is going. Very often the people that are buying have paid 
someone at their airport to ensure safe package. It does cost some overheads to get it transported, 
but it is well worth it.  
We have 3 different levels of well insulated people and then it goes into different networks that then 
potentially move it and resell it within their networks. Everywhere along the way people are paid not 
to do their job. You will never see the top guy. If you have to get paid, they blindfold you and you will 
be taken somewhere where his right hand guy would pay him’.  
Box 6.2: Case study II142 – Anson Wong’s alleged illegal wildlife network and ‘business as 
usual’ (at the time of the interviews) 
Chapter 4 provides some general details of Anson Wong’s dealings in illegal wildlife prior to his 
conviction. This case study reflects the views from a participant interviewed (albeit others noted 
similar concerns off the record) and suggests the illicit activities of his network continue:  
‘Anson Wong [was] a master in compromising governments. He is very organized, has a lot of money, 
is very smart and is fearless. He had a number of layers of protection and was organized so people 
would take the fall if they got caught. He only had problems when he didn't take care of some of the 
runners that he used that got caught [and] that rolled over on him … and they had hard evidence, 
which provided information to assist with the investigation. He relied on the bribed officials to do his 
business ...  He only got caught because he smuggled something himself and because the NGOs and 
media put a lot of pressure on the government to take action and the matter could not be dropped 
given the high media outrage’. 
‘While Anson Wong was arrested, his wife was running the show. Through their network, he did as 
much as possible to mitigate potential problems by corrupting officers. This is easy to do in the 
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A further example of an illegal wildlife trade network is that of the pangolin lady (not its real name). 
This network allegedly specializes in the illicit trade of pangolins in Southeast Asia:  
She is an illegal trader with a large network that is protected by her husband, a high ranking 
police officer in Thailand. If other officers try and investigate the case, they get ‘relocated’ to 
a different office and province. The network spans from Malaysia to the northeast of 
Thailand where the main headquarters are. Local people along the way gather pangolins and 
sell them to local traders that deal with the drivers. The drivers don’t know about the trader, 
they just drive from A to B and collect cargo along the way. Half way across they change 
vehicles and drivers. From HQ the pangolins are smuggled through Laos where village 
leaders are involved and facilitate border crossings, and then to the final destination: Viet 
Nam. (Interview with M) 
As there was an on-going investigation at the time of the interview no locations or further details 
were provided.  
country if you can provide enough money.  Even though his network is well known, he continues to 
trade. He relied on ineptitude and malfeasance of officers and was untouchable. This would not occur 
in a legitimate and legal environment. If someone would investigate them in detail, they would be in 
jail’. 
The alleged layers of the network as described during the interviews with the participant are as 
follows: 
 
Source: H 
If the information above is correct, it would suggest a significant lack of appropriate efforts from 
authorities to tackle the problem or, as noted in the previous chapter, that he might still be 
untouchable.  
Anson Wong (known 
illegal trader)
The Madagascar 
(MG) connection
Illegal trader in MG
Retailers
Traders and their 
associated networks
High level 
representatives from 
MG customs
High level 
representatives from 
MG security services 
The Malaysian (MY) 
connection
Wife of Anson Wong
Retailers 
(national/internation
al)
Traders 
(national/internation
al)
Couriers/runners
Veejai XXX - known 
itrader in MY
Retailers
Traders and their 
associated networks
High level 
government and 
enforcement officials
The Indonesian (ID) 
connection
Daniel XXX - known 
buyer in ID with 
specialized network
Exclusive buyers
Traders and 
associated networks
Other: Intemediary 
trader with other 
traders
'Right hand man'
Traders and their 
associated networks
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In terms of networks, participants interviewed clearly highlighted that there are a number of 
networks ‘out there’ dealing in illegal wildlife trade in the region:  
Anson Wong is not the biggest fish in the pond by far. Not many people know the specifics, 
only a limited amount of people know, but there are networks similar to his in Malaysia in at 
least Thailand, Myanmar, Indonesia, Philippines, China, South Africa, two in Madagascar, 
Bangladesh and India … and ‘there are many more. I know ten major traders. Out of those, 6 
are really big and scary high level and very well organized ones that are often involved in 
very lucrative legal businesses (Interview with H) 
For obvious reasons, further details cannot be given. 
 
6.1.3 Impact of illegal wildlife trade 
A number of interviewees highlighted the negative impact of the illegal wildlife trade to species, 
ecosystems and the economic survival of local communities, in particular to those communities that 
are dependent on wildlife to survive: 
Impact of transnational crime, transnational wildlife crime in Africa … and in general the 
impact on economic development in many countries where (wildlife) tourism is a strong 
contributor (Interview with Jiu, Shi, Ershi and Sanshi) 
 
6.1.4 Risk versus reward 
An issue that was highlighted was that ‘once they [wildlife smugglers] find a method that works there 
is no reason not to repeat it’143. In particular, the issue of low risk combined with high reward was 
highlighted by a number of interviewees: 
Wildlife crime is attractive, because penalties are low (Interview with J) 
[The] dynamics of illegal trade are the same. [The] difference is [that it is] less dangerous 
than other more serious crimes. [The] risk level [is] low because consequences of being 
caught are inconsequential. [There is] low awareness and [it is a] confusing subject to many 
officers (Interview with H) 
 
 
 
                                                 
143 Interview with H 
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6.1.5 Links between legal/illegal trade 
The links between legal and illegal trade as well as its international nature were also mentioned by 
various participants from the different groups. Participants also noted the legal trade is used to 
camouflage illegal species or as a front for illicit activities.  
For example, during a joint interview with governmental officers (Interview with Si, Wu and Liu): 
When legal traders cannot do sufficient legal trade, they turn to illegal  
Wildlife is usually traded outside country, as receive higher prices for it than within country  
Given the broad agreement on this point, this issue was generally discussed during initial interviews 
only. At a later stage the discussions during interviews focused more on potential links between the 
illegal trade and other transnational organized crimes.  
 
6.1.6 Links with other crimes 
The government perspective: 
The links with other crimes, particularly the use of the same smuggling routes and techniques as for 
other crime types, were also commonly discussed: 
I believe that wildlife trade is similar to drug trade because they have the mechanics to 
smuggling, how to do operations, concealment methods and everything; they have the same 
because international wild life criminals and drug traffickers learn from each other, how to 
avoid the control or the law enforcement … sometimes people in remote area cross in empty 
roads, hide wildlife among other goods …  [They have] similar techniques, although wildlife 
[is] harder to conceal (Interview with Qi) 
Yes inextricably linked. When you look at some of the trade routes particularly the East Asia 
ones they are linked to drugs routes, firearms and fake goods … If you look at Africa some of 
the bloodshed is linked to the ongoing insurgency in the region … Then look at the end user. 
Countries that have affluence or financial position of strength in the global community. 
Target these pinch points a significant amount of work would be done (Questionnaire 
received from Liushi) 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
The links with other crimes, particularly the use of the same smuggling routes and techniques as for 
other crime types, were also commonly discussed.  
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Goods change, but methods, routes and level of organization remain (Interview with Samsee) 
There are rumours of links between drug and wildlife trade, but no official reports … [I think] 
they are connected because of same route (Interview with Sip) 
The criminals conduct the crimes … whatever opportunity they see to make money they will 
try to do it … so with the situation at the border they know the situation at the border … the 
loopholes … the weakness … that allows the criminal to take the opportunity to make profit 
out of this … whatever the goods they take through the border … they will do it (Interview 
with See) 
Participants from this group however noted a key difference with other crime types: 
Great differences in combating crime, can’t just apply same things, … there many differences; 
when you interfere in wildlife crime, damage still already done … that is why you should 
always try to prevent, you can’t be reactive, but try to prevent in [the] first place, make sure 
it doesn’t happen (Questionnaire received from Ha) 
The non-governmental perspective: 
The links, differences and similarities with other crimes, particularly the use of the same smuggling 
routes or ‘operators’ as other crime types, were discussed. Some participants suggested a link 
between the crimes. Others that it was possible but unlikely. Others noted it was rather a remote 
and coincidental case:  
There are Mr and Ms Big, I think they are specializing in wildlife… I don't see evidence of too 
many of them being a mastermind involved in other crimes … In general [there are always] 
criminal gangs that would do anything … [they] try to make maximum profit by combining 
human trafficking, drugs and wildlife (Interview with N) 
[It is] no different from other trafficking … it's a contraband item. The need for secrecy and 
the protection of assets and income with least amount of risks is what all trafficking has in 
common. Those are identical with all crimes (Interview with F) 
[The Illegal wildlife trade is a] very specialized trade, you would need certain degree of 
specialization to be involved, so [my] assumption is that other criminal networks dealing with 
for example drugs … might become linked with wildlife trade at one certain point (Interview 
with G) 
[I] don’t know for sure if [it is] connected, [there is] not very strong evidence … maybe [they] 
use same routes, [the] same checkpoints, border … regardless of which illegal trade 
(Interview with L) 
[It] depends where you look on wildlife trade chain … there are often criminal brokers on 
border, involved in all kinds of serious organized crime … but wildlife crime is high profit low 
risk, drug is high profit high risk, human trafficking is very different … so [it] can be the same 
network, but not necessary (Questionnaire received from E) 
I suspect that there are some links because there will be … some bottlenecks if you like, 
something at some point will have to cross a sea or get from one airport to another and 
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therefore there’s only a limited number of options … but [there are] also vast differences in 
skills needed in different smuggling techniques, [so] it comes down to key geographies … if 
there is only one checkpoint, a geographical bottleneck (Interview with G) 
I know cases from region where people combine drug, human trafficking and wildlife … 
[there is] some evidence on this  (Interview with M) 
There are obvious links with other organised crime. Wildlife products are often found in 
confiscated shipments containing arms and drugs (Questionnaire received from P) 
In general, the involvement of wildlife criminals in other crimes was deemed by at least one 
participant as less likely as ‘in wildlife it's a high profit and low risk environment and for that reason 
there are not a lot of dealers that will cross over for more dangerous crimes. Because you go from 
making serious money with very low risk … you can jump from that to being executed or life in prison 
with drugs or arms trafficking …’ 144. Conversely, other criminals would easily be tempted to trade in 
illegal wildlife, albeit mostly on an opportunistic basis, as ‘penalties for drugs [are] much higher than 
for illegal wildlife … and often both have [the] same value, so [it is] safer to trade [in] illegal wildlife145. 
This highlights that wildlife can be a specialized crime that in many cases has only limited links to 
other illegal commodities such as drugs when wildlife is the main commodity that is being illegally 
traded. As explained in previous chapters, the case is different where illegal traders do not specialize 
in a particular commodity and exploit every opportunity to trade illegally through their existing 
networks.  
One participant suggested that it is important to emphasize that organized wildlife traffickers and 
individuals facilitating illegal cross-border trade are criminals and should be treated as such, rather 
than focusing on the type of commodity they are illegally trading or smuggling: 
[The] way to settle this issue is we need to show that crooks are crooks. The ones facilitating 
cross-border trade are doing other stuff too. Not necessarily Mr Big, but the people below in 
the wildlife crime syndicates, are doing other stuff too … there is not much evidence, but 
there is evidence that those facilitating cross-border illegal trade are connected. Easy for 
them because they know a) people are not looking, b) easy to corrupt and c) even if you get 
caught the penalties are low. (Interview with O) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
144 Interview with F 
145 Interview with  I 
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PERSPECTIVES ON THE ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE, NETWORKS AND ORGANIZED CRIME 
Participants interviewed were asked about the illegal wildlife trade, their perceptions of the degree 
of organization of such illegal trade and how they thought organized criminal wildlife networks 
operate.  
Overall, government representatives highlighted the varying degrees of organization within the 
illegal wildlife trade and the existence of highly organized networks in some countries with good 
communication channels and the capacity to smuggle wildlife across borders with ease. They also 
noted the lack of understanding of the real scope of the illegal wildlife trade and the individuals 
involved. Pondering on the links between legal and illegal trade as well as the links with other crimes 
participants suggested that they have similar smuggling techniques and trade routes and that there 
is a convergence on key hotspots and border points where other commodities are traded.  
IGO participants interviewed had a similar understanding, noted that there are varying degrees of 
organization based on the value and volume of the commodity traded illegally, and highlighted that 
most of the illegal trade is controlled by a few well-organized individuals. It was also suggested there 
is limited action that is being taken by governments to tackle wildlife crimes and do in depth 
investigations into the criminal organizations involved.  
NGO representatives noted the varying degrees of organization of the illegal wildlife trade, from 
opportunistic and disorganized to highly organized groups with links to organized criminal networks. 
The lack of information on illegal networks was also stressed by participants who also emphasized 
the lack of penalties (or insufficient penalties) for wildlife crime offences. It was suggested in most 
cases networks trading in illegal wildlife tend to be specialized (in a particular species or subspecies) 
but that they are not necessarily involved in the smuggling of other illicit commodities such as drugs. 
An exception appears to be in cases where there are, for example, facilitators or smugglers that 
coordinate all illicit activity in a particular area. Examples of a number of illegal wildlife networks 
that were provided highlight the highly organized nature of some of these illicit networks and 
suggest that multiple groups of this nature exist. 
 
Key similarities and differences in participants’ responses: 
In general there was broad agreement among participants interviewed on the need for additional 
research on wildlife crime. To a degree, there has been a large increase in research on the topic by a 
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number of academics, universities and institutions since 2010, most notably the recent UNODC 
World Wildlife Crime report.  
There was also agreement on the lack of clarity and details on how the networks are organized, 
while acknowledging that in some cases they can be highly organized and sophisticated and that 
there are a relatively large number of unknown networks. Participants from IGOs and NGOs 
interviewed provided more detail and seemed to have more targeted knowledge than government 
representatives. This is because these are specialized agencies that are dealing with wildlife crime at 
the field and national level – as well as in other regions and countries. IGOs, while providing some 
details on networks, generally tended to reflect on more institutional and strategic issues, and in 
particular noted the potential of corrupt practices at possible source (e.g. zoos) or transit (e.g. 
border) areas. NGOs focused more on specific examples of networks, which highlights their 
understanding at the field level.  
Similarly, there was broad agreement on the links between legal and illegal trade in wildlife and the 
use of the legal trade as a potential cover or smoking mirror for the illicit trade, as well as with 
regards to links to other transnational crimes (such as drugs or other). Government representatives 
were, in general, more reserved in their responses due to the lack of data and specialized agencies 
were able to provide additional detail. Specifically with regards to links with other crimes, there was 
broad agreement on the use of similar routes, trends and smuggling techniques, but contrasts with 
other crimes were noted as it was suggested wildlife crime is a specialized kind of illicit trade and 
that those involved will generally not necessarily be involved in other crimes. This is consistent with 
what was explored in chapter 4. The key link between different types of transnational crimes was 
particularly highlighted with regards to the use of border operators or of bottlenecks where 
everything and anything would be smuggled through, irrespective of the commodity. Only a small 
portion of participants, mostly from NGOs, disagreed with the general view and suggested stronger 
links between different transnational crimes. This was based on a number of examples and was 
perhaps suggested as it would help raise the profile of wildlife crime, secure additional funding for 
governments to combat it, and potentially also as it would raise the profile of their activities and 
generate potential future funding from alternative sources.   
Overall, there was agreement on the need to treat wildlife criminals as a serious organized crime and 
on the need to focus on the hierarchy of the organizations to defeat them.  
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6.2 Countering transnational wildlife crime and the need for 
international cooperation 
Participants interviewed were asked to discuss how to combat transnational wildlife crime, and 
whether or not it is possible or better to do this alone, or if international cooperation is needed to 
effectively combat it. The issue of whether or not a network is needed to defeat the criminal 
networks involved in the illegal wildlife trade was also discussed. The following themes were 
identified: 
 
6.2.1 Need for cooperation 
The government perspective: 
Overall, participants from this group noted the difficulty of combating transnational crime alone and 
highlighted that cooperation and collaboration are essential to combat the illegal wildlife trade:  
Having been immersed in the area of wildlife criminal investigation for the last 4 years it is 
obvious that it is a struggle. The only way to possibly combat or in my opinion minimise the 
impact of wildlife crime is to work in partnership. My mantra of communication, cooperation 
and collaboration … [S]uccess …. [is] based on these three principles. You can’t do it on your 
own (Questionnaire received from Liushi) 
The lack of cooperation and a coordinated strategy was also noted: 
There is little cooperation between donors and agencies providing aid. If you offer the 
countries resources or money they will take it whether they need it or not. There is always 
people trying to give them stuff. It's a very fragmented approach (Interview with Wushi) 
More advanced and long term cooperation is needed … government counterparts should be 
involved more from beginning … it creates alignment, ownership, partnership and 
cooperation (working group of approx. 10 government officials) 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
Participants from this group agreed that cooperation and collaboration along and across borders are 
crucial to combat transnational crime and highlighted the differences between national and 
international cooperation. One interviewee explained this rather succinctly while deliberating on the 
benefits of – and requirements for - cooperation: 
‘Many minds are better than one’. ‘It takes two to tango’, ‘many hands make things work’. 
The trick is to avoid ‘too many cooks spoil the broth’. So, the real trick is … to ensure we do 
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not just get cacophony, chaos and ineptitude. Obsessive over coordination often happens. It 
becomes an objectification of the concept of cooperation to such a degree that we don't 
cooperate with the world. We spend all our time fussing whether we are fully coordinated … 
but how much are we actually solving the problem? Often the answer is not that much in 
that case … need a targeted coordinated approach. To actually do it requires an active 
imagination. It's a management issue, it's a leadership issue (Interview with Gao) 
A participant noted that transnational crimes make it necessary to work together and explained how 
crucial it is to cooperate from a Customs perspective: 
You can get information ... [and] evidence … to identify if the business is legal or illegal from 
different sources. For customs when they enforce law, they need the support from many 
agencies. When they want to arrest the criminals, they need support from the police and 
then they hand over the case to the prosecutors. And then finally when they go to court, 
some officers have to be the witness or defendants … so all the enforcement chain requires 
them to work together … agencies can’t work alone … that makes them work together 
(Interview with Song) 
Later sections of this chapter will go into specific details on the different initiatives and their 
effectiveness in encouraging cooperation and countering transnational wildlife crime. It is however 
worth highlighting here a contribution from an interviewee who, reflecting on the BLO mechanism 
and the need for cross-border cooperation as well as the need to work together to combat 
transnational crime, highlighted the essence of cooperation: 
The concept of the BLOs is a means to an end. The strategic priorities of (our organization) in 
terms of ‘how’ approaches, which is to be distinguished between the ‘what’ (the ‘what’ issues 
are things like counter terrorism, criminal justice, TOC, what we do). The ‘how’ is norms and 
conventions, building capacity. One of the crucial how’s is promoting regional cooperation. 
The nature of what we are tackling is not something that can be dealt with by one country 
alone. It takes a network to deal with a network. Fortunately, much of the law-enforcement 
response to the ‘what’ issues, TOC, smuggling, is compartmentalized within national 
jurisdictions. That is something our opponents take advance of. Border is a concept of 
sovereign states but are only viewed as a monitor obstacle that has to be overcome by our 
opponents (Interview with Gao)  
In general, participants noted that that ‘since 1999 the scale of development and quantity of 
cooperation has exponentially increased … [and we have seen] a positive improvement in cross-
border cooperation’146.  
The non-governmental perspective: 
Participants from this group also agreed that cooperation is crucial to combat transnational crime:  
                                                 
146 Interview with See 
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There are a lot of factors. The only real way to overcome it is ensuring that there is 
connections between the parties that need to meet together … regardless of their 
organization, CITES, police, customs … they need to get together regularly and talk … you 
won’t overcome it otherwise (Interview with A) 
In general it was suggested that one organization or country alone cannot deal with transnational 
wildlife crime: 
This is because one organisation does not have all the necessary skills and resources required 
to combat wildlife crime. The elements that need to be tackled are numerous and complex. 
They range from stopping poaching, intercepting shipments, containing and managing crime 
scenes, catching and prosecuting criminals, strengthening laws, all the way to arresting 
consumers (Questionnaire received from P) 
Interestingly, an interviewee noted: ‘wildlife [in Cambodia] is generally for local consumption, a local 
use … most of the trade is local, occasionally cross-border … but there is no close cooperation of 
neighbouring countries, no need for it, [we have] not encountered cross-border issues so far ... [and 
are] not [a] big transit country’147. At the same time, he/she reflected on the need for national 
cooperation at the national level:  
forestry administration is responsible … if any official is involved in investigation or action, 
[they] work together with local police … level of cooperation between local police, military 
police and national police exists (Interview with K) 
Different forms of cooperation were discussed. Reflecting on the illegal wildlife trade as a 
transnational crime, the below essential aspects to ‘properly’148  counter wildlife crime were 
highlighted by a number of participants: 
 National level inter-agency cooperation   
 National level intra-agency cooperation   
 International cooperation between relevant government agencies   
 International cooperation between NGOs   
 International cooperation between NGOs and relevant government agencies 
 International cooperation between agencies such as Interpol, WCO etc   
                                                 
147 Interview with K 
148 Questionnaire received from P 
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 And lastly cooperation between all of the above in a structured, productive and 
meaningful way 
The need for a network approach was highlighted:  
It is needed because of absence of cooperation … [to] get countries to talk to each other so 
they know what they have in common and what would need to change, share resources – if 
you would share resources, everybody could save money, costs are spread … [but I] don’t 
know whether [it would be] more efficient or not (Interview with B) 
It was created because it was quite clear that people around the region were fighting wildlife 
crime in a vacuum … It was a natural progression to create a network to exchange 
information to combat wildlife crime. From our perspective we didn't feel that the CITES 
network alone could tackle this trade … they don't carry badges or guns, and some of them 
frankly are looking the other way … It’s necessary to get customs and police to the table …. 
On top of that, you start to develop standards of performance between the countries. There 
is a bit of pressure to do better (Interview with O) 
To share information about illegal wildlife trade, raise awareness; a union to bring the 
political people to get more involved (Interview with L) 
 
6.2.2 Challenges 
The government perspective: 
The challenges of cooperation between agencies at both the national and international levels, were 
also noted. Overall, participants highlighted that support from their hierarchies and at the highest 
levels of government – or ‘high-level buy-in’149 – was essential to counter the illegal trade and that 
without political will there can be limited action. Participants also stressed that international law-
enforcement cooperation is not generally a priority:   
Cooperation [at national level] is not seen as a priority within law-enforcement. International 
cooperation is even less of a priority (working group of approximately 15 government 
officials) 
It is not given the necessary time and space in daily schedules … Operational life is rather one 
action after another … daily routines of seizures, carry out investigations and things like 
that … I doubt there is enough time in enforcement agencies given to international law-
enforcement and international cooperation …  I suspect this is a luxury for many 
organizations that we can’t afford as we don’t have the resources … (working group of 
approximately 15 government officials)  
                                                 
149 Interview with Sishi 
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If you go to your boss and say ‘I want to sit down and write an eco-message150 now and send 
it to X country’, a lot of managers will say ‘what are you on about? ... better get on with the 
next job’ … the focus will be on aspects that are the most important for the agency. It is like 
any form of life: we look after our own lives and our own families and house. What happens 
to the neighbours or to the village or town is a secondary sort of issue. We are so busy with 
ourselves that it is often hard to look at the rest (working group of approximately 15 
government officials)  
The intergovernmental perspective: 
Participants agreed that cooperation is not as easy as it seems. In the words of one interviewee: 
‘cooperation is easier said than done’151: 
Cooperation is an issue that does not come naturally. Within organizations this does not 
happen.  At country level and international level it is more difficult. This has to be overcome 
and it is very important and that is why we spend so much time on it (Interview with Gao) 
I have worked with governments for some years. I have noticed it is very difficult to work 
with neighbouring agencies. Even within one ministry it is quite difficult to share information. 
Each unit or division wants to hold their own division or data. Maybe there is some 
competition … for promotions … anyways; cooperation is not that easy … you think that 
people are so easily willing to share information with others? There are many barriers. You 
need to break the barriers, you need regulations, the networking, the pressure from 
supervisors to break the barriers … so if interagency cooperation is complicated … then cross-
border is even more complicated. But each agency also faces big challenges. Whenever there 
is a case, a crime or a problem … they need to tackle it and to sort it out. At this moment they 
often need assistance and help from someone else (Interview with Song) 
A participant noted the challenges of cooperation and highlighted an important aspect to be taken 
into consideration: the need to recognize partners.  
Essentially the problem is that agencies are not particularly encouraged to share information 
because they feel that what they share will be utilized by other agencies to conduct some 
operations and …  and no recognition will be given to the source of the information … and 
that would be wrong. Recognition is necessary … a professional relationship between 
enforcement agencies is a relationship in which the exchange of information is recognized … 
is acknowledged … in which agencies that receive information thank officially the other 
agency (source of information) …  in which there is a level of knowledge between people. 
Especially when you operate in the borders … which are remote areas … (Interview with 
Neung) 
  
                                                 
150 An eco-message is a reporting system to report environmental and wildlife crimes to INTERPOL via a 
standardized procedure to assure the validity and reliability of data and information. The information is 
included in the INTERPOL database and allows for efficient cross-referencing of the data and facilitates its use 
for, among other things, criminal intelligence analysis. For more information see 
http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/Ecomessage and Annex 1 of CITES Resolution Conf. 
11.3 (Rev. CoP16) on compliance and enforcement on https://cites.org/eng/res/11/E-Res-11-03R16.pdf 
151 Interview with Song 
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The non-governmental perspective: 
Interviewees also acknowledged that cooperation is not as easy as it seems (‘organizations don't 
often work well together’152) and that cooperation is essential. A number of participants from this 
group reflected on the activities conducted to date and some of the continuing challenges: 
[The] level of training here given the circumstances is not bad, it is quite good; operations 
generally get run pretty well; most training official, but level at which things are done here is 
not low enough to reach immediate attention, but seems to be adequate at the moment to 
address approaching issues (Interview with K) 
Regional level cooperation is hard to measure … national priorities have an effect on it 
(Questionnaire received from E) 
 
6.2.3 Benefits of a network approach 
The government perspective: 
Interviewees also stressed the benefits of a network approach (i.e. a network is better equipped to 
defeat a network) and highlighted that enforcement alone is not sufficient to combat wildlife 
trafficking effectively: 
Yes, agree that network is needed to defeat network … if [you] can build this, maybe [we] can 
contact each other on regional cases, cooperate and share information (Interview with San) 
A network vs. a network is the appropriate way to fight organized crime … [you need] multi-
agency cooperation … dealing with laws, justice etc., but also need to do something about 
consumer demand, enforcement alone cannot solve problem; should strengthen regulations 
or try to get rid of illegal trade altogether. A multi-pronged approach [is] needed: if customs 
officers don’t have sufficient education, how should they differentiate a bird from an 
endangered bird or other animal? (Interview with Jiu, Shi, Ershi and Sanshi) 
[You] need a good network approach to combat organized wildlife crime; [but the] problem is 
[the] consumer … have to reduce demand first. No demand means no trade … the more 
complicated it is to trade, the more expensive it becomes (Interview with Sishi) 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
Participants of this group agreed on the need and benefits of a network approach and highlighted 
that an organized response is essential153: ‘you need to be at least as organized as the criminals are 
to be able to counteract on the same level’154: 
                                                 
152 Interview with F 
192 
 
The idea … is to promote transnational organized justice to counter TOC (Interview with Gao) 
There is no doubt that enforcement has to be multi-agency; [our organization] started an 
informal network … to bring them together … to share information and experiences”… [the] 
linkages between importing and exporting countries [is also] important. [You need] close 
collaboration … [a] multi-pronged, multi-agency kind of approach. … Organized crime is 
always very smart, …. one step ahead of enforcement agencies. [We need to work closely to] 
ensure that [we are] always ahead of smugglers (Interview with Peet) 
Know what set objectives are – countries need to be organized, to do something about it, 
need to take collaborative action at a regional level, make a network, have a common 
platform; law enforcement (Interview with Samsee) 
Lots of good work done … the regional perspective is a good approach (Interview with Sip) 
One interviewee highlighted the need to sort out the national issues first, in order to then be able to 
focus on the international and regional levels:  
Good sign that some countries have national task force, shows willingness; every national 
taskforce has its own challenges, that only adds to the challenge of having one regional 
platform as challenges so different; important to identify and address most important 
challenges per country; learning from neighbours than from international level more 
important (Interview with Samsee) 
 
6.2.4 Political will 
The government perspective: 
Participants from this group highlighted the importance of political will and identified this, as 
explained previously, as a major challenge to effective cooperation.  
There was also broad agreement among government representatives of the need for political will 
and support. When speaking about how to encourage increased political will, one interviewee in 
particular highlighted that ‘the right form should be the General Assembly and the Security Council 
[of the United Nations] … where cooperation originates … and where the spirit of cooperation takes 
place. But if it is hard over there, then …’. 155 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
                                                                                                                                                        
153 Interview with Gao 
154 Interview with Samsee 
155 Interview with working group of approximately 15 government officials 
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A key point stressed by participants was to have an interest in cooperation156  and consensus to 
cooperate. The need for ‘understanding, … awareness and political will’157 was also underlined: 
Firstly you need political will. This includes government organizations involved but also their 
leaders at the highest political levels to do their work and support the efforts. If they get 
leadership and policy and legal framework they can do a lot of things (Interview with See) 
The starting point … they should have the willingness to cooperate … the consensus to 
cooperate. Maybe different countries share different views. The culture, the traditions … like 
in wildlife before most common people think that wildlife is very delicious and nutritious and 
it’s good for traditional medicine and they don’t think it’s a crime (Interview with Song) 
If the countries believe that there is a common interest of issues in between them, if they 
understand very well that this is not an issue of for example [country A] can be also issue of 
[country B]. […] But they have to know, they have to understand very well the reason of 
negotiation and the reason of talking with other countries. Understanding of [this] reason is 
key, [you] have to clarify … specify … that all of them are beneficiaries (Interview with Jet) 
Participants also highlighted the importance of being supported by their hierarchy and by top levels 
of government and for this cooperation to be supported also at the international and regional level: 
‘meeting informally and through the network facilitates cooperation, but [the] whole region needs to 
participate at same level for spirit’158.   
In particular, one participant suggested that treaties and international agreements have an 
important role but that national interests prevail:  
networking, infrastructure, way of coordination and cooperation works very well because of 
international agreements obligations for countries; but the own national interest [is] 
paramount (Interview with Jet) 
That is why it was also argued that cooperation is often driven by ‘champions’ who work at a 
particular ministry or organization, but that ‘once they leave ………’159. They also suggested that 
global intergovernmental organizations should also make this a priority in order for their member 
states to put a higher priority on combating illegal wildlife trade:  
Combating illegal wildlife trade should become priority of a country for change to happen. 
[For customs,] all policies and inputs come from [the world] customs organization, [you] have 
to go there and make it priority there (Interview with Jet) 
The non-governmental perspective: 
                                                 
156 Interview with Sipsee 
157 Interview with Song 
158 Interview with Sip 
159 Interview with Hok 
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Representatives from this group generally agreed with the perspectives outlined above from the 
other groups, but emphasized that ‘[You] also need political support so that this goes somewhere’ 
(Interview with A). 
 
6.2.5 Need for support 
The governmental perspective: 
Most government representatives interviewed highlighted the need for additional support both 
financial and technical from a number of partners was needed. In particular they highlighted the 
need and benefits of having a platform for cooperation and opportunities to meet their counterparts 
(see section 2.7 below for more details). 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
In order to enable cooperation, interviewees highlighted the need for internal and external support. 
It was highlighted that ‘internal support from the governments is the most important’160 but that 
‘external support for capacity building, equipment and financial support was also important’161.  
You need training, capacity building etc. but if high level awareness and will doesn’t exist, 
whatever you do on ground won’t be effective … [it is] like planting a tree without then 
watering it (Questionnaire received from Ha) 
Until this institutional agreement that clarifies terms of collaboration and starting 
infrastructure resources are there, it will be quite difficult to have some meaningful, 
longstanding control over TOC (Interview with Hok) 
Key needs identified were also discussed: 
They certainly need skills … a set of skills that at the moment is not there … In terms of skills I 
am referring specifically to knowledge of the law … to actually know what the law says … and 
what is legal and what is illegal. In my opinion there is still some sort of grey area … 
especially in complex issues such as the illegal wildlife trade where it is really hard to know 
what is legal and what is illegal. So … border officers need first of all to acquire better 
knowledge on these issues from a legal standpoint. The need to … trust each other (Interview 
with Neung)  
Financing and willingness to actually share, to start, to take action is the basic precondition 
to cooperation (Interview with Samsee) 
                                                 
160 Interview with See 
161 Interview with See 
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Respondents highlighted the need to develop trust and relationships between law-enforcement 
organizations in order to cooperate effectively: 
Whereas we can assume that most investigative powers are often with the police, it is a 
reality that most of the seizures at the border are made by customs … combining these two 
sets of information is fundamental. … In many of the countries in the region the jurisdiction 
between the international check points stays with the army … and … having an alliance of the 
law-enforcement agencies such as police and customs with the army is fundamental … so … 
trust and proper professional working relationship with other enforcement agencies is 
essential … (Interview with Neung)   
 
6.2.6 Types of cooperation 
The governmental perspective: 
Participants from this group highlighted the history and changes in the approaches and types of 
cooperation and suggested that ‘cross-border cooperation began [a] long time ago, but only customs 
to customs, police to police … [and] not talking to each other. Now [there have been] some change[s] 
but still a lot of police-police, custom-custom, depending on the area of jurisdiction’162.  
The intergovernmental perspective: 
Representatives from this group suggested that cooperation is in today’s world a synonym for 
survival and that one organization or country alone cannot deal with transnational wildlife crime: 
[We] can’t say that countries are isolated anymore, [we] have to talk to each other, closely 
work together … we cannot survive without … this cooperation with each other. It’s a must 
and countries have understood very well that communication is essential (Interview with Jet) 
Cooperation between domestic and international partners is critical … as it cuts across 
borders. There are also insufficient resources in any single agency to adequately respond. 
Further, each agency brings with it a specific set of skills and capacities… that the whole [of 
the response] is greater than the sum of its parts. Finally, cooperative work fosters proactive 
rather than reactive responses.(Questionnaire received from Hasee) 
It is such a multidimensional problem that it requires interventions from many different 
directions and levels. Many actors who can be each other’s watchdogs and can put pressure 
on each other, many kinds of expertise is required which one organization alone cannot have 
(Interview with Sipsee) 
Different forms of cooperation (e.g. national, cross-border and international) were discussed 
depending on the nature of the crime. One participant made an interesting summary:   
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Fighting TOC, it requires a wide range of activities … some are based at the border … some 
are based in the capitals with the national authorities at the national level …. essentially 
fighting TOC requires prevention, protection, prosecution and a fair and just legal system. 
These four areas require a number of different activities starting from prevention in which 
there are important things that can be done such as offering opportunities to communities 
to … to be more capable of not falling in the lure of quick returns … quick monetary returns of 
illicit activities …  TOC is a huge area and prevention will vary according to which form of TOC 
we are talking about … So it is a very huge issue. The area in which I am working is the area 
of cross-border cooperation … I would say that international cooperation is a cross cutting 
issue for all the areas that I mentioned before ... prevention, protection, prosecution … 
international cooperation at the border is particularly relevant. I can’t tell in the least which 
are the most effective solutions and where cross-border cooperation stands, but I think … I 
would assume it stands pretty high (Interview with Neung) 
The non-governmental perspective: 
Participants from this group emphasized the benefits of regional activities and suggested that 
regional training is an opportunity to talk to other agencies, discuss enforcement matters, policies 
with neighbouring countries, as well as for the development of capacity (Interview with J). 
 
6.2.7 Need for a platform 
The government perspective: 
Overall, participants from this group noted that it was essential to have a strategic direction and high 
level support from the ‘central government’ to facilitate cooperation and collaboration to combat 
the illegal wildlife trade across borders163:  
The basic need … is to have a shared strategic direction with compatible laws … It is also 
important that unconcealed support is obtained from a Minister of State and Senior Police 
Officer. If the common goals are present and there is early collaboration intrinsically linked to 
the other two pillars of cooperation and communication then everything takes care of itself. 
Money will always be a factor but it is surprising what you can do on limited budgets in this 
area of work (Questionnaire received from Liushi) 
Talking about big issues with countries … at national level received a lot of support for 
capacity building and collaboration from international community to fight against 
transnational organized crime, but still country seems to be behind; political will and 
involvement is essential (Interview with Qi) 
The initiatives in general were highlighted as a platform for cooperation to strengthen relationships 
and build trust and to avoid duplication of efforts: 
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Personal relationships between agencies so can work and coordinate including informal 
discussions that officers can change their agencies mandates and missions – learn from each 
other, learn about each other’s role to work effectively – know who you are working with 
(Interview with Sishi) 
Maybe part of that … is to have an established communications protocol to ensure that the 
right people are being engaged and that not too many people, so not duplicating efforts 
(Interview with Jiu, Shi, Ershi and Sanshi) 
Learn from others, but also do updates and knowledge sharing outside of that; but different 
countries work alone most of the time, cooperation happens once or twice a year during 
training (Interview with Ba) 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
In particular, they highlighted the need to know the different cultures and people in order to be able 
to cooperate: ‘if you know the people and culture it’s easier to cooperate … for this it is important to 
also do awareness [and] to show [the officers/government] why it is important to cooperate’ 164.  
The role of the United Nations and relevant conventions and organizations as a forum to bring 
countries together was emphasized: 
The UN can be used to provide a platform for agencies to get together to discuss the ideas 
together and be a convening point to facilitate meetings and cooperation between the 
meetings ... There are many things the governments can’t do alone … [governments] need 
assistance from the UN and international organizations, and other agencies to facilitate 
meetings (Interview with Song) 
In fighting drugs, often complicated to make countries to cooperate – often not enough 
policy, enforcement, often do not care, or are not interested in having policies to control 
export often because of economic reasons; but important to bring these countries into 
position to cooperate more; all countries are like children sometimes, UN agencies are more 
like parents bringing children together (Interview with Jet) 
The importance of networking alongside other activities to achieve cooperation was stressed. 
Participants noted the most basic need is an opportunity to sit down and talk about ‘the issues that 
need to be talked about’165, to have a platform for cooperation166:  
Meetings are designed to encourage cooperation. Technical training is different … When it 
comes to cooperation, you cannot teach them … you cannot give them instructions. You need 
them to personally agree and commit themselves (Interview with See) 
You need a combination of approaches. Reliable contacts within country, established 
relationships through meetings so it comes to informal information sharing as well, [you] 
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need strong institutions … We should be aiming for institutional relationships as people leave 
the organizations and then personal relationships are not sustainable (Questionnaire 
received from Ha) 
The non-governmental perspective: 
One participant from this group suggested that: ‘one of key needs for cooperation is regional 
recognition and financial support. Everything else e.g. political will and engagement will follow’167. 
Overall, however, most participants suggested that it was essential to have – or ensure – strong 
leadership and engagement at the highest levels of government to combat the illegal wildlife trade 
and to ensure the networks enrich their activities:  
We often focus too much down the food chain, the practitioners, the police officers, and so 
on. What is lacking is leadership … I am seeing a total lack of leadership at the top at the 
agencies and the governments that host them to act (Interview with F) 
First and foremost there needs to be a leader, or the top management or the head of the 
country or someone at the top who has the power to do something who will have to say ‘look, 
this has to be done’ (Interview with D) 
The need to recognize the illegal wildlife trade as a serious transnational crime was also emphasized: 
To have illegal wildlife trade recognized as a serious transnationalized crime … [countries 
could] get more budget, more levels involved, training, capacity building, financial systems 
(Interview with N) 
If illegal wildlife trade moves to the top of that list of priorities above various other cards of 
social evils, then they actually can do something about it. [It is] more about willingness than 
capacity, if sense of importance, will act according to agreements, perception cloak 
(Interview with C) 
Participants also stressed the need for the platforms to align to the needs of the field: 
When you are talking about these networks in the same way as we were talking about the 
macro sort of international level there has to be an alignment of goals – there has to be an 
alignment of goals between the people who chose to be part of any network and any sort of 
cooperative agreement … [there has to] be people who care to implement [it] (Interview with 
B) 
Politicians should feel pressure from constituents, that is when they do their job best 
(Interview with J) 
One participant did an interesting analysis: 
[We] don’t need new tools for communicating, the reality is that what is stopping them 
sharing information with each other … I find [it] interesting … [is] not a capacity building 
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thing, although sometimes the budget line [is] missing, making things more complicated… 
the answer is partly political, [it] can be that country doesn’t want to seem to criticize 
bordering countries or other countries (Questionnaire received from E) 
 
PERSPECTIVES ON COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL WILDLIFE CRIME AND THE NEED FOR 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
Participants interviewed were asked to discuss how to combat transnational wildlife crime, and 
whether or not it was better or possible to do this alone, or if international cooperation was needed 
to effectively combat it. The issue of whether or not a network was needed to defeat the criminal 
networks involved in the illegal wildlife trade was also discussed. 
Government participants suggested that cooperation and collaboration are essential to combat 
transnational organized crime and illegal wildlife trade and highlighted the need for cooperation and 
collaboration as well as political support and commitment from their hierarchies to combat it 
effectively. They noted the challenges of cooperation at national and international level and the 
need for increased political support, noting that cooperation in general is not seen as a priority. It 
was suggested that political will should be increased through diplomatic channels such as the UN 
General Assembly or relevant regional and global forums. Participants highlighted the benefits of a 
network approach and also emphasized that enforcement alone would not solve the problem of the 
illegal wildlife trade.  
IGO representatives emphasized that cooperation is crucial to combat the illegal wildlife trade as 
one cannot combat transnational crime in isolation, but that ‘it is not as easy as it seems’. The 
difficulties at the national level and between organizations were noted, as well as at the 
international level. It was suggested coordination at and between the different levels (e.g. national, 
border and international) was essential. In order to do this, political support, consensus and interest 
to cooperate at the government level is crucial. Participants also highlighted the benefits of a 
network approach and the benefits of a multi-agency and coordinated law-enforcement approach, 
and highlighted the need for additional support (financial and capacity) as well as integrity and the 
role of the UN and relevant international organizations and agreements to bring countries together.  
NGO representatives agreed that cooperation is crucial to combat transnational organized crime and 
that one country alone cannot deal with such a problem and highlighted the importance of a 
coordinated multi-agency coordinated approach at the national and international level. In contrast 
one participant suggested the lack of international illegal trade in a particular country and that 
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cooperation was therefore not required in that particular country and therefore not an issue of 
national interest or significance.  The importance of cooperating with NGOs as well as the role of 
NGOs in efforts to combat wildlife crime were noted, together with the need for increased political 
support and the need for additional training. 
 
Key similarities and differences in participants’ responses: 
There was broad agreement from all groups that cooperation is essential – one group in particular 
highlighted the need for long term cooperation in a structured manner. The lack of cooperation was 
also emphasized, together with a general view that there is a fragmented approach to cooperation. 
In this regard all groups agreed that networks were the solution as only a network could defeat a 
network, and very few interviewees suggested otherwise. IGOs and NGOs tended to focus on the 
need to have a more efficient use of funds and the need to put mechanisms in place to evaluate the 
work of the networks (while at the same time acknowledging it is hard to measure and evaluate but 
that it should be done). A number of representatives from the NGO group saw networks as a way to 
enhance performance and increase political will.  
Some representatives from the IGO group cautioned on ‘obsessive coordination’ and suggested the 
focus should be more practical aspects of cooperation because cooperation is not as easy as it seems 
(this latter point was agreed by most participants). In other words, we should talk less about 
coordination, and more about exploring its effects. This appears to be more of a strategic approach 
to cooperation than that of other groups. NGOs in general agreed with the other two groups and 
highlighted that one organization alone cannot achieve results when speaking about countering 
transnational wildlife crime.  Participants from this group focused more on the lack of skills as 
wildlife is a specialized field that requires specialized support and capacity building. 
Interestingly, one of the respondents noted there was no need to cooperate at the international 
level as the illegal wildlife trade was limited in their country. At the same time he/she stressed the 
need for national coordination.  
The challenges, in particular the lack of political will - and the importance of it in order to be able to 
combat it effectively – were stressed by all groups, and the lack of priority accorded to wildlife crime 
at the national and regional level was also emphasized. All groups agreed that more priority should 
be given to wildlife crime and to combating wildlife crime at the national, regional and global level. 
Government representatives in general had a practical approach. Interviewees from this group often 
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expressed frustration that insufficient priority was allocated to this issue, but noted that if it is not a 
priority at the national level it is difficult to address. At the same time they also emphasized that 
they do what they can with the limited resources (both human and financial) available. At the other 
end of the spectrum, participants from specialized NGOs in particular actively complained about the 
lack of action and priority accorded to wildlife crime, while praising the efforts of some countries 
and officers to combating wildlife crime. IGO representatives had a more institutional approach, 
both understanding the limitations and highlighting the need for more action and priority, but also 
looking at potential solutions. Participants from this group highlighted in particular the importance 
of recognizing the work of agencies involved as well as the need to highlight to countries the 
benefits of increased cooperation and action in order to encourage them to allocate further priority 
and resources.  
The need for internal and external support (technical and financial) and increased ownership over 
the initiatives and for cooperation was also highlighted. Governments again highlighted the need for 
financial and technical support. In general, IGO representatives focused more prominently on the 
need for governmental support and institutional backing and ownership over any activities or 
initiatives as a precursor to other support. They also particularly focused on the need to strengthen 
capacity at key points (border crossings) and on the need to develop trust. Participants from the 
NGO group highlighted the lack of skills and the importance of improving them and also 
acknowledged the importance of providing support to generate cooperation and ownership.  
Exploring the different types of cooperation, IGOs focused on examples of how cooperation works 
traditionally (e.g. customs to customs, police to police, CITES authorities to CITES authorities) and 
explored various forms of cooperation and the importance of all the different levels of cooperation – 
and in particular the development of trust and relationships (ideally more at the institutional level 
but noting that in most cases it is based on trust of individuals). Other groups focused more on 
cooperation as a result of engagement (e.g. activities will create the opportunity to meet, exchange 
information and capacity development and will generate cooperation). The IGO approach was more 
strategic and reflected the institutional knowledge and strategic approach of intergovernmental 
organizations in general to support their member states while the NGO approach was more practical 
and focused on delivering activities to generate action.  
All groups highlighted the need for and benefits of a platform to share information, experiences and 
to facilitate cooperation as well as to deliver activities. One crucial part of such platforms was to 
develop relationships and trust (in particular the IGOs emphasized on the need to develop 
institutional trust). The crucial aspect of sustainability and ownership and involvement of 
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government in the initiatives was also stressed. While this was acknowledged by most participants 
interviewed, one interviewee from the NGO group suggested that relationships and political will are 
generated by having sufficient funds to organize activities. In contrast, most participants highlighted 
the importance of political support over all other aspects. The role of the ‘blue flag’ was also noted 
in particular by IGOs as well as by a number of participants of other groups due to the capacity of UN 
organizations to generate political will and institutional support.  
 
6.3 International cooperation to combat wildlife crime: how and with 
whom 
Interviewees discussed different methods and types of cooperation and the basic need to cooperate 
effectively. The opportunities to meet, create relationships and develop trust among officers were 
common themes discussed, as well as different types (formal vs. informal) and forms (bilateral and 
multilateral) of cooperation.  The following themes were identified: 
 
6.3.1 Elements of cooperation 
The government perspective: 
The below statement from a participant interviewed outlines the key elements for cooperation 
(discussed in further detail below): 
Policy makers need to agree to having cross country collaboration, [we] need to develop trust 
between officers, develop joint action plan including guidelines … [develop] personal 
relationships. When people know each other, they trust. Having some kind of high level 
mandate to give [us] direction … for further investigation after seizures, data collection etc. … 
and the political will and backing (Interview with Jiu, Shi, Ershi and Sanshi) 
Another government representative interviewed highlighted that: 
All of the aspects [of communication] can contribute to a greater and more productive 
cooperation. With official meetings you have one official objective to understand an issue 
better, but because of [the] meeting you meet people, opening up informal channels. 
Informal meetings are essential … meeting up for coffee with a neighbouring country BLO, 
workshops, trainings, seminars etc. … they have two purposes, including contributing to the 
understanding of each other (Interview with Er) 
The intergovernmental and non-governmental perspectives: 
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This was also echoed by participants of other groups, who also acknowledged the need for an 
institutional framework to work together (‘If government is going to be involved, then you need 
some structure’168) and the importance of working together. 
 
6.3.2 Levels of cooperation 
The government perspective: 
Participants also highlighted other aspects to take into consideration to cooperate with 
neighbouring countries:  
Two nations must work together, from central government down to local level … [we] need 
to be clear about authorization [through a] bilateral agreement, MoU … then you need a 
clear guidance from central to local level so [you] know to what extent can act without 
having to double-check with higher level all the time. Reporting to government is 
important … but you also need human resources: right language, right skills … and [you] need 
to have defined what cooperation means to them; you need resources, financial for 
equipment to get job done, for basic interaction, office and human resources (Interview with 
Er) 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
One participant noted networking should theoretically be easier at border areas: ‘it is quite 
inevitable to get to know people, because probably there are not as many enforcement officers 
operating in a specific border area as you would find in an urban centre …’ (Interview with Neung). 
The non-governmental perspective: 
Different levels of activity that are crucial for cooperation were highlighted: the opportunity to learn, 
the opportunity to meet your peers, and the opportunity to network as pillars that can later enable 
or facilitate cooperation and collaboration. 
There are a few levels … if we are looking at participants who don’t really know much to 
begin with, then you create an awareness. And then you give them the chance to network, 
which is a very very big deal, especially within the country because as long as you network 
you keep in touch, you can work together and can achieve a lot while doing that. And 
another level I think is empowering the enforcement agencies … talk about [the] issues 
(Interview with D) 
Regular meetings … are important, not necessarily the content of the meetings but more the 
coffee breaks, dinner times … raise the profile of wildlife crime. The connections are crucial … 
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in meetings, [we] should facilitate these times in between, … [as they] give these 
opportunities to participants to spend time together (Questionnaire received from E) 
Participants also highlighted that cultural aspects in the region, and the willingness (or lack of) to 
cooperate also had to be taken into the equation:  
The culture of the different countries has a lot to do with how the worker bees will react … 
[You] need a strong call from government to tackle the illegal trade and cooperate in order 
for it to happen more effectively (Interview with F) 
What drives the enforcement agencies is self enhancement, visibility, upper mobility on the 
part of the bosses. There is not that in western Europe or the US. Pride in catching the bad 
guys. That's not a motivating factor in many cases (Interview with F) 
I think if they decide they want to do it, they have their ways of doing it and they would be 
able to do it. To ask them to do it the way we do it is going up the wrong pole. Training is 
great and all that, but you can’t train people with no power in an institution that is not going 
to allow them to do their work (Interview with F) 
 
6.3.3 Formality versus informality 
The government perspective: 
Overall, participants acknowledged that cooperation is sometimes challenging and requires time and 
the need for agreements (MOUs) to cooperate officially and noted that: ‘when talking about 
cooperation we are talking about how and with whom to cooperate’169:  
From my experience the government has … there are policies that will be implemented and 
achieved for all the government agencies … the government should make it clear that the 
agencies that there are common policies and that they have to work together … this is often 
not clear (working group of approximately 15 government officials)  
We had to know how to cooperate, this is important, if we don’t know how to cooperate, we 
cannot do it … the ability and attitude [are] essential, but also knowledge, culture, 
language … are important. Countries need to know about [the] need to cooperate, need to 
know about differences and understand differences, if they understood then can 
cooperate … [it's a] long process … time needed … but people have to want to listen and to 
learn, especially in remote areas. It changes slowly and gradually (Interview with Qi) 
The different forms of cooperation (formal vs. informal) were also discussed. It was noted informal 
cooperation was the initial step to formal cooperation, as it was generally preferred and faster, but 
that it had to be based on formal rules and procedures: 
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Most of the time we talk about communication we talk about formal setting. … Most 
cooperation works on an informal basis … but through a formal setting. People can get 
together in an informal setting. It is better rather than making it too formal … The work is 
formal, but meeting on an informal setting is important to share ideas and information 
[because] formal cooperation can take 3 months … informally it can be done in 1 month. 
(working group of approximately 15 government officials) 
Often you don't go through official counterparts as it’s very bureaucratic and not as efficient 
and effective as it could be. A recent example, we liaised directly with (USWF) not going 
through official counterpart and not going through INTERPOL … the majority of cooperation 
is done (in my country) by investigators (Interview with Wushi) 
[The informal way] only works up to a certain level … there is a time and a place for informal 
cooperation and informal cooperation … the difference between criminals and ourselves 
(enforcement agencies) is that we have discipline about the way in which we conduct 
ourselves … and that is what gives us the advantage … there is discipline, methods and 
systems and coordination in place (working group of approximately 15 government officials) 
It was suggested that many countries worry excessively about using official channels and that more 
informal communication is needed170 as informal settings are crucial to facilitate communication, but 
that ‘there is a time and a place for both forms of cooperation … and it is pretty clear what those 
times and places are …’171: 
Formal cooperation is a must, but if you can pick up the phone and have the trust to call 
someone and discuss a particular issue … this will facilitate further cooperation (Interview 
with Er) 
Informal contact leads to formal cooperation and … to the efficient outcome of operations 
(Interview with Qi) 
Meetings … facilitate informal cooperation and promote future cooperation … Interagency 
cooperation … involves different agencies with informal cooperation … we involve all the 
agencies. The communication must be better strategically not only the policy level …  Often 
when the government changes the policy changes and we have to start again fresh the 
interagency communication process (working group of approximately 15 government 
officials) 
It was however emphasized that any bilateral international cooperation requires a formal 
cooperation setting (usually MOU) and that ‘more formalized and professional channels … would be 
complemented by simple and informal mechanisms to ensure cooperation is mutually beneficial’172:  
[My] agency can’t divulge information without an MOU or an agreement to do it. They can 
do this bilaterally within the agreements, or do this through INTERPOL or Customs (Interview 
with Wushi) 
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If we haven’t got MoU in central government, we cannot go in the field. The legal framework 
is essential piece to implementation (Interview with Yi and Yao) 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
The different forms of cooperation (formal vs. informal) were discussed for the varying types of 
activities envisaged and from an institutional standpoint. It was suggested that there are different 
levels of cooperation and that approaches are more or less flexible depending on their level. For 
example, if it is at the political level it requires more formal methods of cooperation. At the 
operational level it ultimately requires formal cooperation between law-enforcement agencies but 
such cooperation is often facilitated informally. It was noted both approaches (formal and informal) 
are interlinked and essential to cooperation:  
Our project stimulate[s] the interaction on a formal and informal basis … both dimensions 
have to be taken care of … because formal meetings are fundamental … that’s when 
decisions are made … that’s when official positions are clarified … but at the same time it is 
through the informal meetings that actually joint operations are developed and real 
exchange of information is promoted … so both elements will, and should, go hand in hand … 
of course on our side it is much easier to work on the formal dimension of the interaction and 
we somehow have to hope that the informal dimension will come as a side effect (Interview 
with Neung) 
They will work together better on an informal basis and develop relationships and trust … 
and this should be reinforced by formal aspects (Interview with See) 
The preferred method of communication is usually informal, circumventing bureaucracy, but 
with [sensitive] law-enforcement information might not be the best (Interview with Samsee) 
It was also suggested that ‘informal arrangements give flexibility when the countries can trust that 
each country do[es] its share’173 and that formality ‘provides less flexibility but it is binding …, 
meaning that the trust is replaced by obligation’174. 
Overall, it was highlighted that informality is already formal: 
Once the network is established you have your official contacts. Whenever some information 
arrives, you pick up a phone and call your friend. If you go to the official channels and ask the 
director to send a letter it will take a long time. I don’t know whether to call it informal or 
formal … the people are already the formal focal points, but because the contacts are friends 
they can deal with it … If it’s a friend, they will prioritize your request (Interview with Song) 
The non-governmental perspective: 
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The different forms of cooperation were discussed. It was suggested that informal cooperation was 
in most cases preferred, but that it is a precursor to formal communication: 
At the end of the day individual relationships should not take over … [a] degree of formality is 
needed to safeguard cooperation, informality is the way to get by to receive information 
faster … to get things done faster (Interview with G) 
Obviously locally or nationally it is initially very informal, like we have a good working 
relationship generally, or well known to the local chiefs and various provinces that when we 
are there will just be some discussion generally about ‘why didn’t you tell me?’ … or ‘why are 
you coming here first without ringing me?’ formal is the last possible step; if would do it the 
other way round wouldn’t be too effective (Interview with K) 
 
6.3.4 Trust and relationships as pillars of cooperation 
The governmental perspective: 
Emphasis was put on the fact that all cooperation is based on trust and relationships and the 
important role of the different projects and initiatives to bring people together to foster cooperation 
was highlighted: 
[You] need to have formal work structure, but personal relationships and informal 
relationships are very important to get the work done  (Interview with Sishi) 
First you have to build up trust and understanding with each other (Interview with Er) 
They always request information from other agencies for importing/exporting countries … 
the problem is that the other side does not always cooperate. The question is how to increase 
the level of cooperation between organizations (working group of approximately 15 
government officials) 
We generally don’t get to meet the counterparts … which leaves a gap ... If we get to know 
the people we only know them but if we want to understand them we have to meet them to 
understand them and hear on their issues … Generally we don’t understand the people or the 
issues …. We just know them superficially. There is a need to try to understand others better. 
Need to meet the people to cooperate with them more effectively … Regional offices, UN 
agencies and projects/ initiatives can play a key role to make communication easier and 
faster … (working group of approximately 15 government officials) 
One participant noted a particular case with regards to intelligence exchange and trust: 
It only happens when you know the other person … [In the past,] I had an operation that 
involved a dealer of cocaine who was going to Colombia to arrange a shipment. Because I 
didn't have a person that I knew in Colombia and I had an ongoing operation, I did not share 
the information through official channels because it might have jeopardised the case. If there 
had been someone I knew and trusted I would have shared the information. This is one of the 
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benefits of the BLOs. They know each other and are more likely to exchange information 
(Interview with Wushi) 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
Participants from this group emphasized that ‘you can train people, but you cannot force people to 
work together’175: 
On the encouragement of informal cooperation there is not much that can be done … you 
essentially hope that it happens … you just have to wait for it to happen. At the end of the 
day it is also a matter of human interaction … there might be border officers that like each 
other … that speak the same language … you can’t force it … on the formal side you can 
request them to cooperate but on the informal side we cannot (Interview with Neung) 
One participant stressed the importance of knowing the counterparts and of being able to reach the 
appropriate person (and at the appropriate level): 
You start with the unofficial approach ... for me it is more effective than the so called official 
approach … because in the official approach, number one it is quite a short period of time. 
People come in under the protocol, or under a lot of preparation for the official functions … 
but people try to present or try to act diplomatically, just to look nice … to look OK. But you 
cannot get the real actions. Most of the time when they have these kinds of official 
arrangements most of the time the people involved are from far away … from high ranking 
positions … they come and they go … they don’t do anything in the operational level. For the 
unofficial interactions, normally are among those in the operational level … They will be 
confirmed with the interactions they have … the commitment, the respect, the honesty 
amongst each other … and that are the ways they build trust amongst themselves. Once the 
unofficial interaction has been carried on for a while, people know more about each other … 
after the repetition of the unofficial approach, then that will make the official agreements to 
be more effective and more practical (Interview with See) 
Particular emphasis for effective cooperation was put on one key issue: ‘the opportunity to meet 
face to face’176 and develop trust and relationships, as well as the need for an environment to 
cultivate them: 
Of course training and capacity building is essential, but they need to have the proper 
communication channels and a level of trust and camaraderie between countries to 
cooperate (Interview with Sam) 
First I think they should meet … they should know each other … build trust. And then they can 
start with further steps like share information or take joint enforcement operations …. Of 
course, the training or equipment are necessary to support the mechanism, but the 
important thing is that the two sides … are willing to cooperate (Interview with Song) 
In countries where probably the rule of law is … considered to be stronger … , there are also 
problems of trust between enforcement agencies. What can we do to improve the trust? 
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Well … the first thing is to create an environment in which officers from each enforcement 
agencies get to know each other … getting to know each other … understanding that their 
areas of work are so similar … and that cooperation will bring improved results … rather than 
competition or less visibility (Interview with Neung) 
The non-governmental perspective: 
Similarly, participants from this group also placed emphasis on developing trust and relationships: 
In reality it is all about personal relationships … to meet and know each other’s … and an 
associated need, the need for consistency … or constancy in the players … dealing with some 
of these countries the faces are very familiar and when they are familiar among each other it 
all works better (Interview with A) 
There’s not much cooperation unless people know and trust each other and are happy to 
share information (Interview with L) 
[My] impression … is when they know each other personally, it’s easier, more likely to share 
information. To support that you need a formal network … meetings and conferences are 
important to establishing relationships. One of the basic needs is to use the opportunity to 
meet in the first place to develop trust. Actual cooperation happens or is facilitated by the 
informal relationships that are created (Interview with J) 
The real value in trainings … is putting them together in the same room, much more than 
skills conveyance … although I will hate myself for saying this later, because the skills are 
really lacking as well (Interview with A) 
In particular, the importance of finding the ‘right’ person to work with was stressed: 
If you can find someone that has enough authority, power and ability to call in some favours 
and get things done that's the way to do it. We have found that person  (they) will tell you 
what can and cannot be done, if it can be done, if you are stepping on too many toes 
(Interview with F) 
In Asia it’s about relationships. To get something done it is all about relationships. it is all 
about favours and calling in some favours … it's a patronage system …  if you want to get 
something done it takes a number of transactions that are based on relationships, 
personality and favours. It’s not that it’s their job. What’s the motivation? There is no 
motivation to do something unless they need to do it. It’s how things work (Interview with F) 
A participant also highlighted that: 
[You] need to find the right person to provide information to …  someone that we can work 
with, trust and provide information that can provide good results … but we are failing at it … 
there is pressure to do seizures and arrests … We make interdictions and arrests, but the 
person you catch is often a throw away. We are catching the grapes (Interview with F) 
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PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COMBATING WILDLIFE CRIME 
Participants interviewed discussed different methods and types of cooperation and the basic needs 
for effective cooperation. The need to meet, create relationships and develop trust among officers 
was a common theme discussed, as well as different types (formal vs. informal) and forms (bilateral 
and multilateral) of cooperation.   
Government representatives noted the importance of trust and personal relationships to combat 
wildlife crime: cooperation is based on trust and it requires time to build trust. It was stressed that 
official agreements are essential to facilitate cooperation but that communication and an interest to 
cooperate were indispensable. It was emphasized that the work of government officers is always 
formal and that cooperation is facilitated through an informal basis but through a formal setting. The 
important role of initiatives and institutions to provide a platform for cooperation was highlighted. 
IGO participants highlighted that ‘cooperation is easier said than done’ but that it is essential to 
combat transnational organized crime. The importance of having official agreements and structures 
to facilitate cooperation was highlighted, and it was noted that trainings and meetings as part of the 
network approach were important as they were also a tool to encourage cooperation. Participants 
emphasized that depending on the level of cooperation different forms of cooperation were used - 
the government level will be more official, while it will be more flexible and informal at the border. 
Similarly, it was noted that informal corporation already takes place within a formal framework and 
the importance of personal relationships and the opportunity to meet and develop trust were 
emphasized. The need to recognize successes was also suggested. 
NGO representatives agreed that corporation is not as easy as it seems and that one needs an 
institutional framework or platforms to work together. Such a platform provides the opportunity to 
learn and meet counterparts, develop trust and relationships. The importance of finding the right 
person to work with and the willingness to act of enforcement officers was also stressed 
 
Key similarities and differences in participants responses: 
There was broad agreement from all groups on the key elements of cooperation to combat wildlife 
crime, namely the need for: 
 Political support; 
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 A mandate, agreement or institutional framework; 
 Improved communication between relevant partners; 
 Opportunities to meet and share experiences; 
 Trust and relationships; and 
 Increased human and financial resources, capacity and skills. 
Interviewees from the IGO group in particular highlighted that it is easier to generate cooperation at 
specific border areas as its officers are in close proximity and have increased opportunities to 
develop trust and get to know one another. Governmental representatives focused on institutional 
aspects of cooperation (with a particular focus on the need for support from their hierarchy and a 
mandate to be able to cooperate) as well as practical aspects of cooperation (opportunities to meet, 
develop trust and relationship and the need for financial resources). Participants from the NGO 
group focused more on practical aspects and opportunities to generate cooperation.  
There was broad agreement on discussions over formal or informal cooperation. It was broadly 
acknowledged that informal methods are preferred but that they are all within formal structures or 
mandates. Government representatives in particular noted the importance that policies and 
decisions that are taken at the policy level take into consideration the needs of the field, as this is 
not often the case. This crucial aspect is an issue that is identified in the literature (see chapter 4).  
A key aspect emphasized (by all groups) was the importance of trust, that you cannot force trust to 
develop and the fact that actual cooperation is based on trust and relationships. The important role 
of the initiatives to encourage the development of trust and relationships through various activities 
and opportunities was stressed. As suggested above, IGO representatives focused also on the need 
to develop institutional cooperation so that cooperation is not halted when certain staff members 
are reassigned or moved to a different position.  
It was suggested that the initiatives create and develop opportunities for cooperation but that 
cooperation often happens outside of the actual frameworks of the initiatives through the informal 
channels that have been created. All groups also agreed and noted the gaps between the policy and 
field levels, where the policy level designs the formal structure for cooperation and the field level 
improvises informally within the formal structure that has been agreed upon.  
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Chapter 7: the initiatives, their 
effectiveness and corruption  
 
 
7.1 The initiatives: a platform for cooperation to combat wildlife 
crime 
As explained in previous chapters, the need for increased collective actions has resulted in the 
emergence of a myriad of initiatives to facilitate cooperation. Among the various mechanisms and 
initiatives available worldwide, in Asia, they have taken the form of the Border Liaison Office (BLO) 
Mechanism and the ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN). The overall details and 
analysis of the two initiatives are provided in chapter 4. For easy reference, a brief summary is 
provided here as background for the analysis and discussion in the following sections177. 
 
The Border Liaison Office (BLO) Mechanism178  
A BLO is essentially a coordinating office for national law-enforcement agencies that encourages and 
facilitates enhanced cross-border cooperation. Located close to key border crossings or ‘hot spots’, 
offices are located on both sides of the border and act as a centralized clearing house for informal 
information exchange amongst law enforcement officers in border areas, thus facilitating formal 
exchange of information amongst countries. The aims of the mechanism are: to foster cooperation 
along and across national borders between different national law-enforcement agency units working 
at the borders; to enable direct and real-time communication and information sharing as well as 
improved multilateral law-enforcement; to strengthen enforcement efforts at the borders and 
prevent illicit trafficking; to conduct joint operations against transnational organized crime in the 
region, building trust and mutual understanding; and to promote the dissemination of changing 
trends and new developments in cross-border trafficking (see chapter 4 for more details). 
 
                                                 
177 See footnote 1 in the Introduction for details on previously published worked used in this thesis.  
178 See generally United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Border Liaison Offices in Southeast Asia 
(1999–2009): Ten Years of Fighting Transnational Organized Crime (UNODC Regional Centre for East Asia and 
the Pacific 2010). 
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The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Wildlife Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN)179 
ASEAN-WEN is a wildlife law-enforcement network involving relevant enforcement agencies working 
to combat the illegal wildlife trade (police, customs and environmental agencies) of all ASEAN 
countries.  It aims to enhance cooperation amongst enforcement agencies and increase the capacity 
of governments to counter the illegal wildlife trade. Through annual meetings and a comprehensive 
array of workshops and trainings, ASEAN-WEN increases the capacity of and enhances cooperation 
amongst law-enforcement agencies regionally and globally. The network operates at both the 
national level and at the regional level to counter the illegal trade in wildlife and to enhance 
cooperation. Efforts of the network are coordinated by the Program Coordination Unit (PCU), in 
close cooperation with all its Member States and is supported by a coalition of NGOs under various 
support programmes or projects (see chapter 4 for more details).  
The following sections will explore the views of participants interviewed on the different initiatives 
(ASEAN-WEN and BLOs) and their perceptions on how they worked as a platform for cooperation to 
combat transnational crime, and in particular wildlife crime. The chapter will first provide 
perspectives on ASEAN-WEN, then on the BLOs, and then compare views on each. Interviewees 
highlighted how the different initiatives work, their key objectives, and a number of successes, 
challenges and gaps of the initiatives. It is worth noting that a number of participants gave examples 
of how each of the initiatives work and what they have achieved in the different countries, 
particularly the development of national or border multiagency networks to increase cooperation at 
the national level. One participant graciously summarized the main difference between the two: ‘the 
BLO works in border area only … ASEAN-WEN at a different national, international [level]; they are all 
equally important’180.  
 
7.1.1 Perceptions on ASEAN-WEN 
7.1.1.1 How and why it was developed 
The government perspective: 
Participants gave examples of how the initiative works and was created and highlighted some 
changes since its creation: 
                                                 
179 See generally ASEAN-Wildlife Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN), http://www.asean-wen.org/ (accessed 
September 2013). 
180 Interview with Yi and Yao 
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The original aim of ASEAN-WEN was a network approach … to have a network to fight 
against illegal ones (Interview with Yi and Yao) 
In 2005 during the CITES COP, ASEAN-WEN was agreed to be set up … [we] saw opportunity 
to cooperate with ASEAN countries dealing with these issues … [and] wildlife crime is now 
priority … in 2011 [they] decided to continue … trying to tackle challenges at regional level, as 
at country level would not be sufficient … from 2005 to 2011 there has been [a] shift, 
countries are more involved, [there is] increased interest, but in terms of commitment [it is] 
not yet sufficient (Interview with Jiu, Shi, Ershi and Sanshi) 
My understanding is that ASEAN-WEN was created in the Asian peninsula to form a wildlife 
enforcement network aimed at targeting offenders and their networks whilst also forming a 
large role in the education of the partner agencies (Questionnaire received from Liushi) 
ASEAN-WEN at regional level encouraged networking. Good cooperation is still an ideal, has 
not yet happened … each agency has their own competence, have to maintain their role, but 
cooperation is better than ever before ASEAN … can share information with police and 
[others], before ASEAN-WEN not (Interview with Sishi) 
They also pondered on what it has achieved in the different countries, particularly the development 
of national multiagency networks to increase cooperation at the national level:  
At regional level they have the annual ASEAN-WEN meetings, so there is a platform for them 
all to get together, and now all the countries are members, but I still feel that at regional 
level the PCU181 is struggling a little bit in terms of coordinating to be able to facilitate 
enhanced cooperation across countries and I am not entirely sure about what barriers are 
there. Maybe role isn’t clear, member country might not back PCU financially or share 
information, not clear about added value of PCU in network, in some cases impression that 
too NGO-driven, so still some issue for ownership. [There is] demand by countries for network 
though, I see potential [but it is] hard for agencies to work together with countries at 
regional level (Interview with Jiu, Shi, Ershi and Sanshi) 
National WEN have an interdisciplinary Steering Committee containing different ministries, 
chaired by Prime Minister; quarterly meetings, but also reactive mechanism should urgent 
issues come up; have workshops as well (Interview with Yi and Yao) 
We had law before joining ASEAN-WEN, but competent authority [was] not clear, intentions 
often personal interests and reputation more important … from time to time, authority of 
unit is upgraded, receives more competencies, lucky to have professional officers. Now we 
have ASEAN-WEN, in theory great, but in reality not much of cooperation or information 
sharing happening. [The] PCU is very bureaucratic and hard to approach (Interview with Si, 
Wu and Liu) 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
The initiative was highlighted as a platform for cooperation, to raise awareness, to strengthen 
relationships, to build trust and to avoid duplication of efforts: 
                                                 
181 Programme Coordination Unit (PCU). For additional details on the structure of ASEAN-WEN, see chapter 4  
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[A] good platform to discover different issues and to raise visibility of wildlife crime and make 
people aware of wildlife enforcement … They work on 3 pillars: awareness, creating a 
platform for different agencies of different countries to cooperate … and [an] opportunity to 
strengthen capacity and get countries to work together more closely. [It] created an 
opportunity for different enforcement agencies to sit down and discuss about wildlife law 
enforcement (Interview with Sam) 
The non-governmental perspective: 
The initiative was highlighted as a platform for cooperation, to raise awareness, build capacity, 
strengthen relationships, build trust and avoid duplication of efforts: ‘[it has] built a little fire that 
will maybe grow’.182 
People need to understand what the goal is … we’re not talking about people in different 
uniforms jumping in the same car and going after crooks together … that's not realistic, at 
least in the near term … it doesn't exist in almost any country … here the idea is to create a 
committee that gets together, measure progress, bringing challenges to the table and 
reiterating who is doing what (Interview with O) 
It is recognition that illegal wildlife trade should be on agenda, recognized as transnational 
crime; other than that already existing protocols within ASEAN contributing to agency 
cooperation in terms of compensating environmental crimes; need also to become priority 
area; increased budget needed, become nationally recognized crime, so budget for it 
(Interview with I) 
An interviewee made an interesting reflection and highlighted the need to meet to get work done in 
the region: 
You need offices who are aware of the crime problems and how they could combat it, they 
need the money to be able to do their job, … they need the opportunity to learn best practice 
from others whether they are in their own country, different agencies or different countries 
and form personal networks which on the ground level really end up making the difference. 
Because you can have a multinational agreement, but if everybody doesn’t talk to each other 
because they don’t get on or assume major political or religious differences then the 
agreement stays as a paper agreement, as a tick box exercise (Interview with B) 
It was also noted that it was all part of the strategy: 
First [enforcement people] need authority, then they have to know how to use authority, 
then for international transnational crime they have to know their counterparts; they have to 
know how to deal on international investigations (Interview with N) 
I think in the context of this region the very important thing that we are discovering over and 
over again is that people actually need to see each other face to face. It is not enough to say 
‘this is the email of the contact person of the institution/agency that you need to contact’. 
This isn’t working because people are uncomfortable sharing information and linked to that 
                                                 
182 Interview with F 
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is corruption – you never know whom that person is giving your information to, whether he is 
corrupt. The more meetings you have face to face, the better it is (Interview with M) 
 
7.1.1.2 Benefits and achievements 
The government perspective: 
Participants also highlighted the key benefits of the networks and initiatives, particularly 
strengthening - and sharing - knowledge and awareness (e.g. various forms of capacity building) and 
providing funding to support their efforts: 
Cooperation with other ASEAN countries, help of countries not balanced due to economic 
reasons; human resources is one component, currently building it, need also financial 
assistance – government budget very small and hard to access, need outside financial 
support – government should cooperate more; initiative has strong support from 
government (Interview with Ba) 
Especially in the beginning, funding assistance from outside … it’s important, when you want 
other countries to pay attention to the issues, to create [a] program, training, not only for 
officials to meet but also for building awareness, reach wider audience … as we cannot do 
this with the national budget (Interview with Sishi) 
Human resources not a problem, just equipment … [we] need continuous funding to do 
operations, basic equipment to follow up, need to be able to contact people, to work closely 
with them … [we] need informant network to catch criminals … but transportation and 
equipment [are] missing. … [J]oint training to enable contact and then share information 
when knowing whom to call, building up capacity of officers through training and 
workshops … that's important. The government is providing human resources, but budget is 
cut every year …, too small … we must consider to fully equip, not like CIA unit but at least at 
some degree should have equipment, so can be dealt as enforcement network (Interview 
with Si, Wu and Liu) 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
Participants highlighted the key benefits of the networks and some of the main successes to date: 
Before ASEAN-WEN, [we] had some cooperation, but at different levels, but now with ASEAN, 
cooperation is more effective, faster, e.g. have CITES Management Authority, have 
coordination, authorize some activity, higher level, can discuss with more people, more 
attention (Interview with Yipsee) 
The response at the national level has been the establishment of the national inter-agency 
task forces and on the field level, more agencies dealing with illegal wildlife trade. More 
enforcement officials have been trained (Interview with Sipsee) 
The non-governmental perspective: 
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Most participants gave examples of how the initiatives work and what they have achieved in the 
different countries, particularly on ASEAN-WEN  
There was some cooperation before and some discussions between countries but the 
platform that the networks has created has developed a stronger way for countries to 
prioritize and work to combat wildlife crime (Interview with A) 
People were still cooperating, all the countries in SEA are signatories to CITES, so some level 
of cooperation should have been going on; some countries are more involved than others, 
some might have the money but they won’t allocate it … it is also about allocation of 
resources (Interview with C) 
Before ASEAN-WEN [there was] very little recognition and a big problem. Now [we have] a 
platform, … mechanism, … reason, … excuse to meet up with each other. In many countries 
before the network was created [there was] no mandate, but now [we have a] platform to 
exchange ideas, not ad-hoc anymore, but more institutionalized (Interview with I) 
[A]s far as enforcement goes, all the different provincial officers have the authority to seize, 
which changes the focus … there is a lot more money in there. The regional approach [is] 
working very well … [but] as far as WEN goes to country level, people are appointed as 
liaison person from ministry, … nothing comes out directly from [the] national WEN. [It is] an 
effective information network, but not doing enforcement … [I’m] only aware of annual 
meetings (Interview with K) 
Interviewees also highlighted the development of national multiagency networks to increase 
cooperation at the national level. 
Now national authorities are required to deliver on outputs … one of [our] main goals was to 
create specialized task forces. These have legal basis … the creation of special units within 
government to deal with wildlife crime. ASEAN-WEN is bridging facilitators to operate 
together … [it is] very useful … everything very open, [we] can share information, but [it] 
doesn’t work everywhere; sometimes [it’s] very neutral (Interview with I) 
Reflecting on possible ways the networks could have developed differently, most interviewees 
tended to agree: ‘[I] don’t see practical way of that happening except for how it happened’183. One 
interviewee pondered on the changes in focus and support over the past few years: 
[In the] second phase of ASEAN-WEN support program, the goal was to increase 
incarceration, enforcement of laws … but how to encourage enforcers to do work, when 
person caught can leave jail with a small fine? [We] have to deal with money laundering, 
drugs, navy, military, parliamentarians, doctors … first thought is only CITES and police … but 
we learned a lot … you discover that wildlife crime is just too big, too complicated. We found 
a lot of agencies to work with us to fill gaps, but continue training, supporting national task 
forces, and focus on the new items we think are important (Interview with I) 
 
                                                 
183 Interview with M 
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7.1.1.3 Successes and influence 
The government perspective: 
When asked about the main successes of ASEAN-WEN, participants noted the initiative was 
‘established’ and ‘useful’, but that ‘cooperation could be strengthened’184: 
The ASEAN-WEN network is already established in a useful way (Interview with Yi and Yao)  
There is good work done by people on the ground … [they] should receive more recognition 
(Interview with Jiu, Shi, Ershi and Sanshi) 
Success is in the eye of the beholder. Yes, to some extent I do believe the network has been 
successful, however it could go further. Again, this needs appropriate political buy in and 
support from appropriate enforcement authorities (Questionnaire received from Liushi) 
Participants however highlighted that the initiative had contributed to change the region’s attitudes 
to wildlife crime, and increased cooperation and capacity in the region as well as the number of 
seizures, arrests and prosecutions: 
[As a result, we] … recently signed several MoUs between countries within region to enhance 
cooperation (Interview with Yi and Yao) 
It is working very well because before ASEAN-WEN they just worked separately, police and 
custom, but once they had opportunity to meet and talk then they have a contact detail of 
each other. I think it is better working, more benefits …  now that are connected, customs can 
pick up the phone and ask, for example, where to bring a wild animal to … you also have the 
national WEN, the same mechanism, [an] official network, each agency identifies and official 
contact … its more official, more effective, every agency can contact each other through [a] 
focal point, have improved communication … lots of communication done unofficially, first 
informal contact, then later official documents, … more comfortable like this (Interview with 
San) 
Better with prosecution since ASEAN-WEN … prosecutors and judge know better about 
wildlife crime now, so can give it more attention … [the] attitude towards wildlife crime 
changed – before thought that wildlife is national resources, not a big problem – now know 
that it is not simple (Interview with San) 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
When asked about the main successes of the initiative, interviewees also reflected on its possible 
impact and the need for a thorough evaluation:  
Successful? Like I already said, I think it’s only partially successful and the potential has not 
been used. I think that it has been quite successful of making seizures but less successful in 
                                                 
184 Interview with Yi and Yao 
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preventing the crimes or tackling/addressing the causes of the crimes such as demand or 
poverty (Interview with Sipsee) 
Sometimes you have to ask. Do governments want this to be done, or are they just 
opportunistic and they are happy that they can implement any activities they can get funds 
for. There has to be another step …  In many countries, there is sincerity in pushing this 
forward, but due to financial limitations there is not much they can do (Interview with Sam)  
Without a strong strategic framework to guide and coordinate these things then any 
response is doomed to failure as it will remain ad hoc and reactive. Evaluation is also 
essential as it is through rigorous assessment that we understand what responses work, 
what don’t work so well and why (Questionnaire received from Hasee) 
Participants highlighted ‘interest’ and ‘engagement’ as crucial elements  
Sometimes in developing countries, lack of information is a big issue … also lack of 
equipment … resources is a problem … but [the] lack of interest is definitely key (Interview 
with Jet) 
At regional level, communication has improved a lot, but still lot needs to be done; 
responsiveness and willingness to share information is also a challenge … the level of 
responsiveness is diverse and very different, depends on many factors whether or not 
network might be taken into account at all (Interview with Samsee) 
The non-governmental perspective: 
Interviewees also highlighted the key benefits and some of the main successes to date of the 
initiative: 
[It has] disrupted the day to day easy life of illegal traders (Interview with H) 
[There is a] lot more cooperation, also more regions, more communication … exchanges over 
email, phone calls etc … now there is multiagency international cooperation; [It was] created 
to get agencies together to exchange information, … for training … but [the] concept of 
ASEAN-WEN [had] exchange of information as main objective (Interview with N) 
 [It has] developed good relationships with other regions and networks (Interview with F) 
Addressing wildlife trade in early 2000s was a difficult thing to do, [a] lot has changed in last 
12 years, in [a] positive sense. There was no information sharing earlier, probably because no 
info was collected. In 2005, when the project started, you could definitely say it increased 
international cooperation, but not necessarily because of ASEAN-WEN, it was another 
channel for communicating with other countries, organizations … but has definitely 
generated more engagement in CITES and enhanced communication … [It is] hard to say 
ASEAN-WEN’s impact … but I don’t see it [only] as information exchange platform 
(Questionnaire received from E) 
One of aims has been on cooperating, not only prosecutions – go after bigger fish, not the 
ones driving the truck; regional level cooperation now involves real crimes; now countries 
started to invest a bit more money as see advantage in going after big guys, but still not 
enough; have been helping with actual hands-on investigation, financial support on small 
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scale; different level of involvement, depending on the case, before came to them providing 
information, now people are more and more coming to us (Interview with M) 
 
7.1.1.4 Challenges, gaps and limitations 
The government perspective: 
Participants interviewed were asked to note some of the main gaps and limitations of the initiative 
based on their experiences. This included the identification of loopholes and gaps, where additional 
efforts would be beneficial and what more was needed. Overall, participants from this group noted a 
number of challenges, but also noted that overall much progress has been made in the region to 
combat wildlife crime thanks in part to the efforts of the initiative. In general, interviewees 
highlighted some gaps in political support at the highest levels185: 
 [We need] more leadership from the outset … [I] would like to see more grassroots, let it 
grow more organically … the ownership and commitment is very important (Interview with 
Jiu, Shi, Ershi and Sanshi) 
The network needs someone who takes charge, someone to lead, otherwise it doesn’t work. 
We need to … meet regularly or occasionally, not only annual meetings … [but] to discuss 
about actual events, best practices, etc… (Interview with San) 
Would like to see more ownership of ASEAN-WEN chairs, not only attend annual meeting but 
also trainings and workshops; if ASEAN-WEN invited somewhere, they should be the ones to 
go – more leadership; don’t see enough commitment yet (Interview with Jiu, Shi, Ershi and 
Sanshi) 
The lack of cohesiveness as well as the need to increase the ‘motivation’ to combat wildlife crime in 
the region:   
ASEAN-WEN should be more active, develop common position, increase voice at 
international level, whole region speak with one voice, become a community (Interview with 
Yi and Yao) 
Some countries are more interested than others. Sadly difficulties lie at local and regional 
levels that prohibit meaningful direction or success. Given its position in the world and the 
many other prevailing issues wildlife crime is not seen as a significant issue in some parts of 
the network at an appropriate level of government (Questionnaire received from Liushi) 
                                                 
185 Questionnaire received from Liushi 
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Participants also highlighted the lack of cooperation and communication and the need to improve 
cooperation between neighbouring countries186, and identified a number of needs: 
At national level high level political awareness has improved quite a bit … but there are big 
gaps between members of national taskforces and police, they tend to not cooperate 
(Interview with Jiu, Shi, Ershi and Sanshi) 
There is a big difference between talking during network meeting and [the] reality on the 
ground. The judiciary [is] often reluctant to cooperate … [there is also] the situation with 
some influential people where you cannot act against illegal trade … If the network between 
country and the [ASEAN-WEN] PCU was stronger, and then would be able to cooperate 
better. There is a need to be stronger links, we need less bureaucracy … but the lack of 
financial resources, of cooperation; the gap is now widening (Interview with Si, Wu and Liu) 
[We are] lacking policy coherence … need to adjust common policies in ASEAN and 
establishing common working mechanisms as well. Sustainable financing mechanism to 
support is key, and [we should] look for opportunities to cooperate with other networks to 
strengthen cooperation (Interview with Yi and Yao) 
It was also suggested that: ‘[We need to] start from bottom-up, make every team member realize 
that they become member of the association; raise awareness. Start from ground, structure 
everything so people know each other … monitoring can improve cooperation and understanding’187. 
Participants also pondered about the awareness and knowledge gap and the need to meet more 
frequently and suggested that ‘[We] need more knowledge about national legislations of other 
countries, because animal protection laws are not the same across the region’.188 
It was noted that operational capacity of the initiative was sometimes not adequate: 
My personal view [of ASEAN-WEN] is that a lot of lip service is given to actually carrying out 
enforcement which has given rise to scepticism of its ability to make an impact on the region. 
Another factor is [it] does not have law making powers or hold its members to account that is 
despite some of the excellent work undertaken by regular regional contributors 
(Questionnaire received from Liushi) 
Overall it was emphasized that what was needed was time, but that without strong commitment this 
would not be possible:  
You need to take time to get to people, to achieve [the] goal of the network, ASEAN-WEN is 
doing a good job, but [we] haven’t reached [the] ultimate goal … it will take more time … [it 
is a] difficult issue (Interview with Sishi) 
                                                 
186 Interview with Yi and Yao 
187 Interview with Si, Wu and Liu 
188 Interview with San 
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We need to evaluate past mistakes, look forward to [the] future … and adjust based on 
lessons learned … strengthen national level first and share knowledge to help other country 
build its networks (Interview with Sishi) 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
Participants interviewed were asked to note some of the main gaps and limitations of the initiative 
based on their experiences. This included the identification of loopholes and gaps, where additional 
efforts would be beneficial and what more was needed. Overall, participants from this group noted a 
number of challenges and highlighted the changing nature of combating the illegal wildlife trade, 
and the challenges faced. The following statement provides a good summary of the overall 
recommendation from participants: 
Two things could have been done differently: first, bottom-up approach rather than top-
down, to get every level in every country involved … [and] second, the question of whether 
the right people are chosen … people who can effectively do the job … And [they should have] 
also ask for financial contributions from countries, then you ‘force them’ to show willingness 
from the beginning or you don't do it (Interview with Samsee) 
Interviewees highlighted some gaps in political support and the need to get countries together and 
more involved in wildlife law-enforcement to combat wildlife crime in the region, as this happens 
‘more in some countries than other’189.  
Differences in the region in terms of financial capacity to do so were also highlighted: ‘There is also 
financial differences between countries and how much they can put into it’190: 
Wealthier countries within the region should try to provide more resources so that other 
countries can get more involved. Should be sustainable. Donors have to assist but there also 
needs to be willingness by governments to allocate funds on these issues. They need to have 
a stake in this. If countries are not involved it will not happen. International organizations 
should fill the gaps at the beginning but if it is not taken over by governments it is not a big 
priority. Should not only rely on governments as in many cases governments don't have the 
resources. Should be a common effort (Interview with Sam) 
Government not financially capable to support some countries’ WENs. Lack of financial 
resources in some countries to work on wildlife crime (Interview with Sam) 
One interviewee noted that ‘[I] can see benefits of a regional network and ASEAN-WEN … [but we 
are] spending a lot of time trying to make countries cooperate in the way we want them to do it … it 
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would be better to let them figure out what works best’191. Participants also highlighted the lack of 
cooperation and communication and challenges to cooperation:  
A gap is the strength of the network, … the bond between individual countries. They should 
have a close working relationship, a close bond … strong coordination and more [actively] 
working together, communicating (Questionnaire received from Ha) 
Gap might be also if the network don’t share the information outside to other organizations 
such as the Interpol and becomes a closed “island” (Interview with Sipsee) 
On paper it (ASEAN-WEN) is a great concept and it would work if not for all the obstacles 
that slow it down … it’s like slowing a Ferrari down to a scooter (Interview with Samsee) 
Participants also emphasized that lack of capacity was an important challenge and the need for 
additional funds from both the donor community and countries: 
Human capacity is the major challenge … also bureaucracy and national interest … which 
links to engagement and willingness of sharing information. Many just want to profit from 
the initiative without giving much away. There is a financial gap, the availability of funds is 
also an issue, but this should be approached without a political agenda, which is not really 
possible (Interview with Samsee) 
It was suggested that the operational capacity of the initiative was sometimes not adequate or clear. 
The unclear reporting structure was also noted: 
I’m not aware if there have been any joint investigations’ (Interview with Sipsee) 
[It is] not working too well, with a few exceptions where parties engage, cooperate with each 
other, some information about seizures; often national regulations don’t allow delegates 
share information; official bilaterals are just for sharing general information rather than 
intelligence (Interview with Yipsee) 
The word ‘enforcement’ in [ASEAN-WEN] is misleading: it would be better to call it wildlife 
crime network, or wildlife trade network … enforcement would mean it actually enforces, but 
it is countries individually (Questionnaire received from Ha) 
Overall it was noted that more preparation, resources and time was needed for the initiatives to 
become stronger: 
 [ASEAN-WEN is] successful in the sense that it has been established in every country even 
with lack of resources and the varying economic situation between countries. It is still a 
young network, it is innovative and the model has been now followed by other countries 
(Interview with Sipsee) 
The non-governmental perspective: 
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One participant noted that international illegal trade was not very relevant to some of the countries 
and noted that the involvement of that particular country was therefore rather limited as a result: 
Cross-border trading of wildlife is not a huge issue for this country, [it] doesn’t occur a lot … 
[it is] generally inside the country … so [they have] low level of contact with ASEAN-WEN … 
[this is] an indication that [it is] not [a] massive problem, but certainly a problem. We need 
closer cooperation, then more successes, but haven’t seen anything so far … don’t even know 
about national networks, [they] are virtually non-existent. There is no incident … at the 
border with any wildlife that would need cooperation. We would consider sharing 
information if somebody was caught at the border with relevant officials … but the other side 
[is] not telling (Interview with K) 
Another participant noted that: 
I think ASEAN-WEN is an example of a bad paradigm presented to people without taking into 
account the local cultures. They tried to superimpose a structure over a group that wasn't 
ready for that … it was prematurely done in my opinion … and I say that because they took a 
structure that works in the west, and tried to superimpose it into a wide variety of cultures in 
ASEAN that in my opinion was not accepted by them. The idea is to share information, gather, 
focus it and distribute it (Interview with F) 
Discussing the issue further, participants identified basic needs for the networks to enable 
cooperation along and across borders as follows: computer equipment, good access to the internet, 
dedicated staff, office space and equipment, budget to travel to meetings/workshops and to 
conduct daily work (petrol, etc), and often the ability to speak, read and write English or the 
language of the neighbouring country in the relevant border area.192 It was also highlighted that:  
Some countries will need financial assistance, as it’s not a level playing field … [they] need 
substantial funding mechanisms, for the middle level as well … it’s important to note that 
most countries find it difficult to genuinely cooperate with each other (Interview with B) 
Capacity building was also identified as an important aspect to be addressed193, and it was 
emphasized it should be done in a targeted and strategic manner, taking into consideration local and 
cultural differences:  
Capacity … there is definitely a lack of capacity (Interview with F) 
Capacity building is definitely needed, there are many passionate people who have no idea 
what they are doing … basic knowledge is lacking. [We have to] train [the] right {and] 
passionate people continuously, not just once (Interview with D) 
Meeting at workshops or meetings, talking with each other, meeting a few times for 
establishing good cooperation … having predetermined focal points on all sides …. [You] need 
to constantly meet each other, not just once, constant changes of focal points make 
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cooperation very hard and they should not change that often … it is also important for people 
to understand cultural differences (Interview with L) 
Participants also suggested that ‘you cannot just do one training in one country, but need 
commitment to follow up too’194. You need ‘more professional and stronger hands to help combat 
illegal wildlife trade’195 and there are ‘not enough people trained in the region’196 
Now with ASEAN-WEN there is a standardized syllabus, awareness has been raised, 
knowledge sharing is encouraged, networking is encouraged … but in reality doesn’t always 
work too well, often [officers’] main job is different and [they] receive this task as ‘forced 
focal point’ … only someone really passionate really cares that something happens (Interview 
with D) 
They also highlighted the need for it to find its own identity: 
[ASEAN-WEN] is just becoming aware of its potential … needs to find its own identity, its own 
space to do that, a difficult balance, I would say, [it received] an awful lot of support to kick-
start it, to say these are for example the things you could do and then almost like a teenager 
it needs to have time to think and go ‘actually, that doesn’t work for me’ … it needs to adapt 
to do things that make sense (Interview with B) 
And the road ahead: 
There has been more flow of information across border, but much less than we hoped for 
(Interview with O) 
Overall we have a few wins but we are miserably unsuccessful. We have a huge amount of 
information, but we are the fly in the wall. More needs to be done to get the high level 
traffickers (Interview with F) 
What you put on a powerpoint and what happens in the field is a totally different thing. 
Reporters, NGOs can watch out and make sure that what that they are reporting is true, and 
not bullshit (Interview with O) 
Participants interviewed were asked to note some of the main gaps and limitations of the initiative 
based on their experiences. This included the identification of loopholes and gaps, where additional 
efforts would be beneficial and what more was needed. Overall, participants from this group 
highlighted that the main gaps include funding, high level political will and support, rampant 
corruption and the lack of action against this issue, the lack of capacity of the various enforcement 
agencies in the region, and the limited incentives for enforcement officers to cooperate and share 
information. The limited capacity of the PCU was also stressed: ‘the PCU needs to be officially 
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recognised and funded’197. It was also suggested that ‘task forces that work more with NGOs have 
more and better results’198. 
It was noted that ‘some countries are better equipped and capable than others and those that are, 
are generally better able to tackle the problem’199. The lack of support – and the need of such 
support – from the highest levels of government was also highlighted: 
We need to make people, ministers, cabinet in each country believe that it is their network … 
we need to look at the political engagement and ownership of countries from the beginning, 
then the network can be useful, if [the] countries gives power to [the] network … there is a lot 
of potential with [the] right political will and engagement of countries (Interview with L) 
[Need to] streamline it in ASEAN. ASEAN puts things into pillars, you know, sociocultural or 
trade or security, and the illegal wildlife trade, which is currently under forestry, which is in 
social and culture … you gotta make some links with other parts. My understanding working 
with some of this people is that this is very difficult … you cross agencies and bureaucratic 
lines. To be specific, we need to link with SOMTC in ASEAN and ASEANOPOL … you need to 
cross-fertilize with people and create a communications shell (Interview with O) 
Progress is definitely being made, but it's slow … [the] challenge is to get the issue recognised 
at senior levels of government to help catalyse action and resources to the problem 
(Questionnaire received from P) 
Interviewees also reflected on some of the challenges of the initiative, starting with ownership and 
commitment to sustain the network:  
It’s an attempt to recognize the problem and promote cooperation between entities that 
should be involved in countering wildlife crime in an effort to slow down the epidemic of 
wildlife smuggling and trade. It however didn't have much validity with the countries  
(Interview with F) 
Genuine commitment, [the] sustainability of the network itself and trust between the 
participants … it all comes down to commitment, [they need to] put resources and genuinely 
agree that they want to stop transnational crime, depends on priority (Interview with C) 
[The] biggest issue is sustainability and institutionalization, each country is slightly different 
(Interview with N) 
[Sometimes there is limited] commitment from governments … [they] pass on commitment 
from one agency to others … a basic requirement is top level commitment … and the desire 
to want to do something. In Asian countries [we see a] struggle with losing face, [they] would 
rather not say they have problems, they are in denial … ‘It is a lot about saving face, which 
doesn’t help anyone in the end (Interview with D) 
The need for leadership or a ‘champion’ was stressed: 
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You simply need leadership (Interview with F) 
[You] need a champion within ASEAN to champion ASEAN-WEN. The countries also need to 
get their act together (Interview with O) 
For ASEAN-WEN to be successful, countries need to take ownership of it (Interview with C) 
Further strengthening could be achieved by focussing on increasing the level of political will, 
continued training of enforcement agencies, and strengthening the role and capacity of the 
PCU (Questionnaire received from P) 
Participants interviewed raised concerns that in some cases authorities pose barriers to the 
development of networks: ‘some authorities are involved in the illegal trade and want to make sure 
there is not much action’200. 
The need to ‘give recognition to the officers’201 was also noted:  
Incentive alignment is incredibly important … [a] high level priority. … Looking at the real big 
picture … are the people being rewarded for achieving? [there is] also the issue of pay … if 
you are not paid well enough, you are bribed way easier … [so] you have got to make sure 
that the incentive to do the right thing is strong enough (Interview with B) 
The challenge is to make sure that the guys who work in these very often remote areas feel 
that they are part of some sort of network … you train someone and then they get placed 
somewhere else, as [it is] not a desired job, so [there is] no continuity … [the] job has no 
prestige, but more of a punishment … [so you will] probably not [find] the brightest or the 
best working in border areas (Interview with C) 
A lack of cooperation, communication and information sharing was commonly identified as a key 
challenge to effective cooperation: 
In 2003 [we] brought people together and realized how little cooperation was happening 
(Interview with N) 
At national level governments have created taskforces, don’t think that agents are working 
closely enough … in [a] lot of cases only set up, but might not be meeting or communicating 
at all …, not working together at all (Interview with J) 
[The] national WEN [is] very focused on national level … information sharing between 
countries [is] very limited, and [a] lot of the information is seen to be confidential … general 
information would be shared a bit, but not more … at national level even within national 
network [there is] no real information sharing (Interview with L) 
I feel for it to work, to be efficient, and to be successful, the ASEAN-WEN secretariat will need 
to be a lot lighter in maintaining relationships … should have better communication. Talking 
to them, emailing them once a week … If you maintain relationships you get the trust. … 
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Often just a simple [issue] need to be assisted to get things moving … you need a central unit 
that is communicative, a strong secretariat (Interview with D) 
Pointing fingers and blaming the problems on others was also highlighted as a key challenge: 
Blaming countries puts a barrier to working together … there is a tendency to be very 
guarded (Interview with A) 
International cooperation remains a challenge particularly between enforcement agencies as 
many are reluctant to share sensitive information (Questionnaire received from P) 
A weak or inappropriate coordinating body and focal points was also suggested to hinder efforts: 
The down side of the network is the CITES focal points wanting to control it and they do it 
administratively (Interview with O) 
The focal point is often not necessarily the best person (Interview with D) 
Officers involved are not enforcement personnel, lead should be done by investigation 
agencies (Interview with N) 
AWEN has been dominated by CITES. This is part of the problem because they are 
administrative bureaucrats and not enforcement officers. Sometimes they don't want to 
share the information with CITES authorities. But for enforcement you need police and 
customs. Need to connect more effectively with customs and police (Interview with O) 
Sometimes there is lack of communication between the different agencies involved … the 
administrative part and the law enforcement part (Interview with O) 
[You] need active government officers running the secretariat making things happen … to 
bridge to ASEANOPOL and ASEAN … Law-enforcement agencies should be leading. [I] would 
make stronger links with police and customs, on securing and institutionalizing law-
enforcement involvement. But that was probably not possible 7 years ago! (Interview with O) 
Cultural and language problems were also emphasized: 
Cultural issues in the dialogue are an important gap … but that's often a face issue … 
(Interview with A) 
Different languages could be an issue but also cultural differences … for example, if you 
approached the wrong person some people will be silent instead of saying so, and 
implementation will fail (Interview with B) 
A number of other challenges were identified, particularly the lack of enforcement coordination and 
engagement. The lack of appropriate penalties that fit the crimes was also noted: 
As a public relations network, it (ASEAN-WEN) is very effective … raises profile and public 
awareness … [but] it’s not really working as an enforcement network … It’s beating away at 
the problem … but doesn't get you results. They have had some successes but it’s not doing 
enough enforcement (Interview with F) 
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It (ASEAN-WEN) is a large network. Diverse. Unwieldy. … [It] should focus on strengthening 
ties between enforcement officers and operations … Keep it operational and simple 
(Interview with F) 
ASEAN-WEN is doing great stuff with what they’ve got; often state controls communication 
channels and materials - could commit so much more in-kind; often people participate in 
meetings just to receive funding to participate and have a nice holiday instead of getting 
something out of it – often people selected according to rank, not according to who would 
benefit from training (Interview with J) 
There are too many loopholes. If [the] ‘kingpin’ gets caught, [the] fine is not high enough, 
[the] punishment is not high enough… (Interview with I) 
The lack of capacity of officers was also stressed as a major problem, together with the reduced 
operational capacity and the lack of action: 
It often happens that some people just buy uniforms and work on border without any 
training. The police and customs usually gets training, the ministry less, it is more on the job 
(Interview with K) 
There is lack of capacity to do in depth investigations. Sometimes they are dealing with a 
complex case for the first time … [and] they don't know. They don't talk with the prosecutor 
because they feel they can’t. It's a different agency or too senior officer, so ……… (Interview 
with O) 
Training is the way, on a regular basis, not necessarily by outside NGOs, but it is key is to get 
the skills you need and attitudes you need included in the agency curriculum, so that 
everybody within the agency gets trained (Interview with C) 
We have been trying from the beginning that the ASEAN-WEN LEEO the law-enforcement 
extension office should have more active role in actually coordinating enforcement 
operations; agencies might not want to share the sensitive intelligence, and that is 
understandable, but we would like to move to a point where the LEEO is actually being more 
proactive in getting things off the ground; that’s been quite slow (Interview with M) 
There is clearly a lack of trained investigators with appropriate background to make an 
impact. Investigations should rely on governments. But they don't do so much, so NGOs do a 
lot of the ground work. NGOs quickly find out there are things you can and can’t do. If this is 
done then they (governments) do it. If they trust you … But you are enabling them … they 
should be doing it (Interview with F) 
A participant provided an example of a practical challenge with an operation related to the 
investigation of the illegal trade in tigers in the region:  
I tried to buy some tigers in country X, we had it all lined up, I had to front 5000 USD to flash 
to these guys. My informant gave them a deposit of 3000USD. When we got down to the 
operational phase, we spoke to the government but they didn't want to get involved if there 
were any costs involved. All they needed to do is provide the car but they were not interested. 
The sellers then changed the timeframes and requested more money and the deal fall apart. 
And the tigers got sold to someone else.  They would have got involved if it was all ready and 
then they would call the photographer for the picture in the papers. This is just one example, 
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I have had many cases that have gone well, but this is just an example of one of the 
challenges … (Interview with F) 
Similarly to other groups, participants highlighted that the situation is changing202 and that the 
initiatives need more time to develop and fully reach their potential:  
[You] need the network and the relationship to grow organically … It is slow ... [you] can’t 
force it. They need to get used to work together. They have been put together and the 
relationship has been rushed ... I think they bit up more that they can chew … but you have to 
find the balance between what you can do and how much you can wait (Interview with F) 
To build all that capacity will take a very long time (Interview with B) 
In some countries things are already ongoing … [we] need to let the countries lead the effort 
(Interview with O) 
Time will change it (the situation) … expectations are different … it will get better slowly 
(Interview with F) 
 
7.1.1.5 Ownership, sustainability and commitment 
The government perspective: 
The importance of ensuring the sustainability of the initiatives (‘sustainability is still one of main 
issues and gaps’203) was also stressed: 
Need government to put its resources behind their activities … Once project funds run out, 
what happens? (Interview with Wushi) 
The commitment of governments to resources essential, also [of] donor governments 
(Interview with Yi and Yao) 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
The importance of ensuring high level political support and that it remains a priority was stressed:  
I think the main limitation is the lack of political will, no trust, no high political interest to 
engage in ASEAN-WEN and to make it more effective ... there is lack of courage …  There 
should be more coordination. I also suspect that the countries are still quite reluctant to 
share intelligence ... You need clear leadership (person) for the network … more powers to 
the [ASEAN-WEN] PCU to take more initiative and encourage states to act … they should 
have some balls … They also have financial problems and in many cases delegations cannot 
participate to the meetings and workshops are not held unless they receive support 
(Interview with Sipsee) 
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Sometimes the mechanism gets established, but then not used. The fact that it is there is a 
good thing, but … there needs to be much more political will (Interview with Sam) 
The legal status of ASEAN-WEN and the PCU has still not been clarified. Is it an international 
organization or what? (Interview with Sipsee) 
Measures to ensure the sustainability of the initiatives as well as the need to improve the motivation 
and status of border officers were highlighted: 
[I would suggest] making the financial contributions from states obligatory so that there 
could be fully functional and independent secretariat [for ASEAN-WEN] (Interview with 
Sipsee) 
The non-governmental perspective: 
The need to recognize wildlife crime as a serious wildlife crime and to ensure the ownership and 
sustainability of the initiatives was also stressed:  
Everybody should contribute to funding ASEAN-WEN, not just one country (Interview with D) 
Ownership and funding are essential … the government put in some in-kind funding in 
beginning, but [it] needs long time for countries to see as [their] own initiative, to take 
ownership. It needs an ‘enforcement mind-set’ as there is lack of cooperation between 
different agencies at international level (Interview with M) 
The thing is, member countries are often not aware of the network … ASEAN-WEN should be 
operated by member states … there is no high level political engagement, no buy-in. … [The] 
minister of each country should be involved and aware, should have ownership of it … get 
behind [the] idea and push it themselves (Interview with L) 
The importance of trust and relationships to share information was also emphasized: 
The concept of sharing valued information about smugglers with people they don't know … 
they are out of their minds, they have no chance of working (Interview with F) 
[A] main gap is that we really need some top level enforcement people … so we need this [to 
be] recognized as an organized crime for [the] right funding … more governments to 
contribute financially to strengthen [it] …,  secondment of officers … from each of Asian 
countries … people have to get to know each other (Interview with N) 
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7.1.1.6 Role of different partners  
The intergovernmental perspective: 
Participants highlighted the important role of Intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organizations in this work: ‘to raise the profile for the reasons why they need to cooperate’204: 
The non-governmental perspective: 
The role of civil society organizations in combating wildlife crime when police are not able or willing 
to do investigations and to monitor and encourage cooperation was noted: 
A few different NGOs here [are] involved … working together with police to get information 
and then conduct the investigation … its better than doing it separate from police. The 
authority and decision making rests with [the government organization] as they are 
legislated to be able to act; [we get] funding and salary paid, but no capacity to influence, 
rather suggestions … and pointing in right direction, [putting some] light pressure, asking 
questions: why was someone not arrested, prosecuted, etc (Interview with K) 
It is important to maintain security, but the issue is getting the balance right between secure 
information systems and the accessibility and not making it too ultra-secure. Wildlife crime 
needs to tie in with other crimes. In most countries have to develop own system, learn own 
lessons instead of learning from others, don’t know reasons for sure, whether competition for 
resources, funding? (Interview with J) 
There was a need to monitor cooperation, [we] will always need a strong, pushing-kind of 
NGO (Questionnaire received from E) 
An interesting reflection: ‘If we really went after them we could really cause these smugglers a lot of 
grief … we could present them with a speed bump that they might have to worry about’205. It was 
also noted that ‘the development of the network (ASEAN-WEN) has been very territorial’206.  
 
7.1.2 Perceptions on the Border Liaison Office Mechanism 
As noted at the start of the chapter, in general, intergovernmental organizations interviewed had 
more interaction and involvement with the BLO mechanism and therefore usually responded to 
questions related to it and often declined to comment on the other network. Similarly, most 
nongovernmental organizations interviewed had more interaction and involvement with ASEAN-
WEN and therefore responded more generally to questions related to the regional initiative. This 
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difference is particularly relevant in this section as there were limited responses and discussions 
from NGO representatives on the BLO mechanism due to their limited involvement (at the time) in 
the BLO mechanism. Some of the comments on ASEAN-WEN are, nonetheless, relevant also to the 
BLO mechanism.  
 
7.1.2.1 How and why it was developed  
The government perspective: 
Participants gave examples of how the initiative works and what they have achieved in the different 
countries. Some challenges were also mentioned.  
In this country everyone knows about BLO, as high level government official is chief of BLO. 
There is country-wide awareness, meetings in provinces every month; people know about 
BLOs in border areas … the concept is information sharing (Interview with Qi) 
Key aspect of BLO … is the informal exchange of information across the border between 
countries. Needs to be refined to formal ways of exchanging information if MOUs and similar 
are not already agreed upon (Interview with Wushi) 
First time BLO [was] created because of lack of cooperation; at checkpoints where [a] lot of 
officers working on both sides, [they are] now cooperating, also sharing information, but still 
some obstacles. If officers know each other, they share information from day to day work, 
sometimes criminal [are] arrested because of illegal documents … for example fake passport, 
then just discovering goods … then customs officers from one country speak with 
immigration officer from other etc … sometimes also mobile customs units, but mostly only 
on main roads, small roads [are] seldom watched (Interview with Qi) 
The initiative was also highlighted as a platform to help develop a culture of cooperation: 
I believe in the BLO mechanism, I support it a lot … from my point of view, BLO is not only 
supporting cross-border cooperation, it is supporting international cooperation between 
related national agencies … a multi-agency approach … connections and work much more 
efficiently … you create a culture of cooperation where everybody is happy to contribute. 
Some are more active than others… (Interview with Er) 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
One clarified the role of the mechanism: 
There is a certain tendency (...) to look at the BLOs as some specialized units with super cops 
with a license to cross borders, arrest drug traffickers and do extreme operations. There is 
nothing more wrong than this interpretation (Interview with Neung)  
One participant provided a detailed overview, its officers and the type of support that was provided: 
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The BLO mechanism is actually a platform to promote exchange of information … it is really 
an opportunity … a platform … for enforcement agencies to exchange information along the 
border … so different enforcement agencies within the same country … and across the 
border... in which the same mechanism that exists on one side of the border is put in contact 
with the same mechanism at the other side of the border … and that is essentially it. What 
normally happens is that … governments identify a location that they consider particularly 
useful for the BLOs … we check … they provide the premises … the human resources … and we 
provide equipment, training and opportunities to talk … to share … and to get to know each 
other. We don’t sponsor operations or direct interventions. These are the results of what the 
different BLOs decide to do … Essentially we provide the platform … and it is up to the 
government to choose what to do with them… (Interview with Neung) 
The initiative was highlighted as a platform for cooperation, to raise awareness, strengthen 
relationships and build trust and to avoid duplication of efforts: 
The concept of the BLO is a small cross-border and effective mechanism to cooperate. Unlike 
other very complicated international arrangements or concepts, [it] is a very good 
mechanism for the field officers because it adapts to the mechanisms of the field.  In the real 
life we should have very practical, very easy, very handy mechanisms to do the work … 
Before … when they have intelligence they had to report it to the provincial level and then 
report to the national level and then the national level can exchange the information … but 
then the criminals are already gone. So if you want effective enforcement at the border they 
need to exchange information directly (Interview with Song) 
BLOs may have a role in triggering investigations and operations … by the sheer fact that 
they promote sharing of information … part of that information can be taken away by one of 
the members such as police, customs or border army and they can turn it into an 
investigation … into an operation …. The investigation is carried out by the members of the 
BLOs … which are law-enforcement agencies … they do the investigations according to 
national law … the BLO is not substituting the role of law-enforcement agencies … it is just 
providing a platform for the exchange of information … which can generate investigations 
and prosecutions … (Interview with Neung) 
The intention of … the mechanism was meant purely to put together agencies and to get 
them to talk about the kinds of crimes … in that specific border area … understand what the 
trends are … share the information … and transfer the information across the border … 
without going through the capitals … without slowing down the process … so people involved 
are not necessarily BLO officers with a BLO badge and a BLO uniform … they are police 
officers … Customs officers … border army officers … that are doing the job that they are 
normally used to do … but now they are provided with an opportunity to share information… 
(Interview with Neung) 
 
7.1.2.2 Benefits and achievements 
Participants also highlighted the key benefits of the initiative, particularly strengthening - and 
sharing - knowledge and awareness (e.g. various forms of capacity building): ‘Capacity building and 
trainings are important … often border patrol does not have enough knowledge and skills to identify 
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species, custom officers do not understand wildlife enforcement laws’207. When asked about the main 
successes of the initiatives, a participant noted that ‘[The BLO] mechanism working well, just need 
more time to catch up with environmental and wildlife crime’208. 
 
7.1.2.3 Successes and influence 
The government perspective: 
Participants highlighted that the initiative had contributed to change the region’s attitudes and in 
particular the response to wildlife crime at the borders: ‘[the] mechanism of BLO is a good concept 
on operational level, fast reaction, strong cooperation, strong network’209. 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
Participants highlighted some successes to date: 
In recent years there are some successful cases … big cases … of cross-border cooperation. I 
have heard many stories from (MR X) and the Chinese authorities at the border. How can 
they arrest a big trafficker at the border? It is difficult. They cannot enforce the law across 
the border, but if their counterparts in Myanmar are willing to cooperate … they make things 
smoothly and easier … The BLOs have facilitated this. Before you cannot imagine this. Before 
the criminal would be living and enjoying a happy life in the other country (Interview with 
Song) 
Thailand is certainly a good case … it is a case where without support, the counter narcotics 
bureau of Thailand has succeeded to generate funds to create BLOs on the borders of Laos 
and Cambodia … it is an example in which the role of UNODC has been minimal … and that is 
exactly how it should be … And it is a case in which BLOs are still there. Thailand has 
sponsored a lot of meetings with their counterparts … and it is certainly a good practice … it 
shows the ownership of the country and shows an element of sustainability (Interview with 
Neung) 
When asked about the successes of the initiatives, interviewees also reflected on the possible impact 
of the initiatives and the need for a thorough evaluation:  
The exchange of information … the communication … the cooperation is promoted … as side 
effect of the increase in the level of communication is that there can be joint investigations 
that can eventually lead to arrests, seizures … many other things … but the number of 
seizures and arrests are not an indicator of the success of the BLOs. A successful BLO actually 
is a BLO that manages to prevent crime … so in an area of a good BLO probably there are no 
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arrests and many seizures because criminals know that the BLOs are effective and can 
prevent crime … the arrests and seizures are an indicator of the problem, but not an indicator 
of the effectiveness (Interview with Neung) 
The impact is uneven. First of all, we have been doing it for 12 years. There have been some 
success. If there wasn't success governments wouldn't be promoting it. But with the passage 
of years there has been an attrition in the number of effective BLOs. Depends on many things. 
Finance, level of leadership, national support. One of the biggest challenges is expanding the 
mandate and showing that the threat is from all cross-border crimes such as wildlife 
(Interview with Gao) 
I cannot provide a conclusive answer for 2 reasons … mainly because 10 years ago I don’t 
know what was the level of cooperation … secondly because it is hard to do a general 
statement of the BLOs even across southeast Asia … because it is evident that out of the 70 
or 80 pairs of BLOs in the region, a good part of them is not currently operational … number 
of reasons for that such as lack of funding … lack of attention from central authorities … lack 
of support from UNODC … a number of complicated reasons that show that the sustainability 
of the mechanism needs to be improved ... it still relies on external support and from support 
from the capitals ... So in certain areas the level of communication is not dramatically 
different from what it was before … and if it is it is not because of the BLO mechanism … in 
other areas instead the communication has improved because of the BLO mechanism …  in 
some BLOs it is clear that enforcement officers on the two sides of the border from the 
different agencies know each other and like each other and occasionally have coffee together 
(Interview with Neung) 
Further pondering on the potential successes of the mechanism, one participant in particular noted 
that ‘finding what is the attribution of the BLOs to the success of some operation is difficult or 
impossible. Nobody can tell exactly whether that piece of information was generated by a BLO … 
whether it was generated formally or informally … it is impossible and I would say that it is 
irrelevant’210. 
Participants highlighted ‘interest’ and ‘engagement’ as crucial elements to ensure the mechanism 
works.  
 
7.1.2.4 Challenges, gaps and limitations 
The government perspective: 
Participants interviewed were asked to note some of the main gaps and limitations of the BLOs 
based on their experiences. This included the identification of loopholes and gaps, where additional 
efforts would be beneficial and what more was needed. Overall, participants from this group 
highlighted a number of challenges, but also noted that overall much progress has been made in the 
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region to combat wildlife crime thanks in part to the efforts of the initiative. In general a participant 
stated that ‘cooperation …, budgets …, technical support …, … all needs to be improved … it’s not 
good enough yet. Need bit of balance, financial assistance, even stronger commitment of 
government, some local authorities … [but need to] merge central with local level on possible budget 
and expenses’211. In general, interviewees highlighted some gaps in political support at the highest 
levels212, the lack of cohesiveness as well as the need to increase the ‘motivation’ to combat wildlife 
crime in the region:   
I don't see a will within Asia to stop wildlife crime. There are a number of very dedicated 
people, at every level that are trying to do it, but there are a number of issues that critically 
impact on their ability to interject wildlife traffickers, funding and training … they are 
unprepared. There are people that buy their uniforms instead of earning them.  The most 
rightest and motivated are not the ones going to the trainings. To give you an example there 
is a young officer here (at the training) that has been in the immigration department for one 
year, he has a bachelor’s degree in administration, speaks excellent English, and he received 
a 2 weeks introductory training, he has no idea how to check passports , he’s intelligent, alert, 
articulate, but he’s not on the training … while we have people that are clearly not up to the 
task on the training … some of the people that are here are here because they want to be 
seen, not because they want to learn (Interview with Wushi) 
[It is a] commitment issue. Sometimes meetings in certain country don’t even happen if 
everything is paid for … how to motivate? maybe with a special BLO badge, plaques or 
something. It doesn’t pay more, but gives more morale [and] motivation to do better work’ 
(Interview with Er) 
Participants also highlighted that ‘in general communication is key’213 , suggested a lack of 
cooperation and communication and identified a number of needs: 
There is a lack of authorization at lower level … senior level meetings are needed so that the 
agreement and authorization is there (working group of approx. 10 government officials) 
To me the people working at the BLOs are very dedicated and knowledgeable but they are 
hamstrung by regional issues, jealously. It is also a fragmented response (working group of 
approx. 10 government officials 
It was noted that different agencies have different rules and that it is important to ‘find ways to use 
the rules agencies have to get things done’214. It was also suggested: 
When cross-border events are happening, [we should] invite other countries as neutral 
observers helping building up cooperation (working group of approx. 10 government officials) 
                                                 
211 Interview with Er 
212 Questionnaire received from Liushi 
213 Working group of approx. 10 government officials 
214 Interview with working group of approx. 10 government officials 
238 
 
Short, clear communication channels would be needed, currently have to use official, formal 
way, which takes much time (working group of approx. 10 government officials) 
Participants also pondered about the awareness and knowledge gap and the need to meet more 
frequently: 
Partnerships and cooperation with the BLO very effective … PATROL 215  is all about 
cooperation.. [but] with more awareness and ownership, more engagement would be 
possible (working group of approx. 10 government officials) 
We have to prioritize which gaps should be dealt with as a basis … the lack of understanding 
is something to look at. National authorities should be met more frequently … [but] also 
awareness raising crucial (Interview with Er) 
Need [the] right people placed at BLO’s … they are often not well suited, not sufficient 
knowledge of international cooperation, the language, there is no targeted selection. There 
should be commitment, there is good training, but not too frequent transfers, because then 
the knowledge leaves as well and [the] training [is] in vein. It would be good for officers 
before transferred to BLO to have a basic training (working group of approx. 10 government 
officials) 
Need more awareness of these crimes – customs officers often don’t know about it, 
controlling goods is different from controlling humans, that is immigration (working group of 
approx. 10 government officials) 
Funds and language barriers were also identified as ‘a problem for cooperation and 
communication’216:  
We assigned … [an] officer to combat, to track down the illegal wildlife with a team … the 
team after the end of [the] month did a report … the structure is there, but no funds to really 
implement or pursue (Interview with Ba) 
Often have to join network without being ready to be part of community, to reap all benefits, 
government makes you do it but without financial support (Interview with Si, Wu and Liu) 
The political will is there … but [we have] financial and capacity gaps. The turnover of people 
[is] too quick. We need to know [the] culture of other people … [and] only let those people 
work on border area who actually speak language of neighbouring country (Interview with 
Qi) 
It was emphasized that the location and operational capacity of the initiatives was sometimes not 
adequate. The unclear reporting structure was also highlighted: 
BLOs should be actually on a border … maybe even having people in a no man’s land in 
between, but [this is] not really feasible [all the time] … the point is: on the border, with both 
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sides communicating with each other on regular basis (working group of approx. 10 
government officials) 
There is no [clear] reporting mechanism. Only for project activities, but not at the national 
level. The concept is good … the critical issue is whether it continues to work without external 
funding. The government has done new BLOs but we don't know if they are operational or 
not. It is difficult to know and there is very limited data to answer the question. It needs to be 
operational. If it is not used by operational people on the ground it will never result on a 
successful operation on the ground (Interview with Wushi) 
Overall it was noted that what was needed was time, but that without strong commitment this 
would not be possible:  
[Wildlife trafficking], that's not something you can’t solve over time, but until nations are 
prepared to change this … to actively tackle the problem, the problem will not be solved. 
There is also corruption, and the issue that some governments won’t even acknowledge 
there is a problem with illegal trade.  We’re at the beginning of what is a long process … It 
should be a 25 year plan (Interview with Wushi) 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
Participants interviewed were asked to note some of the main gaps and limitations of the initiative 
based on their experiences. This included the identification of loopholes and gaps, where additional 
efforts would be beneficial and what more was needed. One particular challenge identified that 
should be highlighted was the expansion of the mandate of the BLOs to include environmental crime 
and wildlife trafficking: 
The BLOs for drugs bring together different enforcement agencies … there is a good 
multiagency approach to cooperation. The problem is that … it is more difficult to identify an 
agency or a national authority with jurisdiction over TOC … it is easier to find a single agency 
with jurisdiction over one problem … there are many different organizations with many 
different divisions … which creates some sort of confusion as there is usually not one single 
organization or agency dealing with all the different TOC … with this cumbersome process of 
trying to get official endorsement for the project we opened a Pandora’s box in which we 
found out that in most of the countries there is no single authority that is responsible for TOC 
at the border … no single authority that is competent for issues that span from drug 
trafficking to human trafficking … to smuggling of migrants, wildlife trafficking and timber 
trafficking … response to these threats is scattered … in different divisions and 
departments … and there seems not to be one authority that has a general mandate … no 
one wants to take responsibility for these things … and this shows a tremendous weakness 
(Interview with Neung) 
Overall, participants from this group emphasized a number of challenges and highlighted that ‘in real 
life [we] need to adjust to what is happening in the field … it is a learning process for us … and for 
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them’217. This statement clearly summarizes the changing and evolving nature of combating the 
illegal wildlife trade, and the constant and evolving challenges faced.  
Differences in the region in terms of financial capacity to do so were also explored: 
Member countries have different levels of involvement and have different capacity. Some are 
more involved than others and some cooperate more than others (Interview with See) 
Previous experience is that there is not sufficient funding for what we want to do in order to 
support countries. We … and they (countries) … need more funding (Interview with See) 
Participants also highlighted the lack of cooperation and communication and challenges to 
cooperation. In particular an important gap was noted: ‘[we] will have to start inviting other entities 
like INTERPOL, WCO218 as contributing agencies given their expertise and national contacts’219.  
Communication level among and within developing countries is poor … they need to 
understand [the] benefits and reasons for communicating (Interview with Jet) 
More in-depth discussion about the exact terms of collaboration [are important] … [we need] 
more clarification on implementation issues and modalities, that would have saved time 
(Interview with Hok) 
The [BLO] mechanism was very successful to deal with drugs. When you want to include 
wildlife … or other things … the drugs people say NO, NO … they are the drugs people, why do 
they have to deal with other people? Who will be the boss? It is hard to find the organization 
with overreaching powers for all the different crimes. Dealing with all the crimes in a similar 
manner is a very interesting concept, but they need a national committee that takes the lead 
to coordinate everything. But he is not the boss of everyone. He has to deal with everyone 
and encourage cooperation (Interview with Song)  
Participants also stressed the lack of capacity as an important challenge and the need for additional 
funds from both the donor community and countries, even though it was suggested the problems 
should not be blamed exclusively on the lack of funding. In addition, it was suggested that the 
location and operational capacity of the initiatives was sometimes not adequate or clear and that 
there was an unclear reporting structure: 
I would like to ensure that BLOs are not too far away from the border … they should be closer 
to the actual border and closer to each other. The problem is that it is hard for governments 
to find premises and if it is too far away for the enforcement agencies they do not use it 
(Interview with Neung) 
A gap in – and the need for – better monitoring and evaluation procedures for the mechanism220 was 
highlighted: 
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One gap that we tried to address recently … with partial success … is that there are no clear 
Standard Operating Procedures between BLOS … they are there … but they don’t have any 
procedures on how often they should meet … who should call for the meeting … who should 
pay … the difference between an operational meeting and a management meeting … it is not 
clear whether the heads of office have to meet regularly with the officers … whether they 
should meet transnationally …. These are areas that countries have asked UNODC not to 
prescribe or dictate to strictly because it is ultimately a bilateral decision (from the 
countries)… It is necessary to develop a monitoring and follow up mechanism to ensure that 
the BLOs continue to operate. If they don’t, then they should be closed (Interview with Neung) 
We have to monitor closely how national committee or steering committee is working, to 
avoid creating another layer of bureaucracy … but there is a monitoring gap, still no 
reporting at field level (Interview with Hok) 
The non-governmental perspective: 
Participants interviewed that discussed the BLO mechanism highlighted in particular the difficulties 
with the expansion of the BLO mandate to include wildlife crimes as well as the lack of ‘action’ and 
political will to combat wildlife crime:  
[The] initial BLO objective was easier, because the original objective was drug control, and 
almost everyone agrees now that it is bad, but illegal wildlife trade has been going on for 
many thousands of years. There is traditional usage… it’s difficult to change … [and] hard to 
get approval from countries (Interview with C) 
[The] main gap in both the BLO and ASEAN-WEN is the will to act, the political vote 
(Interview with C) 
 
7.1.2.5 Ownership, sustainability and commitment 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
The importance of ensuring high level political support and that it remains a priority was stressed:  
Cooperation is not a major priority of governments. There are limited resources and staff 
that are provided … [we] need more political support and allocation of financial and human 
resources (Interview with See) 
Political support is critical. If the countries want to do it, they have to commit … there needs 
to me much more support from the national level from the beginning … start from the top 
and go down … and the countries can revise their legislation to address the crimes … you 
could also encourage the creation of a transboundary crime unit. If such organization was 
created it would be easier to find the lead agency (Interview with Song) 
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Institutional in-house thinking doesn’t come naturally, it takes a lot of effort … continuous 
efforts working with senior management and others, they have the tendency of giving 
priority to global work, but [we] have to stress the importance of regional and national work 
and accept the differences (Interview with Hok) 
Measures to ensure the sustainability of the initiatives as well as the need to improve the motivation 
and status of border officers were highlighted: 
Need to request countries to commit human resources more strongly … Working at the BLOs 
should be as recognition of the skills and experience of officers … officers should have a 
certain level of seniority, experience and skills (Interview with Neung) 
[They] rely on the intervention of international organizations to provide training and 
encourage cooperation ... Without the support from international organizations there is no 
interventions and no monitoring (Interview with See) 
I noticed that some BLO offices already stopped functioning because of lacking of funding. 
Also when we did the training needs analysis we interviewed the border areas … we noticed 
the staff are marginalized because it is a border area … to work there it is kind of a 
punishment … so they need continued financial support … they need to meet regularly, to 
have meetings, they need support … from international organizations and the governments 
should also support (Interview with Song) 
Overall it was noted that ‘the system itself is OK … it has enough procedures in place to work 
effectively and measures are being taken to identify and solve the gaps in monitoring and 
evaluation221.  
The non-governmental perspective: 
As noted earlier due to the limited involvement of representatives from the NGO group in the BLO 
mechanism, participants from this group did not discuss a number of issues related to the BLOs. The 
issue of ownership, sustainability and government commitment were however discussed in detail by 
interviewees in relation to ASEAN-WEN (see section 4.1.5 above) and the findings of those 
discussions are also relevant here. They should, however, be considered in terms of their overall 
perceptions and thoughts on the importance of government ownership and commitment and of the 
sustainability of the initiative and not with regards to a specific initiative. 
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7.1.2.6 Role of different partners  
The intergovernmental perspective: 
Interviewees also mentioned the important role of Intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organizations in this work: ‘to raise the profile for the reasons why they need to cooperate’222: 
Some BLOs work well, others just on paper … we need to accept that and move on … In [the] 
long run, [you] need political will … government needs to see the need of putting specific 
resources into specific border areas … in the meantime international entity could contribute 
so minimum controls can start in hotspots, once these are identified, all entities outside 
government need also to contribute ensure that minimum is done in terms of monitoring and 
control; in the meantime government can take time and adjust priorities if needed, resource 
allocation as appropriate … there are different roles of different organizations to be played 
over time (Interview with Hok) 
 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE INITIATIVES:  
Participants were asked about the different initiatives (ASEAN-WEN and BLOs) and their perceptions 
on how they worked as a platform for cooperation to combat transnational crime, and in particular 
wildlife crime. Interviewees highlighted how the different initiatives work, their key objectives, and a 
number of their successes, challenges and gaps.  
 
Key similarities and differences in participants’ responses: 
All groups highlighted the need for political support and for a platform for cooperation and that the 
initiatives were essential to strengthen collaboration and to build trust in the region. In general 
government participants stressed the need for political support and for a platform for cooperation 
and that the initiatives were essential to strengthen collaboration and to build trust in the region. 
IGO representatives agreed and suggested that strong support, willingness and mandate from 
governments were essential. This was also emphasized by most interviewees from the third group, 
albeit a limited number of NGO representatives highlighted that the most important aspect was the 
recognition of the problem and availability of financial support and that the rest will follow. 
Government representatives in particular stressed that there was too much support being provided 
and that it was done in a fragmented manner and with sometimes limited consultation with 
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governments. They argued strongly that they (i.e. governments) should be more involved in the 
strategic direction of the initiatives to increase ownership and investment in them. This is likely due 
to the fact that international aid is often unstructured as there are a myriad of organizations (both 
IGOs and NGOs) delivering activities and with similar mandates that are willing and able to provide 
support but that may not cooperate among themselves. This was stressed as a major challenge for 
governments which called for increased cooperation among agencies providing support and for the 
support to be provided in a more structured manner. It should be noted that since 2010 the number 
of coordinated efforts has risen considerably with, for example at the IGO level, the development of 
the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC) or a number of NGO 
consortiums that have been organized along large projects funded by major donors. Representatives 
from the IGO group and a most interviewees from the NGO group focused on the need for 
institutional support and ownership of the initiatives. In contrast, a limited number of NGO 
representatives highlighted that the most important aspects where the recognition of the problem 
and the availability of funds to deliver activities and that the rest will follow. 
 
Perceptions on ASEAN-WEN 
Government representatives agreed that the initiative increases the involvement and awareness of 
countries, encourages networking and promotes national level networks and a multi-agency 
approach. It was also suggested that in general there are insufficient resources at the national level 
to combat illegal wildlife trade and that the benefits included assistance from donors to develop 
programs, raise awareness, provide equipment and strengthen capacity. Successes include its 
‘establishment’, that it is ‘useful’ (but could work better), and that it has contributed to raise the 
profile of wildlife crime in the region, increase interagency cooperation at national and International 
level, raise awareness, enhance capacities, increase cooperation and contribute to a number of 
seizures, arrests and prosecutions. It was emphasized that good progress had been made but there 
was not sufficient political support, strong leadership and interest as this was not seen as a priority 
in some countries. The limited operational role of the network was also raised by most participants, 
as it has limited operational involvement outside of targeted operations coordinated through the 
network223. The lack of ownership from some countries and the importance of the sustainability of 
the network were also stressed. Additional challenges included lack of capacity throughout the 
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region, and of its coordinating unit, lack of cooperation and communication between countries, lack 
of cooperation with the judiciary and a lack of common ASEAN policy. Overall, it was agreed that the 
initiative needed more time and commitment from countries in the region to be more effective and 
in particular to enhance its operational capacity which was one of the main gaps identified. The need 
to evaluate the work delivered to date was also stressed. 
IGO participants noted it is a platform for cooperation, to raise awareness, strengthen relationships 
and build capacity. It was developed as a network to combat illicit networks. Benefits included 
facilitating cooperation and a multi-agency approach at the national as well as international level 
and the increase of knowledge about the illegal wildlife trade and the capacity of officers throughout 
the region to combat it. It was suggested it has been partially successful but a number of participants 
questioned whether the governments were really interested in the initiative or whether it was just 
opportunistic because donors had made funds available for activities. In reference to the approach, 
it was suggested by a number of participants that if a bottom up approach rather than a top down 
approach had been used it might have helped ensure increased engagement from all levels of 
government both at the national policy level and at the national operational level. The lack of 
political support and financial contribution from countries to ensure its sustainability was stressed. 
The need for continued engagement as well as the need for a number of partners to continue to 
support it was stressed. It was also suggested the governments might have been more inclined to 
support the initiative if they had had more of a leading role in its development. A further comment 
was made with regards to the focal point of the network and it was suggested CITES authorities 
might not be the appropriate organizations to lead an enforcement network. Overall, it was noted 
that it is a young network with lots of potential – ‘a scooter with the potential to become a Ferrari’. 
NGO representatives suggested it was an umbrella or platform to bring countries together, to raise 
awareness and build capacity as well as encourage cooperation and wildlife law enforcement. The 
importance of personal relationships was noted. While most participants acknowledged its 
relevance to increase cooperation in the region, one stressed that cooperation was not important in 
their country as there is limited international illegal trade in that particular country. Successes 
included that it has been developed and that it has enhanced interaction between countries, 
developed relationships and assisted governments in the implementation of CITES and in combating 
illegal wildlife trade. Additional successes included that it has been important to increase capacity in 
the region, raise the profile of the illegal wildlife trade and share information, as well as a way of 
providing financial assistance to relevant authorities. It was however noted that it is an effective 
information network but that it is not doing much on enforcement and that there is limited 
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information exchange. Challenges included the lack of government investment, genuine 
commitment and ownership of the initiative and sustainability. Additional gaps included a lack of 
funding, buy in, will and support at the highest level as well as corruption, inaction, lack of capacity 
and incentives to cooperate. It was suggested that national taskforces have been set up but that 
they are mostly inactive or inoperative in most countries and that in some cases the lead agency was 
often not appropriate and that enforcement agencies should be more active within the network. It 
was suggested by some participants that there was a strong initial push, and that it potentially 
developed too fast for countries. It was also emphasized that the development of the network has 
been ‘territorial’ but the important role of NGOs to combat illegal wildlife trade was highlighted. In 
some cases it was also suggested that there is a certain over-reliance on NGOs to provide support. 
Similarly to others, participants noted the network needs more time to become more effective.  
 
Key similarities and differences in participants’ responses: 
The different groups had similar attitudes towards why ASEAN-WEN was created and its benefits as 
a regional platform.  
Government representatives interviewed welcomed the initiative but were more reserved than 
other groups in their responses. They highlighted that it had contributed towards strengthening 
cooperation in the region but that there was still a long road ahead.  
Participants agreed on role of ASEAN-WEN as a platform to develop policy, and to raise awareness 
and the profile of wildlife crime as a serious crime and encourage enforcement. Expectations from 
the NGO group however had shifted towards that of an enforcement platform, which was the 
expected next step (or initial objective for some) of the initiative. Some interviewees acknowledged 
however that it was potentially built at the wrong level (e.g. top down instead of bottom up, or 
policy level instead of practitioner level) or had inappropriate focal points (e.g. administrative focal 
points instead of enforcement officers) to be more operational. 
The main successes of the networks that all groups agreed upon included that it has been 
established and that it is contributing to and has been useful in raising awareness and changing the 
attitudes in the region to wildlife crime. Government representatives highlighted an increase of 
cooperation between member countries and agencies as a result of the network. Interviewees from 
the IGO group were broadly supportive and suggested it was partly successful, in particular in terms 
of strengthening the regional approach and policy and increasing awareness about wildlife crime, 
247 
 
but were rather critical on its usefulness at the operational level. Participants from the NGO group 
praised the changes that happened in the region because of ASEAN-WEN, particularly highlighting 
policy and awareness as the other groups, but also the potential for enforcement that it had – but 
that had not yet been achieved. Overall the different groups had different perspectives, particularly 
representatives from the NGO group, as they had been more active in supporting the network.  
There was also broad agreement on a number of challenges faced by the network. These included 
lack of interest, buy-in and ownership by some members over the initiative (some government 
representatives suggested their governments were not necessarily interested), the need for stronger 
government leadership and support, and the lack of operational capacity of the network. A number 
of IGO and NGO representatives questioned the approach and suggested a bottom-up approach that 
evolved naturally would have been more beneficial for practical enforcement purposes and for 
increasing the sustainability and government ownership of the initiative instead of an imposed 
structure (suggested by some representatives of IGO group) or the rushed development of the 
network (suggested by some participants from the of NGO group). Government representatives 
focused also on lack of capacity and coordination (with for example the judiciary), which were also 
challenges echoed by the other groups.  
Within the group of NGOs, there was disagreement over the structure and development of the 
network. Some participants were very supportive, notably those that had been involved in its 
development, while others were very critical of it. While the reasons provided are indeed valid, it 
should also be stressed that the development of the ASEAN-WEN had had conflicts over the 
development, ownership and support the initiative received (as noted above) and therefore there 
are bound to be overly positive and negative perceptions to it from the different groups involved, 
which should be taken into account. In general a lot of focus by the NGO group was placed on the 
lack of capacity of government to take action, with some (perhaps idealistic) perspectives and 
requests that appeared not to take into consideration the challenges expressed by government 
representatives in terms of their limited capacity to take further action in relation to human and 
financial resources, but also political and hierarchical support.  It should also be noted that NGO 
representatives interviewed were overall able to provide much more of a detailed account of the 
network and its activities as they had been much more involved in the practicalities and 
development of the network. They were nonetheless also very critical of its challenges.  
The important role of supporting partners was also raised by both the group of IGO and NGO 
representatives. IGO representatives focused more prominently on making countries understand 
why they should cooperate; while interviewees from the NGO group sometimes (but not always) 
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suggested activities would make them cooperate and complained about their lack of cooperation. 
This reflects the different roles of the partners.  On one side there is (theoretically) more strategic 
and long term and based on requests from member states and governments, a viewpoint held for 
example by UN organizations or international agreements or conventions. On the other, there is 
more targeted and specialized nongovernmental organizations, based on specific interests, agendas 
and priorities but with more capacity on the ground. There was, nonetheless, general agreement on 
the fact that the initiative has a lot of potential but that it requires a bit of time to reach it.  
 
Perceptions on the Border Liaison Office Mechanism 
Government representatives suggested there was good awareness of the mechanism at national 
level as high-level government officials were the heads of the offices. This created more awareness 
and ownership of the mechanism. Benefits included strengthened capacity and understanding of 
trends and patterns of illegal wildlife trade. It was also highlighted that it is a good mechanism as it is 
focused at the operational level. It was suggested good progress has been made but that a number 
of aspects need to be improved, including increased financial assistance and commitment from 
governments at national level. It was also noted that even though there are some extremely 
dedicated officers working at the border areas, there is a lot of self-interest in certain countries and 
within certain offices. The problem of corruption at certain border posts was highlighted and it was 
suggested that officers lack incentives to be more involved and engaged in activities to combat 
transnational crime at the border. In some cases participants noted a lack of cooperation and 
communication and highlighted the need to meet more frequently to develop trust and partnerships. 
Language and cultural barriers to cooperation and communication were emphasized and it was 
suggested the location and operational capacity of some of the offices were sometimes inadequate. 
The need for strong government commitment to ensure the mechanism was effective was 
highlighted as well as the need for more time to be more successful.  
IGO representatives highlighted that it is a platform for cooperation and exchange of information 
and that it provides an opportunity to increase corporation in the field and across borders, build 
trust and strengthen relationships as well as a platform to raise awareness about trends and 
transnational crime at border areas. Its successes included some successful cases of cooperation 
across borders as well as government ownership of the initiative as some countries had, for example, 
self-funded a number of offices. Challenges included the extension of the mandate to include other 
transnational crimes such as wildlife, and the needs for evaluation and to strengthen sustainability. 
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It was stressed that a thorough evaluation is needed and that enforcement operations are generally 
a side effect of cooperation through the mechanism and that it was therefore difficult to attribute 
them to the mechanism. It was noted some offices were active and operational while others were 
not (i.e. not operational or abandoned). Additional limitations were highlighted, including the 
constantly evolving nature of transnational organized wildlife crime, the need for increased political 
support and to ensure the sustainability of the mechanism, as well as the fact that cooperation was 
not generally a priority for governments. The lack of cooperation and communication as well as a 
number of challenges of cooperation within the country and internationally were emphasized and 
the importance of working with relevant international law-enforcement bodies such as Interpol and 
WCO was highlighted. Lack of capacity and funds to provide comprehensive support to the different 
countries were also stressed. The location of some offices far from border areas was noted as a 
challenge to effective cross-border cooperation. Overall it was suggested sufficient procedures were 
in place for the mechanism to work effectively and that measures are being identified to address 
known gaps.  
As emphasized previously, there were limited responses and discussions from NGO representatives 
on the BLO mechanism due to their limited involvement (at the time) in the mechanism. The main 
issue discussed was related to the main challenges of the mechanism, which included the extension 
of the mandate of the BLOs to other transnational crimes and in particular wildlife crime, and 
cultural attitudes towards the use of wildlife (e.g. traditional and cultural use) in the region.  
 
Key similarities and differences in participants’ responses: 
As noted above, it is difficult to fully explore key differences and similarities between the different 
groups in this case, as one of the groups had limited involvement in the BLO mechanism. The 
analysis will therefore mainly focus on differences between government and intergovernmental 
perspectives.  
Government representatives focused primarily on the reasons behind the creation of the mechanism, 
and the practical approach of the BLO concept, whereas IGO interviewees reflected and provided 
generous details on the rationale behind the creation of the BLOs. This reflects the perspectives 
from the different groups, one more practical and concerned with the enforcement of the law along 
and across borders, the other with more of a technical and strategic approach with the objective of 
250 
 
assisting countries to develop mechanisms to facilitate cooperation and provide technical 
expertise224.  
Both groups identified similar benefits of the mechanism. The key challenge identified by both 
groups was also the expansion of the mandate of the BLO mechanism to cover wildlife crimes, which 
was one of the issues also identified by NGO representatives that were able to provide some 
feedback on this issue during the interviews. An interesting fact to note is that the challenges with 
the expansion of the mandate were sometimes technical (e.g. awareness about wildlife crime or 
problems with species identification) but chiefly more about institutional challenges and the fact 
that there would be new agencies involved, which disturbed the ‘balance’ that had been established 
between the different offices involved, as now new agencies were added to the mix.  
The main success, again agreed by both groups, was the ownership of the programme and that it 
helped develop trust, and facilitate cooperation and exchange of information between border 
officers. Government representatives also mentioned a number of successful cases, although 
interviewees from the IGO group noted that it was difficult to associate cases to specific actions of 
the BLOs. This reflects one of the other challenges identified by both groups, but more prominently 
by participants from IGOs, that there had been limited monitoring. In fact, IGO representatives had 
mostly a critical and analytical perspective over the successes and possible impact of the initiative 
and highlighted the need for more detailed monitoring mechanisms. It is also a key factor expressed 
by all groups in general in latter sections of this chapter, with regards to the difficulty in assessing 
the effectiveness of the initiatives due to the limited data available.  
One interesting reflection with regards to the challenges of the network: everything needs to be 
strengthened. The intergovernmental perspective focused on a strategic multi-level approach 
(including capacity, opportunity to meet and strengthen relationships, delivery of activities and 
monitoring of actions and their potential impact) and reflected on potential risks and challenges 
(such as corruption or language barriers). Government representatives focused more prominently on 
the lack of political will to combat wildlife crime and practical issues such as language barriers and 
the need for more meetings and capacity building activities. Both groups also agreed on the fact that 
the actual location of the offices was sometimes problematic (e.g. not close enough to the border).  
IGO representatives again focused chiefly on the importance of ownership and sustainability of the 
initiative225 and stressed engagement from countries as a crucial development of the initiative (e.g. 
                                                 
224 It is assumed from other sections of interviews with NGO representatives, that they would have practical 
information and technical skills that they would also be able to offer. 
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the office will only be supported if the government provides the premises and funds its staff). While 
acknowledging that it works better in some places more than others, and that it was unknown if 
some offices were operational, they praised the fact that for example the government of Thailand 
unilaterally funded and created a number of BLOs and funded their counterparts in a number of its 
neighbouring countries. This directly reflects the levels of interest and ownership from some 
countries involved in the initiative, with some countries showing good support for the network.  
Similarly to what was emphasized in the case of ASEAN-WEN, the important role of supporting 
partners was acknowledged to support the development and capacity of the mechanism and the 
officers at the border area as well as to raise awareness on wildlife crime. Here there was also 
agreement that the mechanism needs a bit of time to adjust to the ‘new’ focus area of wildlife crime 
and awareness on the fact that it is a crime to smuggle, for example, tigers or pangolins across the 
border.  
 
7.2. Effectiveness and measuring effective cooperation 
Participants interviewed were asked about the effectiveness of the initiatives, including their views 
on what effectiveness means, and how it can be measured, as well as different types of effectiveness. 
Participants were also asked to assess or measure the effectiveness of the different specific 
initiatives based on their experiences and perceptions on the effectiveness of the different networks 
and initiatives to combat transnational organized wildlife crime.  
In general, participants from the three different groups agreed that effectiveness should be 
measured ‘based on a number of issues’226. These included political and awareness-related aspects 
of effectiveness, as well as discussions on effective cooperation and effective enforcement. 
Participants also noted the importance of monitoring and reflected on the effectiveness of the 
different initiatives based on their different perceptions. A considerable number of different themes 
were identified under the general heading of ‘effectiveness’, as set out below.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
225 The issue of sustainability and ownership was also a key issue for NGO representatives interviewed with 
regards to ASEAN-WEN and it can be safely assumed that would be the same case here. 
226 Interview with Er 
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7.2.1 Defining effectiveness 
The governmental perspective: 
Government representatives noted that it was difficult to define effectiveness as it could relate to 
various types of activities, some of which  cannot be measured and agreed that effectiveness should 
include a number of indicators to provide a balanced assessment.  
The intergovernmental perspective: 
Overall, participants from this group suggested that there were multiple ways to define effective 
cooperation and in general suggested it should be defined as an activity which leads to a tangible 
and real reduction in wildlife crime as well as stressing the difficulty of measuring it:  
Only thing we should be looking to do is to reduce amount of wildlife taken from its natural 
habitat. That should be the sole goal, [and] anything that doesn’t do that is not going in the 
right direction. Seizures are not achieving [the] objective; … if you have incredible awareness, 
but no reduction in wildlife crime, then you also haven’t achieved the objective 
(Questionnaire received from Ha) 
The non-governmental perspective: 
Overall, participants from this group agreed that ‘effectiveness’ and ‘effective cooperation’ or 
‘effective enforcement’ were interrelated and encompassed a number of issues: 
An activity is an indicator of how much is going on, but not a measure of success. There is a 
continuum. There are a number of layers, it is like an onion ring. Ultimately the only way to 
know if it will be effective is if the species are saved … but there are many layers that 
contribute to that (Interview with A) 
How measure effectiveness? increasing detection, reduced availability of illegal stuff … in an 
ideal world you have a baseline measure of crime rates of some sort, and can show an actual 
decrease in goods passing through the supply chain (Interview with G) 
I would define effectiveness as dismantlement and disruption. Make it expensive and difficult. 
Act on information through a multiagency approach. How effective it will be? It will go up 
and down in how well different agencies will work with each other. It is however the best 
approach, as long as everyone understand their roles, and you minimize duplication 
(Interview with O) 
Dismantling organized crime is effectiveness, taking the money people down, having high 
level prosecution and convictions, operations to shut it down … you can look at successful 
cross-border investigations, how many times information is exchanged … a very long list 
(Interview with J) 
One interviewee had an interesting and encompassing concept of effectiveness: 
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We do a rather bad job of keeping in mind why we are doing things. It is really important to 
keep in mind that the whole reason to do this … the bottom line … is the need to make sure 
things stay in forests. Other bottom lines are raising the profile [of wildlife crime], increasing 
[political and law-enforcement officer’s] engagement, and so on, but those are means to an 
end. Bottom line effectiveness is going to be species conservation. It’s not going to be the 
number of interdictions or convictions, or fines, or slowing in the flow of illicit wildlife 
goods … it’s going to be things on the ground staying on the ground. In an approximate sense, 
yes, the interdictions are important, but just interdictions don't get you there … you need to 
look at conviction rates, at penalties … even beyond that is who is being penalised … is it the 
little guys or the key players. Another level is the impact on national parks and protected 
areas. The final layer really is: do you have the wildlife there (Interview with A) 
Effective cooperation was defined as: 
An honest and transparent exchange of information towards a common goal, which could be 
interdiction or reducing illegal trade. For that you want … transparency, [and have to] trust 
the people you work with (Interview with F) 
A genuine, open sharing of relevant knowledge (Interview with G) 
Effective cooperation has to be results, like increased level of prosecution, bigger sentences … 
this is more likely to raise profile and more intense enforcement (Interview with C) 
Participants were therefore pointing to several measures of effectiveness of quite different kinds – 
measures of prevention (so that wildlife levels stay constant), measures of outcomes of enforcement 
activity, and measures of awareness that this activity (i.e. the illegal wildlife trade) is a criminal 
activity and the importance of tackling it. 
 
7.2.2 Difficulties in assessment 
The government perspective: 
Overall, participants from this group noted that effectiveness was difficult to assess in relation to 
separate aspects and that ‘balancing is the key’227. In particular it was suggested that it was ‘difficult 
to give any one reason, but that [effectiveness] could perhaps be better measured through a 
checklist of a number of issues, and with enhanced and improved monitoring. 
The lack of data and the need for increased monitoring, assessments of effort, and to have more 
operational activities and training228 to be more effective were also highlighted. 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
                                                 
227 Working group of approx. 10 government officials 
228 Interview with working group of approx. 10 government officials 
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It was suggested it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of international cooperation:  
the problem is so huge, [it is] difficult to quantify success. Number of successful seizures 
would be a good indicator, but if [we] analyse it at [an] entirely different level it means that 
many seizures equal to much illegal activity going on, maybe not the effective enforcement. 
The increase of number of endangered wildlife population could be a good measure, but 
difficult [to measure]. Increasing [the] number of level of prosecution also [could be] a 
measure (Interview with Peet) 
It is [a] difficult question to answer. [There are d]ifferent levels and achievement indicators. 
You can measure in terms of meetings, number of successful cases extradited, the extent to 
which people have been arrested, but there is other issues like human rights … if someone 
gets extradited and gets executed, is that a good thing? (Interview with Gao) 
The lack of data, let alone any baseline from which to measure improvements (or declines), and the 
need for increased monitoring to assess the effectiveness of efforts were also highlighted: 
There should be analysis and statistics available for the network to be able to discern the 
patterns and take effective countermeasures (Interview with Sipsee) 
You should have exact figures [and] … measurable activities, quantifiable. It is really difficult 
to measure them sometimes, but have to go that way … [we] have to do that. [We] need a 
survey, have to send ground level people who can go to the field to talk about specific issues 
etc ... in this way find out where there is a problem. [We need a] combination between 
collecting real evidence that is linked to the means of country. It is very important to find out 
the root causes because usually we talk about the causes, but we don’t talk about root 
causes. If you find [the] root causes of the problems … then you find out more things, more 
facts, more evidences … Then you see ‘Oh, this part cannot be solved by training, you are 
wasting your time, and you are wasting your resources’. [We] need to analyse the problem to 
bring it to the right level, but first look at [the] ground level (Interview with Jet) 
Governments previously used seizures and arrests as an indicator of a good result. During the 
workshop it was agreed that these are not necessarily measurements for success. The 
indicators developed [recently] are going to be implemented. The aim is to create a 
necessary common monitoring system for all BLOs to ensure consistency of the monitoring 
(Interview with Neung) 
The non-governmental perspective: 
The need for increased monitoring and data in order to assess the effectiveness of efforts were also 
stressed: 
Every country focal point [should] produce a plan of action including plans of number of 
people to be trained, trainers of trainers, awareness campaigns etc., then at the end of the 
year you should see progress and can commit resources (Interview with D) 
For a network to be effective I think we obviously need a plan that is agreed … you need to 
find common ground or common ways to work together to achieve the objectives ... and you 
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need to measure your success, find out what went wrong and fix it if needed … its part of 
adaptive management (Interview with D) 
What you put on a powerpoint and what happens in the field is a totally different thing. 
Reporters, NGOs should watch out and make sure that what that they are reporting is true, 
and not bullshit (Interview with O) 
 
7.2.3 A balanced measurement 
The government perspective: 
With regards to the BLO mechanism, representatives from a working group229 recommended the 
following process, which could also be (more or less) associated with ASEAN-WEN, as a process to 
facilitate effectiveness: 
i) International support: signing of MoU or similar bilateral/multilateral agreement;  
ii) National support: government should issue a specific decree for internal arrangements 
to support the network; 
iii) National coordination: government should set up a central steering committee;  
iv) Fundraising and sustainability: financial support should be clarified upfront, including 
how much does the partner organization have for support, how much does the 
government have to commit to ensure the sustainability of the initiative; 
v) Location: where should the office(s) be located; 
vi) Staff: what organizations and officers should be involved; 
vii) Operations: what is expected. 
These suggestions of course concentrate upon building structures, rather than activity or outcomes. 
It was suggested that if the above process is followed strictly, a balance would be achieved: ‘first we 
need the establishment … with the realizing mandate, then forging relationship with the cross-
                                                 
229 Working group of approx. 10 government officials 
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border aspect … and then training at third place is good approach. [We need to] strengthen the 
setting, then [the] network, then [build] capacity … have a good flow’230. 
 
7.2.4 Layers of effectiveness 
One intergovernmental interviewee did a particularly interesting summary of all the different 
elements that should be considered:  
‘In general it is effective if the cases [are] reduced …. The people’s awareness is raised … 
they know it is illegal … the enforcement officers know how to handle and detect illegal 
shipments. Other indicators are markets … if it is difficult to find wildlife in the market. And 
the reduction of the illegal trade across the borders. Also whether they have regular 
meetings, how many intelligence they actually exchange, whether they have arrested any 
criminals. That could be evidence for effective cooperation.  It is important that the 
information is shared. If it is not shared then the mechanism is not used correctly’ (Interview 
with Song) 
The need to raise the profile of wildlife crime231, increase political support and the importance of 
good leadership and ownership were also highlighted by participants from nongovernmental 
organizations as important factors related to the effectiveness of the initiatives:  
Relationships and leadership are essential (Interview with F) 
It is not going to be effective if [wildlife crime is] still not recognized as serious organized 
crime, if [the network is] run by CITES officials [and not law-enforcement officers], if [it is] not 
strengthened (Interview with N) 
 
7.2.4.1 Political will 
There was broad agreement from all groups on the importance of political will and support for 
efforts to be effective.  
A government representative highlighted the need for political will:  
Whether [or not] there is a will to address transnational wildlife crime is also a different 
matter. We cannot solely rely on external donors and agencies to do this if there is no follow 
up from countries. Until this catches up with policy, it might not be as effective as it can be 
(Interview with Wushi) 
                                                 
230 Working group of approx. 10 government officials 
231 Interview with A 
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In general, intergovernmental representatives noted that ‘the network is only as strong as the 
individual countries … if [the] majority [is] strong, then it will be more effective’232 and participants 
tended to agreed that ‘there should be strong leadership’233 for it to be effective and that ‘members 
have to realize that they are in a group and need help from outside, support, lessons learned…’234: 
There must be commitment of the member states, shared and strong interest to engage to 
the common effort, the means and structure to share the information and to communicate, 
multi-agency approach at national level which do communicate between counterparts across 
borders, all states parties should be parties also to key treaties (CITES, UNTOC and UNCAC), 
countries must share best practices and learn from each other (Interview with Sipsee) 
 
7.2.4.2 Awareness, sustainability and ownership 
The governmental perspective: 
Ownership, establishing national steering committees and sustained financing were highlighted as 
important factors related to effectiveness. Note that these are elements contributing towards 
effectiveness, or possibly indicators, rather than measuring effectiveness directly:  
If there is ownership and a steering committee it really goes towards sustainability. The 
concept should be reflected into national policies, work plans and to organizations’ fiscal 
years, … fiscal plans. If the government has ownership, it should consider sharing financial 
support and reflect it in budget … but often they don’t want to put [it] into written report 
because [they] want to see more external funding coming into [the] country … but it should 
be put into national policies and legislation (working group of approx. 10 government 
officials) 
Some considered national ownership as one of the most important factors to ensure any initiatives 
or activities are effective:  
You could look at increasing number of seizures, prosecutions … but it is difficult to compare 
this because we do not have a baseline, but I look at what happened to the drug trafficking, 
therefore if each member country put wildlife crimes in their agenda and with formal 
structures to deal with it, like they have national taskforce, know what the taskforce will be 
doing and have resources to support that then I see that effective law enforcement including 
wildlife laws improves (Interview with Jiu, Shi, Ershi and Sanshi) 
 
 
                                                 
232 Questionnaire received from Ha 
233 Interview with Sipsee 
234 Interview with Sip 
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7.2.4.3 Communication and cooperation 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
It was suggested an indicator of effective cooperation should be the interaction between 
enforcement officers235, and in particular that the effectiveness of such cooperation ‘goes up and 
down in terms of the quantity and quality of the cooperation. Staff rotation, political changes and 
other issues affect the relationship and effectiveness of the mechanism and of cooperation. It is a 
love and hate relationship … but it is hard to say exactly how effective [it is] because there is no good 
recording mechanism in place. It is hard to keep track!’236. 
In order to measure effective cooperation ‘you can put some of the funding to better network, 
through lunch or dinner type of interaction to foster cooperation and friendships’237. Strictu sensu, it 
was also noted that ‘meetings, telephone conversations etc … are activities, not performance 
indicators for effective cooperation. Performance indicators are how many fake replicas could be 
discovered, increased numbers of criminals recognized or identified compared to last year, seizures, 
prosecutions, number of investigations …’238. 
The non-governmental perspective: 
Participants agreed that ‘there are a few levels to effective cooperation’ and stressed the importance 
of effective cooperation and communication: ‘if we are looking at participants who don’t really know 
much to begin with, then you create awareness. And then you give them the chance to network, 
which is a very very big deal, especially within the country because as long as you network you keep 
in touch, you can work together and can achieve a lot while doing that’239. 
 
7.2.4.4 Strength of initiative 
Some participants highlighted the need to measure the strength of the initiative, or the level of 
development. While they had no specific way of measuring it, they nonetheless suggested it would 
be a way of measuring effectiveness.  
                                                 
235 Interview with See 
236 Interview with See 
237 Interview with Samsee 
238 Interview with Jet 
239 Interview with D 
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7.2.4.5 Trust and relationships 
The governmental perspective: 
Participants also stressed the importance of effective cooperation and communication: 
'effectiveness is good cooperation; there is not really clear information … good information and 
sharing of that … I think it is maybe good to define international cooperation’240. In particular, it was 
noted:  
‘Trust is essential … for almost everything! For cooperation, partnership, it’s [an] important 
driving force … but it’s easier said than done. Trust is not [the] result of trainings or 
instructions, trust evolves in response to respect and working together … if this is created, 
then cooperation, intelligence and information sharing will follow. Friendship is everything … 
then difficult things can be implemented’241. 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
In particular it was noted that one of the indicators of effectiveness should be trust: ‘[you have to] 
look at trust between both sides of the border and the involvement of the different law-enforcement 
agencies’242. How to measure trust? Respondents noted that ‘it is impossible to have hard data on 
this … one needs to observe how they perform and react to requests, how often they have meetings 
or take actions, and how the activities turn out … the reliability of information shared, the quantity of 
information shared, etc ...’243. 
 
7.2.4.6 Enforcement cooperation and intelligence exchange 
The non-governmental perspective: 
How to measure effectiveness? ‘You have to measure the usefulness of information exchanged … it 
has to result in useful, timely, actionable information’244. It was noted however that: ‘cooperation is 
means to an end, not a measure of effectiveness … number of meetings, bums in seats … these are 
                                                 
240 Interview with San 
241 Interview with working group of approx. 10 government officials 
242 Interview with See 
243 Interview with See 
244 Interview with G 
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not measures of effectiveness, they are measures or mechanisms that eventually take you to the 
point of being effective, but any attempt to measure them is understandable but also misguided’. 245 
It was also noted that information should be able to get around with minimum effort, in a natural 
way and that: ‘information should … lead to action from individual countries and sometimes lead to 
actions shared between countries if they’ve got a joint task force or whatever it’s called. Then you 
have cooperation when you are implementing something. Effective cooperation is people who want 
to do a job, getting together, doing the job effectively. I think the idea of cooperation is the absence 
of barriers’246. 
You need intelligence on how the poaching network works to dismantle it and get the ‘big 
fish’. The small poachers at the bottom can get replaced easily … but you take out one or two 
key people and the network collapses. It all goes back to effective information sharing 
(Interview with G) 
 
7.2.4.7 Seizures, arrests and/or prosecutions 
The governmental perspective: 
Participants considered the meaning of effective enforcement and whether enforcement was itself a 
measure of effectiveness of the kinds of structures such as ASEAN-WEN or the BLOs.  Prosecutions 
were seen as important indicators, but seizures provoked a much more mixed reaction: 
Effective enforcement … [should be] investigation leading to high level prosecution and arrest, 
[but] often enforcement [officers are] targeting smaller players … not sure if [the] network or 
countries themselves could do that, but [it] needs to be taken seriously (Interview with Jiu, 
Shi, Ershi and Sanshi) 
Increased seizures, increased regional investigations are not necessarily [a] positive sign … 
the question of measuring is very hard (Interview with Jiu, Shi, Ershi and Sanshi) 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
In relation to enforcement, similarly: 
Arrests and seizures are the means to measure the problem but not suitable to assess the 
effectiveness of the initiatives (Interview with Neung) 
It’s important to ramp up prosecution levels … to find evidence to take organized crime apart 
(Interview with Sip) 
                                                 
245 Interview with A 
246 Interview with G 
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Not sure whether this is realistic or not, but [you] want to see how much of the activity is 
affecting the level of prosecution. It won’t be immediate … and it is very complicated to do so 
(Interview with Hok) 
The nongovernmental perspective: 
Participants also considered the meaning of and the possibilities of measuring effective enforcement: 
Looking at number of seizures, you don’t know whether there is more enforcement or more 
crime (Interview with M) 
If you are not careful, seizures and arrest can become the success, when it is only part of the 
way towards success (Interview with A) 
In wildlife crime, every time you have a seizure, the animal is already dead – need trade 
investigations, prevent wildlife crime from happening in order for it to be effective 
(Questionnaire received from E) 
It was noted that ‘seizures are indicator of activity but not necessarily a measure of successful 
activity’247.  Effective enforcement should ‘not only look at the number of people you catch, but also 
what they receive for the illegal wildlife trade and it should be taken away’248. The level and numbers 
of prosecution as measures of effectiveness were also noted, but it was however stressed that it was 
difficult to attribute that specifically to any of the initiatives249. 
 
7.2.4.8 Increase in wildlife population 
Both representatives from intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations highlighted the 
need to measure an increase in wild populations: 
If [you] start measuring, [you] would see an increase in seizures first … but as a target you 
should fairly quickly see an increase in wildlife population, if it is effective (Questionnaire 
received from Ha) 
We are having the discussion and trying to measure who is being arrested… but the only 
measure that counts from a wildlife standpoint is are you protecting the resources, the 
wildlife (Interview with A) 
 
 
                                                 
247 Interview with A 
248 Interview with C 
249 Interview with D 
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7.2.4.9 Number of operational units/offices 
Representatives from intergovernmental organizations, with regards to the BLOs, suggested that the 
‘Indicators should also look at how many are operational and the work that is taking place (when it is 
done, if it is really done). Reports should be produced and agencies should share information and 
data across agencies and borders. This is difficult because of the lack of trust but if there is no 
cooperation and no exchange of information, then those particular BLOs are not effective’250. 
 
7.2.4.10 A ‘points’ system 
One participant from the nongovernmental group had an interesting observation: ‘We should give a 
value to the key people in the syndicates. The boss, the deputy, the accountant … you know, the 
recruiter, the buyer, the seller … the big boss should count more than a courier, and we should aim to 
remove all of those people … We should also look at the amount of money that has been frozen or 
taken away from syndicates. How many points do you get?’251. 
 
7.2.5 Assessment of the initiatives  
The government perspective: 
Participants also assessed the different initiatives, based on their experiences and expertise. Of the 
BLOs mechanism, it was suggested that: 
The concept of BLOs is sound. Whether it can work [or it works] is another thing. We don't 
know what they do as there is a lack of data to monitor. They are starting to do this, but it is 
difficult to measure with data. I think there is potentially limited proactive engagement of 
government unless there is a specific activity planned. [It is v]ery difficult to report on an 
informal relationship. I am sure there is some level of relationship and activity … a good 
informal relationship. Whether that is enough to result in a seizure or an investigation is 
unknown. Once data is available it will be easier to address this issue (Interview with Wushi) 
They combat international wildlife crime in general, and the border zone and remote areas 
also benefits, it is already a sustainable concept with BLOs within the country … it is not only 
a project, but has become the policy, the mechanism and agenda of government to fight 
against crime (Interview with Qi) 
Of ASEAN-WEN, it was suggested that: 
                                                 
250 Interview with Neung 
251 Interview with O 
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I see that effective law enforcement including wildlife laws improves … it is moving along 
that way, but not yet accomplished … it is still far away (Interview with Jiu, Shi, Ershi and 
Sanshi) 
[It is]effective in sharing information on what is happening in the region … not really effective 
on operational level (Interview with Ba) 
Awareness is OK, serious training has been organized, information about the network is wide 
spread … but enforcement not so [much … [there is] no real communication … and law-
enforcement should be lead[ing] (Interviews with San and Si, Wu and Liu) 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
Participants also assessed the different initiatives, based on their experiences and expertise. Of the 
BLOs mechanism, it was suggested that: 
Some BLOs work well, others just on paper. We need to accept that and move on. The 
effectiveness of fighting transnational wildlife crime depends on the BLO (Interview with Hok) 
Speaking about the impact and effectiveness of the BLOs [is difficult] … I cannot provide a 
conclusive answer for two reasons … mainly because 10 years ago I don’t know what was the 
level of cooperation … it was not recorded. Secondly because it is hard to do a general 
statement of the BLOs even across Southeast Asia … because it is evident that out of the 70 
or 80 pairs of BLOs in the region, a good part of them is not currently operational (Interview 
with Neung) 
In general there is more awareness on the BLOs, more outreach, better perceptions … a real 
day to day presence of BLOs and activities, they are doing joint patrols, doing meetings 
between countries and actors … It is already effective and they are preventing crimes to 
happen because [of the] knowledge that [they are] around the corner (Interview with Hok) 
The BLOs are an intelligence and communication centre … and are for encouraging the 
exchange of information. By this standard they are currently not totally effective. There has 
been huge progress made to date but more needs to be done (Interview with Neung) 
There is systematic cooperation framework from national level to the operational level. 
Cooperation is already in place. Yet, when you monitor it is clear that it is not implemented. 
Need more monitoring and cooperation (Interview with See) 
May be little too early to assess outputs … may be little too early for evaluation; but seeing 
from needs assessment training: lot of enthusiasm to see how coordination on ground is 
working; hoping that will get some encouraging results; it appears to be a cost effective 
initiative … [and we are] building up on it (Interview with Peet) 
One participant made an interesting reflection:  
A BLO is effective if there is the software element and if it has the hardware element. The 
hardware element is staff, equipment and budget to sustain the BLOs. The software element 
is if it provides good multiagency cooperation along and across the border – noting that 
along and across the border are two different problems and should be two separate 
indicators for effectiveness. BLOs might work very well along the border but not cooperate 
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well across the border. An example of this is two of the more recently established BLOs where 
the staff is very active and interested to work together along the border (with their law-
enforcement counterparts) but where there has been little to no cooperation across the 
border i.e. no international cooperation with BLO counterparts in the neighbouring country 
(Interview with Neung) 
Of ASEAN-WEN, it was suggested that cooperation was better than without it, that it was partially 
successful but that it had not reached its potential, but that there was however limited exchange of 
information: 
Effectiveness is country specific, but [there is] common interest now. Keeping in mind that [it 
is a] young network, [it is] effective and has a lot of potential (Interview with Sip) 
I think it is working only satisfactorily, there is not enough trust, not high level participation. 
Still depending on outside pressure and support ... There have been increased amount of 
enforcement actions especially in terms of seizures and it has brought countries together. 
However, it is definitely not working in its whole potentiality which shows from the continued 
illegal trade. I also believe that the countries are not cooperating and sharing information as 
much as they should (Interview with See) 
Information exchange only [happens] when [the] coordination [unit] initiated it, but not 
natural  you need to get countries to talk to each other automatically, without reminder 
email. [A] voluntary, natural exchange (Interview with Samsee) 
I am not sure how to answer this question but I see that ASEAN-WEN as such does not 
encourage much for effective cooperation. At national level, I see that it encourages 
cooperation in the sense that basically it requires the establishment of the national task force 
structure which ideally then communicate between themselves. I think the tools to 
encourage are limited but through the meetings and reports, bilateral meetings etc. It can 
encourage cooperation. In the field level, it is more difficult, except perhaps border areas 
where the cooperation can be physically more imminent (Interview with Sipsee) 
The non-governmental perspective: 
Participants also assessed the different initiatives, based on their experiences and expertise. Given 
the limited involvement of NGOs in the BLO mechanism, all respondents focused on ASEAN-WEN. It 
was suggested that: 
There has been more flow of information across border, but much less than we hoped for … 
The potential for improvement is great. You could take a program that is performing as a B 
or a B+, you could turn it into an A+. Need to professionalize and get backing from ASEAN 
(Interview with O) 
It has definitely matured over the last few years, but don’t know how effective [it has been] 
in decreasing illegal trade … I don’t think quite effective, there has been a lack of 
incarcerations, proper prosecutions, it was more about the initial glory. To improve it I would 
have an annual review or something, … on what has happened to these cases where there 
have been seizures. And I would want regular updates on the stages at which these cases 
drop off the criminal justice system. This would not be difficult to do. I also would like to see 
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genuine efforts on crime prevention … because seizures alone make the problem worse 
(Interview with G) 
I don’t think that we can argue that [it has had a] real impact, but moderately successfully 
increasing the profile of wildlife crime and cooperation, the small things, but not at a level 
where it could make a big impact on enforcement yet (Interview with J) 
Reflecting on the successes of the initiative, it was emphasized that in time the initiative will become 
more effective and that the development and strengthening of the initiative requires time: 
Initiatives such as this take time. It depends on what the success indicators are. If success 
indicators are to stop wildlife crime in the region then no, it has not been a success. However, 
if the indicator is improved levels of communication and cooperation and more high level 
political will accorded to the issue, then yes there has definitely been some success 
(Questionnaire received from P) 
ASEAN-WEN has not been effective so far, as different level of commitment by different 
countries, some don’t do anything at all … [and] that has to be addressed by ASEAN-WEN or 
[the ASEAN] Secretariat. You need a really strong leader, [a] strict ASEAN-WEN chair with a 
vision, focused (Interview with D) 
One participant in particular was very critical: 
Disappointing to dysfunctional would be the two words I would think about. I think there has 
been insufficient government leadership and involvement (Interview with F) 
In general, it was noted that ‘now we have the umbrella … the big picture, the framework … now we 
need to do gaps analysis at lots of levels … we realized that we are starting to get enforcement 
agencies involved … but then we realized convictions were not happening … so that was an additional 
level … the next level is getting policy people more involved … so that's the next layer out … there are 
more layers along the chain that need to be addressed to make sure the link is solid’252. Participants 
also suggested that ‘ASEAN-WEN and BLO mechanism are doing well, but should be better linked 
up’253.  
 A further issue that was emphasized by interviewees, with direct correlation to the effectiveness of 
any and all activity designed to tackle illegal trade and in particular transnational organized wildlife 
crime was corruption. The next section will highlight the main challenges associated with corruption 
as well as the consequences it can have on the ground. This is particularly important as corruption 
appears to be one of the key issues to take into consideration and that hinders effective 
enforcement efforts and cooperation between organizations, networks and initiatives.   
 
                                                 
252 Interview with A 
253 Interview with N 
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PERSPECTIVES ON EFFECTIVENESS AND MEASURING EFFECTIVE COOPERATION 
Participants interviewed were asked about the effectiveness of the initiatives, including their views 
on what effectiveness means, and how it can be measured, as well as different types of effectiveness. 
Participants were also asked to assess or measure the effectiveness of the different initiatives based 
on their experiences and perceptions on the effectiveness of the different networks and initiatives to 
combat transnational organized wildlife crime.  
Government participants stressed it was difficult to assess and measure effectiveness and 
cooperation. It was suggested effectiveness could be measured by including aspects such as: official 
agreements, increased awareness and support for the work that is being conducted at the national 
level, coordination at the national level (e.g. good cooperation and communication as well as the 
development of trust), the sustainability and funding it receives at the national level, as well as 
issues such as location and the capacity of staff (activity measures). Finally, it should also be 
measured by its enforcement and operational capacity leading to successful detection, investigation 
and prosecution, and disruption of criminal networks, as well as wildlife levels (outcome measures). 
The lack of data and monitoring to be able to measure the effectiveness of the initiatives were also 
noted.  
Of the BLOS, it was suggested that it is a sound concept that works to a higher or lesser degree in 
certain countries and border areas and that it is difficult to measure and report on its enforcement 
activities and the informal relationships that are created as a result. It was noted it is sustainable and 
part of the government policy of some of the countries in the region (e.g. Thailand) that have 
directly established a number of offices and funded them in neighbouring countries, which highlights 
that it is considered to be effective by a number of governments. Of ASEAN-WEN, it was noted that 
it is increasingly effective in sharing information, and increasing awareness and political will. 
However, it is ‘not yet there’ on enforcement. One of the reasons is that the lead agency is not 
generally an enforcement agency and that there might not be sufficient multiagency cooperation 
with enforcement agencies in the country. 
IGO representatives noted effectiveness could be measured by a reduction in wildlife crime, but that 
it was ultimately difficult to measure. The importance of strong leadership and government 
commitment was stressed. Overall it was noted cooperation goes up and down in terms of quantity 
and quality and that it is different between different offices and countries. Noting it is difficult to 
measure, a mechanism would be considered to be effective if it can develop trust and collaboration 
between countries. Issues such as meetings, seizures, cases, prosecutions and convictions could also 
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be considered, but these were rather indicators of activity (as opposed to effectiveness). Moreover it 
was noted it is difficult to correlate any such seizures or prosecutions with any particular initiative.  
Of the BLOs it was noted that they are exploring the possibility to develop indicators to measure the 
effectiveness of the initiative (not developed at the time of the fieldwork). It was suggested that it 
encourages effective cooperation and communication between relevant authorities at the border 
and that some offices work well, while others only work ‘on paper’. It was suggested that to 
measure effectiveness one should look at the ‘hardware’ (e.g. staff, equipment, sustainability of the 
initiative) and also the ‘software’ element (e.g. whether there is good multi agency corporation 
along as well as across borders - for example it might work well at national level but not across the 
border).  Of ASEAN-WEN, most participants agreed that it was ‘more or less’ effective, but that this 
was country specific and that it is a growing network that has not reached its full potential. Overall it 
was suggested it had been effective as it had contributed to raising the profile of wildlife crime at the 
regional level in the sense that the number of seizures had increased, and coordination and 
cooperation had increased. It was however emphasized there was limited enforcement and 
exchange of intelligence.  
NGO representatives highlighted there are a number of issues to take into consideration to measure 
effectiveness, including levels of activity, detection of crimes and increases in seizures, prosecutions 
and convictions, suggesting that ultimately effectiveness would relate to the dismantling and 
disruption of criminal networks. It was suggested other indicators could be the use of a multiagency 
approach as well as an increasing profile for and attention to wildlife crime at the national and 
regional levels. It was noted the actual exchange of information and measuring the usefulness of 
such information should also be considered. The need for monitoring and data to assess the 
effectiveness of the initiatives was emphasized. Of ASEAN-WEN, it was highlighted that it had been 
relatively effective, particularly in raising awareness and attention to the issue and encouraging 
coordination, but that it is still in its infancy and has a lot of potential. It was suggested however it 
was difficult to say how effective it has been in combating wildlife crime. It has had some successes 
and been involved in operations but it is difficult to establish if the enforcement actions are as a 
result of the network. The difficulties with institutional support were emphasized as a challenge. 
Some rated it as ‘disappointing to dysfunctional’ due to the lack of government ownership of the 
process. Overall it was however suggested that it is a good umbrella for cooperation that needs to 
further evolve and become more effective. 
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Key similarities and differences in participants’ responses: 
In general, all groups agreed on the difficulty of defining and measuring effectiveness. Governments 
focused on the need to balance a number of indicators and various levels to measure efforts, but 
provided limited details as to how. Intergovernmental and nongovernmental representatives 
focused more actively on the need to have specific indicators and detailed monitoring as well as data 
to measure efforts. IGOs produced more of a strategic and long term approach to ensure sufficient 
data can be collected and analysed and that the appropriate indicators are explored and taken into 
account. NGOs, while agreeing with the other groups, had a more practical approach and focused on 
measuring commitments and actions  
There was broad agreement on the need to measure effectiveness through various layers and a 
broad range of potential indicators. Interestingly all groups highlighted the importance of ultimately 
measuring the outcomes of actions (i.e. more wildlife in the wild as a result of activities), with NGOs 
promoting the measurement of more immediate successes and with some interesting propositions 
(such as a points system) that could potentially be used to rank countries, raise awareness or profile 
their successes.  
While providing a self-assessment on the initiatives, governments did practical assessments: for the 
BLOs the support for the mechanism and its sustainability were key components of its effectiveness. 
For ASEAN-WEN, it was the changes it has generated in the region and its policy and political level 
engagement (but not its operational capacity). IGOs focused more on the need to strengthen 
monitoring to assess the initiatives, and had a critical review of both the BLOs (effective in some 
more than others) and of ASEAN-WEN’s operational aspects and capacity. At the same time they saw 
the benefits and improvements of both on cross-border cooperation through building trust and 
capacity at key border areas (for the BLOs) and contributing to raise the profile of wildlife crime and 
other policy aspects in the region (for ASEAN-WEN). NGOs were somewhat in agreement with 
different components and assessments but focused more on the changes and successes since the 
creation of ASEAN-WEN and its potential, likely due to their strong engagement in its development. 
It should be noted that even within the NGO perspectives there were differing views (some overly 
positive and others overly negative), likely due to the fact that its development was, in participants 
words, ‘very territorial’.  
In all cases however the groups acknowledged that the initiatives were still in the initial stages of 
development and on the way to reach their potential.   
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7.3 Corruption and the illegal wildlife trade 
Corruption in the illegal trade is an issue that was continually highlighted by interviewees as one of 
the major problems in effectively countering transnational wildlife crime.  
When speaking about corruption, it is always useful to use the Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index254 as a baseline to identify the perceived levels of corruption in 
countries. The Index is developed based on expert opinion and measures the perceived levels of 
public sector corruption worldwide.  
Figure 7.1: Corruption Perception Index of 2010 (left) and 2015 (right) for countries in 
Southeast Asia 
 
Source of Maps: Transparency International - Dark red indicates a highly corrupt public sector. Lighter red and 
orange indicates corruption among public institutions and employees is common. Yellow indicates countries are 
perceived as cleaner, but are not perfect255.  
 
The above is a useful indicator that can be used as a baseline for the following discussion. In 
particular it is important to note that most countries in Southeast Asia and in particular those 
included in the research are perceived to be countries where corruption is common.  
Before exploring participants’ perceptions on this crucial matter, however, it should be stressed that 
the issue of corruption is no longer ‘the elephant in the room’ in the wildlife arena. In 2017 
(subsequent to the fieldwork reported in this thesis),  the Conference of the Parties to CITES 
unanimously adopted Resolution Conf. 17.6 on Prohibiting, preventing, detecting and countering 
corruption, which facilitates activities conducted in violation of the Convention, which acknowledges 
the dangers of corruption and calls for CITES Parties, i.e. 183 member states (182 plus the European 
                                                 
254 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
255 2010 data available on http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results. 2015 data available on 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015 
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Union at the time of writing) to adopt measures to address corruption related to wildlife crime. This 
is, by all accounts, a monumental step in the recognition of the problem of corruption in the illegal 
wildlife trade and will help shape future responses.  
As part of the discussions during the fieldwork, participants were asked to reflect on the scourge of 
corruption on the illegal wildlife trade. This question was optional and was only discussed if 
participants were willing to do so. Interviewees were asked if they were aware of any instances of 
corruption but were not directly asked to provide specific examples. Overall, all interviewees of the 
different categories identified corruption as a major problem and highlighted the need to tackle it in 
order to be more successful in combating wildlife crime. Some participants however, were eager to 
provide the examples to ensure this important issue is addressed256. The below themes were 
identified around the issue of corruption: 
 
7.3.1 A major challenge 
The government perspective: 
Most government representatives noted corruption posed a challenge in tackling the illegal wildlife 
trade. In most cases however, they were not directly asked to answer specific questions about 
corruption to ensure they were not put in a difficult or culturally inappropriate position. The matter 
was discussed with participants who raised the issue of corruption at some point during the 
interview and on a case by case basis and where appropriate.  
Overall, most interviewees who wished to discuss this issue, highlighted that it was a serious 
problem that needed to be addressed: 
I heard some stories in the news … [it] obviously happens a lot … corruption is everywhere, 
but often no proof (Interview with Jiu, Shi, Ershi and Sanshi) 
The answer to this question is simple:  YES corruption does exist and it undermines a 
significant amount of the work being undertaken. Am I aware of many examples … but 
cannot comment further(Questionnaire received from Liushi) 
                                                 
256 It should be noted that while virtually all participants highlighted the issue of corruption and were aware of 
instances of corruption, only a small proportion had or were willing to provide examples of corrupt activities or 
practices. Three participants agreed to provide examples that could be used in the thesis while a similar 
number of examples were provided by others in confidence. It should be noted that one interviewee in 
particular that had been involved in the investigation of wildlife crimes in the region for a number of years had 
a long list of examples, some of which are in the following sections (and others that were not recorded at 
his/her request as they cannot be made public). 
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Some of participants in [the] network are taking advantage of [their] position and following 
corrupt activities (Interview with Jiu, Shi, Ershi and Sanshi) 
It should also be noted that in some cases responses were provided off the record and can therefore 
not be included here. Their perspectives are, however, reflected in this chapter.   
The intergovernmental perspective: 
Overall, most interviewees who wished to discuss this issue, highlighted that corruption was a 
fundamental pillar that had to be addressed and that not enough emphasis has been placed on this 
issue at the time: 
Yes, there is corruption everywhere (Interview with Song) 
It certainly damages the fight against crime. It undermines the rule of law, the justice system, 
trust. In some cases this is a cultural element that has to be taken into consideration 
(Interview with Gao) 
Corruption is an important impediment to enforcement … needs to be effectively addressed; 
but we need to be clear about what kind of corruption [we are] talking about. Experience in 
region has been that enforcement agencies are proactive … environmental crime is still not 
considered as major revenue, still not [a] priority … corruption levels have not really 
influenced environmental crime issues in large way, but slowly becoming major area of focus 
(Interview with Peet) 
The need to address the underlying causes of corruption was also stressed: 
It needs a holistic approach … [We are] concerned that a lot of money is going to combating 
crime, but not to combating corruption … but if you remove the human element, corruption 
can be reduced … for example by developing an electronic system instead of [relying] human 
interaction (Questionnaire received from Ha) 
Particular areas susceptible to corruption were highlighted: 
the borders are unfortunately still an area that due to the remoteness … due to a number of 
reasons … is still extremely susceptible to corruption … and corruption remains the main and 
fundamental cancer at the border (Interview with Neung) 
The non-governmental perspective: 
Overall, most interviewees who wished to discuss this issue, highlighted that ‘corruption is probably 
the biggest challenges to effective wildlife trade enforcement. You can build capacity, raise 
awareness, but as long as you have corruption, the laws won’t be enforced. [It is] incredibly wide 
spread, scary’ 257. Participants agreed on the need to tackle it in order to combat wildlife crime and 
                                                 
257 Interview with J 
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agreed with the other groups that not enough emphasis had been placed on this issue at the time. In 
particular it was noted that corruption is ‘the status quo’:  
We have corruption in wildlife but that's not the real problem. The real problem is the whole 
country has a longstanding culture and that's how they keep order here. It’s not great but it's 
the way it works. Corruption … is often the same as the status quo … it's the way the society 
functions. Trying to change the ship around takes a strong effort … It is basically 
institutionalized. The problem is that you get used to it (Interview with F) 
Corruption was highlighted as a ‘huge’ and ‘major’ problem: 
90% of the things wouldn’t happen if people would be doing their job properly (Interview 
with M) 
At one end people who are neither doing anything wrong … but not whistleblowing, on the 
other end you have people actively turning a blind eye and people who say yes please … 
[there are] various degrees … this is because of the lack of incentives and low wages 
(Interview with B) 
Corruption is a major concern in addressing and combating wildlife crime, and something 
that is incredibly difficult to tackle head-on. The problem is that wildlife crime is highly 
lucrative and with the chances of being caught and seriously reprimanded are low. 
Furthermore, wildlife crime is largely not considered a serious offence in Asia compared to 
other crimes, and therefore corruption in relation to wildlife crime is often overlooked or just 
not accorded a high priority (Questionnaire received from P) 
Different types of corruption were noted: 
Yes, corruption is a huge factor impacting the fight against illegal wildlife trade. You have 
different levels of corruption … you have from people on the ground who just get a small fee 
to allow a truck to carry illegal wildlife parts to pass; you have levels from that to the top – 
senior management person who maybe gets paid from the different wildlife traders in the 
country to just look the other way when they make shipments. [Some] border patrols are not 
even shy about it … [I] don’t see any effective way to deal with it … it is obvious that it exists, 
but nobody does anything about it (Interview with D) 
Corruption is a big problem, with a lot of people involved trying to prevent it …, others 
actively in bribing … [there’s] big involvement in forestry products, also wildlife, but to a 
lesser extent … we have to be secretive about operations, because if local authorities are 
alerted, by the time we get there, nothing is left. Local authorities are only contacted after 
evidence is secured … we have good close relationships with some, but with others it’s more 
problematic … officials receive low salaries, and supplement it with bribes. The local NGO 
team usually seizes more than the whole country! (Interview with K) 
The need to address the underlying causes of corruption was also stressed: 
Tackling the problem head-on is difficult, a couple of ways to address the problem include 
raising the profile of wildlife crime as a serious issue and getting more high level political will 
to address the problem. Also, in my view where there is a demand, there will always be a 
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supply so long-term education programs are essential so that people are aware of the 
consequences of buying illegal wildlife (Questionnaire received from P) 
 
7.3.2 Involvement at all levels? 
The non-governmental perspective: 
Interestingly, some participants noted that it was more of a ‘lack of action’ issue, rather than 
corruption itself. The potential involvement of authorities in the illegal trade was also suggested: 
A lot of times what we perceive as corruption is not corruption. You know, I just don't think 
most officers are giving this issue the time of day … I mean I can only imagine, if I am busy, I 
can’t imagine how top cops and customs officers are … I just think they are too busy. 
Corruption in general in the region, we have learned that it is just endemic. The issues are 
pretty much the same across the board. (Interview with O) 
You see … in (country X) for example, very often the people at high levels are not interested in 
combating [it] and very often they are involved in the [illegal] trade (Interview with F) 
Corruption is everywhere … [I] do not have evidence, but receive some information and police 
not always willing to act upon it; but never sure if it is corruption or not – when opportunity is 
there they may not do it, but not sure whether corruption or unwillingness; lack of good 
people – if do job well, i.e. without being corrupt, might be moved to other department or 
get into other trouble; bad guys more powerful (Interview with L) 
Nonetheless participants also noted: ‘there is hope. There are lots of very good officers and they are 
increasingly frustrated. There are also lots of people willing to help’258. 
 
7.3.3 Addressing corruption 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
Multiagency cooperation was also highlighted as a means to reduce the likelihood of corruption: 
It is a very difficult and sensitive question to answer … the approach that we are using to 
encourage … to mitigate corruption is to bring them into the open … in the way to try to 
make them work as a team … through the transparency approach as a team and amongst 
themselves and with their counterparts across the borders. Standard Operational Procedures 
is one of the major things to try to mitigate the opportunity for some officers to get the 
benefits unofficially ... Once we can promote clearer cooperation procedures, that is one way 
to mitigate corruption (Interview with See) 
                                                 
258 Interview with F 
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Working together might also create that kind of discipline which may be an anti-corruption 
incentive … theoretically if someone in uniform has the opportunity or is exposed to an 
opportunity of corruption … might be less encouraged if he or she knows that a person with a 
different uniform is sitting close to him or her … and could not judge positively what they are 
doing … so this kind of interaction could actually have beneficial effects … not only in the 
area of cooperation but also in the level of integrity of a certain border area … (Interview 
with Neung) 
 
7.3.4 Lack of evidence 
The intergovernmental perspective: 
The lack of ‘hard’ evidence was also one of the issues noted: 
[I] heard of some cases, but no evidence (Interview with Yipsee) 
A lot of rumours, only one country where [we] know for sure, but [it is a] common problem. 
The more development, the less chances for corruption … all harder factors of life can make 
you corrupt; business is mostly light, corruption is mostly bribing (Interview with Sip) 
The non-governmental perspective: 
The lack of ‘hard’ evidence as well the potential punishments for not ‘looking the other way’ were 
other issues noted.   
There are national corruption laws, but it is hard to get evidence; corruption is an issue in 
wildlife trade; in CITES model law it is included, also bribery … national authorities should 
incorporate into national laws, but not everyone has incorporated that. There is money, 
bribery involved in obtaining permits … in [country A], there are some allegations, public 
documents; one government did some counter-steps, but not sure about the effectiveness, as 
documents not publicly available (Interview with I) 
 
7.3.5 Examples  
All examples were provided by NGO representatives and are explored in further detail below. A 
specific example was given: 
I know someone that had a son that wanted to be a policeman in country [X]. He applied and 
takes the test … and did great … and they offered him the job. He got it and they said you 
start next week. Then someone from the duty post he had been assigned came to his house 
and asked for a fee for him to start his job. If they don't pay then he can’t get the job. So he 
refused and couldn't get in (Interview with H) 
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The following box contains case studies on corruption in the illegal wildlife trade highlighted by a 
number of participants which clearly indicate the devastating  effect of corruption on efforts to 
regulate and control international wildlife trade and counter transnational organized wildlife crime.  
 
 
 
 
Box 7.1: Case studies: corruption in the illegal wildlife trade 
A number of interviewees gave specific examples of corruption and how it is used by criminal wildlife 
networks to conduct their business: 
‘It's a problem all across Asia … we would have 90% less problems than have now … it is a problem at 
all levels. For example [I know this] female trader who has lot of influence and protection of higher 
police in [country A] … people were able to get guy immediately below her, [but] then the officer 
investigating her got transferred and couldn't catch her … then she moved … from country A to 
country B, got to country C in a truck, moved up to [the] Northern part of country, then ended up via 
country D in country E. She has a good network … she is organizing, people under her don’t know 
what other people are doing … she also smuggled [tiger] cubs with fake parents, [a] DNA test 
revealed truth … she had local people collecting tigers, changing cars … it’s unknown how they cross 
borders, but usually [through] some village, including bribing, to avoid the official checkpoint’ 
(Interview with M) 
‘I can give you a couple of examples. … In [country A] there is a legitimate businessman of mixed [X] 
and [Y] nationality, an ex-gangster from China, that is heavily involved in shipping wildlife, ivory, 
rhino horn, tiger parts and shipping it from Southeast Asia to China … I posed as a rhino horn seller 
and can tell you first hand that they have told me that a number of officials at the airport are dirty. 
He said when he ships something officials at both ends, to ensure the load, are paid’ (Interview with 
F) 
‘In another case, one of the deputy ministers of [country X] was directly involved … very sociable, the 
people get together and are friendly … it’s all about making some money. There is also a government 
official that has a lot of power in the decision making on what is going where … and he was moved 
back to a very critical position at the airport in (country X) where he has a direct control of what is 
happening at the airport. He was found doing it before, moved and after a few years he went back to 
the same position. These are examples of issues I see quite frequently’ (Interview with F) 
‘we followed a bag (containing turtles) from Bangladesh … we had the flight number, no name. We 
gave the information to customs and police to follow the load but they didn't find it because it got 
picked up before the (baggage) belt. There was a leak and now they will change the route as [they] is 
now aware that the route is being watched … You don't know if it's the flight attendant, the customs 
guy, the baggage operators … [it] can be anyone that has access to the bag (Interview with H) 
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PERSPECTIVES ON CORRUPTION AND THE ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE 
Corruption in the illegal trade is an issue that continues to be highlighted as one of the major 
problems to effectively counter transnational wildlife crime. As part of the discussions, participants 
were asked to reflect on the issue of corruption and the illegal wildlife trade. Overall, corruption was 
identified as a major problem and participants stressed the need to tackle it to be more successful in 
combating wildlife crime.  
Government participants acknowledged the serious problem and that it undermines efforts and 
activities to come to wildlife crime. IGO's emphasized that corruption was a fundamental issue that 
should be addressed. They also suggested that corrupt practices are embedded in the region and 
difficult to address. Multi-agency cooperation was seen as a way to increase transparency and 
mitigate corruption. The lack of hard evidence of corrupt individuals was also noted. The NGOs 
highlighted that corruption was the biggest challenge in the region, not only for combating wildlife 
crime, but in general, as it was part of the institutional culture of corruption within the region. This 
was highlighted through a number of detailed examples and case studies as well as by others that 
were provided in confidence and that cannot be mentioned here. They also stressed the different 
levels of corruption that exist across the trade chain and the strong impact on the illegal wildlife 
trade and any efforts to combat it. The potential involvement of authorities in corrupt activities was 
also suggested however it was also stressed that there are lots of good officers out there and that, in 
some cases, the issue is exaggerated.  
 
Key similarities and differences in participants responses: 
There was broad agreement on the need to combat corruption and that it is a major issue and 
challenge that needs to be addressed, as well as about the lack of evidence of corrupt practices and 
activities even though these may be ‘common’.  
Government representatives had a direct but reserved approach to corruption, mainly due to the 
limited known cases, but acknowledged the potential involvement of officers in corrupt activities, 
particularly at border crossings or airports. Intergovernmental representatives, perhaps due to the 
fact that they are specialized agencies but also ‘neutral’, tended to reflect practically on the need to 
address corruption and various strategies that could be put in place to do so. For example, by 
promoting multi-agency cooperation as a way to reduce or mitigate opportunities for corruption. It 
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should be noted that government and intergovernmental representatives did in some cases 
allegedly have specific examples but were not in a position to provide any details. 
In contrast, nongovernmental representatives, while agreeing overall with the other groups, were in 
some cases more vociferous and inclined to provide practical examples as they are potentially more 
involved in the field level and therefore more aware of potential cases of corruption. NGOs also have, 
as national, regional and global watchdogs, the responsibility to raise awareness about crucial issues 
such as corruption. It should be highlighted that at the same person that provided the examples also 
highlighted that there are very committed officers that are trying to do their jobs. It is a question of 
finding the ‘right’ one.  
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Chapter 8: The effectiveness of 
international cooperation to combat 
transnational organized wildlife crime 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
After a number of years exploring the effectiveness of international cooperation to combat 
transnational organized wildlife crime, one of my first conclusions is that both exploring and 
measuring effectiveness are part of a difficult puzzle. The thesis aims to contribute some additional 
pieces to the puzzle by exploring some lessons from initiatives in Asia to combat transnational 
wildlife crime so that eventually a better understanding can be reached259. It provides a snapshot of 
how two particular initiatives operated at a specific time (2010-2013) and place (Southeast Asia) 
based chiefly on the perceptions of those involved260.   
The research has explored the international framework within which the illegal wildlife trade is 
combated, as well as the role of state and non-state actors (see chapters 2 and 3). It has examined 
the illegal wildlife trade as a transnational organized crime and highlighted the emergence of new 
structures or initiatives that have been developed to facilitate cooperation and coordination that 
have been developed in Asia to combat the illegal wildlife trade: the ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement 
Network (ASEAN-WEN) and the Border Liaison Office (BLO) mechanism (see chapter 4). The ensuing 
chapters explained the research methodology (see chapter 5) and explored a number of common 
themes identified based on perceptions of participants involved in the initiatives that were 
interviewed during the fieldwork (see chapters 6 and 7).  This chapter will aim to put the pieces of 
the puzzle together and examine, based on lessons learned from initiatives in Asia, the influence of 
the initiatives on the illegal wildlife trade and cross-border cooperation. It will also aim to evaluate 
their effectiveness as platforms to combat transnational organized wildlife crime. 
Availability of data, information, and access to participants, as elucidated upon in earlier chapters 
(see chapter 5), delimitated the boundaries of the research, which explores the illegal wildlife trade 
in the region and the importance of initiatives and networks to combat illegal wildlife trade. The 
                                                 
259 See footnote 1 in the Introduction for details on previously published worked used in this thesis.  
260 Since 2013, I continued to follow developments in the field and in relation to the organisations involved and 
these data are included where relevant up to the timing of writing in early 2017. 
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research was not able to measure the actual outcome or impact of their efforts on the ground as 
such data is not currently available (see chapters 4-7)261, but attempts to evaluate and measure their 
effectiveness, based on perceptions, and identify ways to strengthen both the effectiveness of 
efforts to combat wildlife crime as well as the way one could analyse or measure the effectiveness of 
networks.  
Evidently, the research does not provide the ultimate and final answer to combating transnational 
organized wildlife crime nor a way to assess the effectiveness of all efforts, networks and initiatives. 
It is hoped that it will however help generate a number of additional research studies or questions 
that can benefit from the available data included here, and perhaps focus on those areas that were 
not possible to address in this piece, such as exploring the possibilities and desirability of using more 
targeted outcome evaluation research strategies (e.g. Pawson and Tilley, 1997) or specific research 
based on specific criminal networks involved, markets or border crossings. 
The research does, nonetheless, provide an in-depth analysis of two existing efforts in Asia and, in 
doing so, attempts to measure their effectiveness and identify ways to strengthen both the 
effectiveness of efforts and the way one could analyse or measure their effectiveness. This is indeed 
something that is necessary, lacking and that requires significant attention, as has been highlighted 
in earlier chapters (see in particular chapter 4).  
This is not only needed in Asia, but across the world as a myriad of similar initiatives exist 
worldwide262 and, as highlighted throughout the thesis, research of this kind is limited or non-
existent. I believe the findings could in fact be generalized to other regions and networks taking into 
account the different levels of development, and the structure, setup and aims and objectives of 
other initiatives as well as regional considerations and cultural aspects. Regardless of the regional or 
global reach, the findings will hopefully address a number of gaps, both in knowledge and 
                                                 
261 There are possible ways to measure the outcome of enforcement and crime prevention policies as well as 
the dynamics and operation of the illegal wildlife trade and modus operandi of traffickers in contemporary 
criminology by, for example, conducting observations at border crossings, markets or specific (illicit) trading 
points or gathering data from criminals involved or that have been prosecuted for wildlife crimes. Due to the 
nature of the research and the limited availability of data on the illegal wildlife trade or of access offenders, it 
was not possible to explore this further as part of the research as it would have required a totally different 
type of research, or more likely a number of different pieces of research on the subject (see Chapter 5). 
262 Similar networks, albeit developed and structured in different ways, exist and are at different levels of 
development in Africa [Central Africa WEN, Horn of Africa WEN (HAWEN), Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime 
Crime (IOFMC), Lusaka Agreement Task Force (LATF), Southern Africa Ivory and Rhino Security Group, 
Southern Africa WEN], the Americas [Central America WEN (ROAVIS in Spanish), South America WEN, North 
America Wildlife Enforcement Group (NAWEG), Caribbean WEN)], Asia [China National Inter-agencies CITES 
Enforcement Coordination Group (NICECG), South Asia WEN (SA-WEN), CITES Experts Group for West Asia] 
and in Europe (European Commission Enforcement Working Group). See reports of the 1st and 2nd Global 
meeting of the Wildlife Enforcement Networks (ICCWC 2013 and 2016) for additional details.  
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understanding – but also help strengthen existing initiatives and provide practical guidance and 
direction to shape future efforts to combat transnational wildlife crime.  
The chapter will return to the key research question: are border and regional law enforcement 
initiatives, such as the BLO mechanism and ASEAN-WEN, effective in combating transnational 
organized wildlife crime? To answer the question, the diverse dimensions (or sub questions) 
explored in earlier chapters will be reflected upon. Firstly, this will include exploring the challenges 
of cooperation and the various actors involved in combating wildlife crime. This will be followed by 
some considerations on wildlife crime as a serious transnational organized crime and combating it 
through platforms for cooperation. The chapter will then explore and endeavour to measure the 
effectiveness of the different initiatives examined and conclude with an overall assessment of the 
effectiveness of the initiatives to combat transnational organized wildlife crime. Given the pervasive 
role of corruption in the illegal wildlife trade, some reflections on this important matter will be 
included. The thesis will conclude with some thoughts for future research and engagement for the 
broader research community as well as practitioners or organizations involved in similar efforts.  
 
8.2 Everyone likes to cooperate but no one wants to be coordinated 
Initial chapters of the thesis highlighted the emergence of tailor-made procedures in international 
environmental law and the development of dynamic and flexible regulatory regimes aimed at 
enhancing cooperation to deal with environmental problems such as, for example, the illegal wildlife 
trade. It was suggested that dealing with international environmental problems is essentially 
political in nature and heavily linked to securing international cooperation at a global level taking 
into account the different priorities of states. In this cooperative puzzle, states remain the key 
decision makers and retain control. However, it is vital that they cooperate with the international 
community (or international society, see chapters 2 and 3) to effectively deal with international 
environmental problems, as states can no longer effectively deal with global problems alone. This 
has motivated the involvement of additional players that, in a complementary and mutually 
beneficial manner, are able to fill in the gaps that states are unable to address alone. The 
participation of additional actors is essential to assist states and to ensure compliance with 
international obligations and conventions such as CITES and to ‘shape’ state behaviour (see chapter 
2 and 3).  
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Indeed, the famous phrase (everyone likes to cooperate but no one wants to be coordinated) has 
been said by many, and they are not wrong. As earlier chapters suggest, there appears to be 
consensus on the need to work together to combat transnational crime. This is not only suggested 
by a number of authors (see chapters 2-4), but also echoed by participants interviewed where there 
was broad agreement from all groups that cooperation is essential (see chapter 6 and 7).  
As explored in detail in chapter 6, there was broad agreement from participants interviewed on the 
key elements of cooperation to combat wildlife crime, namely the need for: political support; a 
mandate, agreement or institutional framework; improved communication between relevant 
partners; opportunities to meet and share experiences; trust and relationships; and for increased 
human and financial resources, capacity and skills. 
In principle, everyone wants to cooperate. How this is done is, however, somewhat more 
complicated. As identified in the literature cooperation is challenging and there are a number of 
issues to take into consideration, including the levels and type of cooperation (e.g. political or 
operational), the basic elements that facilitate cooperation (e.g. trust and relationships) and the 
crucial elements of cooperation (e.g. high-level political support and commitment from 
governments).  
This was also reflected by participants interviewed, who also acknowledged that cooperation is not 
as easy as it seems at the national level, let alone at the international level. It is also not generally 
seen as a priority by countries and political elites, and often done in a fragmented manner. 
Government representatives interviewed focused on practical aspects of cooperation (e.g. 
opportunities to meet, develop trust/relationships and the need for financial resources) and 
institutional aspects of cooperation (with a focus on the required mandate and hierarchical support 
to be able to cooperate). Interviewees from the IGO group highlighted that cooperation at specific 
border areas is easier to generate as its officers have increased opportunities to get to know each 
other and develop trust. NGO representatives focused more on practical aspects of cooperation as 
well as on creating opportunities to encourage cooperation.  
There was broad agreement over discussions on formal or informal cooperation. It was 
acknowledged informal methods are preferred but that they need to be enclosed within formal 
structures or mandates. The importance that policies and decisions taken at the policy level take into 
consideration the needs of the field was also stressed by participants, as this is not often the case. 
This crucial aspect is also identified in the literature (see chapter 4 and 6).  
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All groups emphasized the importance of trust. As noted in chapter 6, actual cooperation is based on 
trust and relationships and trust cannot be developed forcefully. An important role for the initiatives 
was seen as a platform to encourage the development of trust and relationships. As suggested in 
chapter 6, interviewees from the IGO group in particular focused also on the need to develop 
institutional cooperation so that efforts do not end if staff members are reassigned. This is 
summarized well by the following quotes from Sishi, See and A, as set out in chapter 6: 
[You] need to have formal work structure, but personal relationships and informal 
relationships are very important to get the work done (Interview with Sishi) 
You can train people, but you cannot force people to work together (Interview with See) 
In reality it is all about personal relationships … to meet and know each other’s … and an 
associated need, the need for consistency … or constancy in the players … dealing with some 
of these countries the faces are very familiar and when they are familiar among each other it 
all works better (Interview with A) 
The importance of cooperating with a number of partners was also highlighted during the interviews, 
as having several partners can contribute to efforts to combat wildlife crime in a number of ways 
(coordinating, supporting or building capacity or providing technical and financial support) and 
encourage the development and strengthening of political support.  
An interesting reflection that can be taken from both the literature review as well as the interviews 
conducted is the role and responsibilities of the different players involved. Indeed, states, IGOs and 
NGOs have all different and very distinct roles in the development, shaping and implementation of 
international agreements and related efforts. States for example have the responsibility to negotiate, 
accept, ratify and implement treaties, while other actors will also play active roles in the different 
stages of the process that leads to the negotiation, ratification and implementation of treaties. 
However, chapters 6 and 7 suggest there are limited differences between what the various actors do 
in reality and that their roles and levels of involvement are somewhat blurred. The negotiating 
process of treaties and agreements for approving or rejecting certain resolutions is one example 
where certain organisations play a considerable role in the lobbying of decision makers and are able 
to sometimes impose their specific interests. While the roles of the actors involved are indeed 
blurred in many cases, it is important to nonetheless ensure that distinctions in their roles are 
preserved. States continue to be the only decision makers and efforts will fail unless mandates and 
responsibilities of the different actors is respected.   
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8.3 Transnational wildlife crime: a serious organized crime 
Closing the data gap 
Earlier chapters suggested there is limited academic research on the illegal wildlife trade and the 
organization of the criminal networks involved (see chapter 4). This affects the overall knowledge 
one may have of the real threat and, in turn, the capacity to counter and respond to the crime 
effectively. The combination of porous borders with limited data does not enable one to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the illegal wildlife trade, although the overall dynamics are easier to 
understand and specific border spots are relatively well known as hot spots for illegal trade, such as 
border crossings between country A and B, or key markets in country C. General trends, trade routes 
and smuggling routes are known for a number of illicit trades (usually those with a higher profile 
such as ivory, rhino horns, tiger parts, etc.) and are being increasingly explored for a number of 
additional species (such as pangolin). More targeted research is however required on the overall 
trends, organisation and involvement of organized groups and data collection should be enhanced. 
This was also reflected by participants interviewed who in general agreed on the lack of data and 
understanding of the dynamics of the illicit trade and the need for additional research on wildlife 
crime.  
As noted in earlier chapters the lack of data on the illegal wildlife trade is a problem that is slowly 
being addressed (see chapter 4). The increasing profile of wildlife and environmental crimes over the 
last decade has generated a growth in related disciplines and interest from research institutions, as 
well as a growth in interest of the organizations that are ‘tasked’ with combating it (Wellsmith, 2011, 
126). The limited knowledge of wildlife networks is also ‘slowly growing’ (Ayling, 2013, 59; see also 
Pink, 2010, 2013; Pink and Lehane, 2011; Pink and Bartel, 2015 and chapter 4). A critical 
development is the publication of the first ever World Wildlife Crime Report (UNODC, 2016). The 
report, produced by UNODC with support from ICCWC ‘takes stock of the present wildlife crime 
situation with a focus on illicit trafficking of specific protected species of wild fauna and flora, and 
provides a broad assessment of the nature and extent of the problem at the global level. It includes 
a quantitative market assessment and a series of in-depth illicit trade case studies’ (UNODC, 2016, 9). 
The key reason why this report is particularly important is that it is based on official data provided by 
countries using a similar approach to the UNODC Annual World Drug Reports. Another reason is that 
wildlife crime is finally getting sufficient attention for countries to actively request it to be monitored 
much more closely (see chapter 4).   
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In addition, CITES Parties are now requested to submit (starting in 2017 and with the first reports 
due at the end of October 2017), official data on the illegal trade and have requested that these data 
continue to be analysed through annual reports on illegal wildlife trade263. This will generate future 
iterations and improve and expand the current knowledge base and information available.  
 
The illegal wildlife trade, a serious transnational organised crime 
The illegal wildlife trade has created a lucrative black market for traders and fiercely competitive and 
highly organized (legal, illegal and criminal) networks to exploit.  While most of the illegal trade in 
wildlife is believed to be done by competing networks displaying different levels of organization 
depending on the volume and value of their trade, evidence suggests that sophisticated and highly 
organized criminal groups are increasingly involved in particular types of highly profitable 
commodities.264  
This was also pointed out by participants interviewed who agreed on the lack of clarity and details 
on how illicit wildlife networks are organized, the varying degrees of their organisation and that 
there are a relatively large number of unknown networks (see chapter 6). The comment that F sets 
out in chapter 6 reflects the overall consensus:  
There is disorganized crime and organized, and then highly organized crime … Many are 
opportunists … the disorganized criminal … a chance to make a quick buck. Most [illegal] 
trade is done by highly organized competing networks (Interview with F) 
Two important questions arise: Are criminal organized groups dealing in arms, drugs or human 
trafficking involved in the illegal wildlife trade? Are organized wildlife networks involved in the trade 
of other illicit commodities? 
As the analysis of wildlife crime with other transnational crimes such as drugs and art highlighted 
(see chapter 4), there are a number of commonalities, differences and links between the various 
illicit trades. As highlighted in chapter 4, commonalities between the trades include: 
1. The illegal market is intimately linked with legal markets and the legal international trade 
(particularly for arts/wildlife, but not necessarily for drugs)  
2. The commodities are poached/stolen/produced illegally  
                                                 
263 See CITES Notification 2016/007; CITES Res. Conf. 11.3 Paragraph 14. 
264 See chapter 4 for additional details. See also footnote 1 for details on previous published work.  
285 
 
3. The smuggling routes and techniques are similar 
4. Goods are smuggled along a trade chain: from source (or producer) to a consumer market in 
rich or emerging economies, with varied distribution mechanisms that adapt to the market 
demands 
5. They range from highly organized and criminal organizations to the loosely organized or 
disorganized 
6. Criminals operate across ‘disturbingly porous’ borders (Schmidt, 2004, 98)  
7. They are ‘enterprise crimes’. In other words, they are ‘conducted as a business would be 
conducted, meeting a demand with an illegal supply’ (Wright, 2011, 337) 
8. They undermine the authority and legitimacy of government and enforcement efforts 
9. Commodities can be laundered into the legal trade (where such legal trade exists)  
10. Combating them requires technical and specialized expertise that is ‘often beyond the 
capacities of ordinary law-enforcement personnel who have not been specifically trained in 
this area’ (Wright, 2011, 337) 
11. They rely on bribery, corrupt practices and violence to conduct their business 
One additional point, harder to prove as general in terms of overall trends and patterns, due mainly 
to the limited and anecdotal evidence available is that live animals can be used conceal drug 
shipments or as drug mules (see chapter 4).  
There are two additional points that need further elaboration: 
12. The organizations will deal in any commodity to maximize profit 
13. Organized criminals involved seek control, power and wealth 
For the last two last points, it is believed however, by the enforcement and international agencies 
involved that (at least in Southeast Asia) that organized groups involved in wildlife crime will not 
generally be involved in other crimes. This would radically increase the risk and fines involved as well 
as their chances of being arrested, prosecuted and convicted. Conversely, criminal organizations 
dealing in drugs, and in particular illicit border operators, are likely to wish to complement their illicit 
trades with any additional commodity that increases their profits. This would indeed include wildlife. 
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In addition, it appears those involved in transnational organized wildlife crime are not necessarily 
seeking power, whereas those involved in the drugs trade may be (such as for example the mafia, 
see chapter 4 for additional details). Rather the main objective of wildlife crime is profits. Moreover, 
while in some cases rebel militia or other revolutionary or insurgent groups may finance some of 
their activities with profits from illicit wildlife trade, there is limited evidence for this in Asia (it is 
potentially in Africa as noted in chapter 4) and would in any event only be a small proportion of their 
funding (UNODC, 2016). 
These points were also highlighted by participants interviewed who, somewhat similarly, overall 
agreed on the use of legal trade as a potential cover or smoking mirror for illicit trade. Government 
representatives were, in general, more reserved in their responses due to the lack of data and 
specialized agencies were able to provide additional detail. Specifically concerning links with other 
crimes, there was broad agreement on the use of similar routes, trends and smuggling techniques, 
but contrasts with other crimes were noted as it was suggested wildlife crime is a specialized kind of 
illicit trade and that those involved will generally not necessarily be involved in other crimes. 
The key link identified by interviewees between different types of transnational crimes was 
particularly highlighted with regards to the use of border operators or of bottlenecks where 
everything and anything would be smuggled through, irrespective of the commodity. Only a small 
portion of participants, mostly from NGOs, disagreed with the general view and suggested stronger 
links between different transnational crimes.    
In relation to the first question (are criminal organized groups dealing in arms, drugs or human 
trafficking involved in the illegal wildlife trade?), one can therefore conclude that, larger organized 
crime networks are indeed involved in illicit wildlife trafficking as part of their wider portfolio of 
criminal activities (i.e. the illegal wildlife trade is a secondary or opportunistic trade) or as a 
complementary illicit activity (see chapter 4 and 6; see also Duffy, 2010). In most cases, involvement 
will not be by the organization, but by individuals within criminal groups that may participate or 
have established links at different stages of the illegal wildlife trade chain (see chapter 4 and 6; see 
also Pires and Moreto, 2011). Individuals involved may make use their existing illicit trade chains or 
networks to deal in wildlife (see chapter 4 and 6; see also World Bank, 2005) and may be involved, if 
at all, in high volume/value commodities such as illicit ivory or rhino horn (see chapter 4 and 6; see 
also Elliott, 2012; van Asch, 2013, 2015).  
Regarding the second question identified above (are organized wildlife networks involved in the 
trade of other illicit commodities?), it can be confirmed that wildlife is frequently moved along 
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similar international trading routes to other illicit commodities (see chapter 4 and 6; see also Duffy, 
2010) and that a number of individuals operate and deal with a number of illicit commodities 
including wildlife. In Asia and Southeast Asia in particular, there are not, however, clear signs to 
suggest organized networks dealing in wildlife are involved in illicit trade in other commodities (see 
chapter 4 and 6; see also van Asch, 2013; Elliott, 2012). As elaborated in earlier chapters, while some 
examples exist where illicit wildlife networks may be connected to other criminal syndicates and 
organizations, specialized wildlife networks are rarely involved in other crimes (see chapter 4 and 6). 
This is largely because the trade in wildlife is specialized and entails specific skills and knowledge 
without which the trade would not be possible. In addition, and more importantly, the illegal wildlife 
trade is a low risk and high profit activity and dealing in other commodities such as drugs would 
significantly increase the risk of capture and prosecution (see chapter 4 and 6; see also Duffy, 2010).  
As both empirical research and the available literature show, wildlife crime includes loosely 
organized or opportunistic crimes. There are however, a growing number of complex and highly 
organized criminal networks involved in the illegal wildlife trade (see chapter 6 case study I: The 
Bangladesh connection, and II: Anson Wong’s alleged illegal wildlife network and ‘business as usual’ 
as well as other examples of pangolin networks or the illicit market operations provided), but there 
is – or seems to be – limited knowledge about them. This is highlighted by a quote from H, as set out 
in chapter 6: 
Not many people know the specifics, only a limited amount of people know, but there are 
networks similar to (Anson Wong’s) in Malaysia in at least Thailand, Myanmar, Indonesia, 
Philippines, China, South Africa, two in Madagascar, Bangladesh and India … and there are 
many more. I know ten major traders. Out of those, 6 are really big and scary high level and 
very well organized ones that are often involved in very lucrative legal businesses (Interview 
with H) 
One can only hope that the reason behind the lack of knowledge about them is because they are 
being investigated, but the issue remains: they exist, we know relatively little about them, and 
something should be done about it. What we do know both from the available literature and 
interviewee responses is that criminal organized networks dealing in wildlife often display similar 
levels of organization as their counterparts in other serious crimes, that they have received very 
limited attention to date, and that they should be treated – and prosecuted – with the same vigour 
and determination as other transnational organized criminals. Wildlife syndicates will tend to 
specialize on illegal trade in one or more species and not generally mix with other crimes, but they 
can be as organized and layered as the most sophisticated criminal network could be, and that they 
are highly profitable enterprises.  
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Broadly speaking, the illegal wildlife trade is quite similar to other crimes that focus on smuggling 
goods and commodities through trade chains (either locally or internationally). The crime is 
committed locally and then smuggled internationally and the commodity goes from a source country 
(a producer country for drugs) to a consumer country – with more or less steps along the trade chain. 
A network of criminality therefore exists at different stages of the chain, and in particular, at border 
points where it might be controlled by border operators or mediators whose role is to smuggle 
multiple commodities across borders. Combating wildlife crime therefore should be done using 
similar tools and methods as those that are used for other crimes such as drugs (e.g. intelligence 
driven operations, risk profiling, controlled deliveries, covert operations, forensics, and asset 
forfeiture to name a few) and treated seriously by the judiciary and prosecutors. Similarly to other 
crimes lower in the priority list such as art trafficking, the main difference is that the priority given to 
combating it is relatively low and this reduces considerably the probability of success to combat it as 
the enforcement community is not provided with adequate human and financial resources to deal 
with it and as a result have limited capacity.  
In general, it is more difficult to control illicit wildlife trade crossing borders - particularly porous 
borders - than for higher profile crimes due to the lower priority awarded to it. Limited knowledge 
and awareness of the crimes and the difficulties associated with its identification often makes it 
easier to smuggle wildlife across borders. This highlights the important role of knowledgeable and 
proactive border officers in combating wildlife crime in the region. It should be noted that 
combating wildlife crime is becoming a higher priority in certain countries and at key border 
crossings, particularly airports, seaports and key hotspots or border crossings that are known illegal 
trade hubs and (relatively) well monitored (see chapter 4 and 6). Nonetheless, more needs to be 
done at the borders, as border areas and key hotspots are more susceptible to bribery and 
corruption, a key problem hindering efforts to combat wildlife crime (see chapter 7). A further issue 
to highlight is the lack of appropriate punishment for the crime as the illegal wildlife trade tends to 
be a low priority and receive low punishments while it can be a highly lucrative enterprise. This is 
starting to change, with UNGA Resolutions encouraging countries to treat wildlife crime as a serious 
crime. As noted in earlier chapters (see chapter 4), however, legislation in many countries still does 
not criminalize wildlife crime and does not punish it as a serious crime under the UNTOC convention 
(i.e. 4 years imprisonment). 
Measures adopted at CITES CoP16 by Parties demonstrated a clear recognition to, as explained by 
Scanlon (2013; see also chapter 4) coordinate enforcement and make use of special investigative 
techniques and in-depth investigations to target the masterminds behind the illicit trade and to 
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ensure follow-up prosecutions. Effective and coordinated multi-disciplinary responses are therefore 
essential to deal with transnational organized wildlife crime (CITES Secretariat, 2013). CITES CoP17 
has created some additional momentum and CITES member states re-emphasized the need to 
continue to strengthen efforts to combat wildlife crime, with key amendments to a number of 
resolutions and, for example, the adoption of a resolution to combat corruption associated to 
wildlife crime (CITES Secretariat, 2016). There has also been broad support through a number of 
declarations, statements and decisions, most notably those of the UN General Assembly on 
combating illicit trafficking in wildlife crime (see chapter 4). Efforts should continue to ensure these 
decisions and resolutions are implemented and that criminals involved in wildlife trafficking are 
prosecuted using all available tools.  
 
8.4 Combating transnational organized wildlife crime through 
platforms for cooperation 
Combating transnational organized wildlife crime has emphasized the need for collective 
transnational collaboration. As a result, a number of initiatives and mechanisms designed at both 
the national and international levels have emerged to strengthen cooperation between countries 
and to combat illicit wildlife trafficking. As noted in chapter 4, Bowling’s (2010) new structures of 
cooperation have materialised in Southeast Asia in the form of ASEAN-WEN and the BLO Mechanism 
among others, where a number of international, intergovernmental and nongovernmental actors 
play a central and necessary role.   
This was also reflected by interviewees (see chapter 6 and 7), who highlighted that the initiatives 
were important to enhance cooperation in the region and to build trust. This was emphasized by 
most respondents, albeit a limited number of NGO representatives highlighted, as stated in chapter 
7, that the most important feature was the recognition of the problem and the availability of 
financial support and that the rest will follow. 
Government representatives involved highlighted the fact that support was provided in a 
fragmented manner, with sometimes limited consultation, and that there was too much of it. They 
argued strongly that in order to increase ownership and investment in the initiatives, governments 
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should be more involved in the strategic direction and design. They also suggested support should 
be provided in a more structured and coordinated manner.265  
There is often, however, a lack of cooperation in regional cooperative bodies or platforms. 
Traditional types of cooperation (customs to customs, police to police (i.e. national agency in one 
country contacts its sister agency in another)) have moved towards multiagency and targeted 
cooperation efforts and have generated a growth of networks and initiatives as new structures or 
platforms to facilitate international cooperation.  
Platforms have emerged in a myriad of forms and ways to provide their members with opportunities 
to meet, develop trust and relationships, avoid duplication of efforts, provide capacity building, raise 
awareness and overcome cultural differences and challenges. They have also emerged to provide a 
concerted response to transnational crimes such as the illegal wildlife trade and to close loopholes 
or gaps. A key role for a platform for cooperation is to facilitate the development of relationships 
and trust, as without trust the likelihood of exchanging sensitive information is much less likely.  At 
the operational level, networks have emerged as a way to generate a network of informal contacts 
that facilitates the development of relationships and trust and that is followed by formal 
enforcement cooperation structures and appropriate channels at the appropriate time. 
As we saw in chapter 4, the literature identifies various types of platforms for cooperation. These are 
broadly grouped based on their level and aims and objectives – and they do not necessarily work 
well together (Guille, 2010; Block, 2010, 2011; and others; see chapter 4 for details) as they have 
competing priorities. Overall, a platform for cooperation is essential and needed to raise awareness 
of problematic issues (in this case the illegal wildlife trade), renew commitment to tackle it, and/or 
facilitate different types of cooperation. Such platforms, however, need financial support (external 
donors, but also internal from their member states) and champions or leaders that provide a clear 
and strategic approach to the initiative. In the following sections I summarise interviewees’ 
perceptions on the two key initiatives investigated in this study, ASEAN-WEN and the BLO 
Mechanism and the key similarities and differences identified (see chapters 6 and 7). 
 
 
                                                 
265 It should be noted that since 2010 the number of coordinated efforts has risen considerably with, for 
example at the IGO level, the development of the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime 
(ICCWC) or a number of NGO consortiums organized alongside large projects funded by major donors. 
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Participants’ perceptions on ASEAN-WEN:  
Overall the initiative was welcomed and it was highlighted that it had contributed towards 
strengthening cooperation in the region but that there was still a long road ahead. Participants 
agreed that the network was a platform to raise awareness and the profile of wildlife crime as a 
serious crime, develop policy and encourage enforcement actions. Expectations from some groups 
however had shifted more towards enforcement. Some interviewees recognised however that it was 
potentially developed at the wrong level (e.g. policy level instead of practitioner level) or had 
inappropriate focal points (e.g. administrative instead of enforcement officers). 
The main successes of the networks included its establishment and contribution to changing 
attitudes in the region towards wildlife crime as well as the increase in cooperation between 
member countries and agencies. Interviewees from the IGO group suggested it was partly successful 
were broadly supportive, but were rather critical on its usefulness at the operational level. 
Representatives from the NGO group praised its contribution to the change perceptions and 
responses in the region, but also its enforcement potential that (while noting it had not yet been 
achieved).  
The main challenges faced by the network included lack of interest, buy-in and ownership by some 
of its member states (some government representatives suggested their administrations were not 
necessarily interested), the need for increased leadership and support from governments, and the 
operational limitations of the network. A number of IGO and NGO representatives suggested a 
bottom-up approach might have been more practical and would have increased government 
ownership over the initiative instead of an imposed structure or rushed development. The lack of 
capacity and coordination with for example the judiciary was also noted.  
Within the group of NGOs, some participants were very supportive, notably those involved in its 
development, while others were very critical of it. There was, nonetheless, general agreement by the 
different groups that the initiative has unrealized potential (see chapter 7 for additional details). 
 
Participants perceptions on the Border Liaison Office Mechanism 
Overall, the main challenge identified was the expansion of the mandate to include wildlife crimes. 
These challenges were sometimes technical (e.g. awareness or species identification) but mainly 
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institutional as new agencies were involved (e.g. wildlife agencies had not been involved in the past), 
which disturbed the established ‘balance’.  
The main success included ownership over the concept and that it facilitated cooperation and the 
exchange of information, while generating trust between border officers. Government 
representatives highlighted some successful cases, although IGO representatives suggested it was 
difficult to associate them to specific BLO actions. An additional challenge identified (more 
prominently by IGO interviewees), was the limited monitoring and difficulty assessing the 
effectiveness of the initiatives due to the limited data available.  
It was suggested all aspects of the mechanism should be strengthened. Intergovernmental 
representatives focused on a strategic multi-level approach (e.g. strengthening capacity, opportunity 
to meet and develop trust and monitoring of actions and their potential consequences among others) 
and reflected on potential risks and challenges (e.g. language barriers or corruption). The 
government perspective focused on the lack of political and practical issues such as language 
barriers and the need for additional opportunities to meet as well as of capacity building activities. 
Both groups agreed that the location of the offices was sometimes not close enough to the border.  
IGO representatives highlighted primarily the importance of ownership and sustainability266 and 
stressed that the office is only supported if governments commit from its inception by providing the 
premises and funding its staff. While acknowledging that it was unknown if some offices were 
operational or not and that the mechanism works better in some places more than in others, they 
praised commitments by governments that had unilaterally funded and created a number of BLOs or 
funded their counterparts in neighbouring countries.  
Similarly to what was emphasized in the case of ASEAN-WEN, there was also broad agreement that 
the mechanism needed time to adjust to the ‘new’ focus area (e.g. wildlife crime) and increased 
awareness that smuggling tigers, pangolins or other protected wildlife across the border is a crime 
(see chapter 7 for additional details).  
 
 
 
                                                 
266 The issue of sustainability and ownership was also a key issue for NGO representatives interviewed with 
regards to ASEAN-WEN and it can be safely assumed that would be the same case here. 
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An overcrowded platform? 
The role of supporting partners to networks should also be highlighted. The importance of IGOs and 
NGOs in supporting ASEAN-WEN and BLO mechanism has been paramount. NGOs and IGOs can be a 
source of pressure to regulators to encourage them to act and can also facilitate and do 
investigations. NGOs for example have been and are conducting investigations either in close 
cooperation with the government (or just giving the results to a trusted government officer) or 
independently and then providing the results of the investigation officially to the government so 
they can follow up and conduct their own investigations. It needs to be noted that the fact that 
many enforcement efforts have been supported or guided by NGOs in a number of countries in Asia 
is due to the real or perceived limited capacity of the government to conduct investigations or to 
encourage further action at the government level. While this has positive results, and in many 
countries is essential, as the government is not able or interested – or some of its officers may be 
involved in the illegal trade - there are certain dangers as NGOs might not be aware of ongoing 
investigations that might be taking place and might end up destroying an ongoing investigation.  
While this was essential in the past as there was a lesser degree – or an absence – of international 
cooperation, today regional and international enforcement agencies have stepped up their game 
considerably. The result is that there tends to be duplication of efforts and a fair amount of 
institutional competition between international organizations and NGOs to assist member states in 
operations. A necessary step is for these agencies to learn how to work better together – this has 
already started to happen in a number of cases. An additional danger is that governments may 
become reliant (and lazy) because it is all done for them. It should however be noted that 
government agencies have limited funds and multiple priorities and therefore generally welcome 
assistance.  
The large number of players involved in the different initiatives, however, makes it more challenging 
to cooperate. This is due to the different priorities or perspectives of different players involved. 
Governments (theoretically) know and act based on what is happening at national level and their 
national priorities. IGOs have the international perspective and expertise and are (theoretically) 
aware of the extent different countries are engaging in best practices in their specific areas of 
expertise. NGOs have (theoretically) targeted expertise, but are biased and have their own specific 
agendas. In addition they may not know the real extent of government activities, particularly when 
they relate to enforcement actions, which are covert by nature.  
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The different types of organizations involved will also have different types of knowledge or 
perceptions of knowledge. Government perspectives focus their actions on national policies and 
priorities. International organization tend to work for member states (particularly UN organizations 
or in relation to conventions such as CITES) and therefore are governed by member states. NGO 
perspectives and priorities will vary and are different based on the area of chosen focus and will be 
biased or have specific agendas. They will also tend to think there is much more limited capacity and 
action than there is in reality, whereas experience working with government shows that countries 
are indeed rather capable and independent when they wish to be (i.e. if they have a reason, for 
example a specific CITES decision or resolution). It should be noted however that IGOs and NGOs 
have important and essential roles helping to shape agreements, networks and activities.  
 
8.5 Measuring the effectiveness of networks in support of 
international cooperation 
As noted earlier, it is broadly understood that there is no one formula or set of instructions for 
developing a network. Similarly, there is no one way of developing or creating a successful or 
effective network: there are a number of ways. Every network is dependent on its unique 
circumstances at the political, geographical and cultural level as well as in terms of the specific 
challenges it faces or has been developed to address (see generally INECE, 2012; 2nd Global meeting 
WENs, 2016; Pink, 2010, 2015; Pink and Lehane, 2011; Pink and Bartel, 2015 among others). 
Participants interviewed were asked about the effectiveness of the initiatives, including their views 
on what effectiveness means, how it can be measured, as well as different types of effectiveness 
(see chapter 7). In general, the different groups agreed that it was difficult to define and measure 
effectiveness. Governments suggested it was necessary to balance a number of indicators and levels, 
but provided limited details as to how. The other two groups focused on the need for data, 
indicators and monitoring  at both a strategic/long-term level (IGO group) but also at the practical 
level (e.g. measuring commitments and actions) (NGO group). 
Interviewees generally agreed on the need to measure effectiveness through a broad range of 
potential indicators that would include various layers and the importance of measuring the 
outcomes of activities (i.e. more wildlife in the wild as a result of activities), with NGOs making some 
interesting suggestions (e.g. a points system) that could potentially be used to rank countries as well 
as encouraging to measure immediate successes.  
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As highlighted in chapter 4, there are different layers of effectiveness: subnational, national, cross-
border, regional and international. All need to be measured differently. It is important to look at the 
type of network and the objectives of the networks (informational, enforcement or harmonization?) 
as well as whether it is commodity based, geographically based or discipline based (or a hybrid), at 
the status of the network in terms of development (fragile, well established or somewhere along the 
way) and the levels of agency engagement, as this will also help measure the ownership over the 
initiative. In general, they operate at different levels.  
To achieve the ‘balance’ suggested above, a mixture of indicators is therefore needed as many 
potential indicators are unmeasurable (for example, the real extent of illegal trade) or very difficult 
to measure (trust and informal cooperation) in the region, and should also include political 
support/willingness. These are as important – or more in the case of wildlife crime, which used to be 
a low priority – to raise the profile and encourage action.   
 
Type and focus of the initiatives (informational, enforcement or harmonization and commodity, 
geographic or discipline-based) 
This section will explore the differences between networks based on the types and focus (see 
chapter 4), based on the categorizations of Slaughter (2004, 52-61) that identifies three purposes or 
three types for networks: in relation to information, enforcement and harmonisation – or hybrids 
with elements of a number of them. Pink and Bartel (2015, 310) consider three main forms of 
networks: geographically-based networks, discipline-based networks and commodity-based 
networks, as well as hybrids that have features of all three.  
Using Slaughter’s (2004) typology, in general, it appears that ASEAN-WEN is more of an 
informational network with more focus on policy, awareness raising and coordination (but with the 
objective of being an enforcement network) and the BLOs are more of an enforcement network 
focused on information exchange. The initiatives are however also hybrids with elements of both.  
ASEAN-WEN is also a commodity-based network, with a focus on combating illegal wildlife trade at 
the regional level. As it was created at a higher political level, and given that the focal points are 
more policy makers than enforcement officers, it works more as an information network. Since its 
creation, it has helped shape the response to wildlife crime in the region and the profile of wildlife 
crime in the region. At the same time, it attempts, through targeted activities and operations, to do 
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enforcement – but it does not normally focus on enforcement per se, even though its name might 
suggest otherwise.  
The BLO mechanism on the other hand, is a geographically-based initiative, with a focus on 
combating transnational crime across the border. Its focus is on facilitating enforcement cooperation 
and information exchange. The problem is that there are limited data to measure how effectively 
that is done as such information is not collected routinely.  
 
Measuring agency engagement with the initiative 
As noted earlier, Pink (2015, 13-16) established that an agency’s engagement with and benefits from 
networks to national organizations can be measured across five different phases: ‘exposed but sub-
conscious’, ‘increasingly aware but not involved’, ‘aware and involved’, ‘acutely aware and deeply 
involved’ and ‘researching networks’267. These could also be used as indicators to measure how 
effective the use of the network is for national agencies.  
Based on interview data and information obtained at the time of the interviews, both would be in 
phase 3, with Thailand for ASEAN-WEN as host country and the national BLO coordinators in the 
different countries for their agency. Interview data however suggest neither initiative would 
necessarily be in the ‘acutely aware and involved’ phase (see chapter 7). The BLOs probably have 
higher interaction and information exchange at the national level, but it is more likely mostly 
bilateral or across the border. In contrast, ASEAN-WEN will have national focal points whose staff 
will go to meetings, etc., but it is unclear if/how much of the benefits of the participation of an 
officer in the network will be pushed to the frontline. This is likely to be a result of the challenges 
and differences between the operational and policy foci of the bodies, which are in some cases 
difficult to tackle as noted previously.  
                                                 
267 The first includes ‘exposed but sub-conscious’ where those involved in the network are aware of the 
network, have started to attend related events, but have a limited understanding of the network. The second 
is ‘increasingly aware but not involved’, where representatives attend events but do not actively participate 
and engage. Their understanding remains basic and their involvement does not necessarily benefit their 
national agency. The third is where network participants are ‘aware and involved’, have a good understanding 
of the network and start to actively engage and create a links between the network and their respective 
agencies, leading to greater coordination and increased (informal) exchange of information. The fourth phase 
is where representatives understanding is comprehensive and they are ‘acutely aware and deeply involved’ in 
the network by becoming involved and taking a key role and in related activities. In such cases, national 
agencies recognize the work and benefits of the networks as a core activity and promote coordination through 
the network. The fifth and final level is where network representatives are ‘researching networks’ (Pink 2015, 
13-16). For additional details see chapter 4.  
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Exploring other (measurable?) indicators  
Other useful indicators of effectiveness that could be used are how networks support their member 
states to implement international commitments. For example, how are ASEAN-WEN or the BLOs 
helping their countries to implement CITES decisions and resolutions? It is difficult to know overall 
how well they are doing this because they seem to be independent with their own agenda and 
priorities – some of which, one would hope, link to national and international obligations. These 
initiatives should however align their mandates and activities more closely to support countries to 
implement key resolutions and decisions under CITES as well as other international obligations. They 
are supposedly engaged (or mentioned) in specific CITES resolutions and decisions but it is difficult 
to assess if this is a political imperative of countries or whether it really has an impact and an 
important role in assisting their member states.  
Activities and successes can be measured but doing or participating in activities is not necessarily a 
measure of success. It should be noted that seizures are also not necessarily an indicator of success 
as ultimately, disrupting networks, the flow of illicit goods in the region and the availability of illegal 
products should be the indicator to follow. Again, it is difficult to measure this and establish direct 
links to the initiatives as it would be difficult to know if specific results are based on specific activities 
of the network or not (except in very particular instances and operations). Other crucial aspects, 
virtually impossible to measure, are the levels of informal coordination and communication between 
participants and the sharing of information and intelligence between officers as data are not 
available, and they are dependent on trust, which is equally difficult to measure.  
One could also not measure, at least in the short term, the effectiveness of initiatives based on their 
enforcement results (e.g. arrests and prosecutions). However, the nature of enforcement is by itself 
covert and therefore more is happening in reality than is or may be reported. An operation that will 
achieve considerable results will be likely to take a long time (even years) and not have any 
immediate results. Does that mean it is unsuccessful or ineffective during the investigation but 
suddenly effective when the investigation ends successfully? (and if it ends successfully, which might 
not be the case). Overall, except for targeted operations or activities, the link is difficult to establish 
as there is insufficient information available to know if seizures are the result of efforts from the 
network or initiative, a result of a successful independent investigation or a random coincidence.    
Other aspects that should be used to measure the effectiveness of networks could include increasing 
the political profile and awareness about wildlife crime or the (increased) involvement of 
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prosecutors and the judiciary. These are important gaps in the current response and, as highlighted 
in earlier chapters (see chapters 4, 6 and 7), critical issues for successful enforcement. Sustainability 
and lack of funds are also commonly identified as a challenge. One of the most important aspects 
identified throughout the research is the importance of political support and national ownership as 
well as the sustainability of the networks or initiatives. These factors could be used to measure 
governmental interest and involvement as in most cases without governmental support and buy in 
over a specific initiative, no unlimited amount of funds will be able to achieve long term sustainable 
results. 
Finally, one additional aspect to take into consideration is that networks are as good as their 
individual partners and, at the time of the interviews, a number of the national networks that had 
been allegedly developed were ‘ghosts’ that existed only on paper. Recent information received268 
would suggest they might be more active but the lack of coordination at the national level continues 
to be an urgent need that should be addressed. It is therefore crucial to address efforts to 
strengthen national (multiagency) responses before an effective international response can be 
expected.  
 
Participants’ perceptions on the key effectiveness indicators of the initiatives: 
Participants were asked to assess or measure how they saw the effectiveness of the different 
initiatives based on their experiences and perceptions on the effectiveness of the different networks 
and initiatives to combat transnational organized wildlife crime. 
While providing a self-assessment on the initiatives, governments did practical assessments: for the 
BLOs the support for the mechanism and its sustainability were key components of its effectiveness.  
For ASEAN-WEN, it was the changes it has generated in the region and its policy and political level 
engagement (but not its operational capacity).  
IGOs focused more on the need to strengthen monitoring to assess the initiatives, and had a critical 
review of both the BLOs (effective in some more than in other borders) and of ASEAN-WEN’s 
operational aspects and capacity. At the same time they saw the benefits and improvements of both 
cross-border cooperation through building trust and capacity at key border areas (for the BLOs) and 
                                                 
268 Personal communication from previous interviewees. 
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contributing to raise the profile of wildlife crime and other policy aspects in the region (for ASEAN-
WEN).  
NGOs were somewhat in agreement with different components and assessments but focused more 
on the changes and successes since the creation of ASEAN-WEN and its potential, likely due to their 
strong engagement in its development. It should be noted that even within the NGO perspectives 
there were differing views (some overly positive and others overly negative), likely due to the fact 
that its development was, in participants words, ‘very territorial’.  
In all cases however the groups acknowledged that the initiatives were still in the initial stages of 
development and on the way to reach their potential. The indicator here should therefore perhaps 
become relative effectiveness over time.   
 
The network evaluation matrix 
Pink and Lehane’s (2011) network evaluation matrix explores how to consider the levels of network 
maturity and measure their effectiveness by ‘identifying and documenting a number of capabilities 
that span the five distinct levels of maturity’ (Pink and Lehane, 2011, 2-5; see Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 
and chapter 4). The overall objective is then to reach ‘maturity’ i.e. to be well established. To assess 
maturity, Pink and Lehane (2011) gave numerical values to each sector from their fieldwork to value 
the levels of maturity of the different aspects of the network. Accordingly, they allocated numerical 
values (or points) for various maturity levels scored towards the major themes or attributes of each 
level269. Once these were calculated, a general score was allocated to determine the overall level of 
maturity of networks270: these ‘can be added together to determine an indicative overall level of 
network maturity’ (Pink and Lehane, 2011, 12; emphasis added). 
As highlighted in chapter 4, the results obtained using the matrix presume that a more mature 
network will be more effective. While there are a number of additional concerns that should be 
taken into consideration (see discussion in chapter 4 for details), the matrix is one of the best (and 
only) tools currently available to measure or evaluate networks similar to ASEAN-WEN and the BLO 
mechanism and has therefore been used as an additional indicator to measure their effectiveness.  
                                                 
269 Scores of levels towards the major themes or attributes of each level: 0 - Absent, 1 - Emerging, 2 - Fragile, 3 
- Maturing, and 4 - Well Established; see Pink and Lehane 2011, 12 and Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 for details 
270 General score to determine the overall level of maturity of networks: 0 = Absent, 1 – 7 = Emerging, 8 – 13 = 
Fragile, 14 – 17 = Maturing, and 18 – 20 = Well Established; see Pink and Lehane, 2011, 12 
300 
 
The Table below is an assessment of the two initiatives based on participants’ perceptions as well as 
the available literature and has been conducted using Pink and Lehane’s (2011) grading system and 
criteria for the different levels of maturity as described in chapter 4 (see also Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3), 
which seek to evaluate networks’:  
 Members (membership, leadership and value added); 
 Finances (budget, internal/external contributions and funding); 
 Governance (access to and review of relevant materials and structures); 
 Support (Liaison with others, support base and functions), and;  
 Deliverables (events, outcomes achieved and products delivered). 
The assessment conducted using the criteria identified by Pink and Lehane shows that ASEAN-WEN 
is bordering between fragile and maturing with a score of between 11 and 14: 
 Members (assessed between fragile i.e. 2 and maturing i.e. 3): all ASEAN countries are 
already part of the network and have designated focal points. There are a number of 
agencies providing support but generally a lack of proactive leadership and clear benefits for 
proactively engaged members. Challenges include most notably the involvement of the 
appropriate agencies at the different levels, and in particular the limited involvement of 
enforcement officers.  
 Finances (assessed as fragile i.e. 2): while contributions have been considerable, funding 
relies primarily on external sources and there is a general lack of government ownership and 
investment in the initiative, with the exception of Thailand that hosts the PCU. It should be 
noted however that most countries cover some or all of their costs of participating in annual 
meetings.    
 Governance (assessed as maturing i.e. 3): there is a good amount of information available 
through the website and partners involved on the network but there is limited or inexistent 
third party review of efforts and the initiative overall. The initiative over-relies on NGO 
partners and agencies of supporting projects to conduct its business.  
 Support (2/3): ASEAN-WEN has effectively liaised with other networks and has established a 
good support base, however there is limited coordination without external support (NGOs) 
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as well as limited coordination at the national level and with other initiatives in the different 
countries.   
 Deliverables (2/3): there are a number of deliverables, including annual meetings, activities 
of partner agencies. These are generally however led by key partners to the network and not 
the network itself and are subject to external funds and external donors. Some operational 
activities take place (e.g. regional operations) subject to external support.  
The assessment of the BLO mechanism using the criteria identified by Pink and Lehane is fragile with 
a score between 10 and 13, but very close to maturing (1 point away):  
 Members (2/3): all relevant agencies appear to be involved now that a number of new and 
different agencies are now involved with the extension of the mandate to cover 
environmental crimes (and in particular wildlife crimes). There are limited data to assess if 
there is information exchange. Indications are that this exists but that it limited. Some 
interviewees however stressed they have very good cooperation and exchange of 
information.  
 Finances (2/3): the mechanism has strong support from governments. There are however 
limited projects and financial contributions to support continued activity and limited 
information on what actually happens outside of the specific projects.  
 Governance (2): there is limited access to information and data/reports on the initiative 
other than those of UNODC, and memoranda of understanding between the participating 
countries, so it is difficult to assess this. Similarly, there is limited third party review. The 
development of standard operating procedures has however initiated a more 
comprehensive review process that was previously available. It should be noted here that a 
number of reports might be available in local languages that I might have overlooked.  
 Support (2): informal enforcement cooperation is difficult to measure.  Interview data 
indicate that there are increasing exchanges of information between officers, but wildlife 
crime is a relatively new area for the BLOs. The real extent of cooperation is unknown, but 
anticipated to be moderated among the BLOs along and across the border, and limited with 
other initiatives.  
 Deliverables (2): events are subject to external funding which at the time of the interviews 
was very limited for wildlife crime. When funding is available, however a large amount of 
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training is provided. There are also no publications or reports developed outside of those 
produced by UNODC.  
Table 8.1: Assessment of level of network development for ASEAN-WEN and the BLO 
mechanism using the Pink and Lehane (2011) evaluation matrix 
 
Initiative Members Finances Governance Support Deliverables Total 
ASEAN-WEN 2/3 2 3 2/3 2/3 11-14 
BLO mechanism 2/3 2/3 2 2 2 10-13 
 
As the network evaluation matrix has not been tested to date other than for AELERT and a small 
limited number of cases (see chapter 4 and Pink and Lehane, 2015), it would be interesting to see 
how Pink and Lehane measure the above initiatives and how the initiatives measure themselves or 
how these are measured by the various supporting partners. An educated guess is that the results 
would likely be towards the lower end (e.g. 11) or similar if measured by Pink and Lehane (as they 
have conducted a number of tests using the matrix; see chapter 4 for details) and higher than the 
assessment provided here (e.g. >14) by the initiatives (as they would likely measure themselves 
more subjectively). It should be noted that in some cases the results could be in between two 
categories and I have therefore provided a range of numbers (e.g. 2/3) that gives a more realistic 
range and allows for errors or misconceptions. I have also taken a ‘hard’ approach and, where 
information is limited, given a lower score than might be the case in reality (for example for the BLO 
assessment of governance and support, given the limited information it is assessed as ‘2’ when it 
could also be a ‘2/3’). I therefore believe the result provided above is a good reflection of networks 
at the time of the interviews. 
It should be noted that the matrix does not directly measure enforcement efforts or the 
effectiveness of enforcement efforts. There are various differences between the networks but one 
of the key ones is that one is more oriented towards enforcement actions while the other is more of 
a policy body. It is therefore difficult to only use this assessment. One of the key reasons for this is 
that one network is more focused at the regional and policy level and the other is a geographically 
based network. ASEAN-WEN relates more to the realities of the political level noted previously 
(policy, awareness, coordination and some enforcement) and the BLO mechanism responds to 
operational/enforcement aspects (trust, knowing counterpart and informal cooperation within 
formal setting).  
303 
 
It is likely that, if the same analysis was conducted based on similar interviews and fieldwork 
conducted today, both initiatives would potentially increase their rating. In particular, the current 
BLOs assessment is conditioned by the limited information that was available during the fieldwork 
period about what officers actually do. This has somewhat changed or is being addressed at the time 
of writing, and would move it into the maturing criteria. For ASEAN-WEN, it is likely it would improve 
slightly, but it would probably remain as a maturing network in coming years. Much depends on the 
ongoing integration with the ASEAN experts group on CITES, which should, theoretically, further 
strengthen the network and close key gaps.   
 
Where does corruption fit in? 
Corruption is an issue that has been highlighted as one of the major problems to effectively counter 
transnational wildlife crime and participants stressed the need to tackle it to be more successful in 
combating wildlife crime (see chapter 7 for details and examples). Nonetheless participants also 
noted, as was said in chapter 7: ‘there is hope. There are lots of very good officers and they are 
increasingly frustrated. There are also lots of people willing to help’ (Interview with F). 
Theoretically, promoting multi-agency cooperation can be seen as a way to reduce or mitigate 
opportunities for corruption. As explained by See in chapter 7, one of the more promising initiatives 
was to use this cooperation to create more transparency: 
It is a very difficult and sensitive question to answer … the approach that we are using to 
encourage … to mitigate corruption is to bring them into the open … in the way to try to 
make them work as a team … through the transparency approach as a team and amongst 
themselves and with their counterparts across the borders … to try to mitigate the 
opportunity for some officers to get the benefits unofficially ... Once we can promote clearer 
cooperation procedures, that is one way to mitigate corruption (Interview with See) 
It would however make sense to add corruption (or anti-corruption efforts) as an indicator of the 
effectiveness of efforts as limited progress will be achieved without tackling the corruption 
associated with the illegal wildlife trade.  
As highlighted in chapter 7, corruption is no longer ‘the elephant in the room’ in the wildlife arena. 
In 2017 (subsequent to the fieldwork reported in this thesis), the Conference of the Parties to CITES 
unanimously adopted Resolution Conf. 17.6 on Prohibiting, preventing, detecting and countering 
corruption, which facilitates activities conducted in violation of the Convention, which acknowledges 
the dangers of corruption and calls for CITES Parties, i.e. 183 member states (182 plus the European 
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Union at the time of writing) to adopt measures to address corruption related to wildlife crime, 
including specifically recommending that regional and sub-regional networks include anti-corruption 
efforts into their activities. This is, by all accounts, a monumental step in the recognition of the 
problem of corruption in the illegal wildlife trade and will help shape future responses. However, it 
will still need to be put into effective operation. 
 
8.6 Concluding remarks 
As noted above, there are different layers of effectiveness: subnational (e.g. provincial), national, 
cross-border, regional and international. All should be measured as they are important to evaluate 
the effectiveness of networks and in particular of the initiatives explored here.  
I have suggested a mixture of indicators is needed and attempted to measure the effectiveness of 
the different initiatives by type (informational, enforcement or harmonization), focus (commodity 
based, geographically based or discipline based - or a hybrid), development (fragile, well established 
or on the way) and levels of agency engagement. I will now evaluate their effectiveness based on the 
different (applicable) layers noted above and trying to take into account other aspects that are more 
difficult to measure – or unmeasurable – such as trust, generation of informal cooperation (or 
perceived informal cooperation), increase in political will and coordination and overall regional 
support. These last will be judged through participants’ views.  
This is explored as a way to gauge the influence of the activities in the different levels and can be 
related to their overall effectiveness.  
The table below provides an overview. It starts with a summary of the various ways that could be 
used to evaluate network effectiveness that have been highlighted in earlier sections and continues 
with an evaluation of the potential influence of the initiatives at the different levels or layers of 
effectiveness based on the various levels of cooperation and challenges identified by participants 
interviewed as explored in earlier chapters (see in particular chapters  4, 6 and 7).  
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 Table 8.2: Evaluating ASEAN-WEN and the BLO mechanism, a multi-pronged approach 
 
 ASEAN-WEN BLOs Rationale 
Type of 
initiative and 
level 
 Informational (hybrid with 
enforcement) working at 
political/regional level 
 Enforcement at 
ground level 
 Identification based on 
key purposes of networks 
identified by Slaughter 
(2004) and Pink and Bartel 
(2015). See above and 
chapter 4.  
Focus  Commodity based (wildlife)  Geographical (cross-
border – combating 
illicit trade in wildlife 
and other crimes 
across borders) 
 Type of network based 
on Pink and Bartel’s (2015) 
network categorisation.  
See above and chapter 4. 
Agency 
engagement 
 Aware and involved (more at 
political/policy level) 
 Aware and involved 
(more at 
practical/ground level) 
 Identification based on 
Pink’s (2015) five phases of 
agency involvement and 
engagement with 
networks, which relates to 
the levels of activity and 
therefore effectiveness. 
See above and chapter 4. 
Network 
evaluation 
matrix 
 Border between fragile and 
maturity (score of 11-14) 
 Fragile (score of  10-
13) but close to 
maturity (14) 
 Identification based on 
Pink and Lehanne’s (2011) 
matrix criteria and 
interviews conducted. See 
above and chapter 4. 
Influence at 
subnational 
(provincial) 
level 
 Limited known impact  Increased 
awareness of 
transnational crime 
and in particular 
wildlife crime 
 Increased 
involvement of the 
enforcement 
community in efforts 
to combat wildlife 
crime at provincial and 
border levels 
 Identification based on 
layers of effectiveness 
identified above, available 
literature and perceptions 
of participants interviewed. 
See above and chapters 4, 
6 and 7. 
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 ASEAN-WEN BLOs Rationale 
Influence at 
national level 
 Strengthening multiagency 
cooperation through the creation 
of national networks or 
multiagency task forces. However, 
in some cases these are 
established only ‘on paper’ or not 
operational or actively used 
 Measurable increase in seizures 
in the different countries since the 
network was established 
(particularly in recent years), but 
difficult to establish if this is a 
result of network activities, of 
better monitoring generated by 
the network, or simple 
coincidence. 
 Increase awareness 
and importance of 
combating wildlife 
crime at national level 
 
 Identification based on 
layers of effectiveness 
identified above, available 
literature and perceptions 
of participants interviewed. 
See above and chapters 4, 
6 and 7. 
Influence at 
cross-border 
level 
 Limited influence except during 
targeted operations/activities.  
 Strengthening 
multiagency 
cooperation along and 
across borders 
 Increase 
coordination, informal 
information and 
intelligence exchange 
and cooperation along 
and across borders  
 Contributing to 
development of trust 
among officers at 
border areas 
 Identification based on 
layers of effectiveness 
identified above, available 
literature and perceptions 
of participants interviewed. 
See above and chapters 4, 
6 and 7. 
Influence at 
regional level 
 Increased coordination of 
activities and  exchange of 
information 
 Raised awareness and political 
will/coordination to combat 
wildlife crime 
 Contributing to development of 
networks at regional level and to 
link enforcement officers of 
different countries 
 Unclear if informal 
exchange of 
information from 
border offices has 
contributed to 
regional efforts 
 Identification based on 
layers of effectiveness 
identified above, available 
literature and perceptions 
of participants interviewed. 
See above and chapters 4, 
6 and 7. 
Influence at 
international 
level 
 Increased awareness of 
networks and important role of 
networks to combat wildlife crime 
 Limited influence   Identification based on 
layers of effectiveness 
identified above and based 
on available data and 
perceptions of participants 
interviewed. See also 
chapter 4. 
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Are border and regional law-enforcement initiatives, such as the BLO mechanism and ASEAN-WEN, 
effective in combating transnational organized wildlife crime? 
Overall, each initiative is more effective than the other based on their respective network type and 
focus areas and have more limited influence in other spheres. One cannot however be expected to 
rank them against one another, as they are different creatures in nature and operate at different 
levels. 
ASEAN-WEN has clearly more of an influence at the regional and policy level and a more limited 
influence on enforcement, albeit the network has been involved in a number of successful 
operations. Its role however is more suited towards coordination, cooperation, and the political and 
policy spheres. One of its benefits is that it is in a position to provide guidance and strategic direction 
to its member states. Conversely, the BLOs have had little influence at regional and international 
level as their focus is more operational and limited to specific geographic locations. The overall trend, 
however, is clearly that both initiatives have had a positive influence and resulted in increased 
attention and focus given to combating wildlife crime, and cooperation to bring the criminals 
involved to justice.  
In terms of enforcement, the BLO mechanism is more oriented towards facilitating effective 
enforcement across borders as direct contacts between police are the backbone of police 
cooperation. They also encourage trust and informal cooperation (at least theoretically, because 
there are limited data to suggest there is active sharing of information other than the perceptions of 
officers interviewed and a few success cases). Conversely, ASEAN-WEN may be far too political to be 
an effective operational body.  
It is, however, worth highlighting that the overall objective of ASEAN-WEN is to facilitate 
enforcement cooperation in the region. It is not a regional enforcement body with powers of 
investigation, seizure or arrest. Rather, it provides a platform with the aim of facilitating cooperation 
that can – and ideally should – generate cooperation between its enforcement officers.  It also plays 
an important role in facilitating increased collaboration and coordination by promoting cohesion in 
the activities of their member states. Their involvement tends to be through facilitating cooperation 
or encouraging their members to participate in specific enforcement operations/activities. In reality, 
they are providing an essential platform to facilitate and encourage enforcement cooperation, but 
they have limited involvement in enforcement per se. Actual enforcement happens in the field and is 
conducted by enforcement officers, and can be facilitated or encouraged by other levels. Moreover, 
ASEAN-WEN is currently led by CITES Management Authorities, which are political and regulatory 
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bodies and in most cases, not enforcement bodies. If within the network there is good coordination 
and cooperation at the national level between management and enforcement authorities there will 
undoubtedly be some form of enforcement cooperation, but to date intelligence exchange through 
the network has been limited. Instead, what the network has facilitated is that enforcement 
agencies make contacts with their counterparts and develop relationships with them, which is also 
an essential aspect to encourage international cooperation between different countries. If the 
network wanted to be more operationally focused, it should change its focus and focal points, and 
be led by enforcement officers. 
A question that Guille (2010, 263) asked about Europol appears to be very relevant and valid for 
ASEAN-WEN. She suggested ‘Europol is far too political’ and that it should explore whether it wanted 
to be a political or an operational body: ‘an instrument of cooperation for police forces or whether it 
should represent the Member States along with their own political priorities’. ASEAN-WEN member 
states should probably ask themselves the same question. Should it be an operational body or 
should it focus at the political level and use existing regional enforcement bodies for operational 
activities? The way it was conceived envisaged an operational role for the network, but this has had 
a very limited effect to date outside of operations coordinated by supporting partners and NGOs. It 
is therefore more of a political body in reality and should perhaps focus more on strengthening its 
links with existing regional enforcement bodies.  In order to promote more effective enforcement 
cooperation, ASEAN-WEN might be linked more closely with regional bodies such as ASEANAPOL, 
the INTERPOL Regional Bureaus or the WCO RILO network, which can serve as practical operational 
platforms for enforcement activities and, at the global level, with the INTERPOL Wildlife Crime 
Working Group. The problem is that the network itself appears to be somewhat pushed into an 
operational capacity by supporting agencies and donors and has not had the time, at the time of the 
interviews, to adapt and decide what it wants to be271, nor any real independent analysis and 
assessment of what it can, should and could do.  
Major gaps for both initiatives appear to be sustainability and accountability as well as the lack of 
alignment with ongoing processes. Concerning ASEAN-WEN, while it has generated a vast 
momentum, has been included in countless declarations, and is often mentioned as the example to 
follow, it has failed at the time of the interviews to generate the necessary government ownership 
                                                 
271 This is now being address with the integration of ASEAN-WEN into the ASEAN Experts Group on CITES and 
Wildlife Enforcement, which will help address a number of the limitations of the network, in terms of 
ownership and its strategic direction. It will also associate it more closely with the ASEAN Senior Officers 
Meetings on Transnational Crime (SOMTC), which will ensure efforts to combat wildlife crime are included in 
the agenda of countries as part of their agenda to combat transnational crimes. The issue of whether it should 
be involved or not in enforcement directly should however also be addressed. 
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that the network requires to be sustainable and not reliant on external funds and assistance. At the 
time of the interviews, only one country (the host country to the PCU) had provided funds for the 
coordination office and very limited secondments had been assigned by member countries. While a 
number of attempts were made to secure sustainability, these were not successful, partly as a result 
of the overreliance on donor and NGO support. While such support was necessary and indeed 
essential to contribute to the development of the network, it was all too much and done too quickly 
without allowing for sufficient time for governments to develop and commit more vigorously to it272.  
This is still the case, but most recent developments indicate ASEAN-WEN is being integrated into the 
ASEAN Experts Group on CITES and Wildlife Enforcement (under development at the time of writing) 
which will (theoretically) give it a stronger institutional backing from governments in the region and 
contribute towards addressing its major sustainability gaps (if it does not result in its disbanding). 
The BLO mechanism is slightly different, as the supporting project had limited funds for activities and 
was much smaller in scale. The result was that there was increased government ownership of the 
process, but much more limited engagement and activity overall. As noted earlier, some offices were 
also not used or abandoned which is also a problem to take into account.  
Chiefly, the initiatives are not linked among themselves and, noting the challenges with different 
levels of cooperation as described in chapter 4, they should be. The BLOs in particular should 
attempt to establish links at the national level with the national WENs (or equivalent structures) and 
their respective focal points (where they exist) and could serve as an operational border branch for 
the network. An interesting case is that of Cambodia, the only country at the time that had an 
operational national task force for the network (Wildlife Rapid Response Team supported by NGO 
partners), albeit the members of the taskforce had limited involvement with the network as noted in 
their interviews (see chapter 7). This type of operational structure at the national level could be 
encouraged and serve as an example for others, noting that it is (or was at the time) fully 
coordinated and funded by an NGO – and therefore has similar sustainability problems as those 
emphasized above. A further problem is that in some cases the offices in the field that could 
(theoretically) be part of the networks were not aware about the networks themselves or that they 
were part of an initiative as there was often insufficient cooperation and information at the national 
level. This highlights the point noted above that a network is only as strong as its individual member 
states. In particular for ASEAN-WEN, it should be used more prominently as a platform to 
                                                 
272 While it was ‘too much’ and ‘too quick’, it should also be emphasized that the opposite option (too little 
and too slowly) was probably not a real option at the time. ASEAN-WEN was a key development in the regional 
and significantly contributed to efforts to increase the attention and focus to wildlife crime in the region. If this 
had not been pushed as it was, the likely result was that much less attention would be given to wildlife crime 
today.  
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communicate relevant issues to its member states and monitors progress, to further align the 
regional response and assist their member states to implement activities or decisions taken by 
relevant international processes (e.g. CITES decisions and resolutions).  
 
Some final thoughts 
Overall, by all assessments both initiatives have different degrees of effectiveness and each is more 
effective on their specific areas of focus and relatively ineffective for other purposes. The initiatives 
have increased cooperation both at the borders and at the regional level of relevant stakeholders to 
raise the profile of wildlife crime, as well as the need to combat it. That by itself makes them 
relatively effective as this is an area that needed urgent attention at the time and indeed continues 
to require it.  
As ASEAN-WEN stands, it is more of a wildlife network than a wildlife enforcement network, but it is 
a useful and constructive platform that may provide the countries in the region with increased 
possibilities to cooperate, or at a bare minimum, a regional platform to discuss issues. The BLOs are 
more of an operationally focused mechanism to facilitate cooperation and promote enforcement.  
Focusing efforts at the border level and at the national and regional levels are both essential. 
Emphasis should, however, be placed on closing the gap between the national and the field levels. 
They should, probably, not attempt to work outside their levels and link with one another to benefit 
from their respective strengths. By working together and creating a platform for cooperation, be at a 
higher political level or on the ground, organizations and individuals learn to understand the issues, 
the different organizations involved, and who they should trust (or not). This is facilitated through 
conferences, training events, operations, activities and a range of other actions that both initiatives 
have been involved in and will accelerate the rate of learning of officers involved as well as improve 
the overall response.  
I have argued that even if they are not as effective as intended they have an important role to play 
at their respective levels though not necessarily at other levels. They should also explore how to 
work together by identifying and agreeing who might be better placed to deliver certain activities, 
and how to avoid duplication and channel resources and financial support more effectively to align 
their efforts, each within its specific area of focus (e.g. regional and political versus field and 
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operational). Increased cooperation amongst them would undoubtedly result in increased actions at 
all levels of the enforcement chain273. 
Finally, It should be noted that, while the research focuses primarily on enforcement or law 
enforcement efforts to combat wildlife crime and on networks, an issue to keep in mind is that 
responding to organized crime in a ‘traditional way’, i.e. treating it as a criminal justice or security 
issue requiring strengthened cross-border and domestic law-enforcement, border control, and 
intelligence-gathering capacity (Shaw and Reitano, 2013, 21) is not the ultimate solution to the 
effective countering of transnational organized crime in general, and the illegal wildlife trade in 
particular. As a paper reviewing the evolution of transnational organized crime in Africa, published 
by the Institute for Security Studies, highlights: 
It is clear from the story of organised crime’s evolution across the continent that fighting this 
phenomenon can no longer be understood in terms of curbing the illicit trade in counterfeit 
goods, drugs, weapons and people – if that were not challenge enough. Given the almost 
continent-wide interdependence of organised crime and corruption at the highest levels, and 
the degree of social entrenchment and identity it has within communities, addressing 
organised crime … also involve[s] preventing and reversing the criminalisation of 
governments and providing sustainable economic alternatives for its citizens (Shaw and 
Reitano, 2013, 21). 
Given that wildlife crime is rapidly consuming the world’s wildlife and bringing certain species one 
step closer to extinction, a swift law enforcement response is imperative to (attempt to) address or 
reduce the problem in the short and medium term. Combating the illegal wildlife trade will however 
not be fully successful without taking into consideration other strategies that complement law 
enforcement efforts. These complementary strategies might include thinking about educational and 
developmental  crime prevention, as well as potential situational crime prevention strategies or 
programmes, for example, against opportunistic poachers274. In order to put in place effective 
educational, developmental and situational measures, it is necessary to know more about wildlife 
                                                 
273 Increased engagement with judges and prosecutors, however, needs to continue. A further step that should 
be taken is ensuring that countries are equipped with the appropriate tools and that they use modern 
investigative techniques such as those used to counter other transnational crimes, to combat the illegal 
wildlife trade. This is essential to move beyond seizures and ensure follow-up investigations and prosecutions, 
especially targeted at the masterminds behind the illegal wildlife trade, when organized groups or larger 
organized criminal networks are involved. This is particularly important when larger organized criminal groups 
are involved (see generally chapter 4) 
274 As Challender and MacMillan (2014) note, Illegal trade is more than an enforcement problem. Homel (2005, 
2) suggests, ‘Developmental prevention involves the organized provision of resources in some fashion … to 
forestall the later development of crime or other problems’. Pires and Clarke (2012, 125) note that ‘[a] better 
understanding of the illegal trade in parrots might considerably assist thinking about prevention because, 
consistent with the crime-specific premises of situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1980), the measures 
needed for dealing with opportunistic poaching are likely to be different from those for organized poaching.’ 
See also Pires, 2012; Levi and Maguire, 2004. 
312 
 
crime itself and about those who engage in it, so that both measures can be targeted and also 
outcomes can be measured. Currently, there is insufficient knowledge about the populations of 
targeted wildlife to be able clearly to measure outcomes of the mix of strategies selected. With 
regards to the initiatives, the fragility or maturity of the networks could be an indicator of how able 
they are to assist with – or facilitate – preventive strategies. 
 
8.7 Ideas for future engagement 
Lastly, I would like to suggest some potential ideas for future engagement and academic research as 
well as some pracademic thoughts on a potential strategy to strengthen regional efforts to combat 
wildlife crime.  
As highlighted throughout the thesis, there is insufficient research on the illegal wildlife trade, and in 
particular on the levels of organization of criminal networks involved and the links between different 
transnational crimes explored in this thesis. While this is starting to change, additional research on 
this issue would be extremely beneficial and should be conducted.  
Similar research on the initiatives studied here would contribute to their further development and 
should be considered. Additional research on other existing networks would greatly contribute to 
being able to analyse the effectiveness of similar efforts to combat wildlife crime across the globe 
and would be extremely beneficial to both academia and a broad range of governments and 
organizations worldwide.  
Moreover, research exploring the operational versus policy nexus, and in particular on networks, 
could be extremely beneficial as there are growing efforts and funds devoted to combating wildlife 
crime and to networks. Research could be conducted on how to close the gap between policy and 
enforcement levels as the empirical research conducted here and a number of authors have 
indicated these areas do not necessarily work well together. International practices (regional 
bodies/networks) are increasingly geared towards bridging this gap and making regional networks 
more and more operational, particularly through regional enforcement bodies such as those 
provided by INTERPOL or WCO but also the growing operational approach by regional enforcement 
bodies such as Europol.  
The thesis provides a detailed assessment of the perceptions of those involved in efforts to combat 
wildlife crime. A more specific exploration of the dynamics and operation of the illegal wildlife trade 
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and the modus operandi of transnational wildlife criminals would be very valuable, as well as an 
exploration of weak points or vulnerabilities in the ‘commissioning’ of the crimes (e.g. Edwards, 2016) 
to research the importance of crime ‘promoters’ in the criminal chain and weak points in trafficking 
in order to be able to better understand the criminal dynamics and be able to anticipate and provide 
a more targeted response. Such research could be conducted, for example, by conducting separate 
and specific research focused on observations of border areas or wildlife markets, or through 
interviewing perpetrators of wildlife crimes which was not possible to do as part of this thesis (see 
chapter 5). In time, additional records and information (e.g. court records, annual illegal trade 
reports submitted to CITES, additional World Wildlife Crime reports etc.) will be available and will 
also facilitate this task considerably. In particular, such information could enable more research into 
organized crime or the organization of transnational organized wildlife crime from different 
analytical perspectives or ‘an argument over what constitutes the substantial relations of connection 
that are ‘contingently-necessary’ for the commission of serious crimes’ (Edwards and Levi, 2008, 
383). It could also allow for a more holistic evaluation of the initiatives or regulatory organizations 
more closely linked to how the phenomenon of transnational wildlife crime is organized by 
understanding the specific context of wildlife crime in particular countries or regions (see Edwards 
and Sheptycki, 2009). In addition, as noted in the section above, the thesis focuses primarily on 
enforcement and law enforcement responses to combat wildlife crime. Similar research exploring 
alternative or preventive responses to organized crime (e.g. Levi and Maguire, 2004; Challender and 
MacMillan, 2014; Pires and Clarke, 2012) and potentially the role of networks in alternative 
responses would be an interesting research project.  
As noted in earlier sections (see 8.1 above), it was not possible to undertake an outcome evaluation 
and to measure the impact of the initiatives in this thesis. The possibilities and desirability of 
targeted outcome evaluation research strategies (e.g. Pawson and Tilley, 1997, 2004) could however 
be explored in the future involving a more detailed analysis of the specific mechanisms and context 
of particular border areas or hotspots for illicit trafficking of wildlife. Understanding the specific 
context and mechanisms of illicit trade at key border areas would be extremely useful and beneficial 
to better understand how the efforts under specific activities or initiatives may have a direct effect 
on the illegal trade. As Pawson and Tilley (2004, 2) state, instead of asking ‘what works?’ or ‘[d]oes 
this program work?’, one should examine ‘[w]hat works for whom in what circumstances and in 
what respects, and how?’ (2004, 2). While this was not possible, for reasons noted in earlier 
chapters (see Chapter 5), it might be worth pursuing separately. It should be noted however that 
conducting such research for wildlife crime at the regional context might bring a number of 
additional challenges, as the mechanism and context for the illicit wildlife trade will vary from 
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species to species and from one location to another. For example, it will likely be significantly 
different depending on whether the illicit trade involves tiger parts, rhino horn, pangolin scales, 
ivory, turtles or lizards, and from one location to another as the trade routes would be different for 
each species (see chapter 4) and constantly evolve and shift to adapt to increased law enforcement 
response or awareness in a particular border point or in a particular species. It might be useful to 
focus for example on a small number of BLO offices instead of the over 70 offices that exist (UNODC, 
2015), or on specific airports or seaports for major known trans- or inter-continental trafficking 
routes.  
Finally, Pink and Lehane suggest a ‘dialogue’ (2011, 13-14) to further enhance efforts to measure the 
effectiveness of networks and regional efforts based on their evaluation matrix. A targeted approach 
to enhance regional law-enforcement efforts and conduct regional reviews and analysis of efforts 
and networks to combat transnational (wildlife) crime is essential to guide future efforts and 
initiatives. It might be worth exploring how to further develop the network evaluation matrix into a 
framework to measure the effectiveness of networks at regional level. This could be done based on 
the network evaluation matrix taking into account the findings of this thesis. Assuming such a tool 
can be developed, research could be conducted on how to develop a comprehensive regional or 
global strategy to strengthen networks and cooperation at the regional and global level. This could 
form a basis to analyse regional efforts and provide specific and targeted recommendations for 
strengthening networks at the regional level in all regions but examining all the relevant levels upon 
which the efforts of the various players involved (governments, IGOs, NGOs, and donors) could be 
focused. It should include: 
1. National level analysis of the (multiagency) response and capacity with a focus on 
strengthening monitoring and increasing cooperation with relevant players and identifying 
capacity building gaps and needs275; 
2. Development of targeted national strategies to address the needs identified during the 
national analysis/assessment.  
3. Regional level assessment276 of networks, initiatives or platforms, in particular ensuring links 
between its member countries and with relevant enforcement bodies, partners, 
organizations and individuals in the different countries, as well as exploring support that 
might be available 
                                                 
275 Among others, existing tools such as the ICCWC wildlife and forest crime analytic toolkit or the ICCWC 
indicator framework for combating wildlife crime could be used here as part of the assessment.  
276 Using the proposed framework to measure the effectiveness of networks that could be developed. 
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4. Recommendations on strategic needs at the different levels taking into account the different 
layers identified during the research and implementation of targeted capacity building 
programmes to strengthen networks  
5. Development of targeted regional strategies to address the needs identified.  
6. Revision of the proposed framework to measure the effectiveness of networks.  
As noted in earlier sections, the initiatives should be more closely linked to international processes 
(e.g. assist their member states to implement CITES decisions and resolutions or commitments 
under for example international declarations) and be used as a platform to assist their member 
states to implement relevant resolutions and decisions. Recent developments indicate that this has 
already started to change as seen in the recent CITES CoP17 and in particular the 2nd global meeting 
of the wildlife enforcement networks (ICCWC, 2016) where networks from across the world explored 
potential steps to increase cooperation and coordination. In particular, the potential development of 
guidelines for the development of new networks and strengthening of existing networks and the 
next steps identified during the meeting might provide a much needed advice and guidance on what 
to do (or not to do) when establishing or strengthening networks. This would also inevitably 
contribute towards their effectiveness and facilitate further understanding of networks. All role 
players involved with networks (networks themselves, supporting partners (government, IGOs, 
NGOs, donor agencies and academia) should actively participate in this process. The assessment 
should however ensure it takes into consideration the differences between the different levels of 
international cooperation (see chapter 4 and above) and the findings of this thesis. 
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